Joshua Cole Smith v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                           May 25 2018, 11:26 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                             CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                 Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Stephen T. Owens                                         Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Public Defender of Indiana                               Attorney General of Indiana
    John Pinnow                                              Monika Prekopa Talbot
    Deputy Public Defender                                   Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Joshua Cole Smith,                                       May 25, 2018
    Appellant-Petitioner,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-PC-73
    v.                                               Appeal from the Montgomery
    Circuit Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Harry Siamas,
    Appellee-Respondent.                                     Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    54C01-1511-PC-3697
    Riley, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018                   Page 1 of 21
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    [1]   Appellant-Petitioner, Joshua Smith (Smith) appeals the post-conviction court’s
    denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.
    [2]   We affirm.
    ISSUE
    [3]   Smith presents one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the post-
    conviction court properly denied Smith’s petition for post-conviction relief,
    where Smith had at first been mistakenly released from the Indiana Department
    of Correction (DOC) and then reincarcerated to serve his outstanding executed
    sentence.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    [4]   On May 9, 2001, Smith was convicted in Florida of armed burglary of dwelling
    with a firearm, a 1st Degree felony; and grand theft of a firearm, a 3rd Degree
    felony. Smith was sentenced to serve a “[S]plit sentence: 2 years Community
    Control followed by 4 years of probation.” (Appellant’s Exh. Vol. I, p. 188).
    On August 27, 2001, a petition to revoke Smith’s probation was filed and a
    warrant of arrest was ordered. Smith was rearrested in March 2002, but was
    released on July 30, 2002, “on condition that he reports to Community Control
    under [the] previous conditions.” (Appellant’s Exh. Vol. I, p. 188). In
    September and October of 2002, two petitions to revoke Smith’s probation were
    filed. Smith’s pre-trial release was subsequently revoked and an arrest warrant
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018   Page 2 of 21
    was ordered. By that time, Smith had already relocated to Indiana and was
    therefore not rearrested.
    [5]   On October 31, 2003, in Tippecanoe County, Indiana, in Cause Number
    79D02-310-FB-00075 (FB-75), the State filed an Information, charging Smith
    with conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine, a Class B felony; and
    possession of two or more chemical reagents/precursors with intent to
    manufacture a controlled substance, a Class D felony. Pursuant to a plea
    agreement, Smith pleaded guilty to the Class B felony conspiracy to commit
    dealing in methamphetamine, and the State dismissed the remaining Count.
    The trial court at that point sentenced Smith to six years in the DOC, with two
    years suspended to probation. On June 21, 2004, Smith was transferred from
    the Tippecanoe County Jail to the “New Directions Monitor House,” a drug
    treatment facility. (Appellant’s Exh. Vol. I, p. 189). On July 14, 2004, against
    the advice of the staff at New Directions Monitor House, Smith left the facility,
    and when contacted, he “confirmed that he had not made any contact with the
    Tippecanoe County Probation since leaving” New Directions Monitor House.
    (Appellant’s Exh. Vol. I, p. 189). A petition to revoke Smith’s probation was
    filed, and a warrant of arrest was ordered.
    [6]   On September 2, 2004, in Montgomery County Superior Court under Cause
    Number 54D01-040-FD-00268 (FD-268), the State filed an Information,
    charging Smith with four Counts of fraud, Class D felonies; and one Count of
    receiving stolen property, a Class D felony. On November 18, 2004, Smith
    failed to appear at his trial and was tried in absentia. Smith was then found
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018   Page 3 of 21
    guilty only of the Class D felony receiving stolen property. The same day, a
    sentencing hearing was conducted and Smith was ordered to execute a one and
    one-half-year sentence in the DOC. That sentence was to run consecutive to
    Smith’s six-year sentence under FB-75 in Tippecanoe County.
    [7]   On January 7, 2005, in Montgomery Circuit Court, the State charged Smith
    with multiple Counts under five Causes. In 54C01-0501-FC-00005 (FC-5),
    Smith was charged with one Count of conspiracy to commit theft, a Class D
    felony. In 54C01-0501-FC-00006 (FC-6), Smith was charged with one Count of
    forgery, a Class C felony; and one Count of conspiracy to commit forgery, a
    Class C felony. In 54C01-0501-FC-00007 (FC-7), Smith was charged two
    Counts of forgery, Class C felonies; one Count of conspiracy to commit forgery,
    a Class C felony; and one Count of attempt to commit forgery, a Class C
    felony. In 54C01-0501-FC-00008 (FC-8), Smith was charged with eight Counts
    of forgery, Class C felonies; and one Count of theft, a Class D felony. Finally,
    in 54C01-0501-FC-00009 (FC-9), Smith was charged with seven Counts of
    forgery, Class C felonies; and one Count of conspiracy to commit forgery, a
    Class C felony.
    [8]   On June 17, 2005, pursuant to an agreement, Smith pleaded guilty to Class D
    felony conspiracy to commit forgery in FC-5; Class C felony conspiracy to
    commit forgery in FC-6; Class C felony conspiracy to commit forgery in FC-7;
    Class C felony forgery in FC-8; and Class C felony conspiracy to commit
    forgery in FC-9. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining outstanding charges
    under each Cause Number. The trial court afterward accepted Smith’s guilty
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018   Page 4 of 21
    plea and sentenced Smith as follows: in FC-5, a sentence of one and one-half
    years; and four-year sentences on each of the Counts under FC-6, FC-7, FC-8,
    and FC-9. Smith’s sentences were to run consecutive, for an aggregate sentence
    seventeen and one-half years. However, five and one-half years were
    suspended to probation. The plea agreement also stipulated that Smith’s
    seventeen and one-half year sentence under the five Causes would run
    consecutive to the one and one-half-year sentence under FD-268. Also, Smith
    expressed at his sentencing hearing that he understood that his seventeen and
    one-half year sentence under FC-5, FC-6, FC-7, FC-8, and FC-9 would run
    consecutive to his six-year sentence under FB-75, and to any other sentence
    imposed in Florida due to his probation violation.
    [9]    On February 22, 2006, under FB-75, the trial court determined that Smith had
    violated his probation and ordered Smith to serve four years, the balance of his
    previously suspended sentence in Tippecanoe County. In June of 2006, Smith
    completed his Montgomery Superior Court sentence under FD-268. Then in
    September of 2007, Smith completed his sentence under FB-75.
    [10]   The record shows that Smith’s seventeen and one-half year sentence in
    Montgomery Circuit Court under FC-5, FC-6, FC-7, FC-8, and FC-9, did not
    display on the DOC website. Instead of serving the executed portion of that
    sentence in Indiana, on September 13, 2007, Smith was directly transferred
    from the Indiana DOC to the Florida DOC to serve a four-year sentence based
    on a probation violation. In 2010, Smith was released from the Florida DOC
    and he returned to Indiana. Smith lived in Terre Haute and Crawfordsville,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018   Page 5 of 21
    Indiana, where he held various jobs in each town. Smith also lived a year in
    Texas working as a construction worker. In 2014, Smith fathered a son. The
    record shows that Smith’s son has since been declared a Child In Need of
    Services and is currently in foster care. The Indiana Department of Child
    Services has also filed a petition to terminate Smith’s parental rights.
    [11]   On July 24, 2014, in Montgomery County, the State filed an Information,
    charging Smith with one Count of possession of paraphernalia, a Class A
    misdemeanor. Smith was later sentenced to eighty-six days in Montgomery
    County Jail. On May 20, 2015, in Montgomery County under Cause Number
    54CO1-1505-F5-001501 (F5-1501), the State filed an Information, charging
    Smith with driving with a suspended license, a Class A infraction; possession of
    methamphetamine, a Level 5 felony; possession of marijuana, a Class B
    misdemeanor; and for being a habitual offender. Smith entered into a plea
    agreement with the State and the trial court ordered the probation department
    to prepare a presentencing report. As a result, it was discovered that Smith had
    not served the executed portion of his seventeen and one-half year as sentenced
    in FC-5, FC-6, FC-7, FC-8, and FC-9, in Montgomery County. 1 On August 23,
    1
    The record shows that the State filed a petition to revoke the five and one-half years of probation in FC-5,
    FC-6, FC-7, FC-8, and FC-9. However, the State later dismissed that petition.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018                        Page 6 of 21
    2015, the DOC took custody of Smith and recommitted him to serve the
    executed portion of his sentence under FC-5, FC-6, FC-7, FC-8, and FC-9. 2
    [12]   On November 16, 2015, Smith, pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief,
    arguing, in part, that the reinstatement of the executed portion of his sentence
    under FC-5, FC-6, FC-7, FC-8, and FC-9, was unconstitutional due to the delay
    in recommitting him to serve that sentence. On November 24, 2015, the trial
    court appointed a public defender for Smith. On June 2, 2017, through his
    counsel, Smith filed an amended post-conviction relief petition which alleged
    that his recommitment to the Indiana DOC after he had been released from the
    Florida DOC, “violates the principles of equity.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p.
    36).
    [13]   On December 11, 2017, the post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary
    hearing. During his direct examination, Smith testified that after he completed
    his Florida sentence in 2010, the Florida DOC issued him a “bus ticket to Terre
    Haute.” (PCR Tr. p. 11). Smith claimed that he “didn’t realize that there was
    an unexecuted sentence” in Indiana, because after he was directly transferred
    from the Tippecanoe County Jail to the Florida DOC, he thought that his
    seventeen and one-half year sentence under FC-5, FC-6, FC-7, FC-8, and FC-9,
    run concurrent with his Florida sentence. (PCR Tr. p. 11). Smith then claimed
    2
    Following Smith’s recommitment to the DOC, Smith withdrew his plea and the State dismissed the
    Information.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018                 Page 7 of 21
    that the reinstatement of his prior sentence under FC-5, FC-6, FC-7, FC-8, and
    FC-9 was inequitable
    because one[,] I have a son that was born June [23, 2014]. Right
    now he’s in foster care and if my sentence had been executed
    when it properly should have I would be out there right now to
    take care of my son and he wouldn’t be in foster care. Also, I
    believe I’m being held accountable for the [S]tate’s negligence. I
    also believe that if I did anything to compromise my sentence as
    escape for example, I’d be held accountable by time being added
    to my sentence. In this case the [S]tate made the mistake so I feel
    like they should have some accountability, possibly and time
    being deducted from my sentence. Also, I feel like I haven’t been
    given the same opportunity that every other offender in the State
    of Indiana has been given to execute their sentence in a fair and
    timely manner. I can go on all day talking about why it’s not
    fair, but those are the main reasons.
    (PCR Tr. p. 16). During Smith’s cross examination, the following exchange
    then occurred between the State and Smith:
    [State]. You were in court when you got sentenced right?
    [Smith]. Yes sir.
    [State]. You understood you had a total sentence of seventeen
    and a half years?
    [Smith]. Yes sir.
    [State]. And twelve of those had to be executed?
    [Smith]. Yes sir.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018   Page 8 of 21
    [State]. And you were aware when you got cut loose by Florida
    that you hadn’t done that Indiana time right?
    [Smith]. I was not aware of that because and I’ll explain. I
    never, I did recall in my sentencing and now that I’ve read the
    transcripts I know I did agree to and I was told that the sentence
    would be ran [sic] consecutive with Florida, but I thought at the
    time I was cut loose from Florida I did not remember that and I
    thought that something had got ran concurrent somehow.
    (PCR Tr. pp. 18-19). On January 2, 2018, the post-conviction court issued its
    findings of fact and conclusions thereon, denying Smith’s petition for post-
    conviction relief.
    [14]   Smith now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    I. Standard of Review
    [15]   Under the rules of post-conviction relief, the petitioner must establish the
    grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction
    Rule 1, § 5; Strowmatt v. State, 
    779 N.E.2d 971
    , 974-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). To
    succeed on appeal from the denial of relief, the post-conviction petitioner must
    show that the evidence is without conflict and leads unerringly and
    unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction
    court. 
    Id. at 975.
    The purpose of post-conviction relief is not to provide a
    substitute for direct appeal, but to provide a means for raising issues not known
    or available to the defendant at the time of the original appeal. 
    Id. If an
    issue
    was available on direct appeal but not litigated, it is waived. 
    Id. Court of
    Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018   Page 9 of 21
    [16]   Where, as here, the post-conviction court makes findings of fact and
    conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6), we
    cannot affirm the judgment on any legal basis, but rather, must determine if the
    court’s findings are sufficient to support its judgment. Graham v. State, 
    941 N.E.2d 1091
    , 1096 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d on reh’g, 
    947 N.E.2d 962
    .
    Although we do not defer to the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions, we
    review the post-conviction court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous
    standard. 
    Id. Accordingly, we
    will not reweigh the evidence or judge the
    credibility of witnesses, and we will consider only the probative evidence and
    reasonable inferences flowing therefrom that support the post-conviction court’s
    decision. 
    Id. I. Delayed
    Sentence
    [17]   At the post-conviction hearing, Smith did not seek an alteration of his executed
    sentence under FC-5, FC-6, FC-7, FC-8, and FC-9; rather, he asked to be
    discharged from incarceration because the DOC delayed five years before
    recommitting him to serve his seventeen and one-half year sentence. In support
    of his claim, Smith relied on the principles of equity articulated in Woods v.
    State, 
    583 N.E.2d 1211
    (Ind. 1992).
    [18]   In Woods, Woods had been released from jail while he was awaiting the
    resolution of his appeal. 
    Id. at 1212.
    After Woods’s conviction had been
    affirmed by our court and certified to the trial court, the trial court delayed five
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018   Page 10 of 21
    and one-half years before ordering Woods’s sentence executed. 
    Id. In ordering
    that Woods be discharged from incarceration, our supreme court held that:
    Through no fault of [Woods], the State delayed the
    commencement of his sentence for more than five and one-half (5
    ½ ) years. Thus . . . the sword of Damocles dangled over the
    head of [Woods] for that five and one-half (5 ½) year period. We
    hold that the trial court in fact lost jurisdiction over appellant by
    reason of this undue delay and that the motion for discharge
    should have been granted . . . . we now hold a court loses
    jurisdiction if it does not act within a reasonable time after the
    certification of the affirmance of a conviction.
    ****
    the execution of the sentence in fact does violate the principles of
    equity and the requirements of prompt action on the part of the
    State in discharging its duties in criminal cases.
    
    Id. at 1212-13.
    One of equitable factors weighed by the Woods court was the
    fact that, during the five and one-half year delay, Woods had stayed out of
    trouble, had supported his children, and had developed health problems. 
    Id. at 1213.
    [19]   The post-conviction court in this case made a thorough analysis of Woods in its
    conclusions of law, stating, in pertinent part,
    20. [Smith] has the burden of establishing his grounds for relief
    by a preponderance of the evidence.
    21. Smith does not challenge the sentence [under FC-5, FC-6,
    FC-7, FC-8, and FC-9 as] originally ordered. . . . . Instead, Smith
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018   Page 11 of 21
    challenges his incarceration for the reason that he was released
    from custody mistakenly and over five years lapsed before IDOC
    detained and placed him back to custody. He asserts that
    pursuant to the holding in Woods v State, 
    583 N.E.2d 1211
    (Ind.
    1992), the Indiana Department of Corrections [sic] is detaining
    him illegally. Smith demands that the [post-conviction court]
    order[s] his immediate release from [the] IDOC custody so that
    he can begin to serve the 5 ½ year probation term . . . . . He
    requests discharge of the executed portion of the sentence based
    on undue delay in carrying out the sentence.
    ****
    25. [Smith] argues that his circumstances are so similar to those
    of the [d]efendant in Woods v State, 
    583 N.E.2d 1211
    (Ind. 1992)
    that the holding in Woods requires this Court to order his
    immediate release from IDOC custody. The defendant in Woods
    was convicted of reckless homicide. The court sentenced him to
    five years, two executed and three suspended. [Woods] appealed
    his conviction, and he remained free during the appeal process.
    The appellate court affirmed [Woods’s] conviction but the trial
    court delayed ordering his commitment to the Department of
    Corrections [sic] for five and [one-half] years. During that time
    the defendant provided for his two children, had no arrests, and
    had developed some health problems. The Indiana Supreme
    reiterated that an American citizen is entitled to live without the
    Damocles sword dangling over his head; and that the defendant’s
    sentence did violate the principles of equity and the requirements
    of prompt action on the part of the State in discharging the duties
    in criminal cases. The Supreme Court set aside the defendant’s
    commitment and discharged him.
    The State argues, in opposition that if the [post-conviction court]
    must apply principles of equity in its analysis in the lawfulness of
    [Smith’s] IDOC detention, then the [post-conviction court] must
    consider whether [Smith] has clean hands. The unclean hands
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018   Page 12 of 21
    doctrine demands that one who seeks relief in a court of equity
    must be free of wrongdoing in the matter before the court.
    Galloway v. Hadley, 
    881 N.E.2d 667
    , 678 (Ind. Ct App. 2008).
    The alleged wrongdoing must have an immediate and necessary
    relation to the matter being litigated. 
    Id. For the
    doctrine of
    unclean hands to apply, the misconduct must be intentional. 
    Id. The purpose
    of the unclean hands doctrine is to prevent a party
    from reaping benefits from his misconduct. 
    Id. The doctrine
    is
    not favored by the courts and is applied with reluctance and
    scrutiny. 
    Id. Another maxim
    of equity provides that whomever seeks equity
    must do equity, a principle whereby relief which involves
    perpetration of an injustice will be denied. Thus, he who would
    invoke the aid of a court of equity must show that he has done
    equity to him of whom he complains.
    Yet another maxim provides that equity follows the law. In
    application, this means that an equitable right cannot be founded
    on a violation of law. Hopper Resources, Inc. v. Webster, 
    878 N.E.2d 418
    , 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
    26. The first question is whether the Woods court really intended
    to apply equitable principles in a criminal case; or when the
    [Woods court] stated that Wood’s [sic] sentence did violate the
    principles of equity, was the [Woods court] really just applying a
    fundamental fairness standard? It isn’t clear from the decision,
    but the [Woods court] does refer to principles of equity and
    therefore this [c]ourt must assume that it must apply principles of
    equity in its analysis of the issue presented by the case at bar.
    27. While the facts of this case are similar to the facts in the
    Woods[’s] case in many respects, there are significant differences.
    First, Woods challenged the inaction of the [trial court] in
    ordering his commitment to the DOC. [Smith] here challenges
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018   Page 13 of 21
    the ability of the DOC to require him to serve his sentence after
    the DOC mistakenly released him from custody. It was not the
    DOC’s inaction that caused the delay, it was the DOC’s mistake
    (which went undetected until [Smith] committed another
    offense).
    Secondly, and most importantly Woods was waiting for the [trial
    court] to order his commitment to begin his sentence. However,
    [Smith] was well aware that a mistake had been made by DOC.
    At the sentencing hearing on June 17, 2005[,] Smith stated that
    he understood that any sentence that the Montgomery Circuit
    Court ordered would be consecutive to the Montgomery
    [S]uperior Court sentence that he was serving at that time. In
    addition, Smith acknowledged during the sentencing hearing that
    he knew that he had a detainer pending against him from the
    State of Florida. Furthermore, he acknowledged that he
    understood that any sentence that he received from the
    Montgomery Circuit Court would run consecutive to any
    sentence that he might receive in Florida. He also stated that he
    had the pending case in Tippecanoe County and that he
    understood that any Montgomery Circuit Court sentence must be
    served consecutive to any Tippecanoe County sentence that he
    might receive. [Smith] wasn’t waiting to be committed to [the]
    DOC [in order] to begin [his sentence under FC-5, FC-6, FC-7,
    FC-8, and FC-9]; he was evading that sentence. The proof is that
    [Smith] was well aware that he had five and a half years of
    probation to serve after he had served his sentences and finally
    was released from custody (presumably by the State of Florida).
    He was under a duty to report to his probation officer when he
    was released from custody. [Smith] never did that. It was not
    the duty of the probation department to find [Smith] [i]n order
    for [Smith] to begin his period of probation. It was [Smith’s]
    duty to report to probation as soon as he was released.
    Therefore, [Smith] effectively evaded justice for over five years
    after his mistaken release.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018   Page 14 of 21
    Thirdly, while Woods led a law-abiding life during the five years
    between the hand down of the appellate court decision and the
    trial court’s commitment of him to [the] DOC, [Smith] did not.
    Smith was arrested in 2014 for [p]ossession of a [s]yringe. He
    was in jail for two weeks. In 2014 he [] was charged with
    [p]ossession of [m]arijuana and received a [ninety-day] sentence.
    On May 15, 2015[,] [S]mith was arrested in Montgomery County
    and charged with [p]ossession of [m]ethamphetamine,
    [p]ossession of [m]arijuana and [d]riving [w]hile [s]uspended.
    Eventually Smith entered into a plea agreement with the State.
    When [the] DOC incarcerated [Smith], he withdrew his plea and
    the State dismissed the Information.
    Based on these much different circumstances[,] the [post-
    conviction court] finds that the Woods decision does not compel
    the [post-conviction court] to ignore [Smith’s] wrongdoing in
    evading justice. Smith knew that [the] IDOC mistakenly
    released him because he knew that he had not served the [twelve-
    year] executed sentence that [had been] ordered. He also knew
    that he was to report to probation after his release but he never
    did. This was a violation of his probation terms. Justice is not a
    game[,] but [Smith] certainly was gaming the system and evading
    the executed sentence that he knew he had not served.
    28. The Woods court also held that the State is required to act
    promptly in discharging its duties in criminal cases. While it is
    clear that [the] IDOC did not promptly discharge its duties in
    carrying out [the sentence under FD-5, FC-6, FC-7, FC-8, and
    FC-9] between 2005 and 2010; it is just as clear that [the] IDOC
    made a mistake. [The] IDOC acted promptly to correct the
    mistake as soon as the mistake was discovered. All the while
    [Smith] was free even though he was well aware that by a stroke
    of luck he had never served any portion of the seventeen and
    [one-half] year sentence that . . .[was] ordered in 2005.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018   Page 15 of 21
    29. [Smith] has failed to carry out his burden of proof. His
    petition for post-conviction relief should be denied.
    (Appellant’s Corrected App. Vol. II, pp. 60-64).
    [20]   Smith now argues that the post-conviction court erroneously distinguished his
    case from Woods in Conclusion #27. He challenges the first distinguishing
    factor cited by the post-conviction court that unlike the defendant in Woods,
    who challenged the inaction of the trial court in ordering his recommitment to
    the DOC, the delay in the commencement of Smith’s already imposed sentence
    under FC-5, FC-6, FC-7, FC-8, and FC-9, was solely on the DOC and not on
    the trial court. Smith claims that “[t]his is not a significant difference because
    the common denominator in both cases is mistakes by the court system.”
    (Appellant’s Br. p. 15). Turning to the facts of this case, unlike the defendant in
    Woods, who challenged the inaction of the trial court in ordering his
    recommitment to the DOC, Smith’s sentence had been imposed by the trial
    court, and presumably due to a clerical error on the Indiana DOC website,
    Smith was mistakenly released to the Florida DOC prior to serving his sentence
    under FC-5, FC-6, FC-7, FC-8, and FC-9. Moreover, Smith’s plea agreement
    for Causes FC-5, FC-6, FC-7, FC-8, through FC-9, stipulated that the executed
    portion of Smith’s seventeen and one-half year sentence under the five cases
    would run consecutive to Smith’s one and one-half-year sentence under FD-
    268. In addition, at the sentencing hearing for Causes FC-5, FC-6, FC-7, FC-8,
    through FC-9, Smith stated that he was aware that his seventeen and one-half
    year sentence under those five cases would run consecutive to his six-year
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018   Page 16 of 21
    sentence under FB-75 and consecutive to any sentence imposed by the State of
    Florida due to his probation violation.
    [21]   Smith next argues that there was no indication from the Woods case that Woods
    “immediately surrendered himself to the trial court once he lost on appeal.
    Instead, [Woods] continued to live his life of freedom, worked, and supported
    his children. When he was ordered to surrender and serve his sentence, he
    moved for [a] discharge[] based on the delay in ordering his DOC
    commitment.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 15). Smith contends that he too, like
    Woods, is seeking “equitable relief in a manner similar to what was ordered in
    Woods. He no more gamed the system than Woods did.” (Appellant’s Br. p.
    16). Again, we disagree. The five and one-half year delay in the recommitment
    of Woods was because the trial court had delayed in ordering Woods’s sentence
    to be executed. 
    Woods, 583 N.E.2d at 1213
    . Woods was not gaming the legal
    system; rather, the legal system had regrettably failed him because the trial
    court had delayed ordering his sentence in a timely fashion. We find that the
    stark contrast between Woods and Smith, is that in Smith’s case, the trial court
    had ordered the sentence, and the delay in recommitting Smith to serving his
    sentence was due to a clerical mistake committed by the DOC.
    [22]   Lastly, as noted, it was the principles of equity that led to Woods’s discharge
    from incarceration in the Woods case. One of the equitable factors weighed by
    the Woods court was that during the five and one-half year delay, Woods had
    stayed out of trouble, had supported his children, and had developed health
    problems. 
    Woods, 583 N.E.2d at 1213
    . In the instant case, when Smith
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    returned to Indiana for an interim period, he avoided legal trouble and he
    fathered a son. However, between 2014 and 2015, Smith committed other
    crimes. Therefore, we find that the equitable principles that operated to effect
    Woods’s discharge in Woods have not been triggered here.
    [23]   Smith makes an additional argument stating that the post-conviction court
    erroneously relied on the unclean hands doctrine in denying him relief.
    Specifically, Smith argues that “he was not guilty of intentional misconduct.
    His premature release from prison was caused by the Indiana [DOC]
    mistakenly releasing him . . . . Smith did not falsify records or engage in fraud
    to cause the error.” (Appellant’s Br. pp. 12-13). The unclean hands doctrine is
    an equitable tenet that demands one who seeks equitable relief to be free of
    wrong doing in the matter before the court. Ruder v. Ohio Valley Wholesale, Inc.,
    
    736 N.E.2d 776
    , 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). In addition, the alleged wrongdoing
    must have an immediate and necessary relation to the matter being litigated.
    
    Id. The purpose
    of the unclean hands doctrine is to prevent a party from
    reaping benefits from his misconduct. 
    Id. at 781.
    To the extent that Smith
    claims that he is without blame as to his delayed sentence, Smith is mistaken.
    Smith knew he had an outstanding seventeen and one-half year sentence to
    serve in Indiana and he was aware that he should have surrendered to
    authorities in Indiana at the very least when he returned to Indiana from
    Florida. Even if we were to credit Smith’s testimony proffered at his post-
    conviction hearing—that he thought that the executed portion of his sentence
    under FC-5, FC-6, FC-7, FC-8, and FC-9 ran concurrently with his Florida
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018   Page 18 of 21
    sentence—when Smith was released from the Florida DOC, Smith had a duty
    to report for probation. Yet, the record shows that when Smith returned to
    Indiana in 2010, he did not report to the relevant probation department and that
    fact alone goes to prove that Smith was avoiding his Indiana sentence.
    [24]   The State then argues that Smith’s case is more akin to our holding in Beliles v.
    State, 
    663 N.E.2d 1168
    (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). In Beliles, just like here, Beliles
    was convicted and sentenced under the terms of a written plea agreement on
    December 20, 1990. 
    Id. at 1170.
    The parties agreed that Beliles was to receive
    the maximum twenty-year sentence with six years suspended. 
    Id. However, an
    error was made in the preparation of the sentencing order, and the order stated
    that Beliles received a twenty-year sentence with fourteen years suspended and
    six years executed. 
    Id. Beliles was
    committed to the DOC under this incorrect
    sentencing order. 
    Id. Less than
    a month later, on January 18, 1991, a corrected
    sentencing order reflecting the actual sentence to be imposed under the plea
    agreement was entered by the judge pro tem; however, no notice of that
    correction was given to either Beliles or his attorney. 
    Id. Moreover, no
    corrected abstract of the judgment was prepared nor was the corrected
    sentencing order/judgment forwarded to the DOC. 
    Id. In 1993,
    based on his
    projected release from prison in December of 1993, Beliles was placed in a work
    release center. 
    Id. Beliles had
    secured employment after his anticipated release
    date, and he also had made plans regarding housing and the purchase of a used
    car. 
    Id. However, on
    September 1, 1993, the sitting trial judge (the successor to
    the judge who had presided over the trial court during the earlier proceedings in
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-73 | May 25, 2018   Page 19 of 21
    Beliles’ case) entered a new abstract of judgment reflecting Beliles’s actual
    sentence of an executed term of fourteen years. 
    Id. The DOC
    was notified and
    Beliles was picked up at the work release center, shackled, and taken to the
    DOC to serve the rest of his fourteen-year sentence. 
    Id. We then
    held that
    The present case is distinguishable from Woods because the sword
    here is double-edged and cuts the other way. Woods had been
    free and had lived a law-abiding life during the period in which
    the sword hung over his head-time which he could have spent
    serving his sentence. On the other hand, in the present case, the
    “sword” which hung over Beliles’ head while he was in prison
    properly serving his sentence consisted of the chance that the
    error in the sentencing order would be corrected depriving him of
    the windfall of a shorter executed sentence than the one he had
    bargained for under his plea agreement. . . . . Beliles has not
    shown prejudice beyond frustrated expectations. Therefore, the
    equitable principles that operated to effect the prisoner’s
    discharge in Woods have not been triggered here.
    
    Id. at 1173.
    Just like the defendant in Beliles, Smith essentially seeks a windfall
    from an inadvertent clerical error that failed to display his correct sentence.
    The intent all along was to have Smith serve the executed portion of his
    seventeen and one-half year sentence which was consecutive to all his other
    sentences in Montgomery and Tippecanoe County, as well as any sentence that
    Florida intended to impose. Allowing Smith to be discharged now from the
    DOC would create a windfall of a sentence shorter than the one he had
    bargained for under his plea agreement under FC-5, FC-6, FC-7, FC-8, and FC-
    9. While the delay in commencement of Smith’s sentence is regrettable,
    pursuant to Woods and Beliles, Smith has not carried his burden of establishing
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    that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we hold that the post-
    conviction court properly denied Smith’s relief.
    CONCLUSION
    [25]   Based on the above, we conclude that Smith has failed to prove that his claim
    warrants post-conviction relief.
    [26]   Affirmed.
    [27]   May, J. and Mathias, J. concur
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