In the Term. of the Parent-Child Relationship of: B.A. (Minor Child), and, D.L. (Father) v. Ind. Dept. of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Mar 15 2016, 9:04 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Leanna Weissmann Gregory F. Zoeller
Lawrenceburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Robert J. Henke
David E. Corey
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Termination of the Parent- March 15, 2016
Child Relationship of: Court of Appeals Cause No.
21A01-1509-JT-1559
B.A. (Minor Child), Appeal from the Fayette Circuit
Court
and, The Honorable Beth Butsch, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
D.L. (Father), 21C01-1505-JT-117
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Appellant-Respondent,
v.
Indiana Department of Child
Services,
Appellee-Petitiner.
Barnes, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] D.L. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to B.A. We
affirm.
Issues
[2] Father raises two issues, which we restate as:
I. whether the trial court properly found that there is a
reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in
B.A.’s removal will not be remedied; and
II. whether the trial court properly found that
termination of Father’s parental rights was in B.A.’s
best interests.
Facts
[3] B.A. was born in December 2012 to Father and A.A. (“Mother”). B.A. came
to the attention of the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) due to Mother’s
and Father’s problems with drug addiction. At that time, Mother and Father
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lived together with B.A. In May 2013, Mother and Father entered into an
informal adjustment to address their drug addictions and lack of stable housing
and income. Mother continued to abuse drugs and became homeless. Father
did not participate in services, except that he took drug screens when the family
case manager was able to locate him. Father continued to abuse drugs and
tested positive for marijuana, opiates, benzodiazepines, 6-acetylmorphine,
hydromorphone, morphine, methamphetamine, xanax, diazepam, methadone,
amphetamine, and EDDP.
[4] Due to Mother’s and Father’s lack of progress, DCS removed B.A. from
Mother’s care in August 2013, and filed a petition alleging that B.A. was a child
in need of services (“CHINS”), which the trial court later granted. At the time,
Father was incarcerated and charged with “three A felony dealing charges, a C
forgery charge, a C fraudulent charge, and a D theft.” Tr. p. 6. In September
2013, DNA testing established Father’s paternity of B.A. Father was ultimately
convicted of two counts of Class C felony forgery, Class D felony theft, and was
found to be an habitual offender. Father also had a 2010 conviction for Class D
felony possession of a controlled substance.1 Father expects to be released from
incarceration in August 2018.
1
The State indicates that Father also has a 2014 conviction for Class B felony dealing in cocaine or a narcotic
drug. However, evidence concerning this conviction was not presented at the termination hearing. As a
result, we do not consider that conviction.
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[5] DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. Mother
voluntarily terminated her parental rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court terminated Father’s parental rights. Father now appeals.
Analysis
[6] Father challenges the termination of his parental rights to B.A. The Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of
parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127,
1132 (Ind. 2010). “A parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or
her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’” Id.
(quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)). “Indeed
the parent-child relationship is ‘one of the most valued relationships in our
culture.’” Id. (quoting Neal v. DeKalb County Div. of Family & Children, 796
N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ind. 2003)). We recognize of course that parental interests
are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests when
determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.
Thus, “‘[p]arental rights may be terminated when the parents are unable or
unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.’” Id. (quoting In re D.D., 804
N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied).
[7] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and
reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. We must
also give “due regard” to the trial court’s unique opportunity to judge the
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credibility of the witnesses. Id. (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). Here, the trial
court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS’s
petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. When reviewing findings of fact
and conclusions thereon entered in a case involving a termination of parental
rights, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. First, we determine whether
the evidence supports the findings, and second we determine whether the
findings support the judgment. Id. We will set aside the trial court’s judgment
only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if the
findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not
support the judgment. Id.
[8] Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(a) provides that “if the court finds that the
allegations in a petition described in [Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4] are true,
the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” Indiana Code Section
31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship
involving a child in need of services must allege, in part:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the child’s removal
or the reasons for placement outside the
home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship
poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
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(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions,
been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child;
and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and
treatment of the child.
DCS must establish these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Egly v.
Blackford County Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1992).
I. Changed Conditions
[9] Father first argues that the trial court’s conclusion that the conditions that
resulted in B.A.’s removal will not be remedied is clearly erroneous.2 In making
this determination, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or
her child at the time of the termination hearing and take into consideration
evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001), trans. denied. However, the trial court must also “evaluate the parent’s
2
Father also argues that the trial court’s conclusion that the continuation of the parent-child relationship
poses a threat to the well-being of B.A. is clearly erroneous. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is
written in the disjunctive. Subsection (b)(2)(B)(iii), which concerns repeated CHINS adjudications, is
inapplicable here. Consequently, DCS was required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence a
reasonable probability that either: (1) the conditions that resulted in B.A.’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied, or (2) the continuation of the parent-child
relationship poses a threat to the well-being of B.A. The trial court found a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in B.A.’s removal and continued placement outside Father’s home would not be
remedied, and there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion. Thus, we need
not determine whether there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child
relationship poses a threat to B.A.’s well-being. See, e.g., Bester v. Lake County Office of Family & Children, 839
N.E.2d 143, 148 n.5 (Ind. 2005); In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 774 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.
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habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or
deprivation of the child.” Id.
[10] Father argues that his attitudes and behaviors have changed after he realized
that he had a child. Father contends that his ability to participate in services
has been limited due to his incarceration, but he points to his participation in
the PLUS program at the Department of Correction. In support of his
argument, Father relies on two recent opinions that reversed the termination of
parental rights of an incarcerated parent. See In re J.M., 908 N.E.2d 191 (Ind.
2009), and In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. 2009). In J.M., 908 N.E.2d at 194-
96, the parents were arrested on dealing in methamphetamine charges, and
their four-year-old child was placed in the care of relatives and later in foster
care. The trial court denied DCS’s petition to terminate the parents’ parental
rights. Our supreme court affirmed and noted that parents’ probable release
dates were “close in time,” the parents had a relationship with the child prior to
their imprisonment, parents had fully cooperated with services, and the father
had secured housing and employment. J.M., 908 N.E.2d at 195. Similarly, in
G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1261-65, our supreme court reversed the termination of a
mother’s parental rights where, although she was incarcerated, her crimes were
committed prior to the child’s birth, she took several classes in prison to better
herself, she had a positive and consistent relationship with the child, she had
made employment and housing plans for after her release, and her release from
prison was imminent.
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[11] G.Y. and J.M. are distinguishable from this situation. Unlike in G.Y. or J.M.,
Father has no relationship or bond with B.A. Father only spent two to four
months with B.A. prior to his incarceration, and B.A. was an infant at that
time. Although Father’s available services were limited by his incarceration,
the family case manager did not receive any documentation or proof that he
participated in the services that were available at the jail. However, Father
testified that he started participating in the PLUS program shortly before the
termination hearing. Father is scheduled to be released from incarceration in
August 2018. At that time, B.A. will be five and one-half years old. Father also
has a significant drug addiction and a substantial criminal history. Even after
Father is released from incarceration, he would have to demonstrate that he
was able to parent B.A. Given Father’s incarceration, uncertain future, lack of
a relationship with B.A., criminal history, and drug addiction history, we
cannot say that the trial court’s conclusion that the conditions resulting in the
B.A.’s removal will not be remedied is clearly erroneous.
II. Best Interests
[12] Next, Father challenges the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in B.A.’s
best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial
court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. D.D., 804 N.E.2d at
267. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to
those of the child involved. Id.
[13] Father acknowledges that B.A. is stable in his pre-adoptive foster care but
argues that his parental rights to B.A. should not be terminated “just because
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Father is incarcerated.”3 Appellant’s Br. p. 18. However, Father’s parental
rights were not terminated “just because of his incarceration.” Rather, the
totality of the evidence revealed that Father had a significant drug addiction
problem, a significant criminal history, and no relationship or bond with B.A.
The CASA testified that termination of Father’s parental rights was in B.A.’s
best interests, and the family case manager recommended termination of
Father’s parental rights due to B.A.’s need for permanency and Father’s history.
Even Father recognized during his testimony at the termination hearing that it
would not be good for B.A. to get attached to someone and “get jerked away.”
Tr. p. 40. Given the lack of a relationship between Father and B.A., B.A.’s
current stable placement, and Father’s history of drug abuse and criminal
activity, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding that termination was in
B.A.’s best interests is clearly erroneous.
3
The State correctly notes that Father erroneously argues “the trial court must consider the totality of the
evidence and determine whether custody by the parent is wholly inadequate for the child’s future physical,
mental, and social growth.” Appellant’s Br. p. 16 (citing In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
(emphasis added). The “wholly inadequate” language is not found in A.K. In fact, our supreme court has
held:
Clear and convincing evidence need not reveal that “the continued custody of the parents is
wholly inadequate for the child’s very survival.” Egly v. Blackford County Dep’t of Pub.
Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1233 (Ind. 1992). Rather, it is sufficient to show by clear and
convincing evidence that “the child’s emotional and physical development are threatened”
by the respondent parent’s custody.
Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148.
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Conclusion
[14] The trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights is not clearly erroneous.
We affirm.
[15] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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