Marvin J. Perkins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  •       MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                                FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                             Oct 24 2018, 5:51 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                             CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                      Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    P. Stephen Miller                                        Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Fort Wayne, Indiana                                      Attorney General of Indiana
    Laura R. Anderson
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Marvin J. Perkins,                                       October 24, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-692
    v.                                               Appeal from the Allen Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Frances C. Gull,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    02D04-1607-CM-2633
    Shepard, Senior Judge.
    [1]   Marvin Perkins borrowed a vehicle and did not return it. He pleaded guilty to
    Class A misdemeanor unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle and was sentenced
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-692 | October 24, 2018                     Page 1 of 6
    to one year executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). He
    appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   The facts most favorable to the judgment are that on July 4, 2016, Gregory Hale
    allowed Perkins to borrow his van, but Perkins did not return it. At some point,
    the vehicle was listed on the police department’s “hotsheet,” and officers were
    informed that Perkins was the individual who took the van. Appellant’s App.
    p. 9. On July 7, 2016, Perkins was seen driving the van by a Fort Wayne police
    officer. He was arrested and charged with unauthorized entry of a motor
    1
    vehicle as a Class A misdemeanor.
    [3]   On October 10, 2017, Perkins entered into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty
    2
    as charged. A hearing was held, following which the guilty plea was taken
    under advisement, and Perkins was placed in the drug court diversion program.
    Per the participation agreement, if Perkins successfully completed the program,
    the State would agree to request dismissal of the charges against him.
    [4]   On January 22, 2018, a verified petition to terminate the drug court program
    participation was filed, alleging that Perkins violated the terms of the
    1
    
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2
    .7 (2014). Perkins also was charged with driving while suspended, a traffic infraction,
    which was later dismissed and is not at issue on appeal.
    2
    He also pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony possession of cocaine, which was charged under a separate cause
    number. The matter is not at issue on appeal.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-692 | October 24, 2018                   Page 2 of 6
    participation agreement. That same day, Perkins withdrew from drug court.
    On February 22, 2018, the trial court found Perkins guilty, based on his earlier
    plea, and entered a conviction for unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle, as a
    Class A misdemeanor. It sentenced him to one year executed in the DOC.
    Issue
    [5]   The sole issue Perkins raises on appeal is whether the trial court abused its
    discretion by imposing a one-year executed sentence.
    Discussion and Decision
    [6]   Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, and as
    long as a sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for
    an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
     (Ind. 2007), clarified
    on reh’g, 
    875 N.E.2d 218
    . An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s
    decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
    before it. 
    Id.
     A trial court may abuse its discretion by failing to enter a
    sentencing statement, entering findings of aggravating and mitigating factors
    unsupported by the record, omitting factors clearly supported by the record and
    advanced for consideration, or giving reasons that are improper as a matter of
    law. 
    Id.
    [7]   Unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle is a Class B misdemeanor offense that
    can be charged as a Class A misdemeanor under certain circumstances. See
    
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2
    .7(d), -(e). Perkins contends that he pleaded guilty to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-692 | October 24, 2018   Page 3 of 6
    unauthorized entry as a Class B misdemeanor, not as a Class A misdemeanor
    and that, because the sentence for a Class B misdemeanor may not exceed 180
    days, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence of one year.
    See 
    Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2
    , -3. According to Perkins, the sentence imposed by
    the trial court was illegal and, thus, constituted fundamental error. See Ben-
    Yisrayl v. State, 
    908 N.E.2d 1223
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (any sentence contrary to,
    or violative of, penalty mandated by applicable statute is an illegal sentence,
    and a sentence that exceeds statutory authority is fundamental error and subject
    to correction at any time), trans. denied. We conclude that the trial court did not
    exceed its authority by imposing a one-year sentence, and that fundamental
    error did not occur.
    [8]   Perkins was charged with unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle as a Class A
    misdemeanor. See 
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2
    .7. His charging information read in
    relevant part:
    UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY OF A MOTOR VEHICLE
    I.C. 35-43-4-2.7
    3543427dMA
    . . . On or about the 7th day of July, 2016, said Defendant,
    having no contractual interest in a motor vehicle, to wit: Maroon
    2004 Chevy Venture Van owned by, [sic] Gregory Hale, did enter
    said vehicle, knowing that said Defendant did not have the
    permission of an owner, a lessee, or an authorized operator of
    said vehicle.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-692 | October 24, 2018   Page 4 of 6
    Appellant’s App. p. 10. The “3543427dMA” was a handwritten notation that
    seemed to indicate that Perkins was charged with the offense as a Class A
    misdemeanor. 
    Id.
    [9]    At his initial hearing, Perkins was told that he was charged with unauthorized
    entry as a Class A misdemeanor. At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court told
    Perkins that he was pleading guilty to unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle, a
    Class A misdemeanor. The trial court asked Perkins if he understood the
    charge to which he pleaded guilty, and Perkins replied: “Yes, I do.” Tr. p. 10.
    The court reiterated, “You’re pleading guilty to a . . . [C]lass ‘A’
    misdemeanor,” and Perkins replied, “Yes sir.” 
    Id.
     The court explained that a
    Class A misdemeanor “carries a penalty of up to one (1) year in jail . . . .” 
    Id.
    The court asked Perkins, “[H]ow do you plead to count I, unauthorized entry
    of a motor vehicle, a [C]lass ‘A’ misdemeanor?” 
    Id. at 12
    . Perkins stated,
    “Guilty.” 
    Id.
    [10]   The trial court made it clear to Perkins that he was pleading guilty to a Class A
    misdemeanor and that he could be sentenced to up to one year. Perkins’
    argument to the contrary fails. His sentence was not illegal, no fundamental
    error occurred, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing.
    Conclusion
    [11]   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    [12]   Affirmed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-692 | October 24, 2018   Page 5 of 6
    Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-692 | October 24, 2018   Page 6 of 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18A-CR-692

Filed Date: 10/24/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/24/2018