Matthew S. Simons v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Feb 28 2018, 8:32 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
CLERK
precedent or cited before any court except for the Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
T. Andrew Perkins Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Peterson Waggoner & Perkins, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Rochester, Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Matthew S. Simons, February 28, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
25A03-1708-CR-1841
v. Appeal from the Fulton Circuit
Court.
The Honorable A. Christopher Lee,
State of Indiana, Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No.
25C01-1404-FD-213
Friedlander, Senior Judge
[1] Matthew S. Simons appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. We affirm.
[2] Simons presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:
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1. Whether Simons’s waiver of his right to counsel was made
knowingly and intelligently.
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Simons’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
[3] On April 8, 2014, Simons was charged with possession of methamphetamine, a
1 2
Class D felony; possession of illegal drug lab, a Class D felony; resisting law
3
enforcement, a Class D felony; and possession of marijuana, a Class A
4
misdemeanor. Three years later on May 2, 2017, the morning of trial, Simons
entered into a plea agreement in which he would plead guilty to the charge of
possession of an illegal drug lab as a Class D felony. In exchange, the State
would dismiss the remaining three charges in this case as well as the charges of
possession of methamphetamine and possession of paraphernalia in another
cause.
[4] After entry of his plea but prior to sentencing, Simons filed his pro se
appearance with a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on June 13. At the
hearing on Simons’s motion, the court told Simons it would not grant him a
different attorney and asked if he wanted to continue being represented by his
public defender or to represent himself. Simons replied that he wanted to
represent himself. After admonishing Simons regarding the dangers of self-
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1 (2006).
2
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-14.5 (2013).
3
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1 (2013).
4
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11 (2013).
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representation, the court granted his request to withdraw the appearance of the
public defender and proceeded with the hearing with Simons representing
himself. Following the hearing, the court denied Simons’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.
[5] At sentencing on July 17, 2017, the court accepted Simons’s plea agreement
and sentenced him accordingly to three years with no time suspended,
consecutive to his sentence in another cause. Simons now appeals.
[6] We first note that generally a challenge to a guilty plea must be pursued through
post-conviction proceedings rather than on direct appeal. Milian v. State, 994
N.E.2d 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Nevertheless, a defendant who
has sought to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing may challenge the
trial court’s denial on direct appeal. Id. This is such a case.
1. Waiver of Counsel
[7] Simons contends that his waiver of counsel at the hearing on his motion to
withdraw guilty plea was not knowing or intelligent. The Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
counsel, and this right encompasses the right to self-representation. McBride v.
State, 992 N.E.2d 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Nevertheless, before a
defendant waives his right to counsel and proceeds pro se, the trial court must
determine that the defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent. Jackson v. State, 992 N.E.2d 926 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
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[8] The defendant who waives his right to counsel and asserts his right to self-
representation should be informed of the dangers and disadvantages of doing
so. Parish v. State, 989 N.E.2d 831 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Our Supreme Court
has stated that there are no prescribed “talking points” a trial court is required
to include in its advisement to defendants but directed trial courts to come to a
“considered determination” that a defendant is making a voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent waiver. Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ind. 2001). In
making this determination, the Court has considered four factors: “(1) the
extent of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s decision, (2) other evidence in
the record that establishes whether the defendant understood the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, (3) the background and experience of the
defendant, and (4) the context of the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se.”
Id. at 1127-28. The Court noted that when applying these factors, the trial court
is in the best position to assess whether a defendant has knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived counsel, and the trial court’s decision will
most likely be upheld where it has made the proper inquiries, conveyed the
proper information, and reached a reasoned conclusion. Id. We review de
novo the trial court’s determination that a defendant waived his right to
counsel. McBride, 992 N.E.2d 912.
[9] Further, the right to counsel guarantee applies at any “critical stage” of the
prosecution where the absence of counsel might diminish the defendant’s right
to a fair trial. Esmond v. State, 20 N.E.3d 213, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The
proper test for determining whether a particular proceeding is a critical stage to
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which the assistance of counsel guarantee applies is whether the defendant is
confronted with the intricacies of the law or the advocacy of the State. Id.[10] In the present case, Simons was advised by the court at his initial hearing in
April 2014 that he had a right to be represented by counsel and that, if he could
not afford one, the court would appoint counsel. Simons requested the court to
appoint counsel, and, after questioning Simons regarding his ability to pay an
attorney, the court appointed counsel.
[11] Soon thereafter, Public Defender Saiz appeared as counsel for Simons.
Subsequently, at the request of the parties, the court set a change of plea hearing
for March 23, 2015. The hearing was then reset for April 13, 2015 at Simons’s
request. However, Simons failed to appear for the April 13 hearing, and the
court issued a warrant for his arrest.
[12] In December 2015, while still represented by Public Defender Saiz, Simons
filed his pro se Motion for Discovery Material, Motion for Transport Order,
and Material and Information in Depositions Motion and informed the trial
court that he was in the Cass County jail. The court issued an order stating it
would take no action on Simons’s filings because he was represented by
counsel.
[13] In April 2016, private counsel filed his appearance for Simons, and Public
Defender Saiz withdrew. Simons, now represented by private counsel, filed a
pro se Motion for Transport. The court again issued an order stating it would
not consider Simons’s motion because he was represented.
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[14] In June 2016, private counsel filed a motion to withdraw his appearance,
stating that “communication between counsel and the Defendant in the above-
captioned causes of action has completely broken down” and that “counsel is
unable to deal with the Defendant anymore [sic] regarding these cases.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 61. The court granted counsel’s motion to
withdraw and reappointed Public Defender Saiz. In August 2016, still
represented by counsel, Simons filed pro se correspondence with the court
seeking discovery materials. The court issued yet another order indicating it
would not take any action on Simons’s pro se filings because he was
represented by counsel.
[15] On January 19, 2017, Simons, although still represented by counsel, filed
correspondence with the court seeking transcripts from depositions in addition
to lengthy correspondence addressed to the judge requesting a fast and speedy
jury trial and outlining suppression of evidence issues he had discussed with his
counsel. On January 24, 2017, Public Defender Saiz filed a motion to
withdraw his appearance, stating “[t]here has been a breakdown in the
attorney/client relationship.” Id. at 83. While counsel’s motion to withdraw
was pending, Simons again filed correspondence addressed to the judge.
During the hearing at which the court granted Public Defender Saiz’s request to
withdraw, the court again explained to Simons that it would not consider his
pro se filings while he was represented by counsel.
[16] On January 31, Public Defender Breitenstein filed her appearance on behalf of
Simons. At a status conference on April 27, less than a week prior to trial, she
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informed the court that Simons had informed her that morning that he wanted
to request a continuance of the trial and wanted a different attorney. The court
then discussed the situation with Simons.
COURT: Okay. Is that right?
SIMONS: Correct, Your Honor.
COURT: I mean you’ve had a few attorneys in this case
already, Mr. Simons.
Tr. p. 26. Simons then explained that, after viewing his taped statements, he
wanted his attorney to conduct a deposition of one of the officers and that his
counsel did not believe it was necessary. The court responded, and the
conversation continued:
COURT: All right. I’m going to deny your request for a new
attorney. We’re on the eve of trial now. This case has been
pending for some time. To the extent that there’s a request for a
continuance that will be denied as well. We are set for trial on
Tuesday, and we will commence on that date.
*******
SIMONS: May I ask a question?
COURT: Go ahead.
SIMONS: If I want to pursue to do the deposition and review
the evidence of the case, and you’re not going to — you’re not
going to give me another attorney, would I have to go pro se to
be able to do that?
COURT: I think that’s something you need to talk to your
attorney with in getting ready for trial. I mean we’re sitting here,
we’ve got a jury panel out, I’ve gotten the instructions ready, and
we’re ready to proceed with trial. And so, any concerns you
have you need to address with your attorney at this point. Okay.
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Id. at 27, 28.
[17] On the morning of trial, represented by Public Defender Breitenstein and with
the jurors waiting in the hallway, Simons entered into a plea agreement with
the State. At the change of plea hearing, the judge asked Simons if he
understood his right to be represented by an attorney, including during trial and
appeal, and explained to him that, if he could not afford an attorney, the court
would appoint one for him. Simons responded that he understood.
[18] On June 13, Simons filed his pro se appearance and motion to withdraw guilty
plea. In his motion, Simons stated his belief that he was “entitled to
meaningful consultation with a new attorney.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 114.
Additionally, included in documents Simons filed with his motion was a letter
he wrote to Public Defender Breitenstein in which he stated, “You are fired
from representing me!” Id. at 124. The trial court set Simons’s motion for
hearing, and, at the hearing, the following conversation ensued.
COURT: I set this for a hearing. Mr. Simons filed a motion
on his own to withdraw from a plea. Typically, Mr. Simons, I
just simply reject those, because you’re represented by counsel.
Because there had been some discussion in your case about
whether you’re going to represent yourself, or you weren’t going
to represent yourself, and so forth, I decided to go ahead and set
this for a hearing here today. Ms. Breitenstein, I guess, I’m —
before we get started, I did not know if — what role you had to
play in this, or if you had a role, or if you object to me even
having a hearing at this point in time.
MS. BREITENSTEIN: Your Honor, we were — I had been
talking to my client about getting such a motion filed. He went
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ahead and submitted one, but I had already had another draft
that was being worked on to be filed, so I don’t have an objection
to proceeding.
COURT: All right. Did you have any evidence to present on
your request?
MS. BREITENSTEIN: Yes, Your Honor. We call — well,
and I guess also — my understanding was the motion he filed
also included a request either for a different attorney or — so I
didn’t know if the Court wanted to deal with that first or — if
not, I would just call Matt Simons to the stand.
COURT: Okay. I’m not going to grant a different attorney at
this time, Mr. Simons. I think we’ve talked about that the last
time I granted you another one. So do you want to have Ms.
Breitenstein represent you or are you going to represent yourself
moving forward?
SIMONS: I don’t – I want to represent myself.
COURT: You want to represent yourself?
SIMONS: Correct.
COURT: All right. Do you understand that there are dangers
to self-representation and that, I’m assuming, you don’t have the
education, the experience, the legal training, and the experience
in representation; is that right?
SIMONS: I have no other choice, Your Honor, if you’re not
going to appoint me another counsel.
COURT: Mr. Simons, we have dealt with this issue, in this
case for some period of time. I think when I appointed you an
attorney the last time we got towards the end of the case, I told
you I wasn’t going to do it again, and I’m not. And so, there are
dangers to self-representation. You have been appointed a very
competent, knowledgeable lawyer to represent you in this case.
And if you don’t choose to utilize her services, then I’m going to
be looking to you to present evidence and argument in this case.
Do you understand that?
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SIMONS: Yeah, MacKenzie Breitenstein was appointed with
60 days on two trial cases, and she prepared depositions on a
case that came before this case. And Danny Saiz was on my case
for two years, on both cases, and he was allowed to withdraw.
COURT: Do you want to have a lawyer — do you want to
have Ms. Breitenstein to represent you or not in this case?
SIMONS: No.
COURT: All right. You understand that you are going — I’m
going to be looking to you to present evidence. So the next thing
that’s going to happen is I’m going to turn to you and say, do you
have any evidence to present on this verified motion?
SIMONS: I do.
COURT: Okay. And you’re prepared to present that
evidence?
SIMONS: Yes, Your Honor. Can we proceed with that today?
COURT: I was planning on it.
SIMONS: Okay.
COURT: Okay. Ms. Breitenstein, I’m going to excuse you at
this time. I’m going to find there’s been a willing, knowing
waiver of an attorney at this point in time.
Tr. pp. 44-46.
[19] Simons then proceeded on the motion that he had prepared and filed and
argued that (1) the fixed sentence of three years contained in the plea agreement
was not the sentence he was told he would receive; (2) the State’s belated filing
of an amended witness list constituted a manifest injustice to his case because it
precluded his testing of the chain of custody; (3) certain scientific tests he
requested were not conducted; (4) he did not view his taped interviews until the
week of trial; (5) no deposition was taken of one of the police officers involved
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in the case; (6) Public Defender Breitenstein prepared for the trial of another of
Simons’s cases before she prepared for the trial of the instant case; and (7) after
Simons pleaded guilty, one of the police officers talked to him without his
attorney present. The State responded to Simons’s contentions by questioning
him about the accuracy of the facts he alleged and by calling Public Defender
Breitenstein to testify. Simons then cross-examined her at length.
[20] In Martin v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), Martin entered a
guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement. At the sentencing hearing, he advised
the trial court of his desire to withdraw his plea, expressed displeasure with his
private counsel, requested the court to appoint counsel, indicated he was unsure
of his competence to properly evaluate the withdrawal of his guilty plea, and
stated he had alibi witnesses. The trial court approved the withdrawal of
Martin’s attorney but denied his request for appointment of counsel. The trial
court held a hearing on Martin’s motion to withdraw plea despite Martin being
unrepresented and having raised substantial questions of law regarding his
competency and alibi witnesses. Based on these circumstances, this Court
concluded that Martin was entitled to the assistance of counsel at the hearing
on his motion to withdraw plea and that he did not knowingly and voluntarily
waive his right to counsel.
[21] More recently, however, in Milian, 994 N.E.2d 342, a panel of this Court
distinguished Martin. After pleading guilty while represented by counsel,
Milian, pro se, moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Subsequently, he also filed a
motion requesting the removal of his appointed counsel and expressing his
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desire to proceed pro se. The trial court held a status conference on Milian’s
motions, at which it announced it would allow Milian to proceed pro se with
his motion to withdraw plea and it would have his appointed counsel serve as
standby counsel.
[22] At the hearing on his motion to withdraw plea, Milian asserted that he was
misled by his counsel as to the offense to which he was pleading and the
inclusion of an habitual substance offender enhancement and that the State had
withheld information from him by delaying discovery. The State responded to
Milian’s contentions, and the trial court denied Milian’s motion. Finding that
Milian made repeated requests to proceed pro se when he was represented by
counsel and that his motion to withdraw guilty plea did not raise substantial
questions of law or issues of fact, this Court concluded it was not error for the
trial court to allow Milian to proceed pro se with his motion to withdraw plea.
[23] We find the facts of the present case to be similar to the facts in Milian. Like
Milian, Simons filed numerous pro se motions while represented by counsel
and his motion to withdraw guilty plea did not raise substantial questions of
law or issues of fact involving legal arguments. In addition, after being
admonished of the dangers of self-representation and when given the choice
between representation by appointed counsel or self-representation, Simons
twice chose self-representation.
[24] In considering the factors of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel within
the circumstances of the present case, we first observe that the trial court
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admonished Simons that there are dangers to self-representation and warned
him that he probably did not have the education, experience, or legal training to
represent himself. The court also advised Simons that he had a competent,
knowledgeable lawyer, and, if he chose not to utilize her services, the court
would expect him to present evidence and argument on his own behalf. Simons
twice unequivocally stated he wanted to represent himself, and then asked the
court if it could proceed on his motion and indicated he was prepared to present
evidence.
[25] Further, it appears from the record that Simons is a high school graduate who
has extensive experience with the criminal justice system and its proceedings.
In general, the documents on appeal reveal a lengthy criminal history of both
felony and misdemeanor convictions. More specifically, his plea agreement in
the present case confirms he had another pending cause in Fulton County and
other information in the record indicates additional criminal charges in Cass
County as well as a very similar motion to withdraw plea in his case in Cass
County. Additionally, Simons demonstrated his experience with criminal
proceedings in his numerous, detailed pro se filings. In all, he filed nine
different motions and/or correspondence with the court seeking discovery
materials, transport orders, depositions of witnesses, scheduling of court dates,
copies of deposition transcripts, a fast and speedy trial setting, entry of pro se
appearance, and withdrawal of guilty plea as well as discussing the suppression
of evidence, specific evidence of his case, and his relationships with his
attorneys.
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[26] Simons claims that he had no choice but to proceed pro se because the trial
court declined to appoint new counsel. We note that the right to counsel in a
criminal proceeding does not mean that the defendant has an absolute right to
be represented by counsel of his own choosing. McBride, 992 N.E.2d 912. A
trial court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, deny a defendant’s
request for a new court appointed attorney. Id. When Simons indicated his
desire to sever ties with his appointed counsel and his intent to represent
himself, the trial court reminded him that he had been warned previously that it
would not appoint another new counsel. Prior to Public Defender Breitenstein,
Simons had been represented by Public Defender Saiz, as well as private
counsel, both of whom withdrew due to a breakdown in the attorney/client
relationship. Simons was in no way forced to represent himself; rather, the
court gave him the choice to represent himself or continue with his current
public defender while making it clear that it would not pander to his cherry
picking for counsel.
[27] Moreover, trial courts need not unreasonably indulge a defendant who
repeatedly fails to cooperate with appointed counsel. Poynter, 749 N.E.2d 1122.
The record here demonstrates Simons’s inability to work with his counsel. Two
different counsel, one private and one appointed, sought withdrawal from
Simons’s case stating that they were unable to deal with him any longer and
that there had been a breakdown in the relationship. Lastly, at the hearing on
his motion to withdraw plea, Simons sought to dismiss Public Defender
Breitenstein, his third counsel/second appointed counsel. The trial court was
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well within its discretion when it denied Simons’s request for new appointed
counsel.
[28] In light of the facts and circumstances before us, we determine that the hearing
on Simons’s motion to withdraw plea was not a critical stage of the proceedings
to which the assistance of counsel guarantee applied. Nevertheless, we
conclude that Simons knowingly and intelligently exercised his right of self-
representation.
2. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
[29] Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(b) (1983) governs motions to withdraw guilty
pleas. The court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if “necessary
to correct a manifest injustice.” Id. By contrast, the court must deny the
motion if withdrawal of the plea would “substantially prejudice[ ]” the State.
Id. In all other cases, the court may grant the defendant’s motion to withdraw a
guilty plea “for any fair and just reason.” Id. Here, we note Simons does not
claim the existence of a manifest injustice and the State does not assert that it
relied on Simons’s guilty plea such that withdrawal of the plea would be
substantially prejudicial.
[30] A trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea comes to this Court
cloaked in a presumption of correctness, and we will reverse the trial court only
for an abuse of discretion. Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41 (Ind. 2001). To
determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, we examine the
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statements made by the defendant at his guilty plea hearing to decide whether
his plea was made freely and knowingly. Id.[31] The judge began the plea hearing by confirming that the signature on the plea
agreement was Simons’s and that he understood the terms of the agreement.
The judge then explained that he was going to ask Simons several questions to
ensure he understood his rights and was freely and voluntarily pleading guilty.
The judge said, “If there is ever a point in time that you don’t understand the
words that I use or the advisements that I give, please don’t hesitate to stop me,
and I’ll be glad to go over them again with you.” Tr. p. 32. Simons responded,
“Okay.” Id.[32] In further dialogue with the judge, Simons responded that he understood he
had a right to a speedy trial by jury, to face and cross examine witnesses against
him, to have witnesses testify on his behalf, to have the charges proved beyond
a reasonable doubt, to remain silent, and to appeal his conviction following a
trial. He also indicated his understanding that by pleading guilty he was giving
up all these rights. The judge also confirmed that Simons understood his right
to be represented by counsel.
[33] The judge next read the charge of possession of an illegal drug lab and asked the
prosecutor to read the relevant statute and explain the potential penalties. The
judge then inquired as to Simons’s understanding of the statute defining the
offense, the range of penalties, the fact that his plea of guilty is an admission
that he committed the offense, the fact that he will be found guilty and
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sentenced without a trial, and the fact that the court will have knowledge of his
criminal history in formulating his sentence. Simons answered that he
understood.
[34] The judge continued by asking Simons if anyone had made him any promises,
given him anything, or forced or threatened him to plead guilty. Simons
responded in the negative. The judge also asked Simons, “Do you feel like
your decision to plead guilty is your own free choice and decision?” Id. at 37-
38. Simons replied, “Yes, sir.” Id. at 38.
[35] The judge then reviewed with Simons the sentence called for in the plea
agreement:
COURT: Are you now on parole, probation, or a suspended
sentence out of this court or any other court?
SIMONS: I’m currently sentenced out of another court.
COURT: Okay. And is that the Cass County case that’s in
the plea agreement?
SIMONS: Correct, Your Honor.
COURT: Okay. The plea agreement calls for this sentence to
run consecutively to that case. I think that that’s probably
mandatory, but in any event, if I accept the plea agreement, then
it will run consecutively to that case, which means that you will
have to serve this sentence before you serve the other sentence or
vice versa. In other words, they’re not going to be served at the
same time. Do you understand?
SIMONS: And that is the statute?
COURT: What now?
SIMONS: That is the statute to run –
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COURT: I suspect it is. I’m not sure of the timing of these
cases.
SIMONS: Oh.
COURT: It is mandatorily consecutive, but in any event
you’ve agreed that it will be consecutive in your plea agreement.
SIMONS: Okay.
COURT: Do you understand that?
SIMONS: I understand.
STATE: The Cass County case occurred while these were
pending, so it would be mandatorily consecutive.
SIMONS: I understand.
COURT: Do you follow?
SIMONS: Yeah.
*****
COURT: All right. Mr. Simons, one of the things about your
plea agreement is that it is a fixed term plea agreement and if I
accept it that means I’m bound by the terms of the plea
agreement. And so, what you need to know is if I accept it,
there’s not going to be an appeal because there’s no reason to
appeal something you agree to. Do you understand that?
SIMONS: Yes, I do.
Id. at 36-37, 38. The judge asked Simons how he wished to plead, and, upon
his plea of guilty, the prosecutor read the factual basis for the plea. To conclude
the plea hearing, the judge found that Simons understood the nature of the
charge and the possible sentence, that his offer to plead guilty was freely and
voluntarily made, and that there was a factual basis to support the plea. A little
over a month later Simons filed his motion to withdraw plea.
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[36] Before denying Simons’s motion to withdraw plea, the court listened to the
recording of the change of plea hearing and considered Simons’s assertions at
the hearing on his request to withdraw his plea. As we outlined previously,
Simons claimed several reasons for the withdrawal of his plea. In response, the
State confirmed with Simons that he was aware of all these facts prior to
accepting the plea agreement and entering his guilty plea:
STATE: You said something to the effect that once you
realized all these things had been done, then you realized you
needed to file this motion to set aside your plea, but everything
you listed, everything you stated happened before the trial,
correct?
SIMONS: Everything I stated?
STATE: Yeah. You complained about the videotape, you
complained about the editing of the videotape, you complained
that [a police officer] wasn’t deposed, you complained that
[another police officer] was deposed. You knew all of that before
the day that you changed your plea. It wasn’t a secret is what
I’m getting. You knew all of those things.
SIMONS: Yes.
Id. at 67.
[37] In denying Simons’s motion to withdraw plea, the judge explained:
[Simons] was clearly explained his rights during the Change of
Plea proceeding. The Court specifically addressed the fact that
this was a fixed term plea and that if the Court accepted the plea
the Court would be bound by its terms. The Court further
advised [Simons] that he would be bound by the terms of the plea
if accepted. [Simons] indicates no confusion as to the terms of
the plea throughout the proceeding or his rights.
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Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 135. Having reviewed all of these same materials,
we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Simons’s request to withdraw his guilty plea.
[38] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the hearing on Simons’s motion to
withdraw plea was not a critical stage of the proceedings to which the assistance
of counsel guarantee applied; nevertheless, Simons knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to counsel at the hearing. We further conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.
[39] Judgment affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1708-CR-1841 | February 28, 2018 Page 20 of 20