David Galyen v. Amber Galyen (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be May 15 2018, 5:59 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Jon P. McCarty Holly Crain Clemence
Covington, Indiana Wallace Law Firm
Covington, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
David Galyen, May 15, 2018
Appellant, Court of Appeals Case No.
83A04-1711-DR-2664
v. Appeal from the Vermillion
Circuit Court
Amber Galyen, The Honorable Harry A. Siamas,
Appellee. Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
83C01-1507-DR-49
Brown, Judge.
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[1] David Galyen (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s October 20, 2017 order on the
objection to his intent to relocate and the request for custody filed by Amber
Galyen (“Mother”). We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Father and Mother have two children, born in 2008 and 2010. The trial court
entered a decree of dissolution, file-stamped on January 10, 2017, dissolving the
parties’ marriage and incorporating their settlement agreement. The agreement
provided the parties shall have joint legal custody of the children and that
Mother’s parenting time would be at a minimum one mid-week visit for four
hours, weekend visitation from Friday after school until Monday at the
beginning of school on two weekends per month, in even-numbered months
and from Friday after school until Sunday evening on three weekends per
month in odd-numbered months, and holiday overnight visits per the Indiana
Parenting Time Guidelines. The agreement also provided Father would have
the first two and last two weeks of summer visitation and Mother would have
the balance of the summer with Father having visitation every other weekend
from Friday until Monday morning.
[3] On July 12, 2017, Father filed a notice of intent to relocate.1 On August 9,
2017, Mother filed an objection to Father’s notice of intent to relocate and a
1
The record does not contain a copy of Father’s notice.
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petition to modify custody.2 On August 14, 2017, the court scheduled a hearing
for September 28, 2017.3 Mother filed an affidavit for rule to show cause. 4 On
September 28, 2017, the court held a hearing at which it heard testimony from
Mother, Mother’s mother, and Father. The court heard testimony that Father
had resided with the children in Ridge Farm, Illinois, and had worked in
Danville, Illinois, that Mother lived nearby in Georgetown, Illinois, and that in
August of 20175 Father relocated with the children to New Carlisle, Indiana,
and began working for a new employer in New Carlisle with a higher salary.
[4] On October 20, 2017, the court entered an order which provided:
1. Initially, the burden is on the relocating parent to show
that the relocation is made in good faith and for a legitimate
reason. [Father] relocated to New Carlisle Indiana to obtain a
job at a much higher salary. He learned that he was hired in
early July and he gave notice of his intent to relocate to [Mother]
and the Court on July 12, 2017. The Court finds that [Father’s]
relocation was made in good faith and for a legitimate reason. In
addition, the Court finds that [Father] filed his notice of intent to
relocate within the time periods provided in I.C. 31-17-2.2-3(b).
2. Next, since [Father] met his initial burden, the burden
shifts to [Mother] to show that the proposed relocation is not in
2
The record does not contain a copy of Mother’s objection or petition.
3
The chronological case summary (“CCS”), with respect to this entry, indicates: “MIN Date: 08/14/2017”
and “Input: 08/21/2017.” Appellant’s Appendix at 9.
4
The record does not contain a copy of the affidavit. The CCS indicates the affidavit was filed on October
11, 2017. However, the court observed at the September 28, 2017 hearing that the affidavit had been filed
and would be considered at the hearing.
5
Father testified he had lived in New Carlisle since August 15th and that he signed his lease on July 31st.
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the children’s best interests. The Court must consider the factors
found in I.C. 31-l7-2.2-1(b) and any other factors that affect the
best interests of the children. The Court finds that the distance of
the relocation is about 180 miles and that the drive time is in
excess of three hours. The distance makes it impossible for
[Mother] to exercise the parenting time that she had been
exercising. The distance adversely affects [Mother’s] ability to
preserve her relationship with her daughters that she was able to
maintain when the children lived in the same area as her. While
[Father’s] reasons to relocate are entirely reasonable the
relocation is a hardship on the children in that the relocation
removes the children from close proximity to their mother, their
paternal and maternal grandparents and their other extended
family and friends. These are important relationships for the
children. While [Father] is willing to do all the driving and
transport the children back and forth between Georgetown
Illinois and New Carlisle Indiana every other weekend and
holidays, this is a long drive for the children, and it still means
that [Mother] is deprived of her weekly Thursday visits, her third
weekend every other month and the ability to participate in the
children’s school activities, extra-curricular activities, and doctor
and dental appointments. While [Mother] has joint legal custody
of the children [Father’s] relocation effectively ends her ability to
act as a joint legal custodian. [Father] presented evidence that
the school system in New Carlisle is much better than the school
system in Georgetown, and the Court has considered that
evidence. However, on balance the Court finds that [Mother]
has carried her burden of proof. The Court finds that relocation
may be in [Father’s] best interest but it is not in the children’s
best interests. The Court finds that therefore [Mother’s]
objection to [Father’s] relocation of the children is sustained.
3. The Court finds that it is not best for the children to be
moved during the school semester. The Court finds that the
children should complete the current school term in New Carlisle
and then they should be enrolled in an appropriate school in
Georgetown or North Vermillion school district at the start of the
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winter or spring school term. The Court finds that if [Father]
chooses to relocate back to the Georgetown area then the order
of January 10, 2017 shall remain in effect. If [Father] chooses to
remain in New Carlisle then the children shall reside primarily
with [Mother] and [Father] shall exercise parenting time
pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines when
distance is a factor.
4. The Court finds that [Father] did not receive notice of the
Court’s order requiring him to enroll the children in Pinecrest
Elementary School in Georgetown, Illinois until after he
relocated to New Carlisle and he had enrolled the children in
alternate schooling. The Court finds that the evidence is not
sufficient for the Court to find that [Father] is in contempt of
court and therefore the Court denies the affidavit for rule to show
cause and [Mother’s] request for attorney fees.
Appellant’s Appendix at 11-12.
Discussion
[5] Father claims the trial court’s October 20, 2017 order is clearly erroneous and
should be reversed. We review custody modifications for an abuse of
discretion. In re Paternity of J.J., 911 N.E.2d 725, 727 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We
will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. We
consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and any reasonable
inferences from that evidence. Id. at 727-728. Where a trial court enters
findings of fact and conclusions of law, first we determine whether the evidence
supports the findings, and second we determine whether the findings support
the judgment. Lechien v. Wren, 950 N.E.2d 838, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We
will set aside the trial court’s specific findings only if they are clearly erroneous,
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that is, when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support them.
Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with
a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. The findings control only
as to the issues they cover, and a general judgment standard applies to issues
upon which the trial court made no findings. Id.[6] The Indiana Supreme Court has expressed a “preference for granting latitude
and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” In re Marriage of
Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178, 178 (Ind. 1993). Appellate deference to the
determinations of our trial court judges, especially in domestic relations
matters, is warranted because of their unique, direct interactions with the
parties face-to-face, often over an extended period of time. Best v. Best, 941
N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011). Thus enabled to assess credibility and character
through both factual testimony and intuitive discernment, our trial judges are in
a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense,
particularly in the determination of the best interests of the involved children.
Id. We will not substitute our own judgment if any evidence or legitimate
inferences support the trial court’s judgment. Baxendale v. Raich, 878 N.E.2d
1252, 1257-1258 (Ind. 2008).
[7] Custody modifications are generally governed by Ind. Code § 31-17-2-21, which
provides that a custody modification is permitted if the modification is in the
best interests of the child and there has been a substantial change in one or
more of the factors identified in Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8. In re Paternity of J.J., 911
N.E.2d at 728.
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[8] Ind. Code §§ 31-17-2.2 governs the relocation of a custodial parent. Id. When a
non-relocating parent seeks custody in response to a notice of intent to relocate
with a child, the court shall take into account the factors found at Ind. Code §
31-17-2.2-1(b). Id. at 729. In contrast to the modification statute, a relocation-
based modification need not involve a substantial change to one of the original
best interests factors. Jarrell v. Jarrell, 5 N.E.3d 1186, 1192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),
trans. denied; In re Marriage of Harpenau, 17 N.E.3d 342, 346 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014). Ind. Code § 31-17-2.2-1(b) provides:
Upon motion of a party, the court shall set the matter for a
hearing to review and modify, if appropriate, a custody order,
parenting time order, . . . or child support order. The court shall
take into account the following in determining whether to modify
a custody order, parenting time order, . . . or child support order:
(1) The distance involved in the proposed change of residence.
(2) The hardship and expense involved for the nonrelocating
individual to exercise parenting time or grandparent
visitation.
(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the
nonrelocating individual and the child through suitable
parenting time and grandparent visitation arrangements,
including consideration of the financial circumstances of
the parties.
(4) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct by the
relocating individual, including actions by the relocating
individual to either promote or thwart a nonrelocating
individual’s contact with the child.
(5) The reasons provided by the:
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(A) relocating individual for seeking relocation; and
(B) nonrelocating parent for opposing the relocation of
the child.
(6) Other factors affecting the best interest of the child.
[9] “The ‘other factors affecting the best interest of the child’ include, by
implication, the factors set forth for custody determinations and modifications
under Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8.”6 H.H. v. A.A., 3 N.E.3d 30, 34 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014) (citations omitted). “The court may consider a proposed relocation
of a child as a factor in determining whether to modify a custody, parenting
time order, . . . or child support order.” Ind. Code § 31-17-2.2-2(b).
[10] The trial court is required to consider all the factors in Ind. Code § 31-17-2.2-
1(b). In re Marriage of Harpenau, 17 N.E.3d at 347. The relocation statutes do
not require findings, but there must be evidence in the record on the factors.
Wolljung v. Sidell, 891 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); see Harpenau, 17
N.E.3d at 347 (“Although the trial court did not make specific findings about
each factor, our review of the record shows that there was sufficient evidence of
each relevant factor to support the trial court’s decision.”) (footnote omitted);
6
The factors listed in Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8 include: (1) the age and sex of the child; (2) the wishes of the
child’s parent or parents; (3) the wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child’s wishes if the
child is at least fourteen years of age; (4) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
parent or parents, the child’s sibling, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best
interests; (5) the child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community; (6) the mental and physical
health of all individuals involved; (7) evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent; (8)
evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian; and (9) a designation in a power of
attorney of the child’s parent or a person found to be a de facto custodian of the child.
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Nelson v. Nelson, 10 N.E.3d 1283, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“[T]he trial court
was not required to make a finding on all factors enumerated in I.C. § 31-17-
2.2-1(b). So long as there is evidence on the record to support each of the
factors, we will affirm the trial court’s finding.”).
[11] The relocating individual has the burden of proof that the proposed relocation is
made in good faith and for a legitimate reason, and if the relocating individual
meets the burden of proof, the burden shifts to the nonrelocating parent to show
that the proposed relocation is not in the best interest of the child. Ind. Code §
31-17-2.2-5. When a relocation is made in good faith, the analysis ultimately
turns on the best interests of the child. Baxendale, 878 N.E.2d at 1256 n.5.
[12] Father argues that the trial court failed to consider or disregarded several of the
factors in Ind. Code § 31-17-2.2-1(b) and notes that, while the relocation
statutes do not require findings, at a minimum there must be evidence in the
record on each of the factors. He further argues that the court’s findings are not
supported by the evidence, no evidence supports the finding that Mother would
be deprived of her third weekend every other month, she would merely lose the
ability to keep the children overnight on Sunday every other weekend, there is
no evidence the children participate in extra-curricular activities, and the record
is devoid of any mention of the children’s medical or dental providers and
where they are located.
[13] Mother maintains that the court properly found the distance of the relocation
would make it impossible for her to exercise all of her parenting time and
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adversely affect her ability to preserve her relationship with the children and
that the court recognized that the children have strong ties and relationships
with family and friends in the area of Georgetown and the importance of those
relationships. She also argues the court properly notes that Father’s relocation
effectively ends her ability to act as a joint legal custodian.
[14] At the September 28, 2017 hearing, Mother testified that the children were six
and nine years old, that she lived in Georgetown, Illinois, that the children had
lived in New Carlisle for about a month, and that she was requesting custody.
She testified that, if the court awarded her custody, she would move in with her
mother and stepfather who lived about two minutes from her and then, within
thirty or maybe sixty days, she would obtain a larger house so the children
would have their own room. She testified the children had been moved away
from their entire support system, there is no one in New Carlisle to watch them
and they do not have family and friends there, her parents and Father’s
grandparents are in Georgetown, and Father’s parents live in Ridge Farm
which is ten minutes away. She indicated that, before they relocated, Father
and the children lived with Father’s parents. She testified the children had
attended school in North Vermillion when the parties lived in their marital
residence and attended school in Georgetown after Father and the children
moved to Georgetown to live with his parents. She testified that her mother
would provide child care while she was at work. When asked if she was
receiving her visitation, Mother stated “No I’m not. I’m getting every other
weekend. I don’t get my four hours during the week. I don’t get my extra
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weekend anymore. I do not get my extra Sunday night.” Transcript Volume 2
at 10. She testified that it took three hours to travel to New Carlisle. Mother
presented evidence that she earned $12.10 per hour and testified that her hours
of employment were from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 or 6:30 p.m. on Mondays and
Tuesdays, 12:30 or 1:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. on Wednesdays and Fridays, 10:00
a.m. to 4:30 p.m. on two Saturdays per month, and 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on
one Sunday per month. Mother also asked for attorney fees due to contempt.
[15] On cross-examination, Mother indicated that Father has provided
transportation for the children to visit her, that the school in New Carlisle is a
better school academically than the school in Georgetown, and that she lives in
a home that, from what she was told, used to be a garage that was converted
into a home. She indicated that, before Father relocated to New Carlisle,
Father’s parents would watch the children between the time Father left for work
and the time they left for school, that the children were released from school at
2:15 p.m., that Father left work at 4:00 p.m., and that as far as she knew their
grandmother watched them until Father arrived home. On redirect
examination, Mother indicated that her mother was going to watch the children
while she was at work and that she would be in the same residence as her
mother. Mother’s mother testified that Mother and the children are welcome to
stay at her house, that she is retired and available to drive the children to school
and pick them up, and that she is concerned that the children are away from all
of their support system.
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[16] Father testified he earns $17,000 more than he earned at his employment in
Danville, Illinois, and he works one hour less per day and receives bonuses. He
stated that the children board the bus at 6:40 a.m., they are released from school
at 1:50 p.m., they take a bus to an after school program, and he picks them up
after work. He testified that he would continue to provide all transportation for
Mother’s parenting time, and that if the court says he cannot relocate the
children, he would move back to Georgetown.
[17] The record reveals that the evidence, as set forth above and in the record,
supports the trial court’s findings that the distance of Father’s relocation was
approximately 180 miles, that the travel time between Mother and Father’s
residences is in excess of three hours, and that the distance adversely impacts
Mother’s relationship with the children and removes the children from close
proximity to their paternal and maternal grandparents. The court heard the
testimony of Father and Mother, as well as that of Mother’s mother, related to
the children’s schooling and the parties’ care for the children, their living
arrangements, and their resources and work schedules. The court was able to
consider Father’s testimony that he was willing to provide all of the
transportation for Mother’s visitation and was willing to give Mother additional
visitation to make up for any missed visitation. While the parties did not
present certain evidence of the children’s medical appointments or of all of the
school and extra-curricular activities in which they were or would be involved,
the distance of Father’s relocation supports the trial court’s finding that the
relocation effectively ended Mother’s ability to act as a joint legal custodian.
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The court was able to consider the testimony presented by the parties and to
take into account the distance involved in the relocation, the hardship involved
for Mother as the nonrelocating parent to exercise parenting time, the feasibility
of preserving Mother’s relationship with the children through suitable parenting
time and the financial circumstances of the parties, the conduct of the parties,
and the reasons provided by Father for his relocation and by Mother for
opposing the relocation. The court was also able to consider the evidence
presented regarding the length of time the children lived with Father as well as
the age and gender of the children, the parties’ wishes, the interrelationship of
the children with their parents and other family members, and the children’s
adjustment to their home and school.
[18] Based upon the record, and keeping in mind our deference to trial judges in
family law matters, we cannot say that there are no facts or inferences drawn
therefrom to support the trial court’s findings or that the court’s decision is
clearly erroneous.
Conclusion
[19] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s October 20, 2017 order.
[20] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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