Douglas L. Leistner v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 19 2018, 8:13 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Steven E. Ripstra Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Ripstra Law Office Attorney General of Indiana
Jasper, Indiana
Angela N. Sanchez
Caryn N. Szyper
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Douglas L. Leistner, December 19, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-491
v. Appeal from the
Dubois Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Nathan A. Verkamp, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
19C01-1611-F1-951
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Douglas L. Leistner (“Leistner”) was convicted after a jury trial of two counts
of child molesting,1 each as a Level 1 felony, and one count of public
voyeurism2 as a Class A misdemeanor and was sentenced to a forty-year
aggregate sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction. Leistner appeals
and raises the following restated issues for our review:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
allowed the State to amend the charging information in
order to change the dates on which the crimes were alleged
to have occurred;
II. Whether Leistner’s two convictions for child molesting
violate double jeopardy or were barred by the continuous
crime doctrine;
III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
declined to give Leistner’s proposed final jury instructions
regarding an uncharged offense; and
IV. Whether Leistner’s forty-year sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.
The State raises the following issue on cross-appeal:
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1).
2
See Ind. Code § 35-45-4-5(d).
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V. Whether the trial court erred when it found that Leistner
was not a sexually violent predator.
[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Leistner and Tracy Erwin (“Tracy”) began a relationship in 2005 and lived
together in Leistner’s home in Jasper, Indiana. Tracy’s daughter, C.E., who
was born in 2002, also lived with them in the home. Tracy and C.E. moved out
of Leistner’s home on May 5, 2016, when she and Leistner ended their
relationship.
[4] In the spring of 2015,3 Leistner took C.E. mushroom hunting. When they
returned home afterwards, Leistner told C.E. and his son, who had also gone
with them, to check their bodies for ticks. Tr. Vol. 2 at 72-74, 119, 121. Later
that night, Leistner entered C.E.’s bedroom and asked her if she had checked
for ticks. Id. at 83; State’s Ex. 3. Leistner then told C.E. that he was going to
check her body for ticks. Tr. Vol. 2 at 83-84; State’s Ex. 3. He pulled on her t-
shirt and looked down her shirt. Tr. Vol. 2 at 84; State’s Ex. 3. He also looked at
her legs and around the edge of her panties and told her that she had a tick “on
her butt.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 83; State’s Ex. 3. He then “started looking and touching
3
Tracy testified that it was in 2015 or possibly 2014, that she “was not exactly positive when it was,” but that
she believed it was about one year before she moved out of Leistner’s home, which she knew occurred on
May 5, 2016, because she checked the lease on her apartment to confirm the date. Tr. Vol. 2 at 70-72. The
video taken on that day was date stamped May 9, 2015. State’s Ex. 3.
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[her] in [her] private areas” with his hands. Tr. Vol. 2 at 83. Leistner used his
hands to touch her legs and “butt hole area,” and for several minutes, he used
his fingers to touch and manipulate the area around C.E.’s vagina and her anus,
penetrating both her sex organ and her anus during his supposed search for
ticks. Tr. Vol. 2 at 83-84; State’s Ex. 3. Leistner used his phone to record himself
doing this to C.E. Tr. Vol. 2 at 84, 124-25; State’s Ex. 3. C.E. never saw a tick
that day, and she was not aware that Leistner was recording her and did not
give him permission to do so. Tr. Vol. 2 at 86.
[5] In 2016, Nathan Leistner (“Nathan”), Leistner’s nephew, was living in
Leistner’s home and found an SD card on top of the refrigerator. On the SD
card, Nathan found a video of Leistner and C.E. that he recognized as being
recorded inside C.E.’s bedroom in Leistner’s home. Id. at 63-64. After viewing
the video, Nathan took the SD card to the police. Id. at 64.
[6] On November 3, 2016, the State charged Leistner with two counts of Level 1
felony child molesting, three counts of Level 6 felony voyeurism, and one count
of Class A misdemeanor public voyeurism. As originally filed, the charging
information alleged, in pertinent part:
Count 1: On or about May 9, 2015 in Dubois County, State of
Indiana, . . . Leistner, a person of at least twenty-one (21) years
of age, did knowingly or intentionally perform or submit to other
sexual conduct as defined in Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-
221.5 with a child under the age of fourteen years (14), to-wit:
the defendant penetrated with his finger the female sex organ of
C.E., whose date of birth is . . . 2002.
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Count 2: On or about May 9, 2015 in Dubois County, State of
Indiana, . . . Leistner, a person of at least twenty-one (21) years
of age, did knowingly or intentionally perform or submit to other
sexual conduct as defined in Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-
221.5 with a child under the age of fourteen years (14), to-wit:
the defendant penetrated with his finger the anus of C.E., whose
date of birth is . . . 2002.
....
Count 6: On or about May 9, 2015 in Dubois County, State of
Indiana, . . . Leistner, without the consent of C.E. and with
intent to peep at the private area of C.E., did knowingly or
intentionally peep at the private area of C.E. and recorded an
image by means of a camera.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 10-11.
[7] On October 18, 2017, a week before Leister’s trial was scheduled to begin, the
State filed a motion to amend the charges to allege that the crimes were
committed “on or between July 13, 2012 and May 5, 2016.” Id. at 114-16, 125-
26. The trial court granted the motion the same day. The amended charges
were filed the following day, and a hearing was held to advise Leistner of the
new charges. Id. at 7, 125-26. At that hearing, after the charges had been
amended and the amended charges read to Leistner, his counsel stated, “I guess
we would object officially just for the record.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 27. He further
stated that “changing those dates does kind of change how we would prepare
for the matter since it opens up those dates.” Id. The trial court acknowledged
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Leistner’s position but ordered that the case would proceed to trial on the
amended charges. Id.[8] A jury trial occurred on October 24 and 25, 2017, and evidence was heard on
the two counts of Level 1 felony child molesting and on one count of Class A
misdemeanor public voyeurism, which were the counts with C.E. as the victim.
On the morning of the second day of trial, the State again moved to amend the
charging information. Id. at 108. It sought to amend the dates of the offenses
to allege that they occurred “on or between July 1, 2014 and May 5, 2016.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 146-47. Leistner objected to the amendment based on
the fact that he had prepared for trial and argued on the first day of trial based
on the understanding of the existing date range contained in the amendment of
October 18. Tr. Vol. 2 at 108. The trial court granted the amendment and
found that time was not an essential element of the charged offenses and that it
did not believe the amended dates altered Leistner’s defense in any way and
might actually benefit him by narrowing the alleged time period. Id. at 108-09.
The trial court then read the amended charges to Leistner and ensured that he
understood them before continuing with the trial. Id. at 109-10.
[9] During the trial, Leistner requested that the jury be instructed on the offense of
child molesting by touching or fondling a child with the intent to arouse or
satisfy the sexual desire of the child or the defendant as a Level 4 felony. Id. at
132-34; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 142-45. The State objected, asserting that the
Level 4 felony offense is not a lesser-included offense of child molesting by
other sexual conduct as charged in this case because the Level 4 felony offense
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requires the proof of elements not required by the greater charge. Tr. Vol. 2 at
133. Leistner argued that the State had opened the door to the instruction by
presenting evidence about his intent regarding whether he intended to check
C.E. for ticks or touched her for sexual purposes. Id. at 134. The State
expressed doubt that it was possible for the State to open the door to instruction
on an uncharged offense or that the trial court had the authority to instruct on
the offense, which was not previously charged. Id. After this argument, the
trial court found that Level 4 felony child molesting was not a factually or
inherently included offense and denied Leistner’s request for the jury
instruction. Id. at 134-35.
[10] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Leistner guilty of two counts of
Level 1 felony child molesting and one count of Class A misdemeanor public
voyeurism. At sentencing, the trial court found as aggravating factors,
Leistner’s criminal history, that he had recently violated community corrections
and probation conditions, that the harm to the victim was significant and
greater than necessary to prove the offense, and that he had violated a position
of trust he held with C.E. Id. at 194-95. The trial court gave the last factor the
greatest weight. Id. at 195. The trial court found no mitigating factors and
specifically declined to find as mitigating that Leistner’s incarceration would
cause an undue hardship to his dependents because Leistner had admitted that
he was unemployed and using drugs prior to his arrest. Id. at 197.
[11] The trial court imposed a forty-year sentence for each of Leistner’s Level 1
felony child molesting convictions and one year for his Class A misdemeanor
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public voyeurism conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run
concurrently for a total executed sentence of forty years. After pronouncing the
sentence, the trial court declined to find Leistner to be a sexually violent
predator, stating that it was “not inclined to find . . . Leistner a sexually violent
predator as recommended by probation, in that I don’t believe he qualifies
pursuant to that definition.” Id. at 197. Leistner now appeals, and the State
cross-appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Amendment of Charging Information
[12] Leistner argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to amend the
charging information to change the dates on which the crimes were alleged to
have occurred. On November 3, 2016, the State originally charged Leistner,
and all the pertinent charges alleged that the offense occurred on May 9, 2015.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 10-11. On October 18, 2017, a week before Leister’s
trial was scheduled to begin, the trial court granted the State’s motion to amend
the pertinent charges to allege that the crimes were committed “on or between
July 13, 2012 and May 5, 2016.” Id. at 117, 125-26. On the morning of the
second day of trial, the State again moved to amend the charging information
to change the dates of the offenses to allege that they occurred “on or between
July 1, 2014 and May 5, 2016,” and the trial court granted the motion. Id. at
146-47; Tr. Vol. 2 at 108-09.
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[13] “‘A charging information may be amended at various stages of a prosecution,
depending on whether the amendment is to the form or to the substance of the
original information.’” Erkins v. State, 13 N.E.3d 400, 405 (Ind. 2014) (quoting
Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (Ind. 2007)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 967(2015). Whether an amendment to a charging information is a matter of form
or substance is a question of law. Id. We review questions of law de novo. Id.(citing State v. Moss-Dwyer, 686 N.E.2d 109, 110 (Ind. 1997)).
[14] Amendments to a charging information are governed by Indiana Code section
35-34-1-5. Subsection (b) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he indictment or
information may be amended in matters of substance . . . before the
commencement of trial [,] if the amendment does not prejudice the substantial
rights of the defendant.” Subsection (c) provides that “[u]pon motion of the
prosecuting attorney, the court may, at any time before, during, or after the
trial, permit an amendment to the indictment or information in respect to any
defect, imperfection, or omission in form which does not prejudice the
substantial rights of the defendant.”
[15] A defendant’s substantial rights “include a right to sufficient notice and an
opportunity to be heard regarding the charge; and, if the amendment does not
affect any particular defense or change the positions of either of the parties, it
does not violate these rights.” Gomez v. State, 907 N.E.2d 607, 611 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009), trans. denied. Ultimately, the question is whether the defendant had
a reasonable opportunity to prepare for and defend against the charges. Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-491 | December 19, 2018 Page 9 of 26
(citing Sides v. State, 693 N.E.2d 1310, 1313 (Ind. 1998), abrogated on other
grounds by Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d. 1201 (Ind. 2007).
[16] The first challenged amendment occurred about one week before trial, and on
the next day, at a hearing following the granted amendment, Leistner objected
“for the record.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 27. However, he did not request a continuance to
permit him to prepare for any change in his defense allegedly necessitated by
the amendments. To preserve the issue for appeal, “the defendant must object
to the request to amend, and if the objection is overruled, must request a
continuance to prepare a new defense strategy.” Parks v. State, 752 N.E.2d 63,
65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Haak v. State, 695 N.E.2d 944, 953 n.5 (Ind.
1998)). A defendant’s failure to request a continuance after a trial court allows
a pre-trial substantive amendment to the charging information over defendant’s
objection results in waiver.” Wilson v. State, 931 N.E.2d 914, 918 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010), trans. denied. Therefore, Leistner waived his claim regarding the first
challenged amendment to the charging information.
[17] Waiver notwithstanding, Leistner’s challenges to the amendments are without
merit. The dates alleged in the charging information were first amended from
May 9, 2015, which was the date of the time-stamp on the video of the crimes,
to a range of dates encompassing that date and beginning on January 13, 2012,
C.E.’s tenth birthday, and ending on May 6, 2016, the date C.E. and her
mother moved out of Leistner’s home. The second amendment narrowed the
time period so that it no longer encompassed two different statutes defining the
offense, and it changed the beginning of the alleged time period forward to the
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effective date of the statute defining child molesting as a Level 1 felony, July 1,
2014.
[18] The amendments changing the dates alleged were not amendments of substance
and could be permitted at any time. An amendment is one of substance if it is
essential to making a valid charge of the crime. Erkins, 13 N.E.3d at 406 (citing
Fajardo, 859 N.E.2d at 1207). Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-2(a)(6) only
requires that the charging information state the “time of the offense as definitely
as can be done if time is of the essence of the offense.” (emphasis added).
Generally, “‘time is not of the essence in the crime of child molesting.’” Baber
v. State, 870 N.E.2d 486, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Barger v. State, 587
N.E.2d 1304, 1307 (Ind. 1992)), trans. denied. In child molestation cases, time is
only of the essence if the victim’s age at the time of the offense is near the
dividing line between classes of felonies. Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 809
(Ind. 2002). Therefore, in the present case, the date of the offense was not
essential to establish a valid charge for child molesting or public voyeurism.
[19] Because time is not of the essence, the State was “not required to prove the
offense occurred on the precise date alleged [in the information],” but only that
the offense was committed within the statute of limitations. Blount v. State, 22
N.E.3d 559, 569 (Ind. 2014) (citing Neff v. State, 915 N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied). On all of the dates alleged by the State in the
amended informations, C.E. was under the age of 14, and Leistner admitted at
trial that she was under the age of fourteen at the time the video was recorded.
Tr. Vol. 2 at 124.
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[20] Because the amendments were not of substance, they could be made at any
time as long as they did not prejudice Leistner’s substantial rights. A
defendant’s substantial rights are not prejudiced if both (a) a defense under the
original information would be equally available after the amendment, and (b)
the accused’s evidence would apply equally to the information in either form.
Gaby v. State, 949 N.E.2d 870, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The allegations, the
evidence, and the theory of the case were the same at all relevant times in this
case. Despite the amendments, the State consistently alleged that Leistner
committed the charged offenses on a single day after he had taken C.E.
mushroom hunting, which only occurred once in her life, and the offenses were
recorded on a video that was time-stamped May 9, 2015. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2
at 10-11, 125-26, 146-47; Tr. Vol. 2 at 71, 82, 90, 119. Although Leistner
challenges the State’s amendments because “the State had all the evidence it
required to closely approximate the date(s) of any alleged criminal acts no later
than . . . the date the police received the incriminating video,” Appellant’s Br. at
17, the same is true for Leistner because he also had the information necessary
to closely approximate the date of the offenses. The date of the video was
specified in the “Affidavit for Warrant for Arrest” that was filed with the
original charges. Appellant’s App. Vol 2 at 16. Leistner was aware of the State’s
allegations and the evidence against him at all times, and the amendments did
not change any of this.
[21] Leistner also asserts that the amendments prejudiced his substantial rights
because different dates were read to the jury in the preliminary and final
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instructions. In the preliminary instructions, the charged date range was read to
the jury as being between January 13, 2012, and May 5, 2016. Tr. Vol. 2 at 49-
50. The third amendment, which occurred on the second day of trial, shortened
that period to begin on July 1, 2014, but still end on May 5, 2016, and the final
instructions reflected that change. Id. at 141-42. Leistner does not explain how
this prejudiced him. Instead, he merely argues that an amendment made
during trial was error if it was substantive. However, as discussed above, the
amendment was not substantive, and there is no reason to find the change in
preliminary and final instructions itself caused prejudice. The trial court
explained to the jurors during final instructions that the dates had changed, that
they need not concern themselves with why the dates had changed, and that
they should deliberate based only on the allegations in the final instructions. Id.
at 141. We presume that, when a jury is properly instructed, it followed the
instructions given to them by the trial court. Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 20
(Ind. 2015), cert, denied, 136 S. Ct. 901 (2016).
[22] The amendments altered the range of dates alleged in the charging information
only, and at all times the range included the originally charged date of May 9,
2015. Because time was not of the essence in the charged offenses, the
amendments changing the dates alleged were not amendments of substance and
could be permitted at any time. Further, the amendments did not prejudice
Leistner’s substantial rights as they did not alter the State’s allegations against
Leistner or his theory of defense. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court
did not err when it permitted the State to amend the charging information.
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II. Jury Instruction
[23] Leistner contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to
give his tendered jury instruction on Level 4 felony child molesting by touching
or fondling (“the Level 4 felony”). He asserts that instruction should have been
given because the Level 4 felony is both an inherently and a factually included
lesser offense of Level 1 felony child molesting by other sexual conduct (“the
Level 1 felony”). When determining whether the jury should be instructed on a
lesser included offense of the crime charged, a trial court must perform a three-
step analysis. Galindo v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1285, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
First, the statute defining the crime charged must be compared with the statute
defining the alleged lesser included offense to determine if the alleged lesser
included offense is inherently included in the crime charged. Id. (citing Wright
v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ind. 1995)). Second, if a trial court determines
that an alleged lesser included offense is not inherently included in the crime
charged, then it must determine if the alleged lesser included offense is factually
included in the crime charged. Id. at 1287-88. Third, if a trial court has
determined that an alleged lesser included offense is either inherently or
factually included in the crime charged, it must then look at the evidence
presented in the case by both parties to determine if there is a serious
evidentiary dispute about the element or elements distinguishing the greater
from the lesser offense and if, in view of this dispute, a jury could conclude that
the lesser offense was committed but not the greater. Id. at 1288. It is reversible
error for a trial court not to give an instruction, when requested, on the
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inherently or factually included lesser offense if there is such an evidentiary
dispute. Id.[24] Here, the trial court concluded that the Level 4 felony was not a lesser-included
offense of the charged offenses and refused to give Leistner’s tendered
instruction. Leistner argues that the Level 4 felony is a lesser-included offense
of the Level 1 felony because it is contained in the same statute. “While child
molesting by fondling or touching is a lesser offense than child molesting by
deviate sexual conduct [or penetration] in terms of sentencing, it is neither
inherently nor factually included in the greater offense and is in fact an entirely
separate offense.” Adcock v. State, 22 N.E.3d 720, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)
(citing Downey v. State, 726 N.E.2d 794, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied),
trans. denied. The two offenses are not inherently included offenses because
each offense contains an element not required by the other. Downey, 726
N.E.2d at 799. Leistner was charged with child molesting by committing other
sexual conduct and was alleged to have knowingly or intentionally penetrated
C.E.’s sex organ and her anus with an object, specifically his finger. Appellant’s
App. Vol. 2 at 10-11; see also Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5 (defining other sexual
conduct to mean “an act involving . . . the penetration of the sex organ or anus
of a person by an object”). A conviction for child molesting by fondling or
touching would not require proof of penetration by Leistner, but it would
require proof that he touched C.E. with the intent to arouse or satisfy his or her
sexual desires, which is an element of specific intent that is not required to
prove the Level 1 felony. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a) and (c); see also D’Paffo v.
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State, 778 N.E.2d 798, 803 (Ind. 2002) (“We conclude that the elements of the
crime of child molesting under [Indiana Code section] 35-42-4-3(a) do not
include the intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires.”).
[25] The Level 4 felony is also not a factually included offense of the Level 1 felony.
The State “can foreclose instruction on an offense that is not inherently
included but potentially factually included ‘by omitting from a charging
instrument factual allegations sufficient to charge the lesser offense.’” Downey,
726 N.E.2d at 799 (quoting Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 570). Here, the State did not
allege facts in the charging information that would satisfy the elements of the
Level 4 felony. The charging information did not contain any allegations that
Leistner had the intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires, and therefore, the
Level 4 felony was not factually included in the charged Level 1 felony offense.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to give Leistner’s
tendered instruction on his claimed lesser-included offense.
III. Double Jeopardy; Continuous Crime Doctrine
[26] Leistner initially argues that his two convictions for Level 1 felony child
molesting violate double jeopardy. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that
“two or more offenses are the ‘same offense’ in violation of Article I, section 14
of the Indiana Constitution, if, with respect to either the statutory elements of
the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential
elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of
another challenged offense.” Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999).
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Leistner focuses his constitutional argument on the actual evidence test. In
applying this test, a defendant must demonstrate, and a reviewing court must
conclude, that there is a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by
the factfinder to establish the essential elements of an offense for which the
defendant was convicted or acquitted may also have been used to establish all
the essential elements of a second challenged offense. Anthony v. State, 56
N.E.3d 705, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216,
1222 (Ind. 2015)), trans. denied. In determining the facts used by the factfinder
to establish the elements of each offense, it is appropriate to consider the
charging information, jury instructions, and arguments of counsel. Id. (citing
Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (Ind. 2008); Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831,
832 (Ind. 2002)). “The ‘reasonable possibility’ standard ‘requires substantially
more than a logical possibility’ and ‘turns on a practical assessment of whether
the jury may have latched on to exactly the same facts for both convictions.’”
Id. at 716 (quoting Lee, 892 N.E.2d at 1236). The Indiana Double Jeopardy
Clause is not violated when the evidentiary facts establishing the essential
elements of one offense also establish only one or even several, but not all, of
the essential elements of a second offense. Henson v. State, 86 N.E.3d 432, 437
(Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Spivey, 761 N.E.2d at 833).
[27] Leistner contends that the actual evidence presented at trial did not establish
that the essential elements of one Level 1 felony offense may not have also been
used to establish the essential elements of the second Level 1 felony offense.
Leistner claims that C.E.’s testimony alters the outcome because she did not
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specifically testify about the element of penetration; however, he does not
explain how that would have led the jury to conflate the two distinct charges.
Appellant’s Br. at 28-29. He also asserts that the trial court’s final instructions
did not differentiate between the body parts violated and that looking at the
charging information, instructions, and the State’s argument, there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the jury to establish the
essential elements of one count of Level 1 felony may also have been used to
establish the elements of the second count.
[28] The charging information in this case alleged that in Count I, Leistner did
knowingly or intentionally perform or submit to other sexual conduct with a
child under the age of fourteen years by penetrating the female sex organ of
C.E. with his finger. Count II alleged that Leistner did knowingly or
intentionally perform or submit to other sexual conduct with a child under the
age of fourteen years by penetrating the anus of C.E. with his finger. Appellant’s
App. Vol. 2 at 146-47. At trial, evidence was presented that, after returning from
mushroom hunting with C.E., Leistner entered C.E.’s bedroom and asked her if
she had checked for ticks. Id. at 83; State’s Ex. 3. Leistner told C.E. that he was
going to check her body for ticks, and after looking at her legs and around the
edge of her panties, Leistner told C.E. that she had a tick “on her butt.” Tr. Vol.
2 at 83; State’s Ex. 3. He then “started looking and touching [her] in [her]
private areas” with his hands. Tr. Vol. 2 at 83. Leistner used his hands to touch
her legs and “butt hole area,” and for several minutes, he used his fingers to
touch and manipulate the area around C.E.’s vagina and her anus, penetrating
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both her sex organ and her anus during his claimed search for ticks. Tr. Vol. 2
at 83-84; State’s Ex. 3. Leistner used his phone to record himself doing this to
C.E. Tr. Vol. 2 at 84, 124-25; State’s Ex. 3.
[29] Additionally, contrary to Leistner’s contention, during final instructions the
trial court specifically instructed the jury on the allegations contained in each
count. Tr. Vol. 2 at 140-41. The jury was specifically instructed that Count I
alleged that “Defendant penetrated with his finger, the female sex organ of
C.E.” and that Count II alleged that “Defendant penetrated with his finger, the
anus of C.E.” Id. at 140. The State also presented detailed argument regarding
the element of penetration in each count, specifically clarifying to the jury that
Count I required that it find that Leistner penetrated C.E.’s sex organ and that
Count II required that it find that he penetrated C.E.’s anus. Id. at 155-59. The
State further made clear the distinction between the two charges, stating that,
“Everything is exactly the same except for, well, what did he penetrate. Count
I, it was the sex organ of [C.E.]. Count II it’s the anus of [C.E.].” Id. at 158.
We, therefore, conclude that each offense was established by separate and
distinct facts. Leistner’s convictions for two counts of Level 1 felony child
molesting did not violate double jeopardy.
[30] Leistner next argues that his convictions for two counts of Level 1 felony child
molesting violate the continuous crime doctrine. He contends that C.E.’s
testimony established that “Leistner touched her and the offense was
continuous.” Appellant’s Br. at 30. Leistner maintains that there was no
evidence that his act of touching C.E. “was ‘terminated by a single act or fact”
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and that the two acts ‘subsisted for a definite period’” and were successive and
similar. Id. He, therefore, asserts that his conduct amounted to only a single
chargeable crime and not two.
[31] The continuing crime doctrine establishes that actions that are sufficient to
constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time,
place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single
transaction. Pugh v. State, 52 N.E.3d 955, 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing
Riehle v. State, 823 N.E.2d 287, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied), trans.
denied. The doctrine involves those instances where a defendant’s conduct
amounts to only a single, chargeable crime such that the State is prevented from
charging a defendant twice for the same offense. Id.[32] Here, the State charged Leistner with two distinct crimes – one involving the
penetration of C.E.’s sex organ and one involving the penetration of C.E.’s
anus. Leistner argues that because both offenses occurred in a relatively short
period of time and were similar in nature, his continuous actions should prevent
him from being convicted of two crimes. However, “the purpose of the
continuing crime doctrine is to prevent the State from charging a defendant
twice for the same continuous offense.” Firestone v. State, 838 N.E.2d 468, 472
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Even when committed in close succession, two distinct
sex acts are separate and distinct crimes not subject to the continuous crime
doctrine. See id. (holding crimes of rape and criminal deviate conduct were not
continuous but separate and distinct crimes where defendant raped victim then
forced her to perform oral sex on him afterward). The continuity of Leistner’s
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actions – penetrating C.E.’s sex organ and her anus in the span of several
minutes – does not negate that fact that the acts were completely separate
offenses accomplished by separate actions. The continuous crime doctrine did
not apply to Leistner’s two child molesting convictions.
IV. Inappropriate Sentence
[33] Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), this court “may revise a sentence
authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the
[c]ourt finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.” Our Supreme Court has explained
that the principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the
outliers, “not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v.
State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We independently examine the
nature of Leistner’s offense and his character under Appellate Rule 7(B) with
substantial deference to the trial court’s sentence. Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d
344, 355 (Ind. 2015). “In conducting our review, we do not look to see whether
the defendant’s sentence is appropriate or if another sentence might be more
appropriate; rather, the test is whether the sentence is ‘inappropriate.’” Barker v.
State, 994 N.E.2d 306, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Whether a
sentence is inappropriate ultimately depends upon “the culpability of the
defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad
of other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at
1224. Leistner bears the burden of persuading this court that his sentence is
inappropriate. Id.
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[34] Leistner argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender. As to the nature of his offenses,
Leistner contends that, although heinous, the child molesting offenses do not
allege facts in excess of those necessary to prove the crime and that the evidence
does not contain extraordinary circumstances. Appellant’s Br. at 35. As to his
character, Leistner asserts that the mitigating factors he presented to the trial
court offset his criminal history and support that his sentence should be revised.
These mitigating factors include that (1) Leistner suffers from alcohol and drug
problems, (2) it is not conclusive that he would not affirmatively respond to
probation or short-term imprisonment, (3) long-term imprisonment will result
in undue hardship to his children, (4) he has no history of sex-related crimes or
impermissible sexual acts, and (5) he acknowledged the wrongfulness of his acts
and expressed remorse.
[35] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is
the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the
crime committed. Kunberger v. State, 46 N.E.3d 966, 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015);
Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Leistner was
convicted of two counts of Level 1 felony, and the advisory sentence for a Level
1 felony conviction is thirty years, with a range of between twenty and forty
years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(b). Leistner was also convicted of a Class A
misdemeanor, for which a person shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not
more than one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2. Leistner received a sentence of
forty years for each of his Level 1 felony convictions and a sentence of one year
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for his Class A misdemeanor conviction, with the sentences ordered to run
concurrently for an aggregate, executed sentence of forty years.
[36] As this court has recognized, the nature of the offense is found in the details
and circumstances of the commission of the offense and the defendant’s
participation. Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Here,
Leistner entered C.E.’s bedroom under the guise of checking her for ticks and
then proceeded to spend several minutes touching, fondling, and ultimately
penetrating both her sex organ and her anus. As the trial court found,
Leistner’s actions were made more egregious by the fact that he exploited the
position of trust he held with C.E. as he had been a father figure living with her
since she was three years old. Leistner’s actions in violating C.E. were made
more horrific in that he recorded his actions without her knowledge or consent.
We do not find that Leistner’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offenses.
[37] The character of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender’s life and
conduct. Perry, 78 N.E.3d at 13. When considering the character of the
offender, one relevant fact is the defendant’s criminal history. Johnson v. State,
986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The evidence presented at Leistner’s
sentencing showed that, even though he was only thirty-six years, Leistner had
an extensive criminal history that included eight misdemeanors convictions and
one felony conviction. It was also shown that Leistner had used numerous
illegal drugs, misused and illegally obtained prescription medications, and had
a history of alcohol-related arrests. Around the time of his crimes in this case,
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he was still drinking alcohol, using methamphetamine and marijuana, and
abusing opiates and illegally obtained morphine. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 164.
His history of criminal activity and failure to address his substance abuse
problems do not reflect well on his character.
[38] Additionally, as previously stated, this crime involved the violation of a
position of trust that Leistner held with C.E. The commission of these offenses
and the violation of the father-figure role that he had played in C.E.’s life since
she was very young, reflect poorly on Leistner’s character and do not support
that his sentence is inappropriate. Further, although Leistner claimed to
appreciate the seriousness of his offenses, in a letter written to the trial court, he
stated that he has “never harmed a child nor would [he.]” Id. at 153. However,
his actions of violating C.E. and recording his conduct did harm C.E. We,
therefore, conclude that in looking at Leistner’s character and the nature of his
offenses, his sentence is not inappropriate.
V. Cross-Appeal
[39] The State cross-appeals and contends that the trial court erred in refusing to find
Leistner to be a sexually violent predator. The State asserts that the trial court
could not find that Leistner was not a sexually violent predator because, under
the applicable statute, the trial court did not have any discretion in making such
a determination as Leistner meets the statutory definition by operation of law.
We agree.
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[40] At sentencing, without explaining its reasoning, the trial court stated that it
would not find Leistner to be a sexually violent predator, stating “I don’t
believe he qualifies pursuant to that definition.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 197. However,
under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5, a person who, being at least eighteen
(18) years of age, commits an offense described in: . . . [Indiana Code section]
35-42-4-3 as a . . . Level 1 . . . felony . . . is a sexually violent predator.” Ind.
Code § 35-38-1-7.5(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added). Leistner was convicted of two
counts of Level 1 felony child molesting under Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3.
Sexually violent predator status “under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5(b) is
determined by the statute itself.” Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803, 815 (Ind.
2011). It is not the result of a discretionary act by the trial court or by the
Department of Correction. See id. If a person is convicted of one of the
enumerated crimes in the statute, he is a sexually violent predator per se, and
there is no need for a hearing or any other process to determine if he meets the
statutory definition. See Vickery v. State, 932 N.E.2d 678, 683 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010) (holding that a defendant who had been convicted of a qualifying crime
under the statute had no due process right to a hearing to try to prove that he
did not meet the definition); see also Lemmon, 949 N.E.2d at 808 (stating that the
legislature had changed the statute from requiring the court to determine
sexually violent predator status at the sentencing hearing to the automatic
designation of sexually violent predator status and that at the time the
defendant was released from prison in December 2007, the sentencing court
was no longer required to have determined a person’s status as a sexually
violent predator); Stockert v. State, 44 N.E.3d 78, 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)
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(finding that, because the defendant was convicted of a qualifying offense, he
was a sexually violent predator by operation of law), trans. denied.
[41] Here, Leistner was convicted of two crimes that each qualify him per se as a
sexually violent predator under the statute. Leistner was convicted of two
counts of Level 1 felony child molesting. Therefore, he is a sexually violent
predator by operation of law, and the trial court was required by statute to find
him as such. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred when it refused
to find Leistner to be a sexually violent predator and remand the case to the
trial court to correct this error and enter a finding that Leistner is a sexually
violent predator.4
[42] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
4
We note that Leistner contends that the State has waived this issue for failure to object to the trial court,
arguing that “a party may not present an argument or issue on appeal unless the party raised that argument
or issue before the trial court.” Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ind. 2004). However, our Supreme
Court had held that “sound policy and judicial economy favor permitting the State to present claims of illegal
sentence on appeal when the issue is a pure question of law that does not require resort to any evidence
outside the appellate record.” Hardley v. State, 905 N.E.2d 399, 403 (Ind. 2009). Here, the State’s claim of
trial court error in sentencing Leistner is a question of law because the trial court was mandated by statute to
find Leistner to be a sexually violent predator.
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