In the Matter of: D.S. and N.H. (Minor Children) Children in Need of Services and A.S. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Mar 31 2016, 8:23 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Danielle L. Gregory Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Robert J. Henke
Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of: March 31, 2016
D.S. and N.H. (Minor Children) Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1507-JC-950
Children in Need of Services
Appeal from the Marion Superior
and Court
A.S. (Mother),
The Honorable Marilyn Moores,
Appellant-Respondent, Judge
v. The Honorable Jennifer Hubartt,
Magistrate
The Indiana Department of Trial Court Cause Nos.
49D09-1503-JC-948
Child Services, 49D09-1503-JC-949
Appellee-Petitioner.
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issues
[1] A.S. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s adjudication of her two children,
D.X.S. and N.H. (“Children”), as children in need of services (“CHINS”).
Mother raises three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as (1)
whether the juvenile court’s CHINS determination is clearly erroneous, and (2)
whether the juvenile court’s Parental Participation Order is clearly erroneous.
Concluding neither the CHINS determination nor the Parental Participation
Order is clearly erroneous, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Born in September 2011, D.X.S. is the child of D.S. and Mother. Following
D.X.S.’s birth, Mother was awarded full custody of D.X.S. and D.S. was
awarded parenting time. Mother and D.X.S. lived with D.X.S.’s maternal
grandmother, T.S., and maternal great-grandmother. In August 2013, Mother
was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and public intoxication,
and Mother was sentenced to probation. Four months later, Mother was
convicted of possession of a controlled substance and operating a vehicle while
intoxicated; again, Mother was sentenced to probation. In August 2014,
Mother gave birth to N.H. Despite not being N.H.’s biological father, C.H.
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signed N.H.’s birth certificate.1 Mother and the Children continued to live with
T.S.
[3] In March 2015, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a
report alleging Mother abused drugs and often left the Children unattended.
Thereafter, Deanna Watson, a Family Case Manager with DCS, began
investigating the report and interviewed T.S. and Mother. T.S. stated Mother
worked late hours as a waitress and exotic dancer. When Mother went to
work, Mother relied on T.S. and the Children’s maternal great-grandparents to
babysit the Children. At times, Mother would leave the house for several days
without returning, or contacting T.S., to check on the Children’s well-being.
When Mother did return home, Mother often slept and did not spend much
time with the Children. T.S. suspected Mother had a problem with drugs and
alcohol. Mother admitted to using cocaine three times per week and leaving
the Children under T.S.’ supervision. Mother further stated the Children
caused her significant stress and she needed assistance and services. Mother
then submitted to a drug screen and tested positive for cocaine and opiates.
Concerned for the Children’s well-being, DCS immediately removed the
Children from Mother’s custody and placed the Children with T.S.
[4] On March 20, 2015, DCS filed a petition alleging the Children were CHINS.
On the same day, the juvenile court held a joint detention and initial hearing.
1
Neither D.S. nor C.H. appeal the juvenile court’s order adjudicating the Children as CHINS.
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At the hearing, the juvenile court continued the Children’s removal from
Mother’s custody and placement with T.S., appointed a guardian ad litem, and
ordered Mother to vacate T.S.’s home until Mother could provide five negative
drug screens.2 Per DCS’ recommendation, Mother began meeting with a home-
based case manager at the beginning of April 2015. On April 20, 2015, the
juvenile court held a pre-trial hearing. Mother did not appear because she was
in jail for a probation violation. On May 4, Mother appeared for a pre-trial
hearing, and the juvenile court authorized Mother to reside in T.S.’s home with
the Children, contingent upon Mother continuing to provide negative drug
screens.
[5] At the fact-finding hearing on June 22, 2015, Mother’s probation officer,
Michael Feldman, testified the terms of Mother’s probation required Mother to
participate in drug testing and a substance abuse assessment. Mother
completed the substance abuse assessment and was not ordered to seek
treatment. After Mother admitted to using cocaine, however, Feldman ordered
Mother to seek substance abuse treatment before her probationary term ended.
To Feldman’s knowledge, Mother was still on probation at the time of the fact-
finding hearing and had not yet sought treatment. Feldman also testified he
had recently filed a petition alleging Mother violated the terms of her probation,
but the record does not describe the allegation(s) with any specificity. Also at
2
On March 30, 2015, the juvenile court granted DCS’ motion to amend its petition to include “A.J.” as the
alleged father to N.H. A.J. never appeared at any of the pre-trial hearings or the fact-finding hearing, and the
juvenile court issued a default order as to A.J.
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the time of the fact-finding hearing, the trial court in Mother’s criminal case had
not made a final ruling on Mother’s alleged probation violation. Despite
Mother having until the end of her probationary term to seek substance abuse
treatment, Feldman opined he was concerned Mother would not complete the
required substance abuse treatment.
[6] Mother’s home-based case manager, Candace Balzano, testified she and
Mother attempted to meet weekly, but Mother did not consistently show up to
her appointments. Balzano opined Mother should receive additional services to
assist in parenting the Children. T.S. testified Mother did not pay for the
Children’s clothing or food. In addition, T.S. stated she kicked Mother out of
the home because Mother came home intoxicated twice. T.S. also testified
Mother’s absence from the Children’s lives had an adverse effect on the
Children. Specifically, T.S. observed D.X.S. missed Mother a great deal and
often asked where Mother was.
[7] On July 1, 2015, the juvenile court issued an order adjudicating the Children as
CHINS. The juvenile court’s order included the following relevant findings:
7. On or about March 18, 2015, [Mother] admitted to DCS
FCM Deanna Watson that she was currently using cocaine
approximately three times per week and had used approximately
three days prior to that date.
8. On or about March 18, 2015, [Mother] admitted to FCM
Watson that she was stressed out with the children and needed
assistance and services.
9. On or about March 18, 2015, [Mother] admitted to FCM
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Watson that she had just left an abusive relationship with [C.H.]
10. On or about March 18, 2015[,] and at the present time,
[Mother] is on adult probation for drug and alcohol related
convictions.
11. [Mother] has been Court ordered through her criminal
convictions to participate in a Substance Abuse Evaluation,
Substance Abuse Treatment, and Random Drug Screens.
12. Despite being Court ordered to complete the substance abuse
services and drug screens, [Mother] has not yet completed the
services.
13. [Mother]’s Probation Officer Michael Feldman has filed a
Violation of Probation with the criminal court concerning
[Mother]’s lack of progress in services.
***
15. [Mother] has acknowledged the need for services to Ms.
Balzano, stating to Ms. Balzano that she is interested in obtaining
a GED, changing her employment from a waitress and exotic
dancer, securing housing, saving money, and achieving sobriety.
16. [Mother] has been inconsistent in her work with Ms.
Balzano and on the achievement of her treatment goals.
17. [Mother] has not successfully achieved her treatment goals
with Ms. Balzano as of the date of this fact finding hearing.
18. The children have been placed in relative care with maternal
grandmother, [T.S.] since approximately [M]arch 20, 2015.
19. [Mother] has attempted to see the children in the home of
[T.S.] when [T.S.] perceived her daughter to be under the
influence of drugs and/or alcohol.
20. [Mother] has told [T.S.] that she wants to get sober, but her
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interest in sobriety is not consistent, therefore she has not been
successful.
***
24. [D.X.S.] has never lived with his father, [D.S.], but merely
visited [D.S.] and his family.
25. [D.S.] is unemployed and has no independent means to
provide necessities, including food, clothing, and shelter, for
himself and his child. Additionally, [D.S.] lives in the home of
his mother . . . and has no independent means to maintain his
own home; [D.S.] has no driver’s license nor independent
transportation . . . .
26. [Mother] has admitted to substance abuse which has resulted
in criminal convictions, probation, and which compromises her
ability to provide care, necessities, and supervision for her young
children.
27. [Mother] has not demonstrated that she has resolved her
substance abuse issues and that she can provide care, necessities,
and supervision for her children. [Mother] has not consistently
participated in casemanagement [sic] services, a probation
violation has been filed regarding her substance abuse services,
and no evidence such as drug screen results were presented to
this court regarding her current sobriety.
28. Neither [C.H.] nor [D.S.] are able or willing to
independently provide care, necessities, and supervision for their
children.
Appellant’s Appendix at 104-05.
[8] On July 18, the juvenile court issued its Parental Participation Order, ordering
Mother to engage in a home-based therapy program and follow all
recommendations, to participate in a substance abuse assessment and
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successfully complete all treatment recommendations, and to submit to random
drug and alcohol screens. Mother now appeals the juvenile court’s order
adjudicating the Children as CHINS and the juvenile court’s Parental
Participation Order. Additional facts will be added as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[9] When reviewing a juvenile court’s CHINS determination, we neither reweigh
the evidence nor reassess witness credibility. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253
(Ind. 2012). We consider only the evidence that supports the juvenile court’s
decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id.
[10] Where, as here, the juvenile court enters findings of fact and conclusions sua
sponte, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the issues covered by the
findings: (1) we determine whether the evidence supports the findings of fact,
and (2) whether the findings support the judgment. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283,
1287 (Ind. 2014). “[W]e review the remaining issues under the general
judgment standard, under which a judgment will be affirmed if it can be
sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).” A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the
record lacks evidence, or reasonable inferences from the evidence, to support it.
In re Adoption of A.S., 912 N.E.2d 840, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
The judgment is clearly erroneous if we are left with a “definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re S.L., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1123
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(Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We will reverse only upon a showing that the court’s
decision was clearly erroneous. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253.
II. CHINS Determination
[11] Mother contends the juvenile court’s order adjudicating the Children as CHINS
is clearly erroneous. Specifically, Mother argues the evidence does not support
six of the juvenile court’s factual findings and the unchallenged findings of fact
do not support the juvenile court’s judgment. The juvenile court adjudicated
the Children as CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which provides,
A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes
eighteen (18) years of age:
(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired
or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the
child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
education, or supervision; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
coercive intervention of the court.
In other words, the statute requires State to prove three basic elements: (1) the
parent’s actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, (2) the child’s
needs are unmet, and (3) the child’s needs are unlikely to be met without State
intervention. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. “That final element guards against
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unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for
families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for their children,’ not merely
where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child’s needs.” Id. (emphasis in
original) (quoting Lake Cnty. Div. of Family & Children Servs. v. Charlton, 631
N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). Because a CHINS proceeding is a civil
proceeding, the State must prove the child is a CHINS by a preponderance of
the evidence. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253.
[12] Mother first argues the juvenile court erred when it found certain facts that,
according to Mother, are not supported by the record. Specifically, Mother
challenges Factual Findings 13 and 24-28. We interpret Mother’s challenges to
Factual Findings 24-28 as merely requests for this court to reweigh the
evidence, which we will not do. 3 See id. As to Factual Finding 13, Mother
concedes the evidence supports a finding that Feldman filed a petition alleging
Mother violated probation, but Mother correctly argues there is nothing in the
record to indicate Feldman filed the petition because of “[Mother’s]’s lack of
progress in services.” Appellant’s App. at 105. For purposes of this appeal, we
proceed under the assumption that the latter portion of Factual Finding 13 is
not supported by the evidence. We note, however, the erroneous portion of
Factual Finding 13 does not render the juvenile court’s CHINS determination
3
Mother also argues Factual Finding 27 indicates the juvenile court shifted the burden of proof to Mother.
We disagree. At best, Factual Finding 27 merely indicates Mother had the burden of going forward with
evidence after DCS met its burden.
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clearly erroneous because, as discussed below, there is sufficient evidence
elsewhere to support the juvenile court’s judgment.
[13] Second, Mother contends there is no evidence that Mother’s actions or
inactions seriously endangered the Children. We disagree. The juvenile court’s
findings indicate Mother, while on probation for drug and alcohol related
offenses, used cocaine approximately three times per week. Moreover, the
record indicates Mother did not pay for the Children’s food or clothing, Mother
left the Children with T.S. for days at a time without checking on the Children’s
well-being, Mother returned to the home intoxicated on two separate occasions,
and Mother tested positive for cocaine and opiates. The juvenile court’s
conclusion that Mother’s actions and inactions seriously endangered the
Children is not clearly erroneous.
[14] Finally, Mother contends there is no evidence that coercive intervention of the
court is necessary. As noted above, Mother tested positive for cocaine and
opiates despite being on probation for convictions related to substance abuse. In
addition, Mother was inconsistent in meeting with Balzano to discuss working
toward securing housing, saving money, changing employment, and achieving
sobriety. Moreover, Balzano opined court intervention was necessary, T.S.
opined Mother could not achieve sobriety on her own, and even Mother
admitted to Watson she needed services. The juvenile court’s conclusion that
coercive intervention of the court is necessary is not clearly erroneous.
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III. Parental Participation Order
[15] Mother also argues there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile
court’s Parental Participation Order requiring Mother to participate in home-
based therapy, to participate in a substance abuse assessment and successfully
complete all treatment recommendations, and to submit to random drug and
alcohol screens. Indiana Code section 31-34-20-3 provides,
If the juvenile court determines that a parent, guardian, or
custodian should participate in a program of care, treatment, or
rehabilitation for the child, the court may order the parent,
guardian, or custodian to do the following:
(1) Obtain assistance in fulfilling the obligations as a
parent, guardian, or custodian.
(2) Provide specified care, treatment, or supervision for the
child.
(3) Work with a person providing care, treatment, or
rehabilitation for the child.
(4) Participate in a program operated by or through the
department of correction.
[16] In support of her argument, Mother relies on our decision in In re A.C., 905
N.E.2d 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). There, the juvenile court adjudicated A.C. a
CHINS and ordered the mother, in part, to submit to random drug testing and
to participate in a substance abuse assessment and successfully complete all
treatment recommendations. Because neither the record nor the juvenile
court’s findings referenced any allegations of the mother’s substance abuse, we
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vacated those portions of the parental participation decree, reasoning,
“Although the juvenile court has broad discretion in determining what
programs and services in which a parent is required to participate, the
requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstance that was revealed
by the evidence.” Id. at 464.
[17] Similar to In re A.C., the juvenile court ordered Mother to participate in a
substance abuse assessment, successfully complete all treatment
recommendations, and submit to random drug and alcohol screens. Unlike In
re A.C., however, the record and the juvenile court’s findings indicate Mother
has a substance abuse problem. Specifically, Mother has been convicted of
possession of a controlled substance on two separate occasions, public
intoxication, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated; Mother admitted to
using cocaine while on probation and thereafter tested positive for cocaine and
opiates; and T.S. kicked Mother out of the house because she arrived home
intoxicated on two separate occasions. We therefore conclude the juvenile
court’s Parental Participation Order relates to Mother’s behaviors and is not
clearly erroneous.
Conclusion
[18] Concluding the juvenile court’s CHINS determination and Parental
Participation Order are not clearly erroneous, we affirm.
[19] Affirmed.
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Barnes, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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