Randol Thomas Palmer-Hall v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                            FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                   Nov 08 2019, 6:05 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                      CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                         Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Sean C. Mullins                                         Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Appellate Public Defender                               Attorney General of Indiana
    Crown Point, Indiana                                    Megan M. Smith
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Randol Thomas Palmer-Hall,                              November 8, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-923
    v.                                              Appeal from the Lake Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Salvador Vasquez,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    45G01-1806-F5-51
    Brown, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019                 Page 1 of 15
    [1]   Randol Thomas Palmer-Hall appeals his convictions for disarming a law
    enforcement officer as a level 5 felony, battery against a public safety official as
    a level 6 felony, and resisting law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor. He
    raises two issues:
    I.    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting his proposed
    instruction regarding mistake of fact; and
    II.    Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction for
    disarming a law enforcement officer.
    We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On June 1, 2018, Palmer-Hall attempted to grab T.W. and “ended up grabbing
    the corner of [her] collar and [her] earbuds” and the first three buttons of her
    jacket broke off. Transcript Volume III at 111. On the same day, Officer Daniel
    Sangkaratana of the Hammond Police Department was patrolling the Hessville
    area in a fully-marked police vehicle with overhead lights and “Hammond
    Police” on the sides. While he patrolled, he wore his department-issued
    uniform which had a Hammond police patch and two marks of rank on the left
    sleeve, and his duty belt which had three magazines, a flashlight, a radio, a
    taser on the left side, and a firearm on the right side. At some point, Officer
    Sangkaratana received a dispatch regarding a black male subject in an SUV that
    had approached and tried to grab and pull a woman into a vehicle, as well as a
    description of the license plate of the SUV. As he drove through the area, he
    passed a vehicle matching the description and verified that the license plate
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019   Page 2 of 15
    matched the description given in the dispatch. He turned around, pulled up
    behind the SUV, and exited his vehicle with the emergency lights on.
    [3]   Palmer-Hall exited the SUV from the driver’s seat, and Officer Sangkaratana
    instructed him to enter the vehicle and yelled repeatedly to “Get back in the
    vehicle, sir.” Id. at 195. Officer Sangkaratana approached Palmer-Hall,
    Palmer-Hall turned toward the SUV, opened the door, and reached toward the
    floorboard, and Officer Sangkaratana said “no,” grabbed him, and
    “immediately went for th[e] hand that was reaching the floorboard.” Id. at 197.
    A struggle ensued, and bystander Patrick Baum, who had exited his vehicle
    upon seeing the struggle, intervened and assisted Officer Sangkaratana in the
    takedown of Palmer-Hall.
    [4]   On June 2, 2018, the State charged Palmer-Hall with disarming a law
    enforcement officer as a level 5 felony, attempted criminal confinement as a level
    6 felony, battery against a public safety official as a level 6 felony, resisting law
    enforcement as a class A misdemeanor, and battery as a class B misdemeanor,
    and later amended the information to add charges for attempted kidnapping as
    both level 5 and level 6 felonies.
    [5]   At the jury trial, Palmer-Hall mentioned that his mistake of fact instruction was
    not included in the preliminary jury instructions, and the court responded it had
    reviewed the preliminary instruction and thought it better “to see how the
    evidence comes out” and indicated that Palmer-Hall would be able, “given the
    evidence presented,” to make the argument that the “mistake of fact instruction
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019   Page 3 of 15
    would be an appropriate instruction as a final.” Transcript Volume II at 45-46.
    Palmer-Hall indicated that it was pled as an affirmative defense, and the court
    stated that it denied that request.
    [6]   Officer Sangkaratana testified he had a Glock-brand firearm while he was
    patrolling on June 1, 2018, which was loaded and did not have an external safety
    device that would place it in a non-firing position, and that a bullet would have
    been expelled if the trigger of the firearm had been pulled. He testified that he
    thought that Palmer-Hall was reaching for a weapon when he reached for the
    floorboard, and the following exchange occurred when he was asked if he
    recalled Palmer-Hall saying anything during their physical contact:
    A. At one point he turns towards me and asks me, “Are you the
    police?”
    Q. Okay. And what happens after he says, “Are you the
    police?”
    A. At that point, everything started flying – he’s grabbing at
    everything on me. The body camera was ripped off. The
    shoulder mic was ripped off and dangling from my knee. I
    couldn’t even reach it to radio that I had somebody that was
    fighting with me.
    Q. And take me through your positioning, when you first initiate
    contact with the driver of the SUV.
    A. Initially, when I first made contact, he was facing the car and
    I was behind him when I went to go grab his hand and pull it
    out. During the struggle, he rolled and turned into me so that we
    were facing each other. And at that point everything – I had
    leverage because I had the door that was open and he was pinned
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019   Page 4 of 15
    between the car and the door and me. And he eventually
    overpowered me and got me into the street.
    Q. And as he’s overpowering you what are his hands doing?
    A. Everything – like I said, the – the body mic had flown off.
    The shoulder mic, I couldn’t radio. When everything – when he
    was grabbing at everything, at that point my job is to create
    distance because I know have a firearm on my – on my hip and I
    don’t want him to go for that. So I created my distance. It came
    into the street, trying to control him as best as I could.
    Q. And when, if ever, did he grab at your firearm?
    A. Probably in the street. I can’t tell you exactly at which point.
    I just know I felt the belt twist and everything coming off.
    Transcript Volume III at 197-199. He described that his firearm has a thumb
    switch, that “you have to press the thumb lever and it releases the firearm,” and
    that, if you do not press the lever, “it won’t come out.” Id. at 199. When asked
    where any vertical force being applied to the firearm without the thumb lever
    being pressed would be transferred, he answered: “Into my belt. My belt will
    twist.” Id.
    [7]   The court admitted and played for the jury audio and video recordings from
    June 1, 2018, from Officer Sangkaratana’s body camera and his police vehicle’s
    dash camera, as State’s Exhibits 8 and 9, respectively. In both exhibits, Officer
    Sangkaratana can be heard stating “Get back in your vehicle” and “Sir, I’m not
    going to tell you again” while a male, identified through questioning as Palmer-
    Hall, can be seen exiting and closing the driver’s door of an SUV. State’s
    Exhibit 8 at 0:35-0:43; State’s Exhibit 9 at 0:35-0:43. The video footage and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019   Page 5 of 15
    audio of the body camera, which was positioned above Officer Sangkaratana’s
    waist, show him shut the police vehicle’s door and rapidly approach Palmer-
    Hall, who is reaching under the seat with his right hand after having re-opened
    the closed SUV driver’s door with his left hand. State’s Exhibit 8 at 0:42-0:47.
    As Officer Sangkaratana engages Palmer-Hall in the doorway of the SUV
    driver’s side, the body camera is positioned such that Palmer-Hall’s right arm is
    outside of the camera frame, and at some point Palmer-Hall can be heard
    asking, “Man, what the f--k?” and “Are you the Police?” before the body
    camera’s video footage becomes obscured. See id. at 0:48-1:00.
    [8]   The footage from the police vehicle’s dash camera shows Officer Sangkaratana
    reach for Palmer-Hall’s right arm and engage him physically, resulting in a
    struggle between them that originates in the SUV’s driver’s side doorway and
    lasts for approximately thirty seconds. As the men struggle in the doorway,
    Palmer-Hall’s right arm moves downward at some point from its shoulder-level
    position and becomes obstructed from view. The dash camera’s video footage
    further shows a black pickup truck park alongside both the police vehicle and
    SUV, the struggle migrate from the SUV’s driver’s side doorway to the middle
    of the street and continue obstructed at waist-level by the truck’s front, and a
    third person eventually approach the pair from beyond the camera frame and
    assist in wrestling Palmer-Hall to the ground.
    [9]   The prosecutor asked Officer Sangkaratana to describe precisely how Palmer-
    Hall reached for his gun, and he responded: “During the struggle, as everything
    was getting knocked off me, I felt my belt twist and that tells me he was going
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019   Page 6 of 15
    for the – my gun or a weapon – either that or my taser, one of the two.”
    Transcript Volume III at 208. When asked to point to exactly where that
    happened in the two videos, he stated “I can’t tell from watching the vehicle.
    There’s a spot where Mr. Baum’s vehicle is blocking.” Id. During cross-
    examination, he indicated he felt his belt twist and that, “[a]s far as when he –
    when exactly during all that, that happened so quickly. You want me to pick a
    snippet, you’d have to ask Mr. Baum.” Id. at 220. He stated that he felt his belt
    twist, Palmer-Hill’s counsel asked “that could have been anywhere on the belt,”
    and he answered “[p]ossibly.” Id. at 220-221. He agreed in response to Palmer-
    Hill’s counsel’s statement that “You’re still struggling. Still struggling. At this
    point, would you agree you’re belly to belly, chest to chest.” Id. at 221. When
    asked if, when “you guys are behind the bumper” was when Palmer-Hall
    reached for the firearm, Officer Sangkaratana stated “I also see his arm go up
    right there at the very end and me grab it as he grabs for my waist where my
    taser site was and then me put it back down.” Id. at 226. He also indicated that
    “I see his arm go up, right towards that area of my hip. And I see like me grab
    his arm, pull it away and put it back down.” Id.
    [10]   Baum testified that he was driving as shown in the police vehicle dash camera
    footage when he stopped and saw an officer “really struggl[e] with somebody.”
    Transcript Volume IV at 2. Baum stated “the man appeared to be
    overpowering the officer” and “[h]e was getting the better of him.” Id. at 4.
    When asked why he intervened, he answered “To me, it looked like he was
    trying to go after the officer’s gun.” Id. During cross-examination, when asked
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019   Page 7 of 15
    about becoming involved, Baum stated: “His hands, they were kind of like –
    they were wrestling around” and “I mean, it happened quick.” Id. at 8. He
    stated that he would agree with the statement “In the video we just watched,
    prior to you moving forward to help, you did not see [Palmer-Hall] reach for a
    gun.” Id. at 10.
    [11]   Defendant’s proposed instruction titled “Mistake of Fact” states:
    It is an issue whether the Defendant mistakenly committed the
    acts charged. It is a defense that the Defendant was reasonably
    mistaken about a matter of fact if the mistake prevented the
    Defendant from intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
    committing the acts charged or, committing the acts charged with
    the specific intent of committing battery on a government official.
    The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
    that the Defendant was not reasonably mistaken.
    Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 150. The court declined to give the
    instruction, stating in part:
    as evidenced by this videotape and they were face-to-face, there
    was – as I saw it – there was no question at all that who he was
    struggling with was, in fact, a police officer. I don’t see any
    mistake of fact in any regard that’s reasonable and honest . . .
    Transcript Volume IV at 72.
    [12]   The jury found Palmer-Hall guilty of disarming a law enforcement officer as a
    level 5 felony, battery against a public safety official as a level 6 felony, resisting
    law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor, and battery as a class B
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019   Page 8 of 15
    misdemeanor and not guilty of the offenses in the remaining counts. The court
    sentenced him to three years on the level 5 felony, one and one-half years on
    the level 6 felony, one year on the class A misdemeanor, and six months on the
    class B misdemeanor to be served concurrently.
    Discussion
    I.
    [13]   The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the
    proposed instruction regarding mistake of fact. Generally, the purpose of an
    instruction is “to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without
    misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at
    a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Overstreet v. State, 
    783 N.E.2d 1140
    , 1163 (Ind.
    2003), cert. denied, 
    540 U.S. 1150
    , 
    124 S. Ct. 1145
     (2004). Instruction of the jury
    is generally within the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed only for an
    abuse of that discretion. 
    Id. at 1163-1164
    . A trial court erroneously refuses to
    give a tendered instruction, or part of one, if: (1) the instruction correctly sets out
    the law; (2) evidence supports the giving of the instruction; and (3) the substance
    of the tendered instruction is not covered by the other instructions given. See 
    id. at 1164
    . Before a defendant is entitled to a reversal, he must affirmatively show
    that the erroneous instruction prejudiced his substantial rights. Lee v. State, 
    964 N.E.2d 859
    , 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Gantt v. State, 
    825 N.E.2d 874
    , 877
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)), trans. denied. An error is to be disregarded as harmless
    unless it affects the substantial rights of a party. 
    Id.
     (citing Oatts v. State, 
    899 N.E.2d 714
    , 727 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); Ind. Trial Rule 61).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019   Page 9 of 15
    [14]   A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defense which has some
    foundation in the evidence. Huls v. State, 
    971 N.E.2d 739
    , 746 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2012) (citing Potter v. State, 
    684 N.E.2d 1127
    , 1135 (Ind. 1997)), trans. denied. 
    Ind. Code § 35-41-3-7
     provides that “[i]t is a defense that the person who engaged in
    the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact, if the
    mistake negates the culpability required for commission of the offense.” For
    mistake of fact to be a valid defense, three elements must be satisfied: (1) the
    mistake must be honest and reasonable; (2) the mistake must be about a matter of
    fact; and (3) the mistake must negate the culpability required to commit the
    crime. Barton v. State, 
    936 N.E.2d 842
    , 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
    “With regard to the first element, ‘Honesty is a subjective test dealing with what
    appellant actually believed. Reasonableness is an objective test inquiring what a
    reasonable man situated in similar circumstances would do.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Nolan
    v. State, 
    863 N.E.2d 398
    , 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied).
    [15]   “When the State has made a prima facie case of guilt, the burden is on the
    defendant to establish an evidentiary predicate of his mistaken belief of fact.”
    Chavers v. State, 
    991 N.E.2d 148
    , 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Upon
    invoking mistake of fact as a defense, the burden shifts to the defendant to
    satisfy the three elements. See 
    id.
     (quoting Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d at 1135).
    In determining whether the evidence required an instruction upon a defense of
    mistake of fact, we consider whether the evidence relevant to it, if believed,
    could have created a reasonable doubt in the jury’s mind that the accused had
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019   Page 10 of 15
    acted with the requisite mental state. Huls v. State, 
    971 N.E.2d 739
     (citing Stoner
    v. State, 
    442 N.E.2d 983
    , 985 (Ind. 1982)).
    [16]   Palmer-Hall’s argument concerns only the first element of the mistake of fact
    defense. He contends: the court failed to make a finding on the first
    consideration of honesty by explicitly refusing to consider his thought process
    and subjective belief; he was in an “unwell state” and his initial conduct and
    statements demonstrate that he did not view Officer Sangkaratana as an
    authority figure prior to when the officer made physical contact; and that he
    was “unable to correct his mistaken belief that the person he was engaged with
    was anyone but a normal citizen.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. He further argues
    that the court, in citing to the video exhibits, “assess[ed] reasonableness from a
    third-party point of view rather than from the point of view of a similarly
    situated individual” and that his difficulty in identifying Officer Sangkaratana
    was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 10.
    [17]   The State maintains that no evidence was presented about what Palmer-Hall
    believed during his altercation with Officer Sangkaratana and, therefore, there
    is no way to analyze the veracity of his subjective belief. It argues that no
    reasonable person assumes a civilian would wear a full police uniform and drive
    a fully marked police cruiser with the emergency lights activated, that no
    evidence was presented indicating that Palmer-Hall could not see the officer’s
    uniform or that he panicked once Officer Sangkaratana attempted to restrain
    him, and that Palmer-Hall had ample time and ability after the outset of the
    interaction to deduce he was struggling with a police officer and cease resisting.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019   Page 11 of 15
    [18]   Palmer-Hall does not direct us to evidence that would create a reasonable doubt
    in the jury’s mind as to the culpability required to find him guilty of battery
    against a public safety official as a level 6 felony under 
    Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1
     1
    and resisting law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor under 
    Ind. Code § 35
    -
    44.1-3-1(a)(1). 2 With respect to the charge of disarming a law enforcement
    officer, he does not point to any authority that requires the trial court to make
    explicit findings as to every element related to the mistake of fact defense after
    having found that a defendant’s mistake of fact was unreasonable. We further
    note that the final jury instructions defined the appropriate mens rea
    requirements and addressed intoxication. 3 In light of the testimony and audio
    and video footage of the struggle from both Officer Sangkaratana’s body
    camera and the dash camera of his police vehicle, we cannot say that the
    evidence supported the proposed instruction on mistake of fact or that the trial
    court abused its discretion in declining to give the proposed instruction.
    II.
    1
    
    Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1
    (c)(1) provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally touches another person
    in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery, and 
    Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1
    (e)(2) provides that that
    offense is a level 6 felony if it is committed against a public safety official while the official is engaged in the
    official’s official duty.
    2
    
    Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3
    -1(a)(1) provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally forcibly resists,
    obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while the officer is
    lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties commits resisting law enforcement, a class A
    misdemeanor.
    3
    We also note that 
    Ind. Code § 35-41-2-5
     provides that intoxication is not a defense in a prosecution for an
    offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state that is an
    element of the offense unless the defendant meets the requirements of 
    Ind. Code § 35-41-3-5
    , which Palmer-
    Hall does not assert.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019                        Page 12 of 15
    [19]   The next issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Palmer-Hall’s
    conviction for disarming a law enforcement officer. When reviewing claims of
    insufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the
    credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 
    656 N.E.2d 816
    , 817 (Ind. 1995), reh’g
    denied. We look to the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that
    support the verdict. 
    Id.
     The conviction will be affirmed if there exists evidence
    of probative value from which a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty
    beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id.
    [20]   
    Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3
    -2(b) provides that a person who “knows that another
    person is an officer; and . . . knowingly or intentionally takes or attempts to take
    a firearm (as defined in IC 35-47-1-5) or weapon that the officer is authorized to
    carry from the officer or from the immediate proximity of the officer . . .
    without the consent of the officer; and . . . while the officer is engaged in the
    performance of the officer’s official duties” commits disarming a law
    enforcement officer, a Level 5 felony.
    [21]   Palmer-Hall argues that no reasonable jury could find him guilty of attempting
    to disarm the officer beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends that Officer
    Sangkaratana’s testimony amounts to “nothing more than a mere inference or
    supposition” that he attempted to disarm the officer, the video exhibits
    demonstrate that he is situated in such a manner as to have no means of
    reaching towards the firearm, and Baum’s testimony “openly acknowledg[es]
    doubt as to whether Palmer-Hall attempted to disarm” the officer . Appellant’s
    Brief at 4, 14. In his reply brief, he asserts that the State does not argue that the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019   Page 13 of 15
    video evidence showed an attempt to disarm Officer Sangkaratana but instead
    that it demonstrated Palmer-Hall had an opportunity to do so, and that this
    reliance by the State “seemingly seek[s] to place the burden on Palmer-Hall to
    prove his own innocence.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4.
    [22]   The State responds that Palmer-Hall’s argument to “have the evidence examined
    piece-meal instead of taken as a whole” is simply an invitation to reweigh
    evidence. Appellee’s Brief at 13. It argues it is only required to show Palmer-
    Hall attempted to take a firearm or weapon from the officer, which the evidence
    most favorable to the verdict demonstrates. It contends that, with Palmer-Hall
    grabbing and tearing other equipment off the officer’s uniform, a reasonable jury
    could have found the reason Officer Sangkaratana “felt [his] belt twist and
    everything [come] off” was because Palmer-Hall attempted to grab either the
    firearm or taser attached to his belt. Id. at 11.
    [23]   The record reveals that Officer Sangkaratana, in describing how Palmer-Hall
    reached for his gun, explained: “During the struggle, as everything was getting
    knocked off me, I felt my belt twist and that tells me he was going for the – my
    gun or a weapon – either that or my taser, one of the two.” Transcript Volume
    III at 208. Baum indicated that it “looked like he was trying to go after the
    officer’s gun.” Transcript Volume IV at 4. Based upon our review of the other
    testimony and evidence as set out above and in the record, including footage of
    the approximately thirty-second struggle, we conclude that the State presented
    evidence of a probative nature from which a trier of fact could find beyond a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019   Page 14 of 15
    reasonable doubt that Palmer-Hall committed the offense of disarming a law
    enforcement officer.
    [24]   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Palmer-Hall’s convictions.
    [25]   Affirmed.
    Altice, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019   Page 15 of 15
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19A-CR-923

Filed Date: 11/8/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/8/2019