Dorfman Property Management v. Tameka Edwards ( 2018 )

FILED
Jun 28 2018, 8:49 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Andrew J. Borland
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Dorfman Property Management, June 28, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
06A01-1711-SC-2623
v. Appeal from the Boone Superior
Court
Tameka Edwards, The Honorable Bruce E. Petit,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
06D02-1704-SC-281
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Dorfman Property Management (“Dorfman”) appeals a small claims judgment
ordering that Dorfman return to its former tenant, Tameka Edwards
(“Edwards”), a portion of her security deposit. Dorfman presents the sole issue
of whether the judgment is clearly erroneous because Edwards was charged for
less than all costs incurred by Dorfman, specifically, those for professional
housecleaning and repainting. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On February 26, 2016, Edwards and Dorfman executed a one-year lease for a
house in Whitestown, Indiana (“the Lease”). The house was to be occupied by
Edwards and her three children. Edwards agreed to pay monthly rent of
$1,250.00 and she tendered a $2,500.00 security deposit to Dorfman. The
Lease specified that the “amount necessary to have the carpet professionally
cleaned” would be deducted from the security deposit, as would amounts
“reasonably required” to reimburse Dorfman for cleaning and repair in “all
rooms in which Tenant shall have damaged or irreparably marked the walls.”
(Def. Ex. B. Para. 9.)
[3] Upon move-in, Edwards asked that certain exterior damages be repaired. With
that matter unresolved, more serious habitability issues arose. A sewer backup
occurred at the rental property and Dorfman attempted to charge Edwards for
the maintenance response. Edwards obtained not-for-profit legal assistance;
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after their intervention on Edwards’s behalf, Dorfman ceased demanding
payment from Edwards related to the sewer backup. Thereafter, the air
conditioning in the home stopped functioning. Edwards again obtained legal
assistance and the air conditioning unit was repaired.
[4] At the end of the Lease, Edwards gave notice of her intent to vacate the
premises and provided a forwarding address in Georgia. Dorfman mailed
Edwards a “Move Out/Deposit Report”1 assessing the following amounts:
Carpet Cleaning $937.30
Housecleaning 225.00
Painting/Wall Repair 987.50
Door Tracks 74.00
Mini-blinds 45.00
Broken screens 70.00
Dishwasher wheel 45.00
Driveway Oil Stain 50.00
Microwave Repair 95.00
Toilet Seats/Lightbulbs 70.00
Sewer Bill 230.22
1
The parties treated this report as an itemization compliant with Indiana Code Section 32-31-3-12. This
statute provides in relevant part:
Upon termination of a rental agreement, a landlord shall return to the tenant the security deposit
minus any amount applied to:
(1) the payment of accrued rent
(2) the amount of damages that the landlord has suffered or will reasonably suffer by reason of the
tenant’s noncompliance with law or the rental agreement; and
(3) unpaid utility or sewer charges that the tenant is obligated to pay under the rental agreement;
all as itemized by the landlord with the amount due in a written notice that is delivered to the tenant not
more than forty-five (45) days after termination of the rental agreement and delivery of possession.
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(Def. Ex. C.) Because the aggregate amount of $2,829.02 exceeded the security
deposit, Dorfman demanded payment from Edwards in the amount of $329.02.
[5] Edwards sued Dorfman in small claims court to recover her security deposit.
On August 15, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing at which Edwards and
Dorfman’s Office/Maintenance Manager, Kari McAtee (“McAtee”), testified.
Edwards and McAtee each submitted photographs for the trial court’s review.
Edwards testified that she had cleaned the house and patched any nail holes.
She claimed that she had personally taken the photographs she submitted into
evidence. McAtee testified that she had never been inside the house rented by
Edwards, but that a leasing agent or real estate agent had photographed the
house. McAtee’s testimony consisted of her description of what those
photographs depicted. McAtee testified that the photographs depicted scuff
marks, dirty walls and baseboards, hair and dirt, a black mark on a wall, a
missing dishwasher wheel, and an unclean door.
[6] The trial court issued an order on October 18, 2017. The trial court’s order
stated that it had found the photographs tendered by Edwards “to be
particularly persuasive” and that the property had been “well-maintained” by
Edwards. (Appealed Order at 4.) The order also stated that “cleaning could
have been a bit more thorough” but there was a lack of “actual damage” to the
rental property beyond ordinary wear and tear for which a landlord would
expect to be responsible as a “cost of doing business.” Id. at 4-5. Dorfman was
permitted to deduct from the deposit: professional carpet cleaning fee of
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$937.30,2 an unpaid sewer bill of $230.22, replacement cost for door tracks of
$74.00, and replacement cost for mini-blinds of $45.00. Dorfman was ordered
to refund $1,213.48 to Edwards.
[7] Dorfman now appeals, contending that explicit terms of the Lease entitled
Dorfman to retain sums for professional cleaning and repainting of the entire
house.
Discussion and Decision
[8] We review a small claims court’s judgment for clear error. Bokori v. Martinoski,
70 N.E.3d 441, 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). A deferential standard of review is
particularly important in small claims actions, where trials are informal, with
the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to
the rules of substantive law. Lae v. Householder, 789 N.E.2d 481, 483 (Ind.
2003). Here, Edwards did not file an appellee’s brief, “and thus we may reverse
upon a prima facie showing of reversible error – but even so, we still may not
reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility.” Bokori, 70 N.E.3d at 444.
[9] Dorfman invites our de novo review of the Lease. The interpretation of a
contract is a pure question of law. Eagle Aircraft, Inc. v. Trojnar, 983 N.E.2d 648,
2
The Lease specifically provided for payment of this item, regardless of the move-out condition of the carpet.
Edwards did not specifically challenge the reasonableness of the amount, $937.30, which the trial court
characterized as “not an insignificant sum.” Appealed Order at 5.
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657 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). When a contract is clear and unambiguous, the
language will be given its plain meaning. Id.
[10] Dorfman directs our attention to certain language of Paragraph 9 of the Lease,
applicable to cleaning and repainting:
The following conditions must be met to qualify for a full-refund:
h. The property has been thoroughly cleaned and delivered in the
same move in condition upon vacating. …
Landlord shall be entitled to deduct from the security deposit any
amounts in addition to the carpet cleaning fee as shall be
reasonably required to reimburse Landlord for a complete
cleaning, repair, and repainting of any and all rooms in which
Tenant shall have damaged or irreparably marked the walls,
including holes created to hang pictures, etc. Such cleaning,
repair and repainting shall not be deemed to be ordinary “wear
and tear.”
(Def. Ex. C.)
[11] Dorfman claims entitlement to the full costs of professional cleaning and
painting, asserting, “an order was issued in contravention of the contract” when
“the trial court added its own interpretation to the written agreement.”
Appellant’s Brief at 11. According to Dorfman, the trial court misdirected its
focus to whether “cleaning could have been a bit more thorough” as opposed to
a requisite “thorough cleaning” and also focused on “actual damage” or
“irreparable damage” rather than “[the fact] that expenses were incurred to
repair [marks and patched spots on the walls].” Appellant’s Brief at 10-11.
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[12] Dorfman argues:
Essentially, the lease requires the tenant to patch holes and return
the walls to move in condition. The Trial Court may not have
liked this condition, but it is a part of the valid contract between
the parties and it is explicit. In this case, the tenant either had to
refrain from marking or putting holes in the walls or she had to
repair the holes and marks she made. She did neither. Under the
language of the lease, she is liable for the cost to the landlord
Dorfman to do so. The Trial Court’s Order to the contrary
should be reversed.
Appellant’s Brief at 12.
[13] Distilled to its essence, Dorfman’s argument is that: (1) the Lease requires a
tenant to leave the premises in move-in condition; and (2) should Dorfman
identify any scuffing, mark, dirt, or nail hole, the Lease requires the tenant to
fully reimburse costs of professionally cleaning and repainting the entire room
or rooms containing scuffing, a mark, dirt, or nail hole. In taking this position,
Dorfman ignores the reasonableness requirements of the Lease and a landlord’s
obligations under Indiana Code Section 32-31-3-12. That said, the trial court
was not tasked with resolving an ambiguity in the Lease but rather with
applying the terms of the Lease in the face of conflicting evidence. Dorfman
ignores the evidence favorable to the judgment.
[14] Edwards testified that she had left the leased house in a clean and undamaged
condition. Her evidentiary photographs, taken by her personally, were those
found by the trial court to be “particularly persuasive.” (Appealed Order at 4.)
As for the photographs taken by a real estate agent or leasing agent and
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introduced into evidence by Dorfman, Edwards denied that they fairly depicted
the condition of her rental house at her move-out. According to Edwards, they
either showed a different rental property or conditions attributable to someone
other than herself. Finally, the trial court questioned Edwards concerning an
“allegation of nail holes poorly repaired” and Edwards responded she had left
her nail holes patched and any inadequately repaired areas were “not hers.”
(Tr. Vol. II, pgs. 41-42.) The trial court, as the fact-finder, credited Edwards’s
testimony and documentary evidence. We will not reweigh the evidence or
assess credibility of any witness. Bokori, 70 N.E.3d at 444.
Conclusion
[15] Dorfman has not shown that the trial court clearly erred in ordering that
Dorfman return to Edwards a portion of her security deposit.
[16] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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