Anthony Wayne Reed v. Leann White and Darrin Chaney , 103 N.E.3d 657 ( 2018 )

FILED
May 18 2018, 9:29 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Anthony W. Reed Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Greencastle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Anthony Wayne Reed, May 18, 2018
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
67A01-1708-MI-1768
v. Appeal from the Putnam Superior
Court
Leann White and Darrin The Honorable Charles D. Bridges,
Chaney, Judge
Appellees-Defendants. Trial Court Cause No.
67D01-1706-MI-30
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Anthony Wayne Reed appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his complaint
against Leann White and Darrin Chaney. Reed presents a single issue for our
review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it dismissed his complaint
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 67A01-1708-MI-1768 | May 18, 2018 Page 1 of 7
for a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On December 11, 2015, Reed, who was then incarcerated at the Putnamville
Correctional Facility (“PCF”), mailed four handmade crosses1 to family
members. However, on December 30, two envelopes containing three of the
crosses were returned to PCF for insufficient postage. Reed was notified of the
problem, but the crosses were not returned to him, and he was not able to
resend them to his family members. Reed later learned that White, who
worked in the PCF mail room, had confiscated the crosses. White, in turn,
gave the crosses to Chaney, an internal affairs officer for the PCF Security
Threat Group (“STG”).
[3] After Reed filed an informal grievance with PCF on January 20, 2016, he was
informed that “STG policy 02-03-105 prohibits the possession, making or
display of any handmade jewelry (rings, necklaces and bracelets) by [the]
offender population as these items can be used to show STG [sic] affiliation by
utilizing color and symbols.” Appellant’s App. at 13. Reed responded by
stating that the colors used in making the crosses were “not in any way
connected with any (known) Gang-memberships.” Id. at 15. Reed then filed
1
The crosses had been constructed with paper and glue.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 67A01-1708-MI-1768 | May 18, 2018 Page 2 of 7
with the Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”) a Grievance Appeal,
which was denied.
[4] On June 13, Reed filed a tort claim notice with IDOC, and on October 26,
Reed filed a complaint against White and Chaney with the trial court.2 In his
complaint, Reed alleged that the reason given for White’s confiscation of the
crosses was invalid, White did not follow IDOC policies governing the seizure
of items in the mail, and White and Chaney committed “criminal conversion”
when they took the crosses. Id. at 20. The trial court dismissed Reed’s
complaint, stating that he had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, “as the Defendants were following IDOC policies and procedures.”
Appellant’s Br. at 12. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Indiana Code Section 34-58-1-2 provides that a trial court shall screen
complaints filed by an offender to “determine if the claim may proceed.” A
claim may not proceed if the court determines that the claim is not a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Id. We review de novo a trial court’s
dismissal of an offender’s complaint under this statute. Guillen v. R.D.C. Mail
Clerk, 922 N.E.2d 121, 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Like the trial court, we look
2
In May 2017, the trial court dismissed Reed’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, and Reed appealed. By order dated July 5, we dismissed that appeal, but remanded to the trial
court with instructions to docket the complaint, which the court had not done, and to otherwise comply with
Indiana Code Section 34-58-1-3 in the event the court dismissed the complaint. On remand, the trial court
complied with our instructions, dismissed the complaint by order dated July 21, and this appeal ensued.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 67A01-1708-MI-1768 | May 18, 2018 Page 3 of 7
only to the well-pleaded facts contained in the complaint. Id. The statute is
akin to a legislative interpretation of Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), 3 a rule which
has given judges in civil cases the authority “to consider a case in its early stages
and, taking everything the plaintiff has alleged as true, determine whether it can
proceed.” Id. at 122-23 (quoting Peterson v. Lambert, 885 N.E.2d 719, 720 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008)).
[6] Indiana Code Chapter 34-13-3 governs tort claims against governmental entities
and employees. As relevant here, Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-5(c) provides
as follows:
A lawsuit filed against an employee personally must allege that
an act or omission of the employee that causes a loss is:
(1) criminal;
(2) clearly outside the scope of the employee’s
employment;
(3) malicious;
(4) willful and wanton; or
(5) calculated to benefit the employee personally.
The complaint must contain a reasonable factual basis supporting
the allegations. . . .
3
We note that Trial Rule 12(B)(6) refers to claims upon which relief can be granted, but the statute refers to
claims upon which relief may be granted. For ease of discussion, we use “can” and “may” interchangeably.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 67A01-1708-MI-1768 | May 18, 2018 Page 4 of 7
[7] Here, in his thirty-two-paragraph complaint, Reed alleged that White and
Chaney had no valid reason to confiscate the paper crosses, that they did not
follow IDOC policies regarding confiscation of personal property, and that their
conduct constituted criminal conversion. In particular, Reed stated that, “for
both defendants to [have] seized [Reed’s] property items (his three Crosses)
without following any of the set, [sic] IDOC policies (and/or Indiana I.C.
Codes) set in place to protect against such seizure, amount[s] to the charge of:
‘Criminal Conversion.’” Appellant’s App. at 13. On its face, Reed’s complaint
satisfies Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-5(c).
[8] However, in its appellee’s brief, the State, on behalf of White and Chaney,
maintains that the trial court properly dismissed Reed’s complaint because he
“failed to provide a ‘reasonable factual basis’ to support his allegations.”
Appellee’s Br. at 12. In particular, the State contends that, “as a matter of law,
governmental employees may not be named for conduct that occurred within
the scope of their employment.” Id. at 10. And, the State avers that,
[t]aking Reed’s facts as true, it appears that White and Chaney
were following IDOC policies and procedures when they
confiscated the paper crosses. According to the grievance
response, the crosses were confiscated in violation of STG
policy. . . . White and Chaney confiscated the property in
furtherance of their job duties to protect the security of the
facility. Their alleged failure to provide Reed with a notice of
confiscation form does not amount to criminal conversion or
“illegal seizure.” Because Reed failed to support this claim with
sufficient facts, he cannot now sue them individually.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 67A01-1708-MI-1768 | May 18, 2018 Page 5 of 7
Id. at 13.
[9] We cannot agree with the State for two reasons. First, the State is correct that a
government employee is immune from liability if the alleged conduct occurred
within the scope of his employment. But the assertion of immunity is an
affirmative defense, and dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted is “rarely appropriate when the asserted ground for dismissal is
an affirmative defense.” Bellwether Prop., LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., 87
N.E.3d 462, 464 (Ind. 2017). Here, if Reed had alleged in his complaint that
White and Chaney were acting within the scope of their employment, dismissal
under Indiana Code Section 34-58-1-2(a)(2) would have been appropriate. See
Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 472 n.4 (Ind. 2003). But Reed makes no
such allegation. Accordingly, looking only at the face of Reed’s complaint,
there is no basis to dismiss the complaint because of White’s and Chaney’s
possible immunity defenses.
[10] Second, taking the facts stated in Reed’s complaint as true, as we must, there
was no basis in any IDOC policy for White and Chaney to have confiscated the
crosses. To the contrary, Reed alleges that the crosses did not violate the STG
policy, and he maintains that White and Chaney’s reliance on that stated policy
was merely a “pretense” to obscure their alleged theft of Reed’s personal
property. Appellant’s App. at 12. Reed’s allegations may prove incorrect at a
fact-finding hearing, but they state a claim.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 67A01-1708-MI-1768 | May 18, 2018 Page 6 of 7
[11] In sum, taking as true all allegations upon the face of Reed’s complaint, we
hold that the trial court erred when it dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaint is sufficient under
Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-5(c) to require White and Chaney to respond
thereto. See Guillen, 922 N.E.2d at 123 (reversing dismissal of offender’s
complaint alleging prison officials negligently or deliberately violated both the
Indiana Constitution and prison mail rules).
[12] Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 67A01-1708-MI-1768 | May 18, 2018 Page 7 of 7