Michael Ayeh v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Dec 06 2017, 10:28 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
CLERK
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
precedent or cited before any court except for the and Tax Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. Burns Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Chandra K. Hein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael Ayeh, December 6, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
49A05-1706-CR-1312
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Linda E. Brown,
Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Trial Court Cause No. 49G10-1611-
CM-43018
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Michael Ayeh (Ayeh), appeals his conviction for criminal
trespass, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(2).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Ayeh presents a single issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the State
presented evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his criminal trespass
conviction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] In 2016, Ayeh and Vida Odai (Odai) had been divorced for about five years.
From the marriage, the parties had three children—aged seventeen, thirteen,
and eleven respectively. All three children lived at Odai’s house, and Odai’s
name was on the house’s mortgage. Ayeh resided in a shelter. On October 13,
2016, the parties’ thirteen-year-old daughter got injured and was taken to the
emergency room. Ayeh was notified of his child’s injury so he also went to the
hospital. At the hospital, the parties’ injured daughter stated, “Mommy, I
know that Daddy is not supposed to stay with us, but I need Daddy right now.”
(Tr. p. 7). Odai agreed, stating, “[Y]our Dad will stay [here] for two (2) weeks
for you to get better, and after that he has to move; and I don’t want you to be
stressed about that.” (Tr. p. 8). According to Odai, Ayeh’s two-week invitation
at her house expired on the morning of November 1, 2016. That morning,
Ayeh informed Odai that he wanted to go the shelter to pick up his mail. On
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the drive to the shelter, Odai told Ayeh that he was not allowed to return to her
residence that day. After dropping Ayeh off at the shelter, Ayeh called Odai on
her way home. Odai again told Ayeh that he was not allowed to go back to her
house, and she expressed to Ayeh that she would mail him his backpack that he
had left behind. Later that day, Ayeh showed up at Odai’s house and Odai told
Ayeh that he needed to leave, but Ayeh refused. Ultimately, Odai called the
police. When Officer Thomas Bergmann (Officer Bergmann) of the
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department arrived, he also told Ayeh several
times that he needed to leave Odai’s residence. Ayeh refused, became irate,
and Officer Bergman arrested Ayeh.
[5] On December 16, 2016, the State filed an Information, charging Ayeh with two
Counts of criminal trespass, Class A misdemeanors. On June 6, 2017, a bench
trial was conducted. At the close of the evidence, the trial court found Ayeh
guilty as charged. The same day, the trial court sentenced Ayeh to 365 days in
Marion County Jail. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court vacated
Ayeh’s second Count of criminal trespass.
[6] Ayeh now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[7] Ayeh contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his
conviction of criminal trespass. Our standard of review on a claim of
insufficient evidence is well settled: For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we
look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the
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judgement. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess
the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm the
conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind.
2017).
[8] The offense of criminal trespass is governed by Indiana Code section 35-43-2-2,
which provides, in relevant part, that “(a) A person who: . . . (2) not having a
contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave
the real property of another person after having been asked to leave by the other
person or that person’s agent . . . commits criminal trespass, a Class A
misdemeanor.” Lack of a contractual interest in the property is a material
element that the State must prove to convict a person of criminal trespass.
Woods v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Thus, to convict
Ayeh of Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass, the State needed to prove that
Ayeh: (1) did not have a contractual interest in Odai’s property and (2)
knowingly or intentionally refused to leave Odai’s property (3) after having
been asked to leave by Odai.
[9] While Ayeh agrees that Odai had allowed him to stay at her house until
November 1, 2016, he argues that because “there was not a stated time” as to
when he was required to leave Odai’s house, he believed “he could stay there
the entire day.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 9). Accordingly, Ayeh maintains that he
had a “reasonable belief that he had a contractual interest in being on [Odai’s]
property on November 1.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 10).
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[10] The term “‘contractual interest,’ as it is used in the criminal trespass statute,
refers to the right to be present on another’s property, arising out of an
agreement between at least two parties that creates an obligation to do or not to
do a particular thing.” Taylor v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005), trans. denied. “The State is not required to disprove every conceivable
contractual interest the defendant might have had in the property.” Id.[11] Here, the record shows that there was probative evidence from which the fact-
finder could have concluded that Ayeh did not have a contractual interest in the
property of Odai. The record demonstrates that pursuant to the terms of Odai’s
and Ayeh’s agreement, Ayeh’s contractual interest was limited to two weeks.
Specifically, the record shows that Odai’s invitation expired on the morning of
November 1, 2016, when Odai expressed to Ayeh that he was not allowed to
return to her residence. Without Odai’s consent, Ayeh returned to Odai’s
residence. Ayeh refused to leave when he was asked to leave multiple times by
Odai. Eventually, Odai called the police. Acting as Odai’s agent, Officer
Bergmann also instructed Ayeh to leave Odai’s residence numerous times, but
Ayeh refused. Here, the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that
Ayeh’s limited contractual interest in Odai’s premises had been terminated
prior to his arrest, and based upon this evidence, the fact-finder could
reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ayeh committed the
offense of criminal trespass.
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CONCLUSION
[12] For the reasons stated, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain
Ayeh’s Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass conviction.
[13] Affirmed.
[14] Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur
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