In the Matter of The Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: A.N. (Minor Child) and F.N. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 11 2019, 8:52 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John G. Forbes, Jr. 1
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Robert A. Rowlett
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
1
On April 2, 2019, Appellee Indiana Department of Child Services, by counsel, filed with this court a Notice
of Information Regarding Death of Parent’s Appellate Counsel, John Forbes, informing this court that
Appellant’s counsel, John G. Forbes, Jr., died on March 26, 2019.
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In the Matter of The July 11, 2019
Termination of the Parent-Child Court of Appeals Case No.
Relationship of: 18A-JT-2147
A.N. (Minor Child) Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
and
The Honorable Marilyn Moores,
F.N. (Father), Judge
Appellant-Respondent, The Honorable Scott Stowers,
Magistrate
v. Trial Court Cause No.
The Indiana Department of 49D09-1706-JT-596
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Robb, Judge.
Case Summary and Issue
[1] F.N. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights to
A.N. (“Child”). The sole issue Father presents on appeal is whether sufficient
evidence supported the termination of his parental rights. Concluding that
there was sufficient evidence to support the termination, we affirm.
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Facts and Procedural History
[2] Father and S.S. (“Mother”)2 are the biological parents of Child, born on March
20, 2013. On February 26, 2014, Indiana Department of Child Services
(“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services
(“CHINS”) because
[Mother] admitted to ongoing and recent heroin use, and she has
not taken necessary action to adequately address her drug
problem. In addition, [Father] admitted to marijuana use, and
there are concerns that he may be using other drugs as well.
[Mother] reported being overwhelmed and is often unavailable to
parent [Child] due to arrests or drug use. She also admitted to a
history of domestic violence with [Father].
Exhibits, Volume I at 10. Child was removed from the home and was
eventually placed in relative care with her maternal aunt and her aunt’s
husband. Child was adjudicated a CHINS on July 10, 2014, when Mother
“admitted to illegal drug use and having a history of domestic violence with
[Father],” and Father waived a factfinding hearing. Id. at 30.
[3] On August 7, 2014, the juvenile court issued a dispositional decree, inclusive of
a parent participation plan, which directed Father to participate in homebased
counseling, substance abuse assessment, random drug screens, and domestic
violence services. He was also directed to successfully complete a Father
2
Mother executed consents to Child’s adoption prior to the termination hearing and does not participate in
this appeal.
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Engagement Program and refrain from committing any acts of domestic
violence.
[4] On June 28, 2017, DCS filed its petition to terminate Father’s parental rights.
A termination hearing (“TPR hearing”) took place on February 7 and July 12,
2018. On August 9, 2018, the court issued its order terminating Father’s
parental rights, finding in relevant part:
7. From Summer 2014 to December 2014, [Father] was
pending deportation proceedings and was detained in a Federal
Detention Facility.
8. By May 21, 2015, [Father] was testing positive for alcohol
and was not engaged in substance abuse treatment or domestic
violence services.
9. On July 16, 2015, the CHINS Court suspended [Father’s]
parenting time due to lack of involvement. The Court authorized
the reinstatement of [Father’s] parenting time upon successful
enrollment in Court-ordered services.
10. As of October 15, 2015, [Father] was still testing positive
for alcohol.
11. At the time of the December 8, 2015 “Permanency
Hearing,” [Father] had still not engaged in a substance abuse
assessment and had not completed substance abuse treatment of
[sic] domestic violence assessment.
12. [Child] had been removed from his [sic] [F]ather’s care
and custody for at least six (6) months pursuant to the
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Dispositional Decree prior to this Termination Action being filed
on June 28, 2017.
13. By March 3, 2016, [Father] had completed domestic
violence services and Intensive Outpatient treatment although he
had stopped submitting to screens in November 2015.
14. At the January 12, 2017 Permanency Hearing, based on
non-compliance and positive alcohol screens, the CHINS Court
ordered [Father] to be placed on a[n alcohol monitoring system].
15. On or about January 18, 2017, [Father] was placed on
[alcohol monitoring].3
16. The Track Group tests alcohol consumption via Outreach
Smartphone Monitoring (“OSM”). This monitor consists of
[Father] being monitored five times per day outside of a nine
hour sleep schedule.
17. [Father’s] sleep schedule was from 9:00pm to 6:00am [sic].
Thus, the device would contact [Father’s] smartphone five times
per day and he had thirty (30) minutes to submit to the test.
18. Between January 18, 2017, and February 5, 2008 [sic],
[Father] would’ve had 2,317 “check-in’s” with OSM. [Father]
missed 993 of these.
3
Father’s alcohol monitoring program was administered through a private entity—the Track Group—“a
private sector of Marion County Community Corrections.” Transcript of Evidence, Volume II at 41. Under
the program, Father was required to take random breathalyzer tests five times each day through an
application program installed on his smartphone. When prompted by a notification sent to his phone, Father
had thirty minutes to complete a test.
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19. [C]hild has been placed in relative care with [her maternal
aunt and uncle] since February 2014. She is doing well and is
bonded with the[m]. This is the only home she has ever known.
Her younger biological brother[4] also resides in the home. This is
a pre-adoptive placement.
20. [Father] rehabs and manages several rental properties. He
spends a significant amount of time on these projects. He is very
busy managing these properties.
21. Despite being ordered by the CHINS Court to provide
100% compliance with alcohol screening, [Father] has missed a
subtantial [sic] number of screens. Between September 6, 2017
through October 9, 2017, [Father] missed 118 out of 206 alcohol
screens.
22. In May 2018, [Father] stopped using the [alcohol
monitoring system] because it was “embarrassing.”
23. [Father] did submit to alcohol tests at his own expense at
United States Drug Testing Labratories [sic] in Greenwood
Indiana on February 7, 2018 and July 3, 2018. However, these
tests were conducted at times of [Father’s] choosing and not
randomly thus rendering any results therein to be of dubious
value.
24. [Father] has admitted that [Child] is better off with [her
maternal aunt and uncle] than she would be with him because of
4
R.N., Child’s younger brother, was born to Mother and Father on March 23, 2015, and is not a party to
these proceedings. R.N. lives with his maternal aunt and uncle—independent of court involvement.
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his work schedule. He has indicated that he needs “a good
woman” to care for his child.
Appellant’s Amended Appendix to Brief, Volume II at 18-19.
[5] Based upon these findings of fact, the juvenile court concluded as follows:
25. There is a reasonable probability that the condition that
resulted in [Child’s] removal and continued placement outside of
the home will not be remedied by [Father]. [Father] has had over
four years to demonstrate sobriety and has not done so. His large
number of missed screens cause significant concerns and he
stopped alcohol screening due to embarrassment [which] leaves
the court with no assurance that he can ensure sobriety.
26. Continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat
to [Child’s] well-being in that it would serve as a barrier to
obtaining permanency for her through an adoption when her
father is unable to provide permanency and parent. By his own
admission, [Child] is better off with [her maternal aunt and
uncle] and [Child’s] separation anxiety has improved in recent
years. [Child] has thrived while in the care of [her maternal aunt
and uncle] and she has recovered from early developmental
delays. Despite having over four years and completing some
services, no provider has been able to recommend unsupervised
parenting time between [Child] and [Father]. [Father] chooses
not to parent [Child] and has even placed his younger child
[R.N.] with [maternal aunt and uncle] independent of Court
involvement.
27. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best
interests of [Child]. Termination would allow her to be adopted
into a stable and permanent home where her needs will be safely
met. [Child] is in need of a stable and sober parent. Although
[Father] clearly loves [Child], permanency for [Child] is of
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paramount concern and [Father] has been unable to demonstrate
sobriety after four years of services. Most egregiously, he
removed his court ordered alcohol monitor due to
embarrassment while this Termination Trial was pending.
28. There exists a satisfactory plan for the future care and
treatment of [Child], that being adoption.
29. The Guardian ad Litem agrees with the permanency plan
of adoption as being in [Child’s] best interests.
Id. at 20. Accordingly, the trial court determined that DCS had proven the
allegations of the petition to terminate parental rights by clear and convincing
evidence and therefore terminated Father’s parental rights. Father now
appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[6] Although we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is “one of the most
valued relationships in our culture,” we also recognize that “parental interests
are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests in determining
the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.” Bester v. Lake
Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005) (internal
quotations omitted). The involuntary termination of one’s parental rights is the
most extreme sanction a court can impose because termination severs all rights
of a parent to his or her children. See In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct.
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Ohio App. 2001), trans. denied. As such, termination is intended as a last resort,
available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed. Id. The purpose of
terminating one’s parental rights is not to punish the parent, but rather to
protect the child. Id.
[7] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258,
265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence
and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. Id. In deference to
the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside its
judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.
In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied; cert. denied,
534 U.S. 1161 (2002). Thus, if the evidence and inferences support the
decision, we must affirm. Id.
[8] When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions
thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147.
First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and, second,
we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are
clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either
directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). A
judgment is clearly erroneous only if the findings do not support the court’s
conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment thereon. Id.
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II. Statutory Requirements
[9] “The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In
re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. Although
parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the
termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their
parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
[10] For our purposes, to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS must have
alleged and proven the following by clear and convincing evidence:
(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least
six (6) months under a dispositional decree[; or]
*****
(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has
been under the supervision of a local office or probation
department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most
recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date
the child is removed from the home as a result of the child
being alleged to be a child in need of services or a
delinquent child;
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
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placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied[; or]
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child[;]
*****
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). “[I]f the court finds that the allegations in a
petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate
the parent-child relationship.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added).
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[11] Father first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile
court’s findings as to subsection (b)(2)(B) of the termination statute cited above,
that is, remedy of conditions resulting in removal and threat to Child’s well-
being. See Ind. Code. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). He also challenges whether
termination was in the best interests of Child. Initially, we observe that
subsection (b)(2)(B) of the termination statute is written in the disjunctive.
Thus, DCS was required to establish only one of the two requirements of the
subsection by clear and convincing evidence. See L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 209.
Nevertheless, the juvenile court determined that both conditions of this
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subsection had been satisfied. We, however, need only consider whether
sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that there is a
reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Child’s removal from Father’s
care will not be remedied.
A. Remedy of Conditions Resulting in Removal
[12] Child was removed from Father’s care because of his inability to demonstrate
sobriety. On appeal, Father argues that he “has shown his commitment to
sobriety[,]” and “[t]he fact that a large number of [alcohol] screens were missed
does not establish a lack of sobriety.” Appellant’s Brief at 5. According to
Father, he did not intentionally avoid the testing, but instead “found the
notification to test very difficult and not informative.” Id. at 4. Father points
this court to his testimony under oath at the TPR hearing and his response of
“Nope” when his counsel asked him if he was involved in “anything that would
be intoxicating in nature?” Id. at 4-5. Father asserts that “[i]f an oath to testify
to the truth is meaningless[,] then society in general is at risk.” Id. at 5.
[13] In deciding whether the conditions that resulted in a child’s removal will not be
remedied, a juvenile court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her
child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence
of changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001),
trans. denied. It must evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to
determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or
deprivation. Id. The juvenile court also may consider, as evidence of whether
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conditions will be remedied, the services offered to the parent by DCS, and the
parent’s response to those services. A.F. v. Marion Cty. Office of Family &
Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
[14] A juvenile court need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a
deficient lifestyle such that his or her physical, mental, and social growth are
permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. In re
E.S., 762 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). A pattern of unwillingness
to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with counselors and those
providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged and unacceptable
home conditions, will support a finding that there exists no reasonable
probability that the conditions will change. Matter of D.B., 561 N.E.2d 844, 848
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
[15] The primary condition leading to Child’s removal was Father’s inability to
demonstrate his sobriety. Father was testing positive for alcohol consumption
as of May 21, 2015, and October 15, 2015. He stopped submitting to alcohol
screens in November 2015. As of December 8, 2015, he was not engaged in
substance abuse assessment and had not completed the substance abuse
treatment that was ordered under his parent participation plan.
[16] At the TPR hearing, ongoing family case manager (“FCM”) Naomi Boone
testified that the only court-ordered service that Father completed was for
domestic violence. She further testified that Father was “in a severe state of
denial regarding his [alcoholism].” Transcript of Evidence, Volume II at 62.
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She explained that while Father completed the intensive outpatient program, he
did not complete the recommendations of the program, which included
abstaining from alcohol, participating in Alcoholics Anonymous, and obtaining
a sponsor. She noted that “[n]ot only did [Father] continue to drink, but . . . he
was arrested March 2016 with an OWI and also endangering another person.”
Id. at 63. The guardian ad litem (“GAL”) appointed to the case testified that
Father promised to provide her with results of his alcohol screenings; however,
he did not do so.
[17] Father was placed on a smartphone alcohol monitoring system between
January 2017 and February 2018. He should have submitted to 2,317
breathalyzer tests; however, he missed 993 tests. FCM Boone testified that
“[e]very missed screen is [considered a] positive [screen].” Id. at 71.
[18] Delanne Bruce, the case manager who monitored Father’s use of the
smartphone alcohol testing application (“app”), testified that when Father
obtained a new cell phone, Father deleted the app from his phone and “did not
[submit to tests] all week.” Id. at 43. When Father met with Bruce to have the
app reinstalled, Bruce testified that Father made her “uncomfortable” because
she felt that he attempted to pressure her to lie about his testing. Id. at 44.
Bruce explained that “[Father] made me aware that he had a DCS trial and
wanted me to know that I needed to be honest with the Judge, and he stated
that he does not drink. Um, he just kept repeating that kind of stuff[.]” Id.
Bruce testified that she told Father she “would not lie under oath. . . . I—in all
honesty, I was feeling a little uncomfortable, because I was not at liberty to
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discuss his case with him, but um, I just continued to tell him that I was not
going to lie under oath and I was going to be honest about his missed test on his
OSM or on home monitoring.” Id.
[19] At the TPR hearing, FCM Boone was asked if she thought the reason that led
to Child’s removal from Father would be remedied. She stated, “No,” and
explained: “[Father]’s had 48 months to complete [the court-ordered services],
which was more than enough time. And in my professional opinion, and being
with the Department of Child Services for 10 years, most parents completed
[court-ordered services] within a year to fifteen months.” Id. at 69.
[20] Given this evidence, we find that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence
that the conditions resulting in Child’s removal would not be remedied.
Father’s arguments to the contrary are a request to reweigh the evidence heard
at the TPR hearing, which we will not do. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind.
2014).
B. Best Interests of Child
[21] Father also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile
court’s conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights was in Child’s
best interests. As set forth above, the juvenile court found that termination of
Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests because
[t]ermination would allow her to be adopted into a stable and
permanent home where her needs will be safely met. [Child] is
in need of a stable and sober parent. Although [Father] clearly
loves [Child], permanency for [Child] is of paramount concern
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and [Father] has been unable to demonstrate sobriety after four
years of services. Most egregiously, he removed his court
ordered alcohol monitor due to embarrassment while this
Termination Trial was pending.
Appellant’s Amend. App., Vol. II at 20. Father specifically challenges the
court’s finding that “he has been unable to demonstrate sobriety after four years
of services.” Id.
[22] In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the trial court is
required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and to look to the totality
of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d
185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In so doing, the court must subordinate the
interests of the parent to those of the child. Id. The trial court need not wait
until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child
relationship. Id. The testimony of service providers regarding the child’s need
for permanency supports a finding that termination is in the child’s best
interests. Id.
[23] Here, the juvenile court found that Father “clearly loves his child[.]”
Appellant’s Amend. App., Vol. II at 20. Testimony was presented at the TPR
hearing that during supervised visits, Father and Child “were excited to see
each other and happy to see each other[,]” and that “the interaction between
them, it is a very loving interaction.” Tr., Vol. II at 23, 83. However,
considerable evidence was presented regarding Father’s inability to demonstrate
sobriety, including his failed alcohol tests, his numerous missed alcohol screens,
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and his unwillingness to participate in court-ordered alcohol monitoring. FCM
Boone testified that “[Father] has been in complete denial of . . . his substance
use, of his alcoholism[.]” Id. at 64. Father admitted that he missed hundreds of
alcohol screens and that he stopped participating in the smartphone alcohol
monitoring because he found it “embarrassing.” Id. at 129. FCM Boone
testified that a missed alcohol screen is considered by DCS to be a positive
result for alcohol consumption. Case manager Bruce testified that she
“[considers a missed alcohol screen] a positive [result for alcohol consumption],
because usually people are drinking during that time period. They know when
to stop testing.” Id. at 49. We find that DCS presented sufficient evidence to
support the juvenile court’s finding that Father was unable to demonstrate his
sobriety.
[24] Regarding whether termination of Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best
interests, the FCM answered in the affirmative, explaining that Child should be
adopted by her maternal aunt and uncle because “[t]his is all [Child] knows. . . .
[I]t is traumatizing . . . to remove her out of her [current] family environment
that she’s been in more than half her life.” Id. at 68. The FCM further testified:
Again, this is the only home [Child] knows, so how much
longer— right, so [ages] one through five is— are the most
important years developmentally for her. And so, for her to be
currently in limbo, and lack the stability, or lack the knowledge
of where she’s going to go, and this concern. It’s very important
for her. At what point do we give her permanency[?]
Id. at 69.
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[25] The GAL also believed that it was in Child’s best interests for Father’s parental
rights to be terminated. In support of this belief, the GAL offered testimony
regarding Father’s thoughts on Child’s current placement with her aunt and
uncle and the type of home situation Father indicated he would need to
properly care for Child, specifically:
[Father] has told me that he knows that the placement [Child] is
in, it is a good placement, that she is well taken care of, that she
has progressed, that . . . she is doing very well there, that there
would be no other place that he would have his child uh— er, no
one else take care of his child. Um, he has also told me that what
he has needed in order to be able to care for [Child] would be, he
just needs a good woman um, and that that would help him be
able to care for her.
Id. at 77. Father’s statements regarding needing a “good woman” caused the
GAL concern. She explained that “as a parent, [Father] needs to be able to
care for [Child] on his own. Um, everybody needs a support, but to say that he
just needs a good woman to be able to have his child back in care is very
concerning.” Id.
[26] Regarding Child’s placement with her aunt and uncle the GAL testified as
follows:
I don’t have any concerns in the home she’s in. Um, she has had
her own room, the family is very accommodating to [Child].
[Child] does see this as her family. As stated before, she does call
um, [her aunt and uncle] uh, mom and dad. Uh, she also sees
their son as her brother. Um, she’s— she just seems very
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comfortable, very well adjusted, very bonded to the family that
she is currently placed with.
Id. at 80. According to the GAL, “removing [Child] from [her aunt’s and
uncle’s] care would turn her world upside down.” Id. at 81.
[27] Katie Wilson, a staff therapist, testified that Child is “very well adjusted and
very happy” in her aunt’s and uncle’s home, and that if Child was removed to
Father’s care, the change would be traumatic for Child and might cause “more
tantrums [on Child’s part], more confusion . . . , [and] a loss of stability[.]” Id.
at 56-57. Wilson explained that stability in a child’s life, especially in the life of
a four year old, is extremely important.
[28] Indeed, Father’s own testimony supported the juvenile court’s findings
regarding termination of Father’s parental rights being in Child’s best interests.
For example, Father admitted to missing a large number of court-required
alcohol screens. His excuse for missing the screens was that he was not able to
hear or see the notification on his smartphone that prompted him to take the
test because he was “busy doing something. Either working or whatever the
reason is[.]” Id. at 119. Father offered the juvenile court evidence of alcohol
screenings that he attended on his own that purported to show that he was not
consuming alcohol. However, the court ultimately found the evidence dubious
and self-serving. Father admitted that he stopped participating in the
smartphone alcohol monitoring despite knowing that the tests were court-
ordered. On cross-examination, Father testified that he found it
“embarrassing” to have to participate in the smartphone tests. Id. at 129.
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[29] Moreover, Father repeatedly testified that he believed that Child should remain
with her aunt and uncle. When asked by his counsel if he would have Child
live with him, Father replied, “to be honest, I really think that she i— [sic] she
will be better with uh— on this case, it will be better with uh, [her aunt and
uncle].” Id. at 108. He testified that if the juvenile court determined that his
parental rights should not be terminated, his desire would be for Child to
remain with her aunt and uncle because “she’s been there for four years, and
uh, I think she is in a good home[.]” Id. at 109. He further testified that he was
“very comfortable” with the aunt and uncle serving as Child’s caregivers. Id. at
117.5
[30] In light of the evidence presented, we find that the juvenile court’s conclusion
that termination of Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests is
supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Conclusion
[31] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that DCS presented sufficient evidence to
support the juvenile’s courts termination of Father’s parental rights to Child.
Accordingly, the juvenile court’s termination order is affirmed.
5
At the TPR hearing, Father offered testimony indicating that he wanted Child to remain with maternal aunt
and uncle, but that he did not want his parental rights terminated—instead desiring a guardianship
arrangement whereby he could visit Child and retain his parental rights. In his Appellant’s Brief, Father
asserts that the “potential for guardianship was not appropriately considered,” however, he does not present
a cogent argument on the assertion. Appellant’s Br. at 5. We therefore decline to address it. See Ind.
Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2147 | July 11, 2019 Page 20 of 21
[32] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2147 | July 11, 2019 Page 21 of 21