In the Matter of Name Change of Minor Child Justin Morgan v. Meghan Price (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 20 2018, 8:55 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE
Justin Norwood Morgan
Albuquerque, New Mexico
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of Name Change September 20, 2018
of Minor Child Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-MI-653
Justin Morgan,
Appeal from the Hendricks
Appellant, Superior Court
The Honorable Robert W. Freese,
v.
Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
Meghan Price, 32D01-1505-MI-181
Appellee.
Brown, Judge.
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[1] Justin Morgan (“Father”), pro se, appeals the denial of his motion to set aside
judgment and motion to correct error. We affirm.
Procedural History
[2] On June 23, 2011, Father and Meghan Price (“Mother”) had a child, and the
child was named Brayson Norwood Morgan at the time of his birth. On May
18, 2015, Mother filed a petition for name change of minor requesting that the
child’s name be changed to Brayson Emerson Price. In November 2015, the
court held a hearing and took the case under advisement. On April 13, 2016,
the court held a hearing and entered an order granting Mother’s petition and
ordering the child’s name changed to Brayson Emerson Price. On November
23, 2016, Brayson died, and as a result, on June 23, 2017, Mother was charged
with conspiracy to commit the murder of Brayson and neglect of a dependent
resulting in death as level 1 felonies and neglect of a dependent resulting in
bodily injury as a class C felony.1
[3] On October 5, 2017, Father filed a “Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant
to TR 60(B)(8)” which cited subparagraphs (1), (2), (3), and (8) of Rule 60(B).
Appellant’s Appendix Volume 2 at 11. Father argued in part that Mother
knowingly misled the court in her testimony at the April 13, 2016 hearing.
Father attached exhibits to his motion which included the transcript of the April
13, 2016 hearing and a news article dated July 21, 2017, related to Mother’s
1
In June 2018, Mother was convicted in connection with Brayson’s death, and the court sentenced her to
thirty-six years. Mother’s criminal appeal is pending.
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criminal charges. The April 13, 2016 hearing transcript reveals that the court
asked Mother the last time Father had seen Brayson, and she replied “[i]t was
the third weekend to [sic] December.” Id. at 20. When the court asked the last
time Father paid support, Mother replied that he paid about $300 the previous
month and “I feel the paying of child support recently is to look good for the
name change. Because he hasn’t paid the actual support that was court
ordered.” Id. She indicated that in 2016 Father paid $18.78 in January, $77 in
February, $386 in March, and $275 in April. She testified that “[e]very time we
have a court case, that’s when the child support starts coming in. But it’s never
consistent.” Id. at 21. The court asked Mother if she requested the name
change “to avoid any type of civil or criminal or any other type of [action],”
and she replied “[n]o.” Id.
[4] Father’s Rule 60(B) motion argued that Father sought to show that, “as
contemplated by the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure 60(B)(1), (2), and (3),
there is ample reason to set aside the judgment and Order issued on April 13,
2016 . . . on the basis of (respectively), excusable neglect or mistake; newly
discovered evidence; and fraud or misrepresentation to the court,” “[b]ut as the
Court is well aware, the trial rules specify that a motion under those subsections
must be filed within one year, and more than one year has passed.” Id. at 14.
“[Father] would urge the Court to . . . grant him such relief from the judgment .
. . pursuant to TR 60(B)(8).” Id.
[5] On January 8, 2018, the court held a hearing at which Father testified that he
resides in New Mexico, and that, after Brayson passed away, he obtained
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various medical records of Brayson. Father indicated he had previously made a
report to the Department of Child Services (“DCS”), and when asked to
describe the circumstances, he answered “[i]t was right after . . . Brayson’s
femur got broke is when I learned that . . . there was a DCS report made in July
. . . .” Transcript Volume 2 at 50. When asked “what year,” Father replied
“2014, I learned about Steven abusing Brayson and then . . . Brayson was left in
the care with Steven when his femur broke” and that Steven was Mother’s
boyfriend. Id. Father testified that, after Mother was arrested, he learned of the
cause of Brayson’s death, and that there were a total of nine DCS reports.
[6] On January 9, 2018, the court issued an order providing:
1. On April 13, 2016, the Court entered an Order on Verified
Petition for Change of Name of Minor.
2. Mother was the Petitioner in the original action and
appeared without attorney at the hearing on April 13, 2016.
3. Father did not appear as Father was out of State.
4. Child died on November 23, 2016.
5. Mother has been charged criminally with the death of the
child.
6. Father knew of the name change of the child no later than on
or shortly after the death of the child.
7. Father had at least 4 months prior to one year after the entry
of the Judgment on April 13, 2016 within which to file his
Trial Rule 60 motion.
8. None of these reasons for Father’s Petition were discovered
after April 13, 2016.
9. On October 5, 2017, Father filed his Motion for Relief from
Judgment.
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10. Hearing was held on January 8, 2018.
11. Father’s Motion for Relief from Judgment is DENIED.
Appellant’s Appendix Volume 2 at 9. Father filed a motion to correct error,
and the court denied his motion.
Discussion
[7] Father, pro se, maintains the trial court erred in denying his motion for relief
from judgment “when there was newly discovered evidence found” regarding
Mother trying to evade DCS and Mother’s crimes against Brayson. Appellant’s
Brief at 16. Father argues “[i]n reality, as could readily be gleaned from the
very title of his motion, [he] was filing his motion for relief pursuant to TR
60(B)(8), which did not contain a one-year time limit,” he “was basing this
motion . . . on newly discovered information,” and he “alleged in his motion
that [Mother] had committed fraud on the court.” Id. at 18-19.
[8] Pro se litigants are held to the same standard as trained counsel. Evans v. State,
809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. We review a denial of
a motion to correct error and a motion for relief from judgment for abuse of
discretion. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC v. Holmes, 885 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind.
2008), reh’g denied. Mother has not filed an appellee’s brief; thus, we may
reverse if Father establishes prima facie error. See Graziani v. D & R Const., 39
N.E.3d 688, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
[9] Trial Rule 60(B) provides in part:
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On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a
party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a
judgment by default, for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) any ground for a motion to correct error, including
without limitation newly discovered evidence, which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in
time to move for a motion to correct errors under Rule
59;
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of
an adverse party;
*****
(8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-
paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).
The motion shall be filed within a reasonable time for reasons (5),
(6), (7), and (8), and not more than one year after the judgment,
order or proceeding was entered or taken for reasons (1), (2), (3),
and (4). A movant filing a motion for reasons (1), (2), (3), (4), and
(8) must allege a meritorious claim or defense. . . .
[10] Under Trial Rule 60(B), the burden is on the movant to establish grounds for
relief. Ind. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 734 N.E.2d 276, 279 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Rule 60(B) is meant to afford relief from
circumstances which could not have been discovered during the period a
motion to correct error could have been filed; it is not meant to be used as a
substitute for a direct appeal or to revive an expired attempt to appeal. Id. The
“residual powers under subsection (8) may only be invoked upon a showing of
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exceptional circumstances justifying extraordinary relief, and is exclusive of
other remedies available under T.R. 60(B)(1), (2), (3), and (4).” Id. (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if Father’s motion could have
properly fallen under any of the provisions of Trial Rule 60(B)(1)-(4), then Trial
Rule 60(B)(8) is unavailable. See id. at 280.
[11] Father’s arguments are firmly based on newly discovered evidence and his
allegation that Mother made misrepresentations at the April 13, 2016 hearing.
To the extent Father’s motion for relief from judgment was based on newly
discovered evidence under Rule 60(B)(2) or on alleged fraud or
misrepresentation under Rule 60(B)(3), we note that a motion under those
subparagraphs must be filed not more than one year after the judgment and that
Father’s October 5, 2017 motion was filed more than one year after the court’s
April 13, 2016 judgment. Father was not entitled to relief under Rule 60(B)(2)
or (3). To the extent Father’s motion cited Rule 60(B)(8), we observe that Rule
60(B) expressly states that the court may relieve a party from a judgment under
subparagraph (8) for “any reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs . . . (2) [and] (3) .
. . .” Because Father’s motion “could have properly fallen under” Rule 60(B)(2)
or (3), Rule 60(B)(8) was unavailable. See Ind. Ins. Co., 734 N.E.2d at 280.
[12] Based upon the record, Father has not established prima facie error or that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for relief from judgment
and motion to correct error. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
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[13] Affirmed.
Altice, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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