Sarah R. Schnieb v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                             May 31 2018, 9:59 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                               CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                   Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Steven Knecht                                           Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C.                              Attorney General of Indiana
    Lafayette, Indiana
    Caryn N. Szyper
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Sarah R. Schnieb,                                       May 31, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    08A02-1710-CR-2403
    v.                                              Appeal from the Carroll Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Kurtis G. Fouts,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    08D01-1705-F6-48
    Bailey, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 08A02-1710-CR-2403 | May 31, 2018            Page 1 of 9
    Case Summary
    [1]   Sarah R. Schnieb (“Schnieb”) appeals the no-contact order issued as a
    condition of her probation. She contends that the trial court abused its
    discretion because the no-contact order, as applied to the father of her children,
    Leslie Field (“Field”), violates her constitutional right to raise her children.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   On May 24, 2017, Field was in a car accident. Early in the morning of May 25,
    Delphi Police Officer Alexander Parkinson (“Officer Parkinson”) went to
    Field’s residence to speak with him about the accident. Officer Parkinson
    encountered Schnieb, Field’s girlfriend at the time, at Field’s residence. Officer
    Parkinson knew Schnieb from past dealings in his police work, and he believed
    Schnieb was under the influence of methamphetamine. Officer Parkinson
    contacted the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”).
    [4]   Around 9:15 that same morning, Delphi Police Officer Justin Wilson (“Officer
    Wilson”) and a DCS worker went to the residence to speak with Schnieb.
    Schnieb was extremely frantic and was making fast choppy movements. Officer
    Wilson believed Schnieb was “highly impaired/tweaking on meth” and that she
    was incapable of caring for any child. Appellant’s App. Vol. II (“App.”) at 11.
    Schnieb allowed Officer Wilson and the DCS worker into the residence, and
    when they stepped inside, Officer Wilson observed a child who appeared to be
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 08A02-1710-CR-2403 | May 31, 2018   Page 2 of 9
    between the ages of six and eight sleeping on the couch in the living room.
    There was also a ten-month-old child sleeping in one of the bedrooms.
    [5]   To avoid waking the children, the adults moved inside the kitchen where
    Officer Wilson observed two lines of what he believed to be methamphetamine
    near the microwave. Schnieb confirmed that the substance was
    methamphetamine and volunteered that it belonged to Field. Schnieb then
    stated that she smoked spice in the garage, and she led Officer Wilson into the
    garage to show him where she normally smoked spice. Officer Wilson could
    smell the odor of spice in the area and saw burnt rolling papers and ash from
    spice in the bottom of a garbage can. Officer Wilson placed Schnieb under
    arrest. At the Carroll County Jail, Schnieb admitted to the jail staff that she had
    used methamphetamine.
    [6]   The State charged Schnieb with possession of methamphetamine, as a Level 6
    felony;1 maintaining a common nuisance, as a Level 6 felony;2 and neglect of a
    dependent, as a Level 6 felony.3 On July 10, 2017, pursuant to a plea
    agreement, Schnieb pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony possession of
    methamphetamine.
    1
    
    Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6
    .1(a).
    2
    I.C. § 35-45-1-5.
    3
    I.C. § 35-46-1-4.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 08A02-1710-CR-2403 | May 31, 2018   Page 3 of 9
    [7]   At Schnieb’s sentencing hearing on July 27, the trial court reviewed the
    presentence investigation report and heard testimony from Schnieb. Schnieb
    reported that Field is the father of both of her children and that she had been in
    a ten-year relationship with Field at the time of her arrest. Schnieb had a long
    history of illegal drug use and failed attempts at rehabilitation. She had been
    convicted of misdemeanor domestic battery in 2012 and violated her probation
    in 2013 when she tested positive on a drug screen. Schnieb reported that both
    she and Field had relapsed into drug use. Schnieb stated that she started using
    drugs again because Field started using again. App. at 28.
    [8]   At the time of sentencing, Schnieb was admittedly addicted to
    methamphetamine and spice. As a result of her drug use, DCS had removed
    Schnieb’s two children from her home and placed them with Schnieb’s parents.
    Schnieb testified that she had a serious drug problem and stated she was willing
    to comply with substance abuse treatment and anything DCS wanted her to do
    to get her children back. Schnieb also testified that she understood that she
    needed to stay away from people who have controlled substance issues, and she
    agreed to do so. Tr. at 8.
    [9]   The trial court sentenced Schnieb to two years and 180 days executed in the
    Indiana Department of Correction, with a recommendation that she participate
    in the purposeful incarceration program. The trial court also ordered Schnieb
    to have no direct or indirect contact with several people involved in drug use
    and dealing, including Field. The trial court explained its no-contact order
    regarding Field as follows:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 08A02-1710-CR-2403 | May 31, 2018   Page 4 of 9
    And I’m going to put another name in here and this is going to be
    a hard one. But Les Field is another name. You’re not going to
    have any contact with Les because you’re both addicts. [Y]ou’re
    going to have contact as is required to comply with the Court’s orders in
    the CHINS case. But you’re a trigger for Les and Les is a trigger
    for you unless somebody can show me otherwise. The consistent
    thing in your life has been Les. And Les is consistently us[ing]
    controlled substances and so we’re not going to have any contact
    with Les until we decide it’s a good idea. And Les isn’t going to
    have any contact with you. Um, very difficult. Very difficult.
    ***
    [The children] should be with you and maybe Les. Although I’m
    really troubled about the dynamic of your relationship. I almost
    never would want to enter an order where people that were either
    married or had children together shouldn’t have contact but I
    mean the proof is pretty stark that this is a toxic situation. So
    we’ll just have to see.
    Tr. at 26-27 (emphasis added).
    [10]   On August 2, 2017, Schnieb moved the trial court to modify her executed
    sentence to community corrections or probation. In her motion, Schnieb
    informed the trial court that: she has two children who had been placed with
    her parents as part of a pending Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) case;
    substance abuse treatment was available to her through the CHINS case; she
    could stay in her parents’ home with her children, and DCS was in support of
    that plan; and she “is willing to comply with all terms and conditions of
    probation….” App. at 32-33. On October 5, 2017, after a hearing, the trial
    court granted Schnieb’s request to modify her sentence. The trial court stayed
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 08A02-1710-CR-2403 | May 31, 2018   Page 5 of 9
    the balance of Schnieb’s executed sentence and placed her on probation through
    the Carroll County Probation Department. As conditions of probation, Schnieb
    was required to: participate in and successfully complete the Open Arms
    Program; have no direct or indirect contact with certain persons, including
    Field; and “comply with all orders in [the pending CHINS cases,] 08D01-1709-JC-19
    and 08D01-1709-JC-20.” Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
    [11]   This appeal ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    [12]   As an initial matter, we address the State’s contention that Schnieb waived her
    claim that the no-contact order violates her constitutional right to raise her
    children by failing to make that argument to the trial court. We disagree. In
    Meunier-Short v. State, 
    52 N.E.3d 927
    , 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), we held that a
    defendant is not required to object to his probation conditions in order to
    preserve the issue for appeal. In so holding, we noted that the appeal of a
    probation condition is similar to an appeal of a sentence, which we may review
    “‘without insisting that the claim first be presented to the trial judge.”’ 
    Id.
    (quoting Piercefield v. State, 
    877 N.E.2d 1213
    , 1218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans.
    denied). Thus, Schnieb has not waived her appeal of the no-contact order issued
    as a condition of probation.
    [13]   A trial court has broad discretion in determining the appropriate conditions of a
    defendant’s probation. Howe v. State, 
    25 N.E.3d 210
    , 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 08A02-1710-CR-2403 | May 31, 2018   Page 6 of 9
    That discretion is limited by the principle that the conditions imposed must be
    reasonably related to the treatment of the defendant and the protection of public
    safety. 
    Id.
     And,
    [w]here, as here, the defendant challenges a probationary
    condition on the basis that it is unduly intrusive on a
    constitutional right, we will evaluate that claim by balancing the
    following factors: (1) [t]he purpose to be served by probation, (2)
    the extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by law-abiding
    citizens should be enjoyed by probationers, and (3) the legitimate
    needs of law enforcement.
    Wilder v. State, 
    91 N.E.3d 1016
    , 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Smith v.
    State, 
    779 N.E.2d 111
    , 117 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied).
    [14]   Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-2.3(a)(18) allows a court to require, as a
    condition of probation, that the probationer “[r]efrain from any direct or
    indirect contact with an individual.” However, there “must be some nexus
    between the no contact order and the crime for which the defendant is being
    sentenced.” Howe, 25 N.E.3d at 214. For example, in Howe v. State, we held
    that there was a nexus between the defendant’s crime of battery and the order
    prohibiting the defendant from contacting a child in front of whom he had
    committed the battery. 25 N.E.3d at 215.
    [15]   Here, Schnieb’s crime is possession of methamphetamine. In the presentence
    investigation interview, she admitted to continued substance abuse and to being
    “unable to control her urge to use.” App. at 27. She also stated that the reason
    she relapsed into drug use was because Field had relapsed into drug use. Id. at
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 08A02-1710-CR-2403 | May 31, 2018   Page 7 of 9
    28. The trial court found that Field was a “trigger” for Schnieb’s drug use, and
    that Field’s and Schnieb’s situation was “toxic.” Tr. at 26-27. Thus, there is a
    nexus between Schnieb’s crime of drug possession and the order prohibiting her
    from contacting Field, who triggers Schnieb’s drug use. And the no-contact
    order serves the purpose of Schnieb’s probation, which is to facilitate her
    recovery from severe drug addiction and the resultant criminal behavior of
    possessing illegal drugs. The no-contact order thereby also serves the legitimate
    needs of law enforcement to keep Schnieb from possessing illegal drugs.
    [16]   Moreover, the no-contact order does not unduly interfere with Schnieb’s
    constitutional right to raise her children, as she claims. The traditional right of
    parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the
    Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. K.W. & B.S. v. Ind.
    Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re A.S.), 
    17 N.E.3d 994
    , 1001-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),
    trans. denied. However, that right is not absolute and must be subordinated to
    the best interests of the children. 
    Id. at 1002
    . Schnieb’s and Field’s children are
    currently the subject of a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) case, which the
    trial court acknowledged in the no-contact order. The trial court specifically
    stated in both its oral and written sentencing orders that Schnieb must comply
    with any orders in the CHINS case. Obviously, such orders could include
    orders that Schnieb have contact with Field, as the trial court noted at the
    sentencing hearing. Tr. at 26. Thus, the no-contact order does not unduly
    intrude on Schnieb’s constitutional right to raise her children with their father;
    rather, it reduces the chances of her further drug use and possession while also
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 08A02-1710-CR-2403 | May 31, 2018   Page 8 of 9
    permitting her to contact Field for co-parenting purposes at whatever frequency
    and in whatever manner the CHINS court deems to be in the children’s best
    interest.
    [17]   Affirmed.
    Crone, J., and Brown, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 08A02-1710-CR-2403 | May 31, 2018   Page 9 of 9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08A02-1710-CR-2403

Filed Date: 5/31/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/31/2018