Terrence Paschall v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be May 21 2019, 9:57 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Terrence Paschall Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
New Castle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Frances Barrow
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Terrence Paschall, May 21, 2019
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-MI-2444
v. Appeal from the Henry Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Kit C. Dean Crane,
Appellee-Respondent Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
33C02-1801-MI-42
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2444 | May 21, 2019 Page 1 of 4
[1] Terrence Paschall appeals from the denial of his petition for declaratory
judgment and preliminary injunction. Finding no error, we affirm.
[2] In May 2012, Paschall pleaded guilty to rape. He was sentenced to serve
twenty years and is currently incarcerated at the New Castle Correctional
Facility, with an earliest possible release date of December 14, 2019.
[3] In June 2018, Paschall filed a petition asking the trial court to order that, upon
release from incarceration, he (1) would not be designated as a sexually violent
predator; (2) would not have to register as a sex offender through the Indiana
Sex Offender Management and Monitoring program (INSOMM); and
(3) would not have to abide by parole conditions restricting his movements and
residency. On August 27, 2018, the trial court denied Paschall’s petition,
finding that it was not ripe because he was still incarcerated. Paschall now
appeals.
[4] Paschall’s petition refers to Indiana Code section 11-8-8-22, which provides a
process for offenders to file a petition to remove a designation or to register
under less restrictive conditions. We will reverse a trial court’s ruling under this
statute only if it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and inferences
supporting the petition for relief. Lucas v. McDonald, 954 N.E.2d 996, 998 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2011). Paschall also requested declaratory and injunctive relief.
Because the trial court denied his request, he is appealing from a negative
judgment. Mann v. Johnson Mem’l Hosp., 611 N.E.2d 676, 677 (Ind. Ct. App.
1993). We will reverse a negative judgment only if it is contrary to law,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2444 | May 21, 2019 Page 2 of 4
meaning that “the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences to
be drawn therefrom lead to but one result and the trial court has reached a
different result.” Id.
[5] Initially, we note that Paschall has raised multiple arguments for the first time
on appeal, including: (1) a sentencing argument under Indiana Appellate Rule
7(B); (2) a separation of powers argument; (3) an argument related to the
statutory authority of the Parole Board; (4) an argument about the
constitutionality of two statutes; (5) an argument about the breadth and
specificity of certain parole conditions; and (6) an Eighth Amendment
argument. He has waived all of these issues by failing to raise them below, and
we will not address them. E.g., Mid-States Gen. & Mech. Contracting Corp. v. Town
of Goodland, 811 N.E.2d 425, 436 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
[6] With respect to Paschall’s argument that he should not have to register as a sex
offender under INSOMM and participate with that program, we agree with the
trial court that this issue is not ripe for review. He is still incarcerated and is not
participating in INSOMM. Moreover, even if we were to attempt to address
the substance of this argument, he fails to explain how participating in
INSOMM violates any of his statutory or constitutional rights. Under these
circumstances, the trial court did not err by ruling against him.
[7] Likewise, with respect to Paschall’s argument that he should not have to
comply with certain restrictive parole conditions, including being designated as
a sexually violent predator, we can only find that this claim is not ripe for
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review. As he is still incarcerated at this time, we do not know what parole
conditions will be imposed upon him and any review would be purely
hypothetical. In other words, there is no evidence that he has been subjected to
any parole conditions that reflect a particular sex offender status, registry
requirement, or restriction on his activities and residency. Therefore, the trial
court did not err by ruling against him. See Gardner v. State, 923 N.E.2d 959,
960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that an ex post facto challenge to application
of the violent offender registry was not ripe for review while the petitioner was
still incarcerated).
[8] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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