Christopher M. Beaty v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                          FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                      Dec 29 2017, 8:31 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                          and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Nicole A. Zelin                                         Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Pritzke & Davis, LLP                                    Attorney General of Indiana
    Greenfield, Indiana                                     Angela Sanchez
    Lee M. Stoy, Jr.
    Deputy Attorneys General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Christopher M. Beaty,                                   December 29, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    30A05-1706-CR-1366
    v.                                              Appeal from the Hancock Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Richard D. Culver,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    30C01-1701-F4-204
    Riley, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A05-1706-CR-1366 | December 29, 2017            Page 1 of 7
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    [1]   Appellant-Defendant, Christopher M. Beaty (Beaty), appeals his conviction for
    dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-
    1.1(a)(1),(c)(1); possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 35-48-
    4-6.1(a); and visiting a common nuisance, a Class B misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-45-
    1-5(a)(3),(b).
    [2]   We reverse and remand.
    ISSUE
    [3]   Beaty raises two issues on appeal, one of which we find dispositive and which
    we restate as follows: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to
    support Beaty’s conviction for dealing in methamphetamine as a Level 4 felony.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    [4]   On January 25, 2017, Sarah Gustin (Gustin) was introduced to Beaty through a
    mutual friend. They spent time together the next day, and on January 27, 2017,
    Gustin drove Beaty to the outskirts of Greenfield, Hancock County, Indiana, in
    order to meet one of his friends regarding “[a] [m]eth deal.” (Tr. p. 81). The
    friend, identified simply as “Taylor,” got into Gustin’s vehicle, and the trio
    drove to the southside of Indianapolis “[t]o pick up the [m]eth.” (Tr. pp. 82,
    84). Gustin parked her vehicle in the parking lot of a pharmacy, and Beaty
    instructed her to wait there as he exited the vehicle and walked further down
    the street. Twenty minutes later, Beaty returned to the vehicle with “a rock of
    [m]eth.” (Tr. p. 86). Beaty “split [the rock] in half” and gave one half—i.e.,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A05-1706-CR-1366 | December 29, 2017   Page 2 of 7
    supposedly a gram of methamphetamine—to Taylor in exchange for $100.00.
    (Tr. p. 86). Beaty kept the other half. Gustin drove Taylor home, then she and
    Beaty drove to a house located at 375 Mount Street in Greenfield. Once again,
    Gustin waited in her vehicle while Beaty went inside, purportedly so that he
    could “weigh out the amount [of methamphetamine] that he had kept.” (Tr. p.
    88).
    [5]   At that time, it just so happened that the Hancock County Sheriff’s Department
    and the Greenfield Police Department planned to execute a narcotics search
    warrant at the Mount Street house. Approximately five or six people, including
    Beaty, were inside at the time the officers entered and were placed under arrest.
    An officer searched Beaty and recovered “a gray piece of plastic which
    contained [a] crystal type substance which later field tested positive for
    [methamphetamine].” (Tr. p. 124). Laboratory testing subsequently confirmed
    the substance was methamphetamine, weighing “1.01 grams plus or minus .02
    gram to a 95% degree of confidence.” (Tr. p. 181). Outside, police officers
    spoke with Gustin and, with her consent, searched her vehicle, where they
    retrieved Beaty’s cell phone. The content of the messages downloaded from
    Beaty’s phone indicated that he was involved in procuring various types of
    drugs for multiple people.
    [6]   On January 30, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Beaty with Count
    I, dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1),(c)(1);
    Count II, possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-
    6.1(a); and Count III, visiting a common nuisance, a Class B misdemeanor,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A05-1706-CR-1366 | December 29, 2017   Page 3 of 7
    I.C. § 35-45-1-5(a)(3),(b). On March 9, 2017, Beaty informed the trial court that
    he desired to proceed pro se, and he demanded a speedy trial. The trial court
    directed Beaty’s previously-appointed attorney to act as standby counsel. On
    May 9, 2017, the trial court conducted a jury trial. At the close of the evidence,
    the jury returned guilty verdicts on all Counts. On June 2, 2017, the trial court
    held a sentencing hearing. The trial court sentenced Beaty to ten years for
    dealing in methamphetamine, two and one-half years for possession of
    methamphetamine, and 180 days for visiting a common nuisance—all to be
    executed concurrently in the Indiana Department of Correction.
    [7]   Beaty now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    [8]   Beaty claims that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
    conviction for dealing in methamphetamine as a Level 4 felony. Our standard
    of reviewing claims of sufficiency of the evidence is well settled. Our court
    considers only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the
    verdict. Boggs v. State, 
    928 N.E.2d 855
    , 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
    We do not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. 
    Id. “We will
    affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
    the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id. The evidence
    need not
    “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” 
    Id. Rather, [t]he
    evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support
    the verdict.” 
    Id. Court of
    Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A05-1706-CR-1366 | December 29, 2017   Page 4 of 7
    [9]    In order to prove the offense as charged, the State was required to establish that
    Beaty knowingly or intentionally delivered methamphetamine, and that “the
    amount of the drug involved [was] at last one (1) gram but less than five (5)
    grams.” I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1)(C),(c)(1). Here, Beaty does not challenge that
    he delivered the methamphetamine to Taylor; rather, his sole contention is that
    the State failed to establish that the weight of the delivered methamphetamine
    was between one and five grams to warrant a Level 4 felony conviction.
    Dealing less than a gram of methamphetamine is chargeable as a Level 5
    felony. I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1)(C).
    [10]   Because the weight of the drugs enhanced the dealing offense from a Level 5
    felony to a Level 4 felony, it is an essential element that the State was required
    to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Halsema v. State, 
    823 N.E.2d 668
    , 673
    (Ind. 2005). In order to prove the weight element of a drug or controlled
    substance, “the State must either offer evidence of its actual, measured weight
    or demonstrate that the quantity of the drugs or controlled substances is so large
    as to permit a reasonable inference that the element of weight has been
    established.” 
    Id. at 674.
    Here, the State presented evidence of the actual,
    measured weight of the methamphetamine found in Beaty’s possession—which
    amounted to 1.01 grams with a margin of error of .02 grams in either direction.
    [11]   To establish the weight of the methamphetamine that Beaty delivered to Taylor,
    however, the State relied on evidence indicating that Beaty and Taylor had
    specifically agreed to exchange one gram of methamphetamine for $100.00—
    the typical rate for a gram of methamphetamine—and that Beaty had “split [the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A05-1706-CR-1366 | December 29, 2017   Page 5 of 7
    methamphetamine rock] in half,” keeping slightly over one gram in his
    possession. (Tr. p. 86). The State does not contend that there was such a large
    quantity of methamphetamine that the weight could be established by inference.
    Instead, the State relies on caselaw indicating that the weight of drugs may be
    established from testimony by “those who regularly use or deal in the substance
    or developed an acute ability to assess the weight of the drugs in which they
    deal” as well as from law enforcement officers “who regularly investigate
    methamphetamine crimes to establish the weight of the final product.” Buelna
    v. State, 
    20 N.E.3d 137
    , 147-48 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    We are unpersuaded by the State’s arguments.
    [12]   “[O]nly direct evidence, not circumstantial evidence, may sustain a weight
    enhancement.” 
    Id. at 148.
    Here, there is no evidence that any law enforcement
    officer observed or handled the methamphetamine that was transferred to
    Taylor to be able to testify as to its weight based on experience. Also, Beaty
    never testified regarding the weight of the methamphetamine, and the fact that
    Beaty went to the house on Mount Street in order to weigh his remaining
    methamphetamine is indicative of his lack of “an acute ability to assess the
    weight” based on his frequent use. 
    Id. at 147.
    There is no evidence as to the
    methamphetamine rock’s weight prior to Beaty splitting it with Taylor, and
    there is absolutely nothing in the record to support a finding that Beaty so
    precisely split the rock in half that the portion delivered to Taylor was identical
    in weight to the 1.01 grams retained by Beaty. Thus, we conclude that the State
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A05-1706-CR-1366 | December 29, 2017   Page 6 of 7
    failed to meet its burden, and Beaty’s conviction cannot stand. 1 We remand
    this case to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment for dealing in
    methamphetamine as a Level 5 felony and to impose a new sentence
    accordingly. See 
    Halsema, 823 N.E.2d at 675-76
    (directing the trial court to
    impose a sentence for lesser charge where weight of drugs was not proven to
    support enhanced charge). 2
    CONCLUSION
    [13]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented insufficient
    evidence to support Beaty’s Level 4 felony conviction for dealing in
    methamphetamine. We remand this matter to the trial court to enter judgment
    and resentence as a Level 5 felony.
    [14]   Reversed and remanded.
    [15]   Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur
    1
    We decline the State’s footnote request to elevate Beaty’s Level 6 felony conviction for possessing
    methamphetamine to a Level 4 felony for possessing methamphetamine with an intent to deliver (i.e., dealing
    between one and five grams, I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2)(C),(c)). Whether Beaty intended to deliver the
    methamphetamine that he retained in his possession is an issue that should have been charged and presented
    to the jury for a determination.
    2
    Because we reverse and remand for resentencing, we will not address Beaty’s other claim that his sentence
    is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A05-1706-CR-1366 | December 29, 2017          Page 7 of 7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 30A05-1706-CR-1366

Filed Date: 12/29/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/29/2017