In the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of Z.C. and L.C. (Minor Children) and N.S. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    Feb 13 2018, 8:32 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                       CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                   Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Justin R. Wall                                            Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Wall Legal Services                                       Attorney General of Indiana
    Huntington, Indiana
    Larry D. Allen
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the Involuntary                          February 13, 2018
    Termination of the Parent-Child                           Court of Appeals Case No.
    Relationship of Z.C. and L.C.                             85A02-1710-JT-2386
    (Minor Children) and                                      Appeal from the Wabash Circuit
    Court
    N.S. (Mother) and J.C. (Father),                          The Honorable Robert R.
    McCallen, III, Judge
    Appellants-Respondents,
    Trial Court Cause Nos.
    v.                                                85C01-1612-JT-16, 17
    The Indiana Department of
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-JT-2386 | February 13, 2018            Page 1 of 11
    Crone, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   N.S.(“Mother”) and J.C. (“Father”) (collectively “Parents”) appeal the trial
    court’s order involuntarily terminating their parental rights to their minor
    children, Z.C. and L.C. (collectively “the Children”). We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Parents are the biological parents of Z.C., born February 2, 2007, and L.C.,
    born May 21, 2014. In July 2015, the Wabash County Department of Child
    Services (“DCS”) was contacted by the Wabash County Drug Task Force
    following a raid at Parents’ home. At the time, Mother was incarcerated and
    Father and the Children were residing in the home. The Children were
    removed from the home due to the discovery of drugs and paraphernalia, as
    well as the deplorable conditions of the home. DCS filed petitions alleging that
    the Children were children in need of services (“CHINS”). Initial hearings
    were held, and the Children were placed with their paternal grandmother.
    After only a few days, the Children’s disposition was changed and they were
    placed in foster care where they have remained since.
    [3]   In September 2015, both Mother and Father appeared at a hearing and each
    admitted that the Children were CHINS. The trial court entered a CHINS
    adjudication on October 9, 2015, and following a dispositional hearing, the trial
    court ordered the Parents to participate in a variety of services, the majority of
    which were centered on “their substance abuse issues and chaotic lifestyle.”
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-JT-2386 | February 13, 2018   Page 2 of 11
    Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at. 65. However, over the next year, neither Mother
    nor Father made substantial or meaningful progress and therefore, DCS filed
    petitions to terminate both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights in December
    2016. Following a termination hearing held in September 2017, the trial court
    entered its order finding in relevant part: 1
    Mother has been in and out of jail for a great portion of the time
    these proceedings have been pending, restricting her ability to
    engage, in any meaningful way, in services. She was just recently
    released. Mother now professes her desire to get clean and stay
    clear and to do whatever it takes. Sadly, her desire to do so, even
    if sincere, is too little, too late. Z.C. and L.C. are twisting in the
    wind. Further, Mother’s poor history of engaging in services even
    when she was not incarcerated reflects her inability to do what
    she needs to do to be a parent or to comply with services. Her
    incarcerations were a result of her actions and she cannot now
    hide behind that as a reason for not participating in services.
    Mother even testified “I feel like I have had plenty of chances.”
    She has, all to no avail.
    Father has had his share of legal problems as well and his
    substance abuse continued to inhibit his ability to engage, in any
    meaningful way, in services. Not long after the petitions to
    terminate parental rights were filed, Father relapsed. While he
    sought treatment, he has yet to overcome his demons. To
    Father’s credit, at least according to his testimony, he has been
    sober for approximately the last 8 months. While he has engaged
    in and even completed some services, they have not resulted in
    any meaningful change. He resides in his mother’s home. His
    work history is sporadic. He continues to minimize his
    1
    We note that the trial court refers to the parties by their full names. We use “Mother,” “Father,” and each
    minor child’s initials where appropriate.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-JT-2386 | February 13, 2018         Page 3 of 11
    responsibility for the [C]hildren’s removal from his care. While
    his intentions appear to be sincere, he is ill equipped to parent
    any child. He continues to offer a myriad of excuses for his
    inability to engage in some services, submit to drug testing and
    see his children. His participation in the last 30 days has been nil.
    …
    Z.C. and L.C. are thriving in foster [care]. Each have their own
    serious issues to deal with. Being older, Z.C. has lived more of
    her life in chaos than has L.C. and, as a result, she has [bore] the
    brunt of Father and Mother’s problems. Z.C. is very angry at her
    parents and rightfully so. Prior efforts at reunification were
    constantly met with destabilizing setbacks, occurring as recently
    as April of this year. Z.C.’s therapist wondered how much more
    she [Z.C.] can stand. Z.C. and L.C. need permanency, which
    neither Father or Mother can provide. Both Father and Mother
    acknowledge they have issues. However, neither seem to
    appreciate the seriousness of their shortcomings, past and
    present, which resulted in the removal of the [C]hildren in the
    first place and which prevent reunification. Each appear to be
    kind[-]hearted and well[-]intentioned. However, their history
    speaks volumes about their ability to parent, both currently and
    in the foreseeable future.
    
    Id. at 66-67.
    [4]   Based upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded that: (1) there is a
    reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s
    removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by
    either Parent; (2) there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-JT-2386 | February 13, 2018   Page 4 of 11
    parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Children;2 (3)
    termination of the parent-child relationship between both Parents and the
    Children is in the Children’s best interests; and (4) DCS has a satisfactory plan
    for the care and treatment of the Children, which is adoption. Accordingly, the
    trial court determined that DCS had proven the allegations of the petitions to
    terminate parental rights by clear and convincing evidence and therefore
    terminated both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. Both Parents now
    appeal.
    Discussion and Decision
    [5]   “The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parents but,
    instead, to protect their children. Thus, although parental rights are of a
    constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights
    when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental
    responsibilities.” In re A.P., 
    882 N.E.2d 799
    , 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citation
    omitted). “[T]ermination is intended as a last resort, available only when all
    other reasonable efforts have failed.” 
    Id. A petition
    for the involuntary
    termination of parental rights must allege in pertinent part:
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    2
    Specifically, the trial court concluded that continuation of the parent-child relationship “would be
    detrimental to [the Children’s] physical and mental well-being.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 67.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-JT-2386 | February 13, 2018           Page 5 of 11
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
    resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
    outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
    parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
    child.
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
    adjudicated a child in need of services;
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove “each and every element” by
    clear and convincing evidence. In re G.Y., 
    904 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1261 (Ind. 2009);
    Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. If the trial court finds that the allegations in a petition
    are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-
    35-2-8(a).
    [6]   “We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving
    the termination of parental rights.” C.A. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    15 N.E.3d 85
    , 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
    We neither reweigh evidence nor assess witness credibility. We
    consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to
    the trial court’s judgment. Where the trial court enters findings
    of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard
    of review: we first determine whether the evidence supports the
    findings and then determine whether the findings support the
    judgment. In deference to the trial court’s unique position to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-JT-2386 | February 13, 2018   Page 6 of 11
    assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a
    parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.
    
    Id. at 92-93
    (citations omitted). “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings
    do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support
    the judgment.” In re R.J., 
    829 N.E.2d 1032
    , 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
    [7]   Parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s
    conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted
    in the Children’s removal from and continued placement outside the home will
    not be remedied, that termination of their parental rights is in the best interests
    of the Children, and that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment
    of the Children.
    Section 1 – Parents fail to challenge the trial court’s
    conclusion that continuation of the parent-child relationship
    poses a threat to the well-being of the children.
    [8]   It is well-settled that because Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written
    in the disjunctive, the trial court need only find that one of the three factors has
    been established by clear and convincing evidence and it is not necessary for
    DCS to prove, or for the juvenile court to find, either of the other two factors
    listed. See In re A.D., 
    31 N.E.3d 1048
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). We note that the
    trial court here concluded both that (1) there is a reasonably probability that the
    conditions resulting in the Children’s removal and continued placement outside
    the Parents’ home will not be remedied and (2) that there is a reasonable
    probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-JT-2386 | February 13, 2018   Page 7 of 11
    to the well-being of the Children. On appeal, Parents only challenge the
    evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable
    probability that the conditions resulting in the Children’s removal and
    continued placement outside the home will not be remedied and they make no
    evidentiary challenge to the trial court’s conclusion that continuation of the
    parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Children.
    Because the unchallenged conclusion, standing alone, satisfies the statutory
    requirement listed in Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B), see In re L.S., 
    717 N.E.2d 204
    , 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied (2000), cert. denied (2002), we
    need not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s
    conclusion regarding the reasonable probability of unchanged conditions.
    Section 2 – Sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s
    conclusion that termination of both Mother’s and Father’s
    parental rights is in the Children’s best interests.
    [9]   Parents assert that the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion
    that termination of their parental rights is in the Children’s best interests. In
    considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a
    child, the trial court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS
    and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family &
    Children, 
    798 N.E.2d 185
    , 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the trial court
    must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child involved. 
    Id. The trial
    court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed before
    terminating parental rights. 
    Id. “The historic
    inability to provide adequate
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-JT-2386 | February 13, 2018   Page 8 of 11
    housing, stability, and supervision, coupled with the current inability to provide
    the same, will support a finding that continuation of the parent-child
    relationship is contrary to the child’s best interests.” In re A.H., 
    832 N.E.2d 563
    ,
    570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The testimony of service providers may support a
    finding that termination is in the child’s best interests. 
    McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 203
    .
    [10]   Parents concede that “DCS established via testimony of a number of witnesses,
    that they believed it to be in the best interest of the Children that the parent-
    child relationship be terminated.” Appellants’ Br. at 22. Indeed, family
    therapist Sandra Duecker testified regarding Z.C.’s extreme emotional distress,
    stating that it was in her best interests if parental rights were terminated and
    “she was allowed to be living in a home that had all of those things that she
    needs, which is stability and soothing calmness, predictability … nurturance, …
    all those things that are an important part of a child’s life.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 59.
    Family case manager Jennifer Lane opined that termination of Mother’s and
    Father’s parental rights to both Children was warranted because of the
    “substantial amount of time” that neither parent has been able to make positive
    changes and that at this point “the [C]hildren deserve permanency.” 
    Id. at 159.
    Even Mother testified that the Parents had not been stable and/or capable of
    taking care of the Children and she admitted that the Children “have waited
    long enough” for such stability. 
    Id. at 106.
    [11]   Parents point to no contrary evidence in the record, and their argument
    regarding best interests is sparse to say the least. Sufficient evidence supports
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-JT-2386 | February 13, 2018   Page 9 of 11
    the trial court’s conclusion that termination of both Mother’s and Father’s
    parental rights is in the Children’s best interests.
    Section 3 – Sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s
    conclusion that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the care and
    treatment of the Children.
    [12]   Finally, Parents contend that DCS failed to present clear and convincing
    evidence that it has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the
    Children. While the trial court must find that there is a satisfactory plan for the
    care and treatment of the child, “[t]his plan need not be detailed, so long as it
    offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the
    parent-child relationship is terminated.” In re S.L.H.S., 
    885 N.E.2d 603
    , 618
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Generally, adoption is a satisfactory plan. 
    Id. [13] Again,
    Parents make virtually no argument on this issue, conceding that
    “[s]everal witnesses testified that the plan for the Children was adoption” and
    that “case law is not in their favor in regards to arguing against adoption being
    a satisfactory plan” for the care and treatment of the Children. Appellants’ Br.
    at 22. Sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that DCS has a
    satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Children, which is adoption.
    [14]   In sum, DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
    termination of parental rights. Accordingly, the trial court’s termination order
    is affirmed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-JT-2386 | February 13, 2018   Page 10 of 11
    [15]   Affirmed.
    Robb, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-JT-2386 | February 13, 2018   Page 11 of 11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 85A02-1710-JT-2386

Filed Date: 2/13/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021