Marzono R. Shelly v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 20 2018, 5:46 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Marzono R. Shelly Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Carlisle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Marzono R. Shelly, July 20, 2018
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
46A03-1702-PC-274
v. Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas J.
Appellee-Respondent. Alevizos, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
46C01-1606-PC-6
Mathias, Judge.
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[1] Marzono R. Shelly (“Shelly”) appeals the LaPorte Circuit Court’s denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief. Concluding that Shelly has failed to raise any
issues that are available for post-conviction review, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The following facts and procedural history of Shelly’s case are taken from the
unpublished memorandum decision of his direct appeal:
In 2012, seventy-three-year-old Charles Harper lived in a house
in Michigan City with his friend, Vincent Fayson. On January
19, 2012, Shelly arrived at Harper’s house and asked Fayson if
Harper was available. Harper asked Shelly to come inside and
gave Fayson some money so that he could leave the house and
go out with his friends. Fayson left the house sometime around
eight o’clock at night.
Around 10:30 p.m., Fayson, still out with his friends, called
Harper and received no answer. When Fayson returned to
Harper’s house later that night, Harper’s truck was gone, but the
lights and television were still on and the door to the house was
unlocked. Fayson entered the house and noticed that a chair was
propped underneath the doorknob to the kitchen door. Fayson
removed the chair, opened the door, and found Harper lying in a
pool of blood.
Harper had been shot five times, including once in the back of
the head and once in the face. Fayson contacted the police and
informed them that Shelly was the last person he had seen with
Harper. Later that evening, officers discovered Harper’s truck
parked at an apartment complex. The next morning, officers
knocked on the door of an apartment at the complex belonging to
Doris Parr, who invited them inside. The officers soon
discovered Shelly hiding in the furnace room and arrested him.
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Officers then spoke with a woman who was in Parr’s apartment
when Shelly was arrested. She informed them that Shelly had
been carrying a twelve-pack box of Icehouse beer and that he had
attempted to hide the box when police arrived. After Parr
consented to a search of her apartment, the officers found the
Icehouse box hidden underneath [Shelly’s] jacket in the furnace
room. They searched the box and found, among other things,
Harper’s wallet, keys, two handguns, and ammunition.
The State charged Shelly with murder, felony murder, class A
felony robbery, and class B felony serious violent felon in
possession of a firearm. The State later requested an habitual
offender sentence enhancement. Shelly filed a motion to suppress
the evidence found inside the Icehouse box, which the trial court
denied. Shelly also filed a motion asking the trial court to declare
Jury Rule 20(a)(8), which allows jurors and alternates to discuss
the evidence amongst themselves during recesses prior to the
commencement of deliberations, unconstitutional. The trial court
denied this motion as well.
During the jury selection process, one of the prospective jurors,
Gorski, informed the trial court that he believed one of [Shelly’s]
tattoos signified that he had previously murdered someone.
Gorski said that he had shared these thoughts with other
prospective jurors.
Shelly moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion,
finding that any taint could be cured by individually questioning
all of the prospective jurors. When questioned, only two
prospective jurors indicated that they had discussed [Shelly’s]
tattoo with Gorski. Both prospective jurors, along with Gorski,
were dismissed. No other prospective juror indicated that they
had participated in or overheard such discussions and the trial
court admonished all that remained that they must not speak
about the case with anyone.
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Following jury selection, Shelly moved to discharge the jury
panel, alleging that the prosecutor had made statements that
improperly informed the jury of the facts of the case,
misinformed the jury as to the elements of the crimes charged,
and improperly commented upon [Shelly’s] exercise of his right
against self-incrimination. The trial court denied this motion as
well.
On August 12, 2013, Shelly was tried before a jury. At the close
of evidence, Shelly moved for a mistrial, alleging that the State
had failed to disclose evidence of Harper’s past criminal activity,
about which Shelly had just learned. The trial court denied the
motion, finding that there was not a reasonable probability that
the evidence would have affected the outcome of the trial. The
trial court also denied [Shelly’s] request to instruct the jury on
involuntary manslaughter.
The jury found Shelly guilty on all counts, and the trial court
later found him to be an habitual offender. The trial court merged
[Shelly’s] conviction for felony murder with his conviction for
murder. Shelly was sentenced to sixty-five years for the murder
conviction, thirty years for the class A felony robbery conviction,
ten years for the class B felony violent felon in possession of a
firearm conviction, and thirty years for the habitual offender
finding. With the exception of the class B felony violent felon in
possession of a firearm sentence, which was to be served
concurrently to the murder sentence, the trial court ordered all
sentences to be served consecutively, resulting in a total executed
sentence of 125 years.
Shelly v. State, 46A03-1404-CR-133, 2015 WL 1228314, Slip op. at *1–*2 (Ind.
Ct. App. March 17, 2015).
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[3] On direct appeal, our court held that Shelly’s merged convictions for murder
and felony murder, and his conviction for class A felony robbery violated
double jeopardy. This court, therefore, instructed the trial court to vacate the
felony murder the conviction and remanded the case to enter a judgment for
robbery, as a class C felony. On remand, the trial court was ordered to revise his
sentence accordingly. As to the remaining convictions, this court affirmed. See
id. at *11.
[4] On June 7, 2016, Shelly filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Shelly
filed an amended pro se petition for post-conviction relief on November 14,
2016. In his amended petition, Shelly raised numerous arguments which we
summarize as: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the
State to amend the habitual offender charge; (2) whether the possession of a
firearm by a violent offender and the habitual offender enhancement violated
double jeopardy; (3) whether he was prejudiced by an allegedly improper jury
instruction regarding motive; (4) whether the trial court erred by not giving an
involuntary manslaughter instruction to the jury; (5) whether certain jury
instructions were ambiguous; (6) whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying a motion for mistrial; and (7) whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying a motion for judgment on the evidence. See Appellant’s
Am. App. pp. 37–43.
[5] At the post-conviction hearing on January 10, 2017, the post-conviction court
made the following findings:
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Petitioner elected not to introduce any evidence other than the
transcript of his criminal trial. The State argued that Petitioner’s
petition should be barred by laches or by waiver.
“The purpose of a petition for post-conviction relief is to raise
issues unknown or unavailable to a defendant at the time of the
original trial and appeal. When an issue is known and available
but not raised on direct appeal, it is waived for post-conviction
proceedings.”
Petitioner has elected not to present any evidence as to whether
any of his allegations are result of newly found evidence or that
which was not available to him at the time of trial or appeal.
However, the Court, having read all the accusations of error in
his amended petition, including 8(a), 8(b), 9(a), 10(a), 10(b),
11(a), 11(b), 12(a), 12(b), 13(a), 13(b), 14(a), and 14(b), finds that
nothing in those allegations indicate that the Petitioner or his
counsel were not aware of these matters at the time of the trial or
the appeal.
Therefore, as all of the issues presented in Petitioner’s amended
post-conviction relief petition were known to the Petitioner at the
time of his trial, or at the time of his original appeal, these issues
have been waived.
Accordingly, Petitioner’s post-conviction relief petition should be
DENIED.
Id. at 46. (internal citations omitted). Shelly now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
[6] The post-conviction petitioner bears the burden of establishing grounds for
relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Willoughby v. State, 792 N.E.2d 560,
562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. When a petitioner appeals the denial of a
petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one
appealing from a negative judgment. Id. On appeal, we neither reweigh
evidence nor judge the credibility of witness. Id. Therefore, to prevail, Shelly
must show that the evidence, as a whole, leads unerringly and unmistakably to
a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Id.
[7] Where, as here, the post-conviction court made specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6), we
must determine if the court’s findings are sufficient to support its judgment.
Graham v. State, 941 N.E.2d 1091, 1096 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d on reh’g, 947
N.E.2d 962. Although we do not defer to the post-conviction court’s legal
conclusions, we review the post-conviction court’s factual findings for clear
error. Id. Accordingly, we will consider only the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences flowing therefrom that support the post-conviction court’s
decision. Id.
[8] “It is . . . well-settled that, because a post-conviction relief proceeding is not a
substitute for direct appeal but rather a process for raising issues unknown or
not available at trial, an issue known and available but not raised on direct
appeal may not be raised in post-conviction proceedings.” See Mills v. State, 868
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N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Ind.
2004)). The issues Shelly raises in his petition for post-conviction relief, which
are listed above, were known and available on direct appeal.1
[9] Shelly did not present any evidence, but merely asked the post-conviction court
to take notice of the trial transcript and his motion and make a decision based
on the court’s review of the transcript. See PCR Tr. p. 3. Post-conviction
proceedings are not “super appeals” through which convicted persons can raise
issues they failed to raise at trial or on direct appeal. McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d
389, 391 (Ind. 2002), reh’g denied. These issues were available at the time of
Shelly’s direct appeal, and therefore, may not be raised in post-conviction
proceedings. See Mills, 868 N.E.2d at 452; Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b)
(stating post-conviction relief “is not a substitute for a direct appeal from the
conviction and/or sentence”).
[10] For these reasons, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err in
denying Shelly post-conviction relief.
[11] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and May, J., concur.
1
Shelly argues that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his relief based on the doctrine of laches.
However, it is obvious on the face of the trial court’s judgment that the court did not rely on laches when it
denied Shelly’s petition.
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