Kyle J. Wilkinson v. Danielle A. Assante, And Paul Assante and Jennifer Assante ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                                  FILED
    Jul 26 2018, 8:08 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
    Jared Michel Thomas                                         Jason M. Spindler
    Evansville, Indiana                                         Princeton, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Kyle J. Wilkinson,                                          July 26, 2018
    Appellant-Petitioner,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-DR-327
    v.                                                  Appeal from the Gibson Circuit
    Court
    Danielle A. Assante,                                        The Honorable Jeffrey F. Meade,
    Appellee-Respondent,                                        Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    And                                                         26C01-1602-DR-273
    Paul Assante and Jennifer Assante,
    Appellees-Intervenors.
    Riley, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-327 | July 26, 2018                                    Page 1 of 10
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    [1]   Appellant-Petitioner, Kyle Wilkinson (Father), appeals the trial court’s Order,
    granting Appellee-Respondent’s, Danielle Assante (Mother), motion to dismiss
    Father’s petition to modify custody of their minor children, A.W & Ai.W.
    (Children), pursuant to the Indiana Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
    [2]   We affirm.
    ISSUE
    [3]   Father raises one issue for our review, which we restate as: Whether the trial
    court abused its discretion when it declined to continue its jurisdiction over the
    Children based on the application of the Indiana Uniform Child Custody
    Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    [4]   Father and Mother are the biological parents of A.W., born July 2, 2009, and
    Ai.W., born May 16, 2010—both Children were born in New Jersey. The
    Parents were never married, but resided together and Father executed a
    paternity affidavit for both Children. During 2010 and 2011, the New Jersey
    Division of Youth and Family Services became involved with the family. On
    May 20, 2010, the Superior Court of Sussex County in New Jersey (Sussex
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-327 | July 26, 2018          Page 2 of 10
    County trial court) awarded temporary legal and physical custody of Ai.W. 1 to
    Maternal Grandmother. On August 31, 2010, the Sussex County trial court
    continued Maternal Grandmother’s temporary legal and physical custody of
    Ai.W. but awarded Parents supervised visitation. On February 15, 2011, the
    Sussex County trial court ordered physical and legal custody of Ai.W. to be
    transferred to Parents and on June 17, 2011, the State of New Jersey terminated
    its involvement with the family because the Children had been returned home
    and all of the conditions causing the removal of the Children had been
    remedied. In its Order terminating the court’s involvement, the Sussex County
    trial court awarded primary physical custody of the Children to Mother, with
    joint legal custody to the Parents.
    [5]   In March of 2014, Parents and Children moved to Gibson County, Indiana,
    where they continually resided until February 2016. On February 6, 2016,
    Mother and the Children moved back to New Jersey, while Father continued to
    reside in Gibson County, Indiana. The Children have been enrolled in school
    in New Jersey ever since.
    [6]   On February 29, 2016, Father filed an emergency petition to modify custody
    with the Gibson County circuit court (trial court). After a hearing and by order
    of March 16, 2016, the trial court issued an emergency custody order, awarding
    emergency custody of the Children to Father. On March 18, 2016, the Sussex
    1
    The record is silent as to whether A.W. was included in this Order, or whether she was the subject of other
    proceedings.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-327 | July 26, 2018                                 Page 3 of 10
    County trial court entered a handwritten order in docket No. FD-19-287-11,
    stating that the Children were to be returned to the custody of Father, and
    afforded Father the right to utilize law enforcement officers to enforce the trial
    court’s order. Thereafter, Paul and Jennifer Assante 2 (Maternal Grandparents)
    intervened by filing an order to show cause under a new cause number with the
    Sussex County trial court requesting it to temporarily restrain Father from
    removing the Children from the State of New Jersey. On March 21, 2016, the
    Sussex County trial court temporarily restrained Father from removing the
    Children and ruled that Maternal Grandparents had thirty days “to file in
    Indiana, the home state, to obtain an order as to custody issues.” (Appellant’s
    App. Vol. II, p. 83).
    [7]   On April 20, 2016, Mother moved the trial court to set aside the emergency
    custody order and, by agreement of the parties, the trial court granted Maternal
    Grandparents’ request to intervene in the cause pending before the Indiana
    court. Over the next eighteen months, the parties were involved in discovery
    efforts “to get discovery from [Father] and [Father’s] drug treatment program”
    from the treatment facility. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 50). Ultimately, the
    Maternal Grandparents, as Intervenors, obtained a motion to compel the third
    party for failing to comply with the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure.
    2
    Jennifer Assante is the stepmother of Mother and the stepgrandmother of the Children. However, for
    convenience sake, maternal grandfather and maternal stepgrandmother will be collectively referred to as
    Maternal Grandparents.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-327 | July 26, 2018                                Page 4 of 10
    [8]    On October 26, 2017, Mother filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to the
    UCCJA, to which Father filed an objection on November 2, 2017. After
    conducting a hearing on Mother’s motion, on November 27, 2017, the trial
    court dismissed Father’s petition for custody, concluding, in pertinent part:
    Although it is certainly arguable that the Indiana court initially
    had jurisdiction at the time the petition was filed on behalf of
    [Father] in this matter, it is evident to this [c]ourt that the State of
    New Jersey is now the most appropriate and most convenient
    forum to determine the best interest of the [C]hildren as it is now
    the state with the closest connections to the [C]hildren and their
    family.
    (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 51). On December 27, 2017, Father filed a motion
    to correct error, which was summarily denied by the trial court on January 9,
    2018.
    [9]    Father now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    [10]   Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his
    petition for custody based on the application of the UCCJA provisions. Where,
    as here, the issue at hand deals with an interstate custody determination, the
    UCCJA, which is codified at Indiana Code Chapter 31-21-5 governs. One
    purpose of the UCCJA is to prevent parents from seeking custody in different
    jurisdictions in an attempt to obtain a favorable result. Tamasy v. Kovacs, 
    929 N.E.2d 820
    , 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). As such, “[t]he UCCJA has provisions
    for the determination of jurisdiction.” 
    Id.
     Under the UCCJA, an Indiana court
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-327 | July 26, 2018               Page 5 of 10
    has an affirmative duty to question its jurisdiction when it becomes aware of an
    interstate dimension in a child custody dispute. Christensen v. Christensen, 
    752 N.E.2d 179
    , 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The trial court must first determine
    whether it has jurisdiction, and, if it does, whether to exercise that jurisdiction.
    
    Id. at 182
    . In determining whether a trial court has improperly exercised
    jurisdiction under the UCCJA, we apply an abuse of discretion standard.
    Tamasy, 
    929 N.E.2d at 826
    . An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial
    court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
    circumstances before the court, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. 
    Id.
    [11]   Where, as here, the trial court issues special findings and conclusions thereon
    pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52, “we apply the following two-tiered standard
    of review: whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings
    support the judgment.” Staresnick v. Staresnick, 
    830 N.E.2d 127
    , 131 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2005), reh’g denied. The trial court’s findings and conclusions will be set
    aside only if they are clearly erroneous, that is, if the record contains no facts or
    inferences supporting them. 
    Id.
     A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review
    of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 
    Id.
    We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses, but
    consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment. We review
    conclusions of law de novo. 
    Id.
    [12]   Turning to the case at hand, after the Sussex County trial court became
    involved with the family and granted Mother primary physical custody, with
    joint legal custody on June 17, 2011, the parties moved from New Jersey and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-327 | July 26, 2018            Page 6 of 10
    made their residence with the Children in Indiana in March of 2014.
    Approximately two years later, in February 2016, Mother and the Children
    returned to New Jersey and Father filed a petition to modify custody with the
    trial court in Indiana. “An Indiana court may not modify a child custody
    determination made by a court of another state unless an Indiana court has
    jurisdiction to make an initial determination under section 1(a)(1) or 1(a)(2) of
    [Ind. Code Ch. 31-21-5] and (1) the court of the other state determines that: (A)
    it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under section 2 3 of [I.C. Ch.
    31-21-5]” I.C. § 31-21-5-3. When making a determination of custody under
    I.C. § 31-21-5-1(a)(1), an Indiana court gains jurisdiction when “(1) Indiana is
    the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding
    or was the home state of the child within six (6) months before the
    commencement of the proceeding, and the child is absent from Indiana but a
    parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in Indiana.” Because
    Indiana was the home state of the Children during the six months prior to
    Father’s filing, and the Sussex County trial court relinquished its jurisdiction by
    declaring Indiana to be the Children’s “home state” in its order of March 21,
    3
    Indiana Code section 31-21-5-2 states:
    [] an Indiana court that has made a child custody determination consistent with section 1 or 3 of this chapter
    has exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
    (1) An Indiana court determines that: (A) neither (i) the child; (ii) the child’s parents; nor (iii) any
    person acting as a parent; has a significant connection with Indiana; and (B) substantial evidence is
    no longer available in Indiana concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal
    relationships; or
    (2) An Indiana court or a court of another state determines that: (A) the child’s; (B) the child’s parents;
    and (C) any person acting as a parent; do not presently reside in Indiana.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-327 | July 26, 2018                                     Page 7 of 10
    2016, the Indiana trial court gained exclusive and continuing jurisdiction to
    preside over any custody disputes pertaining to the Children. (Appellant’s App.
    Vol. II, p. 83); I.C. §§ 31-21-5-1(a)(1); -3. See also In re Custody of A.N.W., 
    798 N.E.2d 556
    , 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (the court that first enters a custody
    decree on a matter gains exclusive jurisdiction, but that jurisdiction continues
    only until all parties and the children that were the subject of the decree have
    left the state), trans. denied
    [13]   The fundamental principle underlying the UCCJA is that once a court with a
    jurisdictional basis exercises jurisdiction over a “custody” issue, that court
    retains exclusive jurisdiction over all custody matters so long as a “significant
    connection” remains between the controversy and the state, and that court
    alone has discretion to decide whether it will defer jurisdiction to the court of
    another state upon the basis that the other court is a more convenient forum to
    litigate the issue. In re Custody of A.N.W., 
    798 N.E.2d 556
    , 561-62 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2003). A “significant connection” remains under the scheme as long as
    one parent continues to reside in the state rendering the initial determination.
    
    Id.
     Accordingly, through the passage of time and by operation of law, Indiana
    has now become the Children’s home state.
    [14]   Nevertheless, the UCCJA provides that “a court with subject matter jurisdiction
    over a child custody dispute may nonetheless ‘decline to exercise its jurisdiction
    any time before making a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum . . .
    under the circumstances . . . and that a court of another state is a more
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-327 | July 26, 2018            Page 8 of 10
    appropriate forum.’” Stewart v. Vulliet, 
    888 N.E.2d 761
    , 766 (Ind. 2008). In
    making this determination, a trial court shall consider
    (1) Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to
    continue in the future and which state is best able to protect
    the parties and the child.
    (2) The length of time the child has resided outside Indiana.
    (3) The distance between the Indiana court and the court in the
    state that would assume jurisdiction.
    (4) The relative financial circumstances of the parties.
    (5) An agreement of the parties as to which state should assume
    jurisdiction.
    (6) The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve
    the pending litigation, including the child’s testimony.
    (7) The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue
    expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the
    evidence.
    (8) The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and
    issues in the pending litigation.
    I.C. § 31-21-5-8(b). This list is not exclusive, and courts may consider all
    relevant factors, including factors not listed. Tamasy, 
    929 N.E.2d at 827
    .
    [15]   In concluding that it was no longer the most convenient forum, the trial court
    considered that the Children had resided within the State of New Jersey
    continuously since birth, with the exception of a two-year span between March
    2014 and February 2016 when they resided in Indiana. Significant family ties
    continue to exist in New Jersey with Maternal Grandparents and other
    relatives. In evaluating the case in its totality, the trial court determined that
    “the majority of the evidence required to resolve the pending custody litigation,
    would be in Sussex County, New Jersey, inasmuch as the [C]hildren
    themselves” continue to reside there. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 49). It noted
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-327 | July 26, 2018             Page 9 of 10
    that the Children are enrolled in school in Sussex County, the Children’s
    therapist is located in Sussex County, and “a host of prior related cases
    involving not only the [C]hildren but also the [M]other and [F]ather” have
    previously been filed and decided in Sussex County. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II,
    p. 49). Because “the court is not limited to considering the parties’
    circumstances only as they existed at the time the petition was filed, but rather
    can evaluate the case on a continuing basis to ensure the Children’s best
    interests are protected,” we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction over Father’s petition to modify
    custody. Stewart, 888 N.E.2d at 768.
    CONCLUSION
    [16]   Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
    when it declined jurisdiction over the Children based on the application of the
    UCCJA.
    [17]   Affirmed.
    [18]   Kirsch, J. and Vaidik, C.J. concur
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-327 | July 26, 2018         Page 10 of 10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case 18A-DR-327

Judges: Riley

Filed Date: 7/26/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024