Harvey Stephens v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                  FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                         Feb 22 2018, 8:34 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                           CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                               Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Sean C. Mullins                                          Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Crown Point, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Laura R. Anderson
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Harvey Stephens,                                         February 22, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    45A03-1709-CR-2227
    v.                                               Appeal from the Lake Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Samuel L. Cappas,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    45G04-0104-DF-90
    May, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1709-CR-2227 | February 22, 2018   Page 1 of 7
    [1]   Harvey Stephens appeals his six-year sentence for Class D felony theft 1 and
    Class D felony attempted theft. 2 He argues his sentence is inappropriate. We
    affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On April 2, 2001, Stephens and two accomplices went to Wal-Mart, and “using
    IBM keys,” 3 (App. Vol. II at 37), opened a cash register and stole the money.
    They attempted to repeat their actions at Target but were thwarted and ran
    away. Police apprehended Stephens and arrested him.
    [3]   On April 4, 2001, the State charged Stephens with Class D felony theft and
    Class D felony attempted theft. On January 17, 2002, Stephens pled guilty
    pursuant to a plea agreement. The plea agreement stipulated Stephens would
    not receive misdemeanor treatment and the State would refrain from filing a
    habitual offender enhancement. On February 27, 2002, because Stephens had
    been incarcerated in Ohio, he was sentenced in absentia. The trial court
    sentenced Stephens to three years on each charge and ordered the sentences
    served consecutively.
    1
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (1985).
    2
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (1985); Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1 (1977).
    3
    No explanation is given in the record to clarify the meaning of this term.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1709-CR-2227 | February 22, 2018   Page 2 of 7
    [4]   On September 27, 2016, Stephens was extradited from Ohio. On October 21,
    2016, Stephens was advised of his sentence and his attendant appellate rights.
    Stephens filed a Petition for Permission to file Belated Notice of Appeal. The
    trial court granted his petition, and we reviewed his sentence. We reversed and
    remanded his case for resentencing because fundamental error occurred when
    the trial court relied on an unverified criminal history report without giving
    Stephens the opportunity to dispute it. See Stephens v. State, 45A04-1612-CR-
    2927, memorandum op. at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
    [5]   On resentencing, the trial court found the following aggravating circumstances:
    l. At the time of the commission of these offenses, the defendant
    had approximately thirty-three (33) felony convictions and one
    (1) misdemeanor conviction;
    2. The defendant’s criminal history demonstrates that the
    defendant has never learned from being incarcerated not to
    commit criminal offenses;
    3. The Court finds that a mitigated sentence would depreciate the
    seriousness of defendant’s crimes, as they are viewed in a pattern
    of criminal history;
    4. The defendant’s pattern of criminal activity demonstrates that
    the defendant is unable to conform his behavior to the norms and
    rules of society;
    5. The defendant is in need of correctional and rehabilitative
    treatment that can only be provided by a penal facility;
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1709-CR-2227 | February 22, 2018   Page 3 of 7
    6. Previous attempts at incarceration have failed to sway the
    defendant’s conduct;
    7. The Court notes that this is the longest criminal history of a
    defendant that it has ever seen.
    (App. Vol. II at 129-130.) The court found a mitigator in Stephens’ guilty plea,
    but the court still found the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating
    factor. The trial court, noting the disparity between the aggravators and the
    mitigator and the fact two victims were harmed, sentenced Stephens to three
    years on each count, to be served consecutively.
    Discussion and Decision
    [6]   Stephens asserts his sentence is inappropriate. Specifically, he argues that
    because he had not had any convictions for ten years prior to the current one
    and because no person or property was harmed during the current offenses, his
    convictions did not warrant the maximum sentence. 4
    4
    Stephens also asserts he is not required to prove both prongs of Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), i.e., the nature
    of the offense and the character of the offender. Although some panels of this court have so held, others have
    declined to do so. Compare Connor v. State, 
    58 N.E.3d 215
    , 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (holding the appellate
    review under App. R. 7(B) requires the reviewing court to “consider both of those prongs in [its] assessment,
    [but there is no] requirement that the defendant must prove each of those prongs [to] render his sentence
    inappropriate” (emphasis in original, footnote omitted)), with Williams v. State, 
    891 N.E.2d 621
    , 633 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2008) (noting revision of sentence under App. R. 7(B) requires appellant “demonstrate that his sentence
    is inappropriate in light of both the nature of his offenses and his character” (emphasis in original)), and also
    with Baumholser v. State, 
    62 N.E.3d 411
    , 418 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (although Baumholser’s character, beyond
    the appealed offenses, was not “deplorable,” Baumholser was required to “demonstrate the sentence [was]
    inappropriate in light of both the nature of the offense and his character” (emphasis in original)), trans. denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1709-CR-2227 | February 22, 2018               Page 4 of 7
    [7]   Under Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence if, after due
    consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find the sentence inappropriate in
    light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Anglemyer v.
    State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    , 491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g 
    875 N.E.2d 218
    (2007).
    We consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court,
    but also any other factors appearing in the record. Johnson v. State, 
    986 N.E.2d 852
    , 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We defer to the trial court’s decision, and our
    goal is to determine whether the defendant’s sentence is inappropriate, not
    whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. Conley v. State, 
    972 N.E.2d 864
    , 876 (Ind. 2012), reh’g denied. Stephens, as the appellant, bears the
    burden of demonstrating his sentence is inappropriate. See Childress v. State, 
    848 N.E.2d 1073
    , 1080 (Ind. 2006).
    [8]   When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting
    point for determining the appropriateness of a sentence. 
    Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494
    . The sentencing range for a Class D felony in 2001 was “a fixed term of
    Furthermore, in Connor, while the court did not require the appellant to prove both prongs, it still applied a
    “holistic” test in which both prongs were considered together. 
    Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 219
    .
    Here, Stephens presents argument as to both the nature of his offense and his character, but he asserts he is
    not required to prove both prongs render his sentence inappropriate. As a matter of law, we disagree. See
    
    Baumholser, 62 N.E.3d at 418
    (“to obtain relief, Baumholser must demonstrate the sentence is inappropriate
    in light of both the nature of the offense and his character”) (emphasis in original). Stephens also argues that
    “even if this court were to agree with the State’s contention that the maximum sentence is appropriate in light
    of [his] criminal history, the benign nature of the offenses still renders the maximum sentence inappropriate.”
    (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 7.) As a matter of fact, we disagree. When a defendant has 33 felony convictions
    and prior punishment has not discouraged his willingness to engage in illegal acts, we see nothing
    inappropriate about a maximum sentence for a “benign” crime. See Ashba v. State, 
    816 N.E.2d 862
    , 867 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2004) (criminal history is a valid consideration when imposing maximum sentence even in the
    absence of egregious offenses).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1709-CR-2227 | February 22, 2018             Page 5 of 7
    one and one-half (1 ½) years, with not more than one and one-half (1 ½) years
    added for aggravating circumstances or not more than one (1) year subtracted
    for mitigating circumstances.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 (1990). The trial court
    sentenced Stephens to three years for each offense, to be served consecutively.
    Thus, Stephens received the maximum possible sentence for his offenses.
    [9]    While committing these offenses, Stephens and his accomplices entered Wal-
    Mart and took money from a register. They then attempted to repeat their
    actions at Target but were unsuccessful. No violence was committed, and the
    money from Wal-Mart was recovered. The crimes were perpetrated against
    two different victims, Wal-Mart and Target. We find nothing in nature of his
    offenses to make them more egregious than necessary to complete each offense.
    [10]   When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the
    defendant’s criminal history. 
    Johnson, 986 N.E.2d at 857
    . The significance of
    criminal history varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior
    offenses in relation to the offense. 
    Id. While Stephens
    argues we should give
    weight to the fact he had not committed any crimes for a decade prior to the
    offenses at issue here, his criminal history is still extensive. Additionally,
    during at least some of that decade, Stephens was in jail. 5 The trial court noted
    5
    The parties disagree how much time Stephens spent in jail before the crimes at issue herein. While
    acknowledging it does not have his release dates, the State asserts the “total of the possible consecutive
    sentences [Stephens] received is greater than the time difference from when his first sentence was imposed
    and the date of the offenses here.” (Appellee’s Br. at 11.) Without giving any proof, Stephens counters that
    he “would have likely served at most four years, less any time served prior to sentencing” as a result of the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1709-CR-2227 | February 22, 2018           Page 6 of 7
    Stephens had “probably one of the worst criminal histories [the trial court had]
    seen.” (Tr. at 20.) It stated Stephens “ha[d]n’t learned from any of [his]
    previous incarcerations.” 6 (Id.) Additionally, nearly all of Stephens’ crimes are
    of the same type as perpetrated here, i.e., robbery, theft, bad checks, forgery, etc.
    In light of Stephens’ extensive criminal history and the types of crimes he
    continually repeated, we see nothing inappropriate about Stephens’ six-year
    sentence. See, e.g., Stokes v. State, 
    947 N.E.2d 1033
    , 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
    (affirming sentence as not inappropriate based on criminal history), trans. denied.
    Conclusion
    [11]   Stephens’ six-year sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.
    [12]   Affirmed.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.
    convictions that last occurred in 1991. (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5.) Without doubt, Stephens spent some
    part of that decade in jail, and we decline to give Stephens credit for a decade of crime-free living.
    6
    We also note that although the trial court seemingly gave no weight to the fact Stephens has been convicted
    of six more felonies since the current offenses in 2001, these too give credence to the trial court’s assertion
    Stephens is incapable of conforming his behavior to societal norms and has not learned from his prior
    incarcerations.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1709-CR-2227 | February 22, 2018            Page 7 of 7