Nathan D. Hummel v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 23 2019, 6:01 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
APPELLANT, PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Nathan Hummel Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Westville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Sierra A. Murray
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Nathan D. Hummel, August 23, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-743
v. Appeal from the Starke Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Kim Hall, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No.
75C01-1112-FA-15
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-743 | August 23, 2019 Page 1 of 5
Statement of the Case
[1] Nathan Hummel (“Hummel”), pro se, appeals the trial court’s order denying
his motion to correct erroneous sentence. Hummel challenges the trial court’s
imposition of a consecutive sentence, arguing that the plea agreement did not
specify a consecutive sentence. Because a motion to correct erroneous sentence
is limited to correcting sentencing errors apparent on the face of the judgment
and Hummel raises an issue outside of this context, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion to correct erroneous
sentence.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Hummel’s
motion to correct erroneous sentence.
Facts
[3] In December 2011, the State charged Hummel with Count 1, Class A felony
dealing a narcotic drug; Count 2, Class B felony robbery; Count 3, Class B
felony robbery (aiding, inducing, or causing); Count 4, Class C felony
disarming an officer; Count 5, Class D felony resisting law enforcement; and
Count 6, Class D felony criminal mischief. In 2012, Hummel entered into a
plea agreement and pled guilty to an amended Count 1 and Counts 2, 3, and 4.
In exchange, the State agreed to amend Count 1 from a Class A felony to a
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Class B felony and to dismiss Counts 5 and 6. The plea agreement provided
that “[t]he sentences in count II, count III, and count IV shall run
concurrently.” (App. 18).
[4] Thereafter, in May 2012, the trial court sentenced Hummel to fifteen (15) years
for amended Count 1, ten (10) years for Count 2, ten (10) years for Count 3,
and two (2) years for Count 4. The trial court ordered Counts 2, 3, and 4 to run
concurrently and amended Count 1 to run consecutively to Counts 2, 3, and 4.
[5] Seven years later, in January 2019, Hummel filed a motion to correct erroneous
sentence. In his motion, Hummel challenged the trial court’s imposition of
amended Count 1 running consecutively to Counts 2, 3, and 4. The trial court
denied Hummel’s motion to correct erroneous sentence. Hummel now appeals.
Decision
[6] Hummel appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct erroneous
sentence. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to correct erroneous
sentence for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the trial court’s decision
is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Davis v.
State, 978 N.E.2d 470, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
[7] An inmate who believes he has been erroneously sentenced may file a motion
to correct the sentence pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-38-1-15. Neff v. State,
888 N.E.2d 1249, 1250-51 (Ind. 2008). INDIANA CODE § 35-38-1-15 provides:
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If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake
does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be
corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person.
The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the
corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must
be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law
specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.
“The purpose of the statute ‘is to provide prompt, direct access to an
uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal
sentence.’” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Gaddie
v. State, 566 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ind. 1991)).
[8] A statutory motion to correct erroneous sentence “may only be used to correct
sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the judgment imposing the
sentence in light of the statutory authority.” Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787.
“Such claims may be resolved by considering only the face of the judgment and
the applicable statutory authority without reference to other matters in or
extrinsic to the record.” Fulkrod v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006). If a claim requires consideration of the proceedings before, during, or
after trial, it may not be presented by way of a motion to correct erroneous
sentence. Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787. “Use of the statutory motion to correct
sentence should thus be narrowly confined to claims apparent from the face of
the sentencing judgment, and the ‘facially erroneous’ prerequisite should
henceforth be strictly applied[.]” Id.
[9] Here, Hummel challenges the trial court’s imposition of amended Count 1
running consecutively to Counts 2, 3, and 4. Specifically, he argues that his
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“plea agreement does NOT call for consecutive sentences[.]” (Hummel’s Br.
6). We agree with the State that resolution of this issue “required the trial court
to consider the proceedings before trial because he asked the court to compare
his plea agreement to his sentence.” (State’s Br. 6). Because the error Hummel
alleges is not clear from the face of the sentencing order, it is not appropriate for
a motion to correct erroneous sentence. See Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787.
Accordingly, Hummel has failed to show that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his motion, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. See,
e.g., Bauer v. State, 875 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming the trial
court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to correct erroneous sentence where
the defendant’s claims required consideration of matters in the record outside of
the face of the judgment and were, accordingly, not the types of claims properly
presented in a motion to correct erroneous sentence), trans. denied.
[10] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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