Brandon Shryock v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                     FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                             Dec 04 2017, 6:51 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                               Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                          and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Dylan A. Vigh                                           Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Law Offices of Dylan A. Vigh, LLC                       Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    Caroline G. Templeton
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Brandon Shryock,                                        December 4, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    48A04-1706-CR-1177
    v.                                              Appeal from the Madison Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable David A. Happe,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Judge
    Trial Court Cause Nos.
    48C04-1503-F5-459
    48C04-1507-F5-1056
    Bailey, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1706-CR-1177 | December 4, 2017       Page 1 of 6
    Case Summary
    [1]   Brandon Shryock (“Shryock”) pled guilty to Criminal Stalking, as a Level 5
    felony,1 Invasion of Privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor,2 Criminal Mischief, as
    a Class A misdemeanor,3 and two counts of Domestic Battery, as Class A
    misdemeanors.4 His aggregate sentence included a term of incarceration and a
    term of home detention; also, a portion of his sentence was suspended to
    supervised probation. Shryock was ordered not to have contact, direct or
    indirect, with his victim. He subsequently violated the no-contact order and
    admitted his violation. As a probation violation sanction, Shryock’s home
    detention placement was revoked, a portion of his previously-suspended
    sentence was reinstated, and he was ordered to serve 1,460 days of
    imprisonment. On appeal, he presents the sole issue of whether the trial court
    abused its discretion in imposing the sanction. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   M.J. is the mother of Shryock’s three children. On January 25, 2016, Shryock
    pled guilty to six charges, in two separate cause numbers, stemming from his
    criminal conduct against M.J. In Case 1056, Shryock received an aggregate
    1
    Ind. Code § 35-45-10-5.
    2
    I.C. § 35-46-1-15.1
    3
    I.C. § 35-43-1-2.
    4
    I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1706-CR-1177 | December 4, 2017   Page 2 of 6
    sentence of ten years, with three years to be executed in the Department of
    Correction (“the DOC”), to be followed by six months in home detention. The
    remainder of the sentence was suspended, with six years of supervised
    probation. In Case 459, Shryock was sentenced to thirty months in the DOC,
    all suspended to direct placement in the Madison County Community
    Corrections home detention program. The sentences were to be served
    consecutively. In each case, the trial court issued a no-contact order prohibiting
    Shryock from having direct or indirect contact with M.J.
    [3]   While he was incarcerated in the DOC, Shryock drafted and mailed a letter
    addressed to his eldest child. The letter included communication intended to
    reach M.J. Shryock requested that the child ask his mother to allow Shryock to
    see his children. Shryock also offered predictions that he and M.J. would be in
    court all the time, he would get joint custody of their children, M.J. would
    hopefully go to jail or prison, and Shryock would not be bringing the children to
    see her. On March 14, 2017, Shryock was charged with Invasion of Privacy.
    [4]   On April 4, 2017, the State filed a petition in Case 1056 to revoke Shryock’s
    home detention placement and probation. On April 25, 2017, the State filed a
    revocation petition in Case 459.
    [5]   On May 8, 2017, Shryock appeared at a hearing and submitted a plea
    agreement to resolve the new charge and the pending revocation petitions.
    Shryock pled guilty to the new charge of Invasion of Privacy and his executed
    prison time was capped at one year. He admitted the alleged violations with
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1706-CR-1177 | December 4, 2017   Page 3 of 6
    respect to Case 459 and Case 1056, with the sanction to be imposed left open
    for argument.
    [6]   Shryock received a sentence for his new offense of thirty months, with eighteen
    months suspended to probation. In Case 459, Shryock’s home detention
    placement was revoked and he was ordered to serve the remainder of his 456
    days in the DOC. In Case 1056, Shryock’s community corrections placement
    was revoked and his suspended sentence was partially revoked. He was
    ordered to serve 1,004 previously-suspended days in the DOC with 1,551 days
    remaining after completion of the executed sentence to be served on probation.
    As such, Shryock was ordered to serve four years (1,460 days) in the DOC as a
    sanction for his violations in Case 459 and 1056. He now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    [7]   If a trial court determines that a probationer has violated the terms of his
    probation, the trial court may continue the defendant on probation, change the
    terms of the probation, or order all or part of the previously suspended sentence
    to be executed. I.C. § 35-38-2-3. Similarly, if a defendant placed on
    community corrections violates the terms of his placement, the trial court may
    change the terms of the placement, continue the placement, reassign the person,
    or commit the person to the DOC for the remainder of the sentence. I.C. § 35-
    38-2.6-5. For purposes of appellate review, a petition to revoke placement in
    community corrections is treated the same as a petition to revoke probation.
    Johnson v. State, 
    62 N.E.3d 1224
    , 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1706-CR-1177 | December 4, 2017   Page 4 of 6
    [8]   Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the court must determine
    whether the terms of probation have been violated; second, the court must
    determine appropriate sanctions for the violation. Heaton v. State, 
    984 N.E.2d 614
    , 616 (Ind. 2013). The Indiana Supreme Court has set forth the standard
    under which we review decisions revoking probation and imposing sanctions
    for the violation of probation terms:
    “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a
    right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State,
    
    878 N.E.2d 184
    , 188 (Ind. 2007). It is within the discretion of the
    trial court to determine probation conditions and to revoke
    probation if the conditions are violated. 
    Id. In appeals
    from trial
    court probation violation determinations and sanctions, we
    review for abuse of discretion. 
    Id. An abuse
    of discretion occurs
    where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the
    facts and circumstances, 
    id., or when
    the trial court misinterprets
    the law, see State v. Cozart, 
    897 N.E.2d 478
    , 483 (Ind. 2008) (citing
    Axsom v. Axsom, 
    565 N.E.2d 1097
    , 1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)
    (“An abuse of discretion may also be found when the trial court
    misinterprets the law or disregards factors listed in the controlling
    statute.”)).
    
    Id. [9] Shryock
    does not contest the determination that he violated the terms of his
    probation and community corrections placement. He argues only that the
    sanction amounts to an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. More specifically,
    Shryock contends that the sanction was unduly harsh because the letter content
    was relatively benign, he did not draft it with malicious intent or blatant
    disregard of the law, and the State did not present evidence of M.J.’s reaction.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1706-CR-1177 | December 4, 2017   Page 5 of 6
    [10]   A review of the record discloses that Shryock has a substantial history of crimes
    against M.J. Despite leniency in the past, he has been undeterred in his
    criminal conduct involving the same victim. In the latest offense of Invasion of
    Privacy, he attempted to use his minor child as an instrumentality for his
    purposes. Shryock’s arguments as to benign intent and minimal consequences
    simply present a request for reweighing the evidence. We conclude that the
    order that Shryock serve a portion of his previously suspended sentence in the
    DOC is not clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
    before the trial court.
    Conclusion
    [11]   Shryock has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in its order
    for sanctions.
    [12]   Affirmed.
    Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1706-CR-1177 | December 4, 2017   Page 6 of 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 48A04-1706-CR-1177

Filed Date: 12/4/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021