James Timothy Spears v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                         FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                     Jun 26 2018, 6:55 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                      CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                  Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    R. Patrick Magrath                                       Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP                      Attorney General of Indiana
    Madison, Indiana
    Henry A. Flores, Jr.
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    James Timothy Spears,                                    June 26, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    40A04-1708-CR-2022
    v.                                               Appeal from the Jennings Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,
    The Honorable Alison T. Frazier,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Senior Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    40D01-0012-CM-1278
    Barnes, Senior Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A04-1708-CR-2022 | June 26, 2018               Page 1 of 9
    Case Summary
    [1]   James Spears appeals his convictions for Class B misdemeanor battery and
    Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. We affirm.
    Issues
    [2]   Spears raises two issues, which we restate as:
    I.         whether the trial court properly denied Spears’s motion to
    dismiss on constitutional speedy trial grounds; and
    II.         whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions.
    Facts
    [3]   On October 31, 2000, Spears got into an argument with his wife, Kimberly.
    The argument escalated into a “shoving match,” and Spears grabbed
    Kimberly’s neck, dragged her to the door, and kicked her out. Tr. Vol. II p.
    139. She had red marks on her neck and shoulder and scraped her arm on the
    door during the incident. On December 5, 2000, the State charged Spears with
    Class B misdemeanor battery and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct.
    On January 23, 2001, and July 25, 2001, the trial court issued arrest warrants
    for Spears’s failure to appear.
    [4]   On October 20, 2016, the trial court issued an order for Spears to appear on
    November 17, 2016, and he again failed to appear. The trial court issued
    another arrest warrant, and he was arrested in Kentucky. Spears filed a motion
    to dismiss the charges, arguing that the almost sixteen-year delay violated his
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A04-1708-CR-2022 | June 26, 2018   Page 2 of 9
    speedy trial rights. At a hearing on the motion, Spears clarified that his
    argument was based on the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
    and Article One Section Twelve of the Indiana Constitution, not Indiana
    Criminal Rule 4. Spears testified that he had moved to Kentucky shortly after
    the charges were filed in 2000, that he thought Kimberly had taken care of the
    charges, and that before he moved he had given the court an updated address
    on Sales Lane, Cave City, Kentucky. He claimed that he was prejudiced by
    the delay because he had lost a business opportunity. The State asked the trial
    court to take judicial notice that the record did not indicate that Spears had
    updated the court with an address change. The trial court concluded that the
    length of the delay was presumptively prejudicial and that the delay was
    attributable to Spears because he left the jurisdiction. The trial court denied
    Spears’s motion.
    [5]   At the jury trial, Sergeant Andrew Richmond with the North Vernon Police
    Department testified that Spears informed him that he got mad at Kimberly and
    grabbed her on her shoulder and neck. Sergeant Richmond saw redness on
    Kimberly’s neck and shoulder and abrasions on her right forearm. However,
    photographs of the injuries were no longer available. The jury found Spears
    guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to ninety days in jail. Spears
    now appeals.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A04-1708-CR-2022 | June 26, 2018   Page 3 of 9
    Analysis
    I. Speedy Trial
    [6]   “The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section
    12 of the Indiana Constitution guarantee the right to a speedy trial.” Wilkins v.
    State, 
    901 N.E.2d 535
    , 537 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. The standard of
    review for a speedy trial issue, which is a pure question of law, is de novo.
    Johnson v. State, 
    83 N.E.3d 81
    , 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
    [7]   Spears claims that the almost sixteen-year delay between his arrest and trial
    violated his right to a speedy trial under the United States and Indiana
    Constitutions. The analysis of a claim involving a speedy trial right is the same
    under both the state and federal constitutions. Sweeney v. State, 
    704 N.E.2d 86
    ,
    102 (Ind. 1998), cert. denied. The inquiry into whether there was a speedy trial
    violation involves “a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the
    prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” Barker v. Wingo, 
    407 U.S. 514
    ,
    530, 
    92 S. Ct. 2182
    , 2191-92 (1972). The Barker analysis considers four factors:
    1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant’s
    assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and 4) prejudice to the defendant. 
    Id. [8] “The
    length of the delay acts as a triggering mechanism; a delay of more than a
    year post-accusation is ‘presumptively prejudicial” and triggers the Barker
    analysis.” 
    Johnson, 83 N.E.3d at 85
    (quoting Vermillion v. State, 
    719 N.E.2d 1201
    , 1206 (Ind. 1999)). “If the length of the delay meets this threshold, ‘the
    court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A04-1708-CR-2022 | June 26, 2018   Page 4 of 9
    delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial
    examination of the claim.’” 
    Id. (quoting Doggett
    v. United States, 
    505 U.S. 647
    ,
    652, 
    112 S. Ct. 2686
    , 2691 (1992)). Here, the length of the delay—almost
    sixteen years—is excessive and clearly qualifies as presumptively prejudicial.
    This factor weighs in favor of Spears.
    [9]   We next consider the reason for the delay. “When considering the reason for
    delays, we look at ‘whether the government or the criminal defendant is more
    to blame for that delay.’” 
    Id. (quoting Doggett
    , 505 U.S. at 
    651, 112 S. Ct. at 2690
    ). Spears blames the delay on the State, arguing that he gave his new
    address to the trial court before he moved to Kentucky and that his new address
    was publicly discoverable. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Spears
    testified that he thought Kimberly had taken care of the charges, that he moved
    to Kentucky, and that he gave the trial court his new address. In support of his
    argument, he submitted a list of addresses found online. However, he claimed
    to have given the trial court an address on Sales Lane in Cave City, Kentucky,
    but that address was not listed on the document. Further, he claimed that his
    last address was in Park City, Kentucky, and that address was not listed on the
    document either. There is no evidence that Spears’s new address was
    discoverable as a public record. Moreover, the trial court records do not reflect
    that Spears provided a new address. The trial court found that the delay was
    attributable to Spears because he left the jurisdiction and because “we . . . don’t
    want to make a precedent of rewarding . . . people who abscond . . . .” Tr. Vol.
    II p. 31. Although the record does not reflect any efforts on the part of the State
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A04-1708-CR-2022 | June 26, 2018   Page 5 of 9
    to locate Spears, the record does demonstrate that Spears absconded to
    Kentucky shortly after the charges were filed in 2000. We cannot conclude that
    the State’s delay in looking for Spears excuses his conduct in absconding. This
    factor weighs against Spears.
    [10]   Next, we consider Spears’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial. “In order to
    claim a constitutional violation of the right to a speedy trial, defendant must
    assert such right.” Lee v. State, 
    684 N.E.2d 1143
    , 1146 (Ind. 1997). Spears did
    not assert his right to a speedy trial until his motion to dismiss in 2017. Spears
    delayed this case himself by absconding to Kentucky. His actions “show that
    he did not desire a speedy trial.” 
    Johnson, 83 N.E.3d at 87
    . This factor weighs
    against Spears.
    [11]   Finally, we consider prejudice to Spears as a result of the delay.
    “The final factor in the Barker test, prejudice, is assessed in light
    of the three interests which the right to a speedy trial was
    designed to protect: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
    incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the
    accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
    impaired.” 
    Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 103
    (citing 
    Barker, 407 U.S. at 532
    , 
    92 S. Ct. 2182
    ). The most important of the three is limiting
    the possibility of defense impairment. 
    Barker, 407 U.S. at 532
    , 
    92 S. Ct. 2182
    . The burden is on the defendant to show actual
    prejudice to prove a speedy trial deprivation. Sturgeon v. State,
    
    683 N.E.2d 612
    , 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied.
    
    Johnson, 83 N.E.3d at 87
    . Oppressive pretrial incarceration is not an issue here
    as Spears was not incarcerated during the delay. Further, Spears makes no
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A04-1708-CR-2022 | June 26, 2018   Page 6 of 9
    argument that the delay caused him anxiety or concern and, as the State argues,
    “[a]ny anxiety or concern was due to his own criminal behavior and . . . his
    unannounced departure and fugitive status.” Appellee’s Br. p. 14. Rather,
    Spears argues that his defense was impaired because the investigating officer did
    not specifically recall the incident and refreshed his recollection with his report.
    The State points out that the passage of time was “actually beneficial to
    Defendant’s defense” because the pictures of Kimberly’s injuries were missing
    and Spears “capitalized” on the passage of time in his attempted impeachment
    of Kimberly and the officer.” Appellee’s Br. p. 14. We agree with the State
    that Spears “suffered no identifiable prejudice.” 
    Id. This factor
    also weighs
    against Spears.
    [12]   Each of the factors except the length of the delay weighs against Spears.
    Although the almost sixteen-year delay is clearly excessive, the reason for the
    delay due to Spears’s absconding, the late assertion of the right to a speedy trial,
    and the lack of prejudice all weigh in favor of finding no violation of Spears’s
    constitutional right to a speedy trial. We conclude that the trial court properly
    denied Spears’s motion to dismiss.
    II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    [13]   Next, Spears argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions.
    In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence
    nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Willis v. State, 
    27 N.E.3d 1065
    , 1066 (Ind.
    2015). We only consider “the evidence supporting the judgment and any
    reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence.” 
    Id. A conviction
           Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A04-1708-CR-2022 | June 26, 2018   Page 7 of 9
    will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting
    each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found
    the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id. “‘It is
    the job of the fact-
    finder to determine whether the evidence in a particular case sufficiently proves
    each element of an offense, and we consider conflicting evidence most
    favorably to the trial court’s ruling.’” 
    Id. at 1066-67
    (quoting Wright v. State, 
    828 N.E.2d 904
    , 906 (Ind. 2005)).
    [14]   Spears was convicted of Class B misdemeanor battery and Class B
    misdemeanor disorderly conduct. The offense of Class B misdemeanor battery
    is governed by Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-1, which required that Spears
    knowingly or intentionally touched Kimberly in a rude, insolent and angry
    manner. The offense of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct is governed
    by Indiana Code Section 35-45-1-3, which required that Spears knowingly or
    intentionally engaged in fighting.
    [15]   Spears argues that “any instance of Spears making contact with Kimberly
    Spears was accidental and was not an intentional act of battery or a reckless act
    of disorderly conduct.” Appellant’s Br. p. 14. The State presented evidence
    that Spears got into an argument with Kimberly and grabbed her neck, dragged
    her to the door, and kicked her out of the house. As a result, Kimberly had red
    marks on her neck and shoulder and abrasions to her arm. Spears’s argument is
    a request to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses,
    which we cannot do. The evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A04-1708-CR-2022 | June 26, 2018   Page 8 of 9
    Conclusion
    [16]   The trial court properly denied Spears’s motion to dismiss, and the evidence is
    sufficient to sustain his convictions. We affirm.
    [17]   Affirmed.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A04-1708-CR-2022 | June 26, 2018   Page 9 of 9