Brian Keil v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Dec 06 2017, 10:10 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Lori S. James Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Beaver & Beaver, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Rensselaer, Indiana
Kelly A. Loy
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Brian Keil, December 6, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
56A05-1612-CR-2930
v. Appeal from the Newton Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Daniel J. Molter,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
56D01-1605-F5-13
Brown, Judge.
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[1] Brian Keil appeals his convictions for two counts of unlawful possession of a
syringe with a prior conviction, one as a level 5 felony and the other as a level 6
felony, and two counts of possession of paraphernalia as class C misdemeanors.
Keil raises three issues which we revise and restate as:
I. Whether the trial court erred in not dismissing a juror;
II. Whether the court erred in admitting a recording taken
from a law enforcement officer’s body camera; and
III. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his
convictions.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On May 3, 2016, Deputy David Rowe of the Newton County Sheriff’s Office
stopped at a convenience store in Newton County, Indiana, and went inside to
talk to the clerk. Keil and Samuel Bass entered the store, Deputy Rowe
immediately noticed that they appeared to be nodding as they were walking
around and their eyes were glazed, and he believed they were under the
influence of heroin. Deputy Rowe exited the store and observed a vehicle
parked in a parking space near his fully-marked police vehicle and started to run
the license plate. Bass exited the store and entered the driver’s seat of the
vehicle, Deputy Rowe asked Bass if he could speak with him, and Bass agreed.
[3] Deputy Rowe learned from the license plate check that the vehicle belonged to
Bass and asked Bass for consent to search the vehicle. Keil then told Bass
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“don’t let him search your car,” and Bass did not give consent to search.
Transcript at 23. Deputy Rowe radioed New County dispatch and requested a
K-9 officer for a search, and Deputy Sheriff Brian Runyon responded and
conducted a free air sniff of Bass’s vehicle. The dog alerted to the passenger
side, and Bass told Deputy Rowe that there was a needle in the center console
and that he had removed it from the passenger side door when he saw Deputy
Rowe’s police vehicle and placed it in the center console so that Deputy Rowe
would not see it in plain view through the window. Bass stated that he had an
addiction and that he and Keil had traveled to a small town in Illinois,
purchased twenty dollars worth of heroin, and shared or used the heroin. Bass
stated that he placed his syringe in the trash at the dealer’s house and that the
syringe in the center console belonged to Keil. Detective Rowe advised Keil of
his Miranda rights and questioned him, and Keil “asked if there was any way to
work it off.” Id. at 26. Keil was searched, and a cigarette lighter and a black
shoelace which had been tied into a loop at one end were discovered on Keil’s
person. A syringe, a spoon, and a small piece of packaging or baggie that was
knotted were recovered from the center console of Bass’s vehicle.
[4] The State charged Keil with: Count I, unlawful possession of syringe while
having a prior conviction as a level 5 felony; Count II, possession of
paraphernalia, a spoon, as a class C misdemeanor; Count III, unlawful
possession of syringe as a level 6 felony; and Count IV, possession of
paraphernalia, a shoelace, as a class C misdemeanor. At Keil’s jury trial,
Deputy Rowe testified regarding his experience in dealing with heroin, that
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heroin is a depressant that causes the user to “want to nod out,” and that it
causes one “to have slurred speech, kinda lethargic type, so it’s pretty much
you’re almost walking around sleeping if you will, it causes your eyes to be
heavy.” Id. at 16. He testified that there are several methods of introducing
heroin into one’s body including using a hypodermic needle, that heroin comes
in a powder or types of a powder rock form, a user will convert the powder to a
form by placing the powder and water or a liquid base in a spoon and heating it
using a lighter, the user will use a needle to extract the liquid from the spoon,
and then, in order for the user’s veins to protrude, the user will commonly use a
shoelace to tie off so the person can have a good injection site and inject the
heroin.
[5] When asked what “any way to work it off” meant, Deputy Rowe testified “drug
users often know if they have information that we need,” “we have to rely upon
users a lot for intelligence and to understand the knowhow of what’s going on
in the drug world,” “that simply means that he’s asking if there’s a way for him
to work it off,” and “[t]hat could be a threshold of things from just giving me
intelligence to making purchases for me or whatever to make the charge go
away or receive leniency from the prosecutor.” Id. at 26. When asked if, based
on his training and experience, the lighter and the shoelace were used to inject
heroin, Deputy Rowe answered “[y]es, they were,” and when asked if he found
“it uncommon for someone to carry a random shoelace that’s been knotted at
one end around in their pocket,” he answered affirmatively. Id. at 28. With
respect to the small piece of packaging or baggie recovered from the center
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console of Bass’s vehicle, he stated that “[m]ost oftentimes when you buy a
drug, especially in powder form, they are going to twist it and they are going to
make a small knot at the end to keep it inside the baggie” and “oftentimes when
we find pieces of a baggie like that on a user, it’s from them pulling it off, that
knot, to open up the bag for usage.” Id. Deputy Rowe also indicated that the
spoon “wasn’t clean” and “was a used spoon.” Id. at 29. Before the State
presented Bass’s testimony, a juror informed the court that she knew Bass, the
court questioned the juror outside the presence of the other jurors, and the juror
was not removed from the jury. The court admitted into evidence a portion of
a recording taken from Deputy Rowe’s body camera.
[6] The jury found Keil guilty as charged under Counts II, III, and IV, and
afterwards Keil pled guilty to Count I. The court sentenced Keil to five years
on Count I, sixty days on Count II, eighteen months on Count III, and sixty
days on Count IV, to be served concurrently for an aggregate term of five years.
It recommended purposeful incarceration and advised Keil that upon successful
completion of a therapeutic community program, it may consider sentence
modification.
Discussion
I.
[7] The first issue is whether the trial court erred in not sua sponte dismissing a juror.
During Keil’s trial, Juror No. 1 told the court that she knew Bass, and the court
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excused the remaining members of the jury. The following exchange then
occurred:
The Court: We’re going to put you under the hot lights here.
You’ll need to come over here and sit by the mic because we
have to record your testimony. Let the record reflect that . . .
Juror No. 1, has indicated she is personally acquainted with Sam
Bass, the next witness called by the State of Indiana. Would you
share with us your acquaintance?
Juror No. 1: [Bass] was a student in my class a number of years
ago. I don’t know how long ago that was and I have seen him at
least once after that just to catch up. I ran into him at a gas
station and asked how things were going. And with his name
coming up, I thought it’s not going to make any difference
because he’s not involved but he’s actually here.
The Court: Just the fact that you’re acquainted doesn’t mean
anything.
Juror No. 1: Okay. I just wanted to make sure that everybody
knew that.
The Court: You haven’t had an experience or something that
would keep you from listening?
Juror No. 1: No, no. I did notice the last time I saw him that he
had lost an awful lot of weight and I was suspicious as to what he
might have been up to. And he said he was getting himself in
shape and getting back on track and I went okay.
The Court: Just the fact that you know him –
Juror No. 1: That’s fine. I just didn’t want to continue under
pretense that mattered.
[Prosecutor]: I’m satisfied.
The Court: Any questions?
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[Defense Counsel]: No questions, Your Honor.
The Court: It’s fine. It’s a small county; I guess you are bound
to know people.
Transcript at 45.
[8] Keil asserts that he was unfairly prejudiced because the court did not dismiss
Juror No. 1, that the court did not make sure that Juror No. 1 was able to
remain impartial, that Juror No. 1’s suspicion shows that the juror was not
impartial, and that fundamental error occurred. The State responds that Keil
did not request that Juror No. 1 be replaced with an alternate, that regardless
there is little evidence showing a relationship between Juror No. 1 and Bass or
suggesting any partiality, and that at most Juror No. 1 had a casual encounter
with a person who was once a student of hers which is not enough to establish
juror bias.
[9] A defendant is entitled to an impartial jury. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; IND.
CONST. art. I, § 13. Trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether
to replace a juror with an alternate, and we will reverse such determinations
only where we find them to be arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.
May v. State, 716 N.E.2d 419, 421 (Ind. 1999) (citing Harris v. State, 659 N.E.2d
522, 525 (Ind. 1995)). The trial court is in the best position to assess the
honesty and integrity of a juror and the juror’s ability to perform as a
conscientious, impartial juror. Id. (citing Harris, 659 N.E.2d at 525). This is
especially true where the trial judge must weigh the nature and extent of a juror
relationship with a party or witness established pre-trial and arising in the
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normal, and often inevitable, course of interaction in an employment or
community environment. Id. As such, our review of the trial court’s decisions
in these matters is highly deferential. Id.
[10] Keil did not object to Juror No. 1 remaining on the jury or request that the juror
be removed, and as such he cannot now question the outcome based on the
juror’s participation. See Barnes v. State, 693 N.E.2d 520, 524 (Ind. 1998) (noting
the defendant did not seek to excuse a juror for cause and holding that, having
failed to challenge the juror at trial, the defendant “cannot now question the
outcome based on her participation”). Waiver notwithstanding, we do not find
Keil’s argument to be persuasive. The trial court was in the best position to
assess the honesty and integrity of Juror No. 1 and her ability to perform as a
conscientious, impartial juror. The court could have reasonably interpreted
Juror No. 1’s comments as nothing more than a natural anxiety regarding her
ability to separate past experience from present judgment. The juror indicated
that she had not had an experience that would keep her from listening, and the
court was able to weigh the nature and extent of her relationship and
interactions with Bass prior to trial and arising in the normal course of an
employment or community environment. Based upon the record, we cannot
say the trial court abused its discretion, erred, committed fundamental error, or
placed Keil in substantial peril when it did not remove Juror No. 1 from the
jury. See Harris, 659 N.E.2d at 525-526.
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II.
[11] The next issue is whether the trial court erred in admitting a portion of a
recording taken from Deputy Rowe’s body camera into evidence. The trial
court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Bradley v.
State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016). We review its rulings for abuse of that
discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial
rights. Id. However, we will not reverse an error in the admission of evidence if
the error was harmless. Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1058 (Ind. 2011).
Generally, errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded unless they
affect the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. at 1059. The improper admission is
harmless error if the conviction is supported by substantial independent
evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court that there is no substantial
likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction. Id.
[12] A contemporaneous objection at the time the evidence is introduced at trial is
required to preserve the issue for appeal. Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207
(Ind. 2010), reh’g denied. A claim that has been waived by a defendant’s failure
to raise a contemporaneous objection can be reviewed on appeal if the
reviewing court determines that a fundamental error occurred. Id. The
fundamental error exception is extremely narrow and applies only when the
error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for
harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental
due process. Id. The error claimed must either make a fair trial impossible or
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constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due
process. Id. This exception is available only in egregious circumstances. Id.[13] Keil argues that “[i]t was fundamental error for the trial court to admit an
electronic disk, State’s Exhibit 1, into evidence over [his] objections” and states
“[d]efense objects to the publication of the materials on the cd, as he had
believed the admission prior in the case was for purposes of the physical cd and
not its contents.” Appellant’s Brief at 14-15. The State responds that Keil has
waived his argument because he did not object to the admission of the exhibit
when it was introduced and does not argue or present cogent argument that the
court committed fundamental error. It also states it “cannot identify any basis
for challenging the admission of the video in whole and [Keil] has never
dissected the video to request the redaction of limited parts,” that Keil has failed
to show that it was fundamental error to admit the video, and that any error in
its admission was harmless as Deputy Rowe testified as to most of the
conversation on the recording. Appellee’s Brief at 23.
[14] Keil filed a motion in limine asking in part that the court instruct the State not to
refer to his alleged prior convictions, and the court ordered the State to refrain
from introducing evidence of Keil’s prior convictions in the first phase of the
trial. During his testimony, Deputy Rowe indicated that his encounter with
Keil was recorded on his body camera, that he had viewed the footage, and that
copies of the footage had been made. The State identified State’s Exhibit 1, and
Deputy Rowe indicated it was a copy of the footage and that his initials were
on the disk. The State moved to admit Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 into evidence, Keil’s
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counsel stated “[n]o objection,” and the court admitted the exhibit into
evidence. Id. at 24.
[15] Later, when the State was ready to present the testimony of Bass, the prosecutor
stated:
Judge, briefly before the jury comes in, my intent during this
examination of the witness would be to present the video that we
have previously entered into evidence. And in publishing that
video to the jury, I want to advise the Court that the video exists
in three different files, three separate consecutive files. And I
only intend to present the third file because there are mentions of
Mr. Keil’s history in some of those files so I don’t want to muddy
the water with the first two files. The third file basically contains
Mr. Bass’ interview with Detective Rowe at the scene. And there
is one statement that Detective Rowe says in the beginning of
that interview that “I know Brian,” the Defendant, “I know
him.” That’s all that’s said, he doesn’t say how he knows him
but I want to put that on the record because I don’t want any
chance of that throwing it in the face of the motion in limine as
to the Defendant’s prior convictions. I don’t believe it does and I
wanted to make the Court aware of it and defense counsel I’m
sure will have something to say about that.
Id. at 46. Keil’s counsel objected to the publication of the video to the jury and
argued that it violated Ind. Evidence Rule 4031, stating “[w]e don’t have any
objection to the video itself, we just object to the publication to the jury,” the
1
Ind. Evidence Rule 403 provides: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
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court asked “[w]hat else would you do with it,” and Keil’s counsel stated “I
saw no need to object to that because we were not publishing to the jury at that
time” and “[w]hat I have a problem with now is that we do feel it’s an unfair
prejudice and it shouldn’t be published to the jury.” Id. at 47.
[16] The court replied “I believe you’ve waived that issue,” “[b]ut regardless, I will
clean it up in the record and I will allow you to publish it,” and “for the record,
State’s Exhibit 1 is being published only with regard to the third file only and
should the jury request – and this exhibit will not accompany the jury to the
jury room and can only be viewed in the presence of the Court and counsel for
the record should they request an opportunity to review this.” Id. The
prosecutor then stated “again, as far as the statements as to [Keil’s] history by
Detective Rowe, at the beginning of that file there is a statement ‘I know
Brian,’” “[t]owards the end there are statements made by [Keil] which I believe
are not hearsay and are party admissions,” and “Detective Rowe says towards
the end when he’s talking to [Keil] that, ‘We’ve tried that before,’ speaking of
he’s had dealings with [Keil] in the past and he’s not willing to work with him
now. I do not wish to play those. He’s testified to it, I want to leave it at that.”
Id. at 47-48. The court asked “[i]s that in the third file,” the prosecutor replied
it “is at the end of the third file,” the court then asked “[s]o you know when to
stop that,” and the prosecutor replied “I can stop that.” Id. at 48. The court
then stated: “Very good. Just so the record is straight with regard to the first
stage of the proceedings, in the event the jury wishes to review this document, it
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would have to be in the presence of the Court and counsel and only with regard
to file three and after the extraction of — or redaction of the one portion.” Id.
[17] The State called Bass as its next witness. After several preliminary questions,
the prosecutor stated “I think now would be a good time to play the video and
publish it to the Jury.” Id. at 49. The transcript at this point indicates: “(The
playing of State’s Exhibit 1, video statement of Samuel Bass, is transcribed as
follows:).” Id. The transcript of the video indicates that, at one point near the
beginning of the portion of the video played, Deputy Rowe stated to Bass:
“[Keil] knows this game, okay. He knows me and if he wants to play like that
and not take or accept responsibility that’s on him but it’s your car. . . .” Id. at
50. No objection was lodged.
[18] The record reveals that Keil’s counsel stated that Keil had no objection to the
admission of State’s Exhibit 1 and the court admitted the exhibit. His later
objection to publication is waived. On appeal he asserts that it was
fundamental error to admit the body camera footage, stating “[t]o disallow the
Defendant to argue his objection was an abuse of discretion that unfairly
prejudiced the Defendant.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. He does not present cogent
argument, and his claim is waived. See Shane v. State, 716 N.E.2d 391, 398 n.3
(Ind. 1999) (holding that the defendant waived argument on appeal by failing to
develop a cogent argument).
[19] Waiver notwithstanding, we cannot say that the probative value of the evidence
of the portion of the video played for the jury was substantially outweighed by
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the danger of unfair prejudice to Keil. Further, even if the court abused its
discretion in admitting the recording, any such error is harmless. The State
elicited testimony from Deputy Rowe regarding his conversations with Bass
and Keil, his observations of Keil, and the location of the discovery of the
syringe, spoon, and a knotted portion of a baggie in the vehicle, as well as the
lighter and shoelace tied into a loop at one end on Keil’s person. The
admission of the challenged recording is not grounds for reversal.
III.
[20] The next issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Keil’s convictions.
When reviewing claims of insufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816,
817 (Ind. 1995), reh’g denied. We look to the evidence and the reasonable
inferences therefrom that support the verdict. Id. We will affirm the conviction
if there exists evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.[21] Keil argues the evidence is insufficient to show his actual or constructive
possession of the syringe beyond a reasonable doubt or to show he intended to
use the needle, spoon, or shoestring to introduce a controlled substance into
one’s body. The State contends that it proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
Keil possessed a syringe and paraphernalia with the requisite intent and that
Keil had both actual and constructive possession of the syringe and other items.
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[22] Ind. Code § 16-42-19-18 provides “[a] person may not possess with intent to: (1)
violate this chapter [the Indiana Legend Drug Act]; or (2) commit an offense
described in IC 35-48-4; a hypodermic syringe or needle or an instrument
adapted for the use of a controlled substance or legend drug by injection in a
human being.” Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4 govern offenses relating to controlled
substances. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1) provides in part that a person “who
knowingly or intentionally possesses an instrument, a device, or another object
that the person intends to use for: (1) introducing into the person’s body a
controlled substance; (2) testing the strength, effectiveness, or purity of a
controlled substance; or (3) enhancing the effect of a controlled substance”
commits a class C misdemeanor. Keil does not challenge his admission that he
had a prior conviction supporting his level 5 felony under Count I.
[23] A conviction for possession of contraband may rest upon proof of either actual
or constructive possession. Washington v. State, 902 N.E.2d 280, 288 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009), trans. denied. Constructive possession occurs when the defendant
has actual knowledge of the presence and illegal character of the contraband
and the capability and intent to maintain dominion and control over it. Id. To
prove capability, the State must demonstrate that the defendant is able to reduce
the contraband to his personal possession. K.F. v. State, 961 N.E.2d 501, 510
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. To prove intent, the State must demonstrate
the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the contraband. Id. This
knowledge may be inferred from either the exclusive dominion and control over
the premises containing the contraband or, if the control is non-exclusive,
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evidence of additional circumstances that point to the defendant’s knowledge of
the presence of the contraband. Id. These additional circumstances may
include incriminating statements by the defendant, flight or furtive gestures, the
defendant’s proximity to the contraband, the contraband being in plain view, or
the location of the contraband in close proximity to items owned by the
defendant. Id.[24] The evidence most favorable to Keil’s conviction reveals that Bass told Deputy
Rowe that he and Keil had purchased and used twenty dollars of heroin, that he
had moved a syringe from the passenger door to the center console so that
Deputy Rowe would not see it, and that the syringe belonged to Keil. The
police dog alerted to the passenger side door of Bass’s vehicle, and the syringe
was discovered in the center console together with a used spoon and a knotted
portion of a baggie. Further, a lighter and shoelace tied into a loop at one end
were discovered on Keil’s person. Deputy Rowe also indicated that he believed
Keil was under the influence of heroin based on his behavior, and Keil asked
Deputy Rowe “if there was any way to work it off.” Transcript at 26. The trier
of fact could reasonably infer that Keil had knowledge of the contraband as well
as the capability and intent to maintain control over it. Further, the trier of fact
could reasonably conclude that Keil possessed the syringe with the intent to use
it to inject heroin.
[25] Based upon the record, we conclude that evidence of probative value was
presented from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Keil
committed the offenses of unlawful possession of a syringe and possession of
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paraphernalia. See Cherry v. State, 971 N.E.2d 726, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)
(holding the jury was entitled to conclude that the defendant possessed the
syringe with the intent to use it to inject heroin), trans. denied.
Conclusion
[26] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Keil’s convictions.
[27] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
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