Christian Burt v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                        FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                    Jan 11 2018, 8:50 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                              Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                        and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Frederick Vaiana                                         Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Voyles Vaiana Lukemeyer Baldwin &                        Attorney General of Indiana
    Webb
    Caryn N. Szyper
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Christian Burt,                                          January 11, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    49A02-1708-CR-1793
    v.                                               Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Alicia A. Gooden,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49G21-1607-F4-27134
    Bailey, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CR-1793 | January 11, 2018           Page 1 of 8
    Case Summary
    [1]   Christian Burt (“Burt”) appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for
    dealing in cocaine, as a Level 2 felony,1 and dealing in a narcotic, as a Level 2
    felony.2 On appeal he raises the sole issue of whether the State presented
    sufficient evidence to support those convictions. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On the afternoon of July 13, 2016, Detective Eric Forestal (“Det. Forestal”), an
    undercover detective with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
    (“IMPD”), was conducting surveillance. He observed a man, later identified as
    Burt, exit an apartment building with an open beer bottle in his hand and walk
    towards a white Cadillac in the parking lot. Det. Forestal saw Burt open the
    trunk of the vehicle, pull back the liner, and place a semi-automatic handgun in
    the trunk. Burt then moved the trunk liner back in place and drove away in the
    vehicle. Det. Forestal followed Burt in his undercover vehicle and, when he
    observed Burt commit a traffic violation, he radioed for an officer in a marked
    police vehicle to conduct a traffic stop.
    [3]   Shortly thereafter, IMPD Sergeant James Martin (“Sgt. Martin”), who was in a
    marked police vehicle, attempted to initiate a traffic stop on Burt’s vehicle using
    1
    Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(2) and (e)(1).
    2
    I.C. § 35-48-4-1(a)(2) and (e)(2).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CR-1793 | January 11, 2018   Page 2 of 8
    his lights and sirens, but Burt did not stop right away. Sgt. Martin observed
    Burt fidgeting and moving around inside the car as he continued to drive. Burt
    then abruptly turned into a parking lot and stopped. As Sgt. Martin approached
    the vehicle, he saw Burt reaching down towards the center console area. Sgt.
    Martin asked Burt for his license and registration, and Burt’s hands were
    shaking badly as he attempted to find his wallet. Burt was the only occupant in
    the vehicle.
    [4]   Det. Forestal arrived on the scene shortly after Burt stopped his vehicle. During
    the traffic stop, the officers learned that the white Cadillac was registered to
    Burt and to a female, later identified as Burt’s mother, and that Burt’s driving
    privileges had been suspended. After informing Burt of his Miranda rights, Det.
    Forestal asked Burt if he had any weapons in the vehicle. Burt denied
    knowledge of any weapons and said that it was not his car. Det. Forestal then
    told Burt that he saw him place a handgun in the trunk underneath the trunk
    liner and Burt “dropped his head.” Tr. at 30. Burt then admitted to placing the
    handgun in the trunk and admitted that he did not have a license to carry a
    firearm. The officers took Burt into custody and found $877 in cash on his
    person during a search incident to arrest.
    [5]   The police had Burt’s car towed to a secure location and Det. Forestal obtained
    a warrant to search the vehicle. During the search, officers found a loaded .45
    caliber Taurus handgun sitting on top of a black plastic bag under the liner of
    the trunk. Inside the black plastic bag, officers found two plastic bags of
    cocaine with weights of 7.13 and 20.73 grams, one plastic bag of heroin with a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CR-1793 | January 11, 2018   Page 3 of 8
    weight of 8.72 grams, and digital scales. The officers also found Burt’s 2007
    GED and his automotive repair paperwork from 2013 in the glove
    compartment. In the trunk, officers found mail dated September 1, 2015, with
    Burt’s name on it.
    [6]   On July 15, 2016, the State charged Burt with unlawful possession of a firearm
    by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony,3 and operating a vehicle as a
    habitual traffic violator, a Level 6 felony.4 On July 22, the State amended the
    charging information to add charges for dealing in cocaine, as a Level 2 felony; 5
    dealing in a narcotic drug, as a Level 2 felony;6 possession of cocaine, as a Level
    3 felony;7 possession of a narcotic drug, as a Level 4 felony; 8 and carrying a
    handgun without a license, as a Class A misdemeanor. 9 The State subsequently
    filed motions to dismiss the unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious
    violent felon charge and the operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator
    charge, and the trial court granted those motions.
    3
    I.C. § 35-47-4-5(c).
    4
    I.C. § 9-30-10-16(a)(2).
    5
    I.C. § 35-48-4-1(a)(2) and (e)(1).
    6
    I.C. § 35-48-4-1(a)(2) and (e)(2).
    7
    I.C. § 35-48-4-6(a) and (d)(2).
    8
    I.C. § 35-48-4-6(a) and (c)(2).
    9
    I.C. § 35-47-2-1.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CR-1793 | January 11, 2018   Page 4 of 8
    [7]   Following Burt’s June 20, 2017, jury trial, the jury found him guilty as charged
    on all remaining counts. At the sentencing hearing on July 14, the trial court
    vacated Burt’s convictions for possession of cocaine and possession of a
    narcotic drug. The trial court then sentenced Burt to ten years executed for
    Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine; ten years executed for Level 2 felony dealing
    in a narcotic drug; and 365 days executed for Class A misdemeanor carrying a
    handgun without a license. The court ordered the sentences to run
    concurrently. This appeal ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    [8]   Burt challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for
    dealing in cocaine and dealing in a narcotic, both as Level 2 felonies. Our
    standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence is well-settled:
    When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to
    support a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor
    judge witness credibility. Bailey v. State, 
    907 N.E.2d 1003
    , 1005
    (Ind. 2009). “We consider only the evidence supporting the
    judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
    such evidence.” 
    Id. We will
    affirm if there is substantial
    evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact
    could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a
    reasonable doubt. 
    Id. Clemons v.
    State, 
    996 N.E.2d 1282
    , 1285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
    Moreover, “[a] conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence alone so
    long as there are reasonable inferences enabling the factfinder to find the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CR-1793 | January 11, 2018   Page 5 of 8
    defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lawrence v. State, 
    959 N.E.2d 385
    , 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted), trans. denied.
    [9]    To support Burt’s convictions of dealing in cocaine and dealing in a narcotic
    drug as Level 2 felonies, the State was required to prove that Burt knowingly or
    intentionally possessed minimum amounts10 of the drugs with the intent to
    deliver11 them. I.C. § 35-48-4-1. A person actually possesses contraband when
    he or she has direct physical control over it. Gray v. State, 
    957 N.E.2d 171
    , 174
    (Ind. 2011). Here, Burt did not actually possess the cocaine and heroin; he did
    not have direct physical control over either drug because they were in the trunk
    of the car.
    [10]   However, "[w]hen the State cannot show actual possession, a conviction for
    possessing contraband may rest instead on proof of constructive possession."
    
    Id. A person
    constructively possesses contraband when the person has (1) the
    capability to maintain dominion and control over the item, and (2) the intent to
    maintain dominion and control over it. 
    Id. The capability
    element may be
    inferred “from the simple fact that the defendant had a possessory interest in the
    premises” where the contraband was found, regardless of whether the
    possessory interest is exclusive. 
    Id. “To prove
    the intent element, the State
    10
    Burt does not dispute that the amounts of the cocaine and heroin were within the statutory minimum
    required to prove a Level 2 felony.
    11
    Burt challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to show his intent to possess the contraband; he does
    not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to show intent to deliver the contraband.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CR-1793 | January 11, 2018             Page 6 of 8
    must demonstrate the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the
    contraband,” and such knowledge may be inferred from the defendant’s
    “exclusive dominion and control over the premises containing the contraband.”
    Goliday v. State, 
    708 N.E.2d 4
    , 6 (Ind. 1999) (holding evidence sufficient to
    show constructive possession of contraband found in the trunk of the car where
    the defendant did not own the car, but had a key to the trunk and had several
    personal belongings throughout the car).
    [11]   This case is indistinguishable from Goliday. Burt’s capability to maintain
    dominion and control over the contraband in the trunk could be inferred from
    the facts that he had a key to the trunk; the undercover officer earlier had
    witnessed Burt opening the trunk and placing a gun on top of the bag
    containing the contraband; and Burt’s personal belongings—including his
    gun—were found in the trunk near the contraband and throughout the car. See
    
    id. And Burt’s
    exclusive possession of the vehicle was sufficient to raise a
    reasonable inference of his intent to maintain dominion and control over the
    contraband. 
    Id. (noting the
    intent element of constructive possession does not
    require proof of exclusive ownership of the premises; rather, intent may be
    inferred by a showing of exclusive possession of the premises); see also State v.
    Emry, 
    753 N.E.2d 19
    , 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“Since Emry had exclusive
    control over the vehicle, it was proper for the jury to infer that Emry had the
    intent and capability to exert dominion and control over the marijuana.”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CR-1793 | January 11, 2018   Page 7 of 8
    Conclusion
    [12]   The State provided sufficient evidence to sustain Burt’s convictions for dealing
    in cocaine and dealing in a narcotic.
    [13]   Affirmed.
    Kirsch, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CR-1793 | January 11, 2018   Page 8 of 8