Kayla Owens v. Amanda Caudillo and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Aug 02 2018, 8:55 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case. CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David W. Masse STATE FARM MUTUAL
Merrillville, Indiana AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO.
Crystal G. Rowe
Alyssa C.B. Cochran
Kightlinger & Gray, LLP
New Albany, Indiana
John H. Halstead
Kightlinger & Gray, LLP
Merrillville, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kayla Owens, August 2, 2018
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
45A05-1712-CT-2934
v. Appeal from the Lake Superior
Court
Amanda Caudillo and State The Honorable William E. Davis,
Farm Mutual Automobile Judge
Insurance Co., Trial Court Cause No.
Appellees-Defendants. 45D05-1304-CT-65
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Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] On May 13, 2011, Kayla Owens was injured when her vehicle was rear-ended
by a vehicle driven by Amanda Caudillo. She subsequently filed suit alleging
negligence against Caudillo and asserting a claim for uninsured motorist
benefits against State Farm. A four-day jury trial commenced on October 30,
2017. After the parties rested their cases, State Farm moved for judgment on
the evidence. The trial court took State Farm’s motion under advisement. The
trial court subsequently granted State Farm’s motion for judgment on the
evidence and alternative motion for judgment on the verdict. The trial court
then entered judgment against Caudillo and in favor of State Farm. Owens
challenges the trial court’s order granting judgment in favor of State Farm. We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] At approximately 7:50 p.m. on May 13, 2011, Owens was stopped at a red light
in the northbound lane of Kennedy Avenue in Highland when her vehicle was
rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Caudillo. Owens was injured as a result of
the impact. She subsequently filed suit alleging negligence against Caudillo and
asserting a claim for uninsured motorist benefits against her insurance provider,
State Farm.
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[3] A four-day jury trial commenced on October 30, 2017. At some point, the trial
court found against Caudillo on the issue of liability and reserved the issue of
damages for the jury. After the parties rested their cases, State Farm moved for
judgment on the evidence. Owens then moved for the trial court to reopen the
evidence so she could question a State Farm representative about the terms of
her insurance contract. The trial court denied Owens’s motion without giving
State Farm the opportunity to respond to Owens’s request.
[4] On November 2, 2017, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Owens and
against Caudillo in the amount of $170,000. The jury did not return any verdict
relating to State Farm. The parties agreed, however, that Owens’s claims
against State Farm could likely be resolved by the trial court’s ruling on State
Farm’s motion for judgment on the evidence.
[5] The parties subsequently submitted briefing on State Farm’s motion. State
Farm filed an alternative motion for judgment on the jury’s verdict. On
November 21, 2017, the trial court granted State Farm’s motions. The trial
court entered final judgment in favor of State Farm on Owens’s claim for
uninsured motorist benefits and entered judgment against Caudillo for
$170,000.
Discussion and Decision
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I. Owens’s Motion to Reopen the Evidence
[6] Owens contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion
to reopen the evidence. “Whether to grant a party’s motion to reopen his case
after having rested is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge.” Flynn v. State, 497 N.E.2d 912, 914 (Ind. 1986). “The decision will be
set aside only when it appears that this discretion has been abused.” Id.
[7] Owens’s claims against State Farm included only the request to recover
uninsured motorist benefits. When seeking to recover under an uninsured
motorist provision, “the insured must prove that he is legally entitled to recover
damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.” Michael v.
Wolfe, 737 N.E.2d 820, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “Generally, this means that
the insured must establish the fault of the tortfeasor, the fact that there is no
insurance policy covering the motorist or motor vehicle, and resulting
damages.” Id.
[8] After both parties rested, State Farm moved for judgment on the evidence
claiming that Owens failed to prove all of the essential elements of her claim.
Owens then moved to reopen the case “for three or four brief questions from
State Farm’s corporate representative in order to show … that this is an
uninsured motorist’s claim and that there is a contract of insurance.” Tr. Vol.
II, pp. 66–67. In requesting that the trial court reopen the evidence, Owens
indicated that she sought only to question the State Farm representative about
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facts relevant to prove that her insurance contract with State Farm included
uninsured motorist benefits.
[9] It is important to note that even if the trial court had allowed Owens to reopen
the evidence in order to ask the State Farm representative the desired questions
about the terms of her policy, Owens would still have failed to prove all of the
essential elements of her claim for uninsured motorist benefits. In attempting to
show on appeal that she did prove all essential elements of her claim, Owens
points to her complaint against Caudillo in which she alleges that Caudillo was
uninsured.1 Since Caudillo was defaulted, Owens argues that we should
consider that fact as admitted by Caudillo. However, even if we were to do so,
Owens points to nothing in the record that proves that the vehicle itself was not
covered by some insurance policy. Further, Owens did not indicate that she
wanted to reopen the case to prove this fact. Such a fact is an essential element
that must be proved in order to recover under an uninsured motorist provision.
See Michael, 737 N.E.2d at 823 (providing that “to recover on an uninsured
motorist claim, the insured must prove that there is no policy applicable to the
vehicle driven by the tortfeasor”). Given that Owens still would have failed to
prove an essential element of her claim against State Farm if the trial court had
1
Owens’s complaint actually alleges that “Defendant, Mary Joseph, was uninsured at the time of the
accident which is the subject matter of this complaint.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 26. We will assume this
was a typographical error as no one named “Mary Joseph” was named as a defendant in the underlying
lawsuit, and Owens refers to this allegation as if it referred to Caudillo.
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granted her request to reopen the evidence, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in this regard.
II. State Farm’s Motion for Judgment on the Evidence
[10] Owens also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting State
Farm’s motion for judgment on the evidence.
The purpose of a motion for judgment on the evidence is to test
the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon review of a trial court’s
ruling on a motion for judgment on the evidence, we apply the
same standard as the trial court, considering only the evidence
and reasonable inferences most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Judgment may be entered only if there is no substantial
evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom to
support an essential element of the claim.
Court View Ctr., L.L.C. v. Witt, 753 N.E.2d 75, 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (internal
citation and quotations omitted). “‘If evidence fails to create a reasonable
inference of an ultimate fact, but merely leaves the possibility of its existence
open for surmise, conjecture or speculation, then there is no evidence of
probative value as to that ultimate fact and a Trial Rule 50 motion should be
granted.’” Id. at 81 (quoting Pearson v. 1st Nat’l Bank of Martinsville, 408 N.E.2d
166, 171 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)).
[11] As we discussed above, in order to successfully raise a claim for uninsured
motorist benefits, an insured “must establish the fault of the tortfeasor, the fact
that there is no insurance policy covering the motorist or motor vehicle, and
resulting damages.” Michael, 737 N.E.2d at 822 (emphasis added). Relying on
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the allegation set forth in her complaint that Caudillo was uninsured at the time
of the accident, Owens claims that she made a prima facie showing of each of
these facts. However, as we noted above, Owens points to nothing in the
record that proves that the vehicle itself was not covered by some insurance
policy. As such, even assuming that Owens’s allegation regarding to Caudillo
was admitted, her claim still fails as she presented no evidence relating to the
vehicle Caudillo was driving. We conclude that State Farm was entitled to
judgment on the evidence as Owens failed to prove one of the essential
elements of her claim against State Farm. The trial court, therefore, did not
abuse its discretion in granting State Farm’s motion and properly entered
judgment in State Farm’s favor.2
[12] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Kirsch, J., concurs.
Baker, J., dissents with opinion.
2
Because we conclude that the trial court properly entered judgment in State Farm’s favor after granting its
motion for judgment on the evidence, we need not consider the propriety of the trial court’s ruling on State
Farm’s alternative motion for judgment on the verdict.
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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kayla Owens, Court of Appeals Case No.
45A05-1712-CT-2934
Appellant-Plaintiff,
v.
Amanda Caudillo and State
Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.,
Appellees-Defendants
Baker, Judge, dissenting.
[13] I respectfully dissent, as I believe that this result sanctions the type of “gotcha”
litigation I so abhor. The record establishes that Caudillo was at fault, Caudillo
was uninsured, and Owens was damaged as a result of Caudillo’s negligence.
The majority affirms based on Owens’s failure to establish that, in addition to
Caudillo herself, Caudillo’s vehicle was uninsured.
[14] Owens’s complaint alleged that when Caudillo caused the accident, she was
driving her own vehicle. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 25. It further alleged that
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Caudillo was uninsured. Id. at 26. In my view, the default judgment against
Caudillo does, in fact, establish a prima facie case that both Caudillo herself
and her vehicle were uninsured. Therefore, I believe that the trial court erred by
granting State Farm’s judgment on the evidence.
[15] I also believe that the trial court erred by denying Owens’s motion to reopen the
evidence, given that Owens’s counsel inadvertently rested and the reopening of
evidence would have caused no prejudice to State Farm, nor would it have
resulted in confusion or inconvenience to the trial court or the jury, which was
still empaneled.
[16] The result in this case amounts to an unearned windfall to State Farm based on
an inadvertent attorney error. I do not believe we should approve of such
“gotcha” litigation tactics. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
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