John W. Anthony v. State of Indiana ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                                       FILED
    May 31 2018, 8:54 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Ruth Ann Johnson                                          Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Victoria L. Bailey                                        Attorney General of Indiana
    Marion County Public Defender Agency
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Tyler G. Banks
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    John W. Anthony,                                          May 31, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
    49A02-1712-CR-2859
    v.                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Marcel A. Pratt,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                        Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49G13-1707-IF-35689
    May, Judge.
    [1]   John W. Anthony appeals the trial court’s determination he violated Indiana
    Code section 9-19-19-3, which prohibits driving “with a sign, poster,
    sunscreening material, or other nontransparent material upon the front
    windshield, side wings, or side or rear windows of the vehicle that obstructs the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1712-CR-2859 | May 31, 2018                       Page 1 of 8
    driver’s clear view of the highway or an intersecting highway.” As the State did
    not present any evidence to prove Anthony violated that statute, we reverse.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On July 25, 2017, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer
    Kenneth Greer observed a car being driven by Anthony. The car “had plastic
    bags of trash, canned foods, clothes, piled from the bottom of [its] floor to the
    ceiling . . . on the dashboard and along the side windows and rear windows.”
    (Tr. Vol. II at 6.) After looking around the car and being able to see in only the
    driver’s window, Officer Greer issued a citation to Anthony for violation of
    Indiana Code section 9-19-19-3.
    [3]   On November 13, 2017, at a bench trial, Anthony represented himself and
    denied violating the statute. Throughout his testimony Anthony repeatedly
    noted the statute prohibits “nontransparent material upon the” windows, 
    Ind. Code § 9-19-19-3
     (emphasis added), and argued he “didn’t have nothing on the
    windshield. [He] didn’t have nothing on the side windows. [He] did have
    items in the automobile.” 1 (Tr. at 13) (errors in original).
    1
    Anthony submitted a picture of his vehicle as Defendant’s Exhibit A. An affidavit from the court reporter
    indicates the Exhibit was admitted but could not be located when the Exhibit volume was being prepared for
    appeal.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1712-CR-2859 | May 31, 2018                          Page 2 of 8
    [4]   The State, during its cross-examination of Anthony, told Anthony he was not
    understanding the statute correctly. The following exchange occurred:
    [State:]      A person may not drive a motor vehicle with a sign,
    poster or non-transparent material, that’s debris, on the front
    windshield, side windows, rear window of the vehicle, obstructs
    the driver’s clear view of the highway or intersection highway.
    You read this?
    [Anthony:] It says nothing on the windshield. I don’t have
    nothing on the windows.
    [State:]          I don’t believe you understand what I’m saying, sir.
    [Anthony:] I understand what you’re saying. I understand what
    I’m reading too.
    [State:]      So you do understand that non-transparent
    materials is not a decal? That’s not a sticker. It’s any non-
    transparent material, do you understand?
    [Anthony:] Yeah, it’s not on the windows. It’s in the vehicle.
    [State:]     That’s correct and as you can see here, it actually
    says that you cannot have those things inside your vehicle to
    obstruct your view of the highway.
    (Id. at 17.) The trial court found Anthony had committed the violation and
    assessed a fine. Anthony paid the fine and filed this appeal.
    Discussion and Decision
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1712-CR-2859 | May 31, 2018          Page 3 of 8
    Statutory Interpretation
    [5]   Anthony was cited for violating Indiana Code section 9-19-19-3, which
    provides:
    (b) A person may not drive a motor vehicle with a sign, poster,
    sunscreening material, or other nontransparent material upon the
    front windshield, side wings, or side or rear windows of the
    vehicle that obstructs the driver’s clear view of the highway or an
    intersecting highway. However, signs, posters, or other
    nontransparent material not larger than four (4) inches square
    may be placed upon the front windshield, side wings, or side or
    rear windows in the lower corner farthest removed from the
    driver’s position.
    [6]   Anthony asserts the “State presented no evidence of any nontransparent
    materials upon [his] windshield or windows[.]” (Appellant’s Br. at 7)
    (formatting changed). Although Anthony concedes his car had items stacked to
    the ceiling, he argues the statute requires the items to be upon the windows and
    they were not. The State argues the legislature’s intent was to prevent drivers
    having their view obstructed by items blocking the windows. Further, it argues
    the word “upon” should be construed broadly and not just mean “affixed”
    because the legislature uses that word in other statutes and would have used it
    here if it meant the nontransparent material only applied to items affixed to the
    windows. (Appellee’s Br. at 7-8.) The crux of the parties’ arguments, and thus
    our review, focuses on the meaning of the word “upon.”
    [7]   When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. In
    re M.W., 
    913 N.E.2d 784
    , 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We first decide if the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1712-CR-2859 | May 31, 2018       Page 4 of 8
    statute is ambiguous. 
    Id.
     If not, we need not and do not interpret it, but instead
    apply its plain and clear meaning. 
    Id.
     If the statute is susceptible to more than
    one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we must determine the
    legislature’s intent so that we can give effect to that intent. Maroney v. State, 
    849 N.E.2d 745
    , 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Statutes must be read in harmony with
    related statutes. St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., Inc. v. Poland, 
    828 N.E.2d 396
    , 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. We assume the legislature intended
    statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute’s
    underlying policy and goals. B.K.C. v. State, 
    781 N.E.2d 1157
    , 1167 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2003).
    [8]   “Upon” was defined in Clark v. Clark, 
    971 N.E.2d 58
     (Ind. 2012), a case that
    interpreted Indiana’s Guest Statute. 2 Our Indiana Supreme Court held:
    The word “upon,” both at the time it was originally added to the
    Guest Statute, see Act of Mar. 11, 1937, ch. 259, § 1, 
    1937 Ind. Acts 1229
    , and when the statute was most recently amended, see
    Pub.L. 68-1984, 
    1984 Ind. Acts 925
    , should be given its literal
    meaning: “[u]p and on” or simply “on.” The New Century
    Dictionary 2112 (1929); American Heritage Dictionary 1328 (2d
    college ed. 1985). Being “in or upon the motor vehicle” thus
    connotes a physical connection to or contact with the vehicle,
    such as being “in” a car or “upon” a motorcycle or truck bed. . .
    . Thus, if the injury is sustained at a time when a passenger is in
    mere physical contact with the motor vehicle but standing
    2
    Indiana’s Guest Statute provides one is not responsible for damages “arising from injuries to or death of
    [certain family members or hitchhikers] resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle while [those persons
    were] being transported . . . in or upon the motor vehicle[.]” 
    Ind. Code § 34-30-11-1
    .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1712-CR-2859 | May 31, 2018                           Page 5 of 8
    outside of or off of it or at a time when the passenger is not being
    “transported” by the vehicle, then the Indiana Guest Statute does
    not bar a passenger’s damage action against the driver.
    
    Id. at 62
     (footnotes omitted).
    [9]    The plain meaning of the word “upon” has not changed. Simply, it means
    “on.” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/upon (last visited May
    2, 2018). The definition of the word “on” is “a function word to indicate
    position in contact with and support by the top surface of[.]”
    https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/on (last visited May 2, 2018).
    The word “on” (and thus, the word “upon”) does not merely mean “near” but
    rather “fixed” to or in some way resting atop or dependent on. The word
    “upon” in this statute is not ambiguous. It clearly means the listed items are
    not allowed to be affixed to the windows.
    [10]   The State argues the statute should be construed broadly to include the
    circumstances at issue herein. However, the legislature has already seen fit to
    prohibit the operation of a vehicle when the driver’s view of the roadway is
    obstructed by materials loaded in the vehicle. Indiana Code section 9-21-8-43
    provides: “A person may not drive a vehicle when [it] is loaded in a manner . . .
    so as to obstruct the view of the person who drives the vehicle to the front or
    sides of the vehicle.” Because the legislature has already provided a means to
    punish citizens who drive vehicles loaded in a manner that obstructs the driver’s
    view, we need not interpret Indiana Code section 9-19-19-3 so broadly that
    “on” means more than its plain and ordinary meaning. See House of Prayer
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1712-CR-2859 | May 31, 2018        Page 6 of 8
    Ministries, Inc. v. Rush Cty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 
    91 N.E.3d 1053
    , 1063-64 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2018) (if the language of the statute is plain, the “judiciary has no
    discretion to substitute different language for that of the statute[;]” however,
    even if the language is ambiguous, the judiciary “would be obliged to avoid
    interpreting it” in a way that would lead to an absurd result).
    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    [11]   “[T]raffic infractions are civil, rather than criminal, in nature and the State must
    prove the commission of the infraction by only a preponderance of the
    evidence.” Rosenbaum v. State, 
    930 N.E.2d 72
    , 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
    denied. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we will
    consider only probative evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
    judgment. Binkley v. State, 
    654 N.E.2d 736
    , 737 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied. The
    decision comes before us with a presumption of legitimacy, and we will not
    substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. 
    Id.
     We do not assess the
    credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence in determining whether the
    evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 
    867 N.E.2d 144
    , 146 (Ind. 2007). If there
    is substantial evidence of probative value supporting the trial court’s judgment,
    it will not be overturned. Rosenbaum, 
    930 N.E.2d at 74
    .
    [12]   While there seems to be little doubt Anthony’s vehicle was full of items that
    obstructed his view, those items were not affixed to the windows or dependent
    on the windows for their support. Rather, the items in Anthony’s car were
    resting on the floors, the seats, and the dashboard. By all accounts, his
    operation of the vehicle raised safety concerns because his view was obstructed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1712-CR-2859 | May 31, 2018     Page 7 of 8
    However, Indiana Code section 9-19-19-3 does not prohibit an “obstructed
    view,” generally. It prohibits placement of “material upon . . . windows . . .
    that obstructs the driver’s clear view.” 
    Ind. Code § 9-19-19-3
    . The State did not
    present such evidence. Accordingly, we reverse. See Atteberry v. State, 
    911 N.E.2d 601
    , 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“State’s failure to properly charge . . . is
    no mere technicality . . . the State must prove the elements of the crime it
    charged, not the elements of some other crime the defendant may have
    committed.”).
    [13]   Reversed.
    Riley, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1712-CR-2859 | May 31, 2018    Page 8 of 8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49A02-1712-CR-2859

Judges: May

Filed Date: 5/31/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024