James Saylor v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Feb 15 2018, 9:28 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
James Saylor Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Carlisle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Andrea E. Rahman
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
James Saylor, February 15, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
47A04-1611-CC-2641
v. Appeal from the Lawrence Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Andrea K.
Appellee-Plaintiff McCord, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
47C01-0411-CC-1357
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
[1] In November 2004, the State of Indiana filed a complaint against James E.
Saylor for the recovery of unemployment benefits. After several unsuccessful
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 47A04-1611-CC-2641| February 15, 2018 Page 1 of 4
attempts at service, on May 18, 2005, an alias summons was sent by certified
mail to Saylor at Putnamville Correctional Facility. It was signed for by “J.
Alexander.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 3. When Saylor did not respond to the
complaint, the State obtained a default judgment against him for $1371 plus
costs.
[2] Over ten years later, in June 2016, Saylor filed a motion for relief from
judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B), asking the trial court to vacate
the default judgment against him because he was never served.1 Following a
hearing, the trial court denied Saylor’s motion, finding that he did not have a
meritorious defense. Id. at 6.
[3] On appeal, the State concedes that Saylor “did not receive proper service of the
summons issued on May 18, 2005” because he “was released from the custody
of the Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) on April 12, 2005” and
therefore was not at Putnamville when the alias summons was mailed to him. 2
State’s Verified Mot. to Dismiss the Appeal Without Prejudice and Remand the
Case to the Trial Ct., pp. 3, 4.
1
Saylor alleges that he learned about the default judgment when he “filed his first tax return from his Dept.
of Corrections PEN Products job in 2015,” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21, and had his federal income tax
return intercepted, id. at 29; Tr. Vol. II pp. 3, 9.
2
Even if Saylor had been at Putnamville at the time, the State concedes that the summons was not served in
accordance with Indiana Trial Rule 4.3, which requires that service of summons upon an incarcerated person
be made “to the official in charge of the institution,” who shall then “immediately deliver the summons and
complaint to the person being served” and “indicate upon the return whether the person has received the
summons.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 47A04-1611-CC-2641| February 15, 2018 Page 2 of 4
[4] If service of process is inadequate, the trial court does not acquire personal
jurisdiction over a party, and any default judgment rendered without personal
jurisdiction is void. Norris v. Pers. Fin., 957 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011); King v. United Leasing, Inc., 765 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002);
see also K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ind. 2006) (“Personal jurisdiction
requires that appropriate process be effected over the parties.”). Indiana Trial
Rule 60(B) provides that “the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default, for the
following reasons: . . . (6) the judgment is void.” A defendant seeking relief
from judgment based on reason (B)(6) is not required to allege a meritorious
claim or defense. Ind. Trial Rule 60(B). A void judgment is a complete nullity
and may be attacked at any time. Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1156
(Ind. 1998).
[5] Because service of process was inadequate in this case, the trial court did not
acquire personal jurisdiction over Saylor. Accordingly, the default judgment
entered against Saylor is void, and the trial court erred in denying his Trial Rule
60(B) motion for relief from judgment. We therefore remand this case with
instructions for the trial court to vacate the default judgment against Saylor.3
[6] Remanded.
3
To the extent Saylor raises other issues, such as we should order the trial court to “reimburse the monies
seized from Saylor’s Tax Refunds,” Verified Mot. to Remand the Case to the Trial Ct. With Insts. to Return
of Monies Seized, p. 2, these issues should be addressed on remand.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 47A04-1611-CC-2641| February 15, 2018 Page 3 of 4
May, J., and Altice, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 47A04-1611-CC-2641| February 15, 2018 Page 4 of 4