S.A.W. v. K.L.W. (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                        FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                     Oct 01 2019, 6:17 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                              Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                        and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    Bryan L. Ciyou                                           Jonathan R. Deenik
    Ciyou & Dixon, P.C.                                      Deenik Lowe, LLC
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    Greenwood, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    S.A.W.,                                                  October 1, 2019
    Appellant-Petitioner,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-DR-1002
    v.                                               Appeal from the Henry Circuit
    Court
    K.L.W.,                                                  The Honorable Bob A. Witham,
    Appellee-Respondent.                                     Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    33C01-1510-DR-214
    Bailey, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1002 | October 1, 2019                   Page 1 of 15
    Case Summary
    [1]   Scott Weaver (“Father”) appeals the trial court order, following an evidentiary
    hearing, granting Kelli L. Weaver’s (“Mother”) request to relocate with their
    child, L.W. (“Child”), and denying Father’s motion to modify child custody,
    parenting time, and child support. Father raises two issues which we
    consolidate and restate as whether the trial court clearly erred by granting
    Mother’s request to relocate with Child and denying Father’s motion to modify
    custody without sufficient evidence on all relevant statutory factors.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   The parties were married on July 15, 2006, and Child was born on March 10,
    2011. On October 19, 2015, Father filed a petition for dissolution of marriage.
    The parties entered into a settlement agreement which was approved by the trial
    court and incorporated into a decree of dissolution on September 27, 2016.
    Under the agreed settlement, the parties shared joint legal custody of Child,
    Mother had physical custody of Child, and Father had parenting time as the
    parties agreed or no less than every Tuesday and Thursday evening for four
    hours and every other weekend. Both parties resided in Henry County,
    Indiana.
    [4]   On March 12, 2018, Mother filed her notice of intent to move residence in
    which she gave notice to Father and the trial court that she intended to move
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1002 | October 1, 2019   Page 2 of 15
    with Child on or around June 2018 to Putnam or Clay County, Indiana. The
    notice stated “[t]he reason for the permanent relocation include[s] better job
    opportunities for myself and my fiancé.” App. Vol. II at 62. The notice further
    stated that Mother would “make every effort to keep up on the current
    parenting time but the distance and time in school may affect the parenting
    time.” 
    Id. Mother further
    indicated she was “willing to go a minimum of half
    the distance of driving and meet at a prearranged location.” 
    Id. [5] On
    May 4, 2018, Father filed his objection to Mother’s relocation with Child
    and a motion to modify custody, parenting time, and child support. Father also
    sought an order enjoining the parties from moving Child pending a decision of
    the court, and, on May 7, the court granted that motion and referred the matter
    to mediation.
    [6]   On May 17, Mother filed an amended notice of intent to move residence in
    which she informed the Court that she would be relocating to an address in
    Cloverdale, Putnam County, on June 15, 2018. Mother stated the reasons for
    relocation were that “she is engaged, planning to get remarried, graduating
    from college[,] and has job opportunities [near the new location] that far exceed
    the opportunities that exist in the current area [where she lives].” 
    Id. at 74.
    Mother also stated that “the minor child needs additional support in school
    which can better be supplied by the school district in which Mother plans to
    relocate.” 
    Id. at 74-75.
    On May 18, Father filed his amended objection to
    relocation and motion to modify custody, parenting time, and child support.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1002 | October 1, 2019   Page 3 of 15
    [7]   On June 13, 2018, the parties filed their “Agreed Entry Regarding [Mother’s]
    Temporary Relocation,” in which they agreed Mother could relocate herself
    and Child to an address in Knightstown, Henry County, in June of 2018, and
    Father’s parenting time would remain unchanged, “pending a full evidentiary
    hearing in this matter on her relocation.” 
    Id. at 5,
    81. The trial court approved
    the Agreed Entry on the same date.
    [8]   On December 11, 2018, following an unsuccessful mediation, the trial court
    held an evidentiary hearing on the pending motions. At the hearing, Mother
    testified that she and Child still lived in Henry County, and Child still attended
    Tri Elementary, the Henry County school he had always attended. Mother
    testified she and Child spent the night at her fiancé’s house in Cloverdale every
    other weekend. However, Mother testified she wished to move with Child to
    Cloverdale in Putnam County because her fiancé lives there, her parents and
    siblings live close to there, and her and her fiancé’s job opportunities are better
    there. Specifically as to the latter reason, Mother testified that, since she had
    obtained her Bachelor’s degree in healthcare administration in May, she was
    now “eligible for a promotion as a practice manager or an executive director
    position” in her field “in the Cloverdale area.” Tr. at 7-8. Mother testified that
    the “promotion” position would pay “[c]lose to forty-five thousand dollars a
    year,” but she had been unable to find such a high paying similar position in the
    Henry County area. 
    Id. at 8.
    Mother was applying for jobs near Cloverdale.
    
    Id. at 42,
    44. Mother also testified that her fiancé was making ten dollars an
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1002 | October 1, 2019   Page 4 of 15
    hour more at his job near Cloverdale than at the job he had previously held in
    Henry County.
    [9]    Mother testified that Child’s Henry County school “labeled him as autistic”
    based on some behavioral issues, and Child has had an Individualized
    Education Plan (IEP) since he was in kindergarten. 
    Id. at 16.
    Child’s IEP
    entitles him to “extra services” at school. 
    Id. Mother testified
    that Central
    Elementary, the school Child would attend in Putnam County, is able to
    provide Child services pursuant to his IEP. Mother also admitted into
    evidence, without objection, documents from the Indiana Department of
    Education stating that Central Elementary school had a “grade” from the State
    of “B,” while Tri Elementary had a “grade” of “D.” 
    Id. at 23-24;
    Ex. at 110-
    114.
    [10]   Mother testified that Child does not have many friends at his school in Henry
    County, but he could have opportunities to regularly interact with his cousins—
    with whom he is “close”—if he lived in Cloverdale. 
    Id. at 34.
    Mother also
    testified that if Child was living in Cloverdale, he would be closer to “Brain
    Balance,” a program that helps Child with “processing … what is going on.”
    
    Id. at 13.
    Mother testified that Child’s “emotional level” and behavior has
    improved since he has been attending sessions at Brain Balance, but that
    program is not located near Henry County. 
    Id. at 19.
    [11]   Mother testified that Cloverdale is one and a half hours’ drive from where
    Father lives in Henry County, and that she would be willing to meet Father half
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1002 | October 1, 2019   Page 5 of 15
    way in between their homes to facilitate Father’s weekend parenting times. She
    testified that she would be willing to take Child one way to Father in Henry
    County on his weekday parenting time. Father testified that the only basis for
    his request to modify custody was Mother’s relocation, but that he and Mother
    had worked well and flexibly together regarding parenting time in the past.
    Father further testified that he did not believe Mother, by relocating,
    “malicious[ly] inten[ded]” to minimize his parenting time with Child. 
    Id. at 122.
    We will provide additional facts as necessary.
    [12]   On April 5, 2019, the court issued its order granting Mother’s request to
    relocate with Child at the conclusion of the 2018-19 school year and ordering
    that Mother continued to have primary physical custody and Father continued
    to have parenting time “as the parties can agree.” 
    Id. at 8.
    The court ordered
    that Father shall have parenting time according to the Indiana Parenting Time
    Guidelines, Subsection II, subpart D,1 in the event the parties cannot agree.
    Father now appeals.
    1
    Ind. Parenting Time Guideline II (D) provides that “regular parenting time” shall include alternating
    weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. and one evening per week for a period of up to
    four hours.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1002 | October 1, 2019                Page 6 of 15
    Discussion and Decision
    Standard of Review
    [13]   Neither party requested special findings, and the trial court did not make any
    such findings sua sponte. See Ind. Trial Rule 52.2 When the trial court has not
    made findings or conclusions, we review its decision as a general judgment and,
    without reweighing evidence or considering witness credibility,
    affirm if sustainable upon any theory consistent with the
    evidence. Judgments in custody matters typically turn on
    essentially factual determinations and will be set aside only when
    they are clearly erroneous. We will not substitute our own
    judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial
    court’s judgment.
    Baxendale v. Raich, 
    878 N.E.2d 1252
    , 1257-58 (Ind. 2008) (citations and
    quotations omitted); see also 
    H.H., 3 N.E.3d at 37
    (“[W]hen reviewing a
    determination regarding the best interests of a child for relocation purposes, we
    ‘view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision and
    defer to the trial court’s weighing of the evidence.’” (quoting T.L. v. J.L., 
    950 N.E.2d 779
    , 788–89 (Ind.Ct.App.2011))).
    2
    Nor was the trial court required to do so. “[W]hile the trial court is to consider all relevant factors [in
    determining whether relocation is in the Child’s best interest], the trial is not necessarily required to make
    specific findings on each factor unless requested to do so by the parties.” H.H. v. A.A., 
    3 N.E.3d 30
    , 37 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2014); see also In re Marriage of Harpenau, 
    17 N.E.3d 342
    , 347 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation
    omitted) (“In modifying custody, the trial court is not required to issue special findings unless requested by a
    party.”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1002 | October 1, 2019                     Page 7 of 15
    [14]   Moreover,
    there is a longstanding policy in our State that appellate courts
    should defer to the determinations of the trial courts in family
    law matters. Best v. Best, 
    941 N.E.2d 499
    , 502 (Ind. 2011). We
    accord this deference because trial courts directly interact with
    the parties and are thus in a superior position “to assess
    credibility and character through both factual testimony and
    intuitive discernment.” 
    Id. Conversely, “appellate
    courts ‘are in
    a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record[ ] and
    conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed
    their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from
    the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of
    the evidence.’” D.C. [v. J.A.C.], 977 N.E.2d [951,] 956–57 [(Ind.
    2012)] (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 
    770 N.E.2d 304
    , 307 (Ind. 2002)).
    Gold v. Weather, 
    14 N.E.3d 836
    , 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
    Relocation of Custodial Parent
    [15]   Indiana Code Sections 31-17-2.2-0.5 through 31-17-2.2-6 govern the proposed
    relocation of a custodial parent. A parent intending to relocate with a child
    must file notice of that intention, Ind. Code § 31-17-2.2-1, and the
    nonrelocating parent must file a response in which he or she may object to the
    relocation and file a motion to modify custody, I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1, -5.
    Following an objection to relocation and corresponding motion to modify
    custody, the relocating parent must prove “that the proposed relocation is made
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1002 | October 1, 2019   Page 8 of 15
    in good faith and for a legitimate purpose.” I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(c).3 If the
    relocating parent meets that burden of proof, “the burden shifts to the
    nonrelocating parent to show that the proposed relocation is not in the best
    interest of the child.” I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(d).4
    [16]   In determining whether to permit relocation of the child or, instead, modify
    custody, the trial court must take into account the following:
    (1) The distance involved in the proposed change of residence.
    (2) The hardship and expense involved for the nonrelocating
    individual to exercise parenting time....
    (3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the
    nonrelocating individual and the child through suitable parenting
    time ... including consideration of the financial circumstances of
    the parties.
    (4) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct by the
    relocating individual, including actions by the relocating
    individual to either promote or thwart a nonrelocating
    individual's contact with the child.
    (5) The reasons provided by the:
    3
    Effective July 1, 2019, this provision is contained in subsection (e) of Indiana Code Section 31-17-2.2-5.
    P.L. 186-2019, SEC. 14.
    4
    Effective July 1, 2019, this provision is contained in subsection (f) of Indiana Code Section 31-17-2.2-5. 
    Id. Court of
    Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1002 | October 1, 2019                       Page 9 of 15
    (A) relocating individual for seeking relocation; and
    (B) nonrelocating parent for opposing the relocation of the
    child.
    (6) Other factors affecting the best interest of the child.
    I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(b). The “other factors affecting the best interest of the child”
    include those factors set forth for custody determinations and modifications
    under Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-8.5 
    Baxendale, 878 N.E.2d at 1257
    .
    Evidence of Good Faith and Legitimate Reason
    [17]   To prove good faith and a legitimate reason for relocation, the relocating parent
    must “demonstrate an objective basis—that is, more than a mere pretext—for
    relocating.” 
    Gold, 14 N.E.3d at 842
    (quotation and citation omitted). Good
    faith and legitimate reasons for relocation include moving to live closer to
    family members, for financial reasons, and for employment opportunities. Id.;
    see also, e.g., 
    H.H., 3 N.E.3d at 36
    (concluding Mother’s desire to relocate in
    order to “live and create a family life with” her current husband was “made in
    good faith and for a legitimate purpose”); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 
    7 N.E.3d 316
    , 320-21
    5
    Those factors include: (1) the age and sex of the child; (2) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents; (3)
    the wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14)
    years of age; (4) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parent or parents, the child’s
    sibling, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests; (5) the child’s adjustment
    to the child’s home, school, and community; (6) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
    (7) evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent; and (8) evidence that the child has
    been cared for by a de facto custodian. I.C. § 31-17-2-8.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1002 | October 1, 2019                      Page 10 of 15
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding Mother’s desire to relocate with her fiancé to a
    larger house to accommodate an expanding family and to “a better school
    district” was “a good faith and legitimate reason for moving”). And, although
    the trial court must consider the distance of the proposed relocation and the
    hardships and expense for the nonrelocating parent to exercise parenting time,
    an inconvenience caused by the relocation—even if it is out of state—does not
    alone warrant custody modification and denial of the request to relocate.
    Fridley v. Fridley, 
    748 N.E.2d 939
    , 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Hanks v.
    Arnold, 
    674 N.E.2d 1005
    , 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)).
    [18]   Here, the evidence established that Mother wished to relocate approximately an
    hour and a half away from Father’s residence for the legitimate purposes of
    having better job opportunities, moving Child to a better school district, being
    closer to her family, and consolidating her family with her fiancé’s family in
    one location. There was also substantial evidence that Mother did not have a
    pattern of attempting to limit Father’s contact with Child; rather, Father
    testified that Mother “work[ed] well” with him and was “flexible” with him
    regarding parenting time. Tr. at 89. Nor was there any evidence of bad faith on
    Mother’s part; Father testified that he did not believe she wished to relocate in
    order to limit his parenting time. 
    Id. at 122.
    Thus, the record evidence
    supported the trial court’s conclusion that the request for relocation was made
    in good faith and for legitimate reasons. Father’s contention to the contrary is a
    request that we reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the
    trial court, which we will not do. 
    Baxendale, 878 N.E.2d at 1257
    -58.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1002 | October 1, 2019   Page 11 of 15
    Evidence of Best Interest of Child
    [19]   As Mother met her burden of proving her wish to move was made in good faith
    and for legitimate reasons, the burden shifted to Father to prove that the move
    would not be in Child’s best interest. To meet that burden, Father was required
    to present evidence on each factor enumerated in Indiana Code Section 31-17-
    2.2-1(b). 
    Harpenau, 17 N.E.3d at 347
    . The driving distance between Father’s
    residence and Mother’s proposed new residence was one and a half hours.
    Mother testified she was willing to drive Child half way between the two
    locations to facilitate parenting time. And, although the evidence indicated that
    Father would have to travel forty-five minutes each way to exercise his
    parenting time, Father presented no evidence that he was unable to do so. The
    evidence indicates that the hardship and expense caused by the distance of the
    relocation would not be extreme. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(b)(1) and (2); cf., e.g., H.S.
    v. S.K. (In re paternity of X.A.S.), 
    928 N.E.2d 222
    , 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
    (finding, in a case permitting relocation, that hardship and expense caused by
    relocation were extreme because nonrelocating parent would have to travel by
    plane and pay for lodging out of state to visit child), trans denied.
    [20]   Although Father presented evidence indicating that exercising his parenting
    time would be more inconvenient if Mother relocated, he provided no evidence
    that he would not be able to preserve his relationship with Child. I.C. § 31-17-
    2.2-1(b)(3). Rather, the evidence established that—despite the inconvenience of
    a longer drive time—Father could still have parenting time with Child during
    the weekdays, every other weekend, and at all other times he had previously
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1002 | October 1, 2019   Page 12 of 15
    had such time. And the parties do not dispute that Mother’s “pattern of
    conduct” regarding Father’s parenting time was to promote contact with Child,
    rather than thwart it. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(b)(4).
    [21]   As noted above, Mother provided evidence that her reasons for relocating were
    that she had better job opportunities in the new location, and the new location
    had a better school district and was closer to her fiancé, her parents, and her
    siblings and their children. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(b)(5)(A). Father presented
    evidence that he opposed the relocation because it would require him to spend
    more time in the car to facilitate parenting time and Child would see less of his
    friends and relatives, such as his half-siblings. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(b)(5)(B).
    However, Father presented no evidence that Child’s friends and relatives could
    not see Child every other weekend at Father’s house as they always had or
    come with Father to see Child during weekdays.
    [22]   Father also testified that he believed the relocation was not in Child’s best
    interest because he opined that Child would not “fit in very well” at a new
    school, Tr. at 102, and it would be “too much for [Child]” to break up his
    current routine, 
    id. at 103.
    However, Father presented no evidence to support
    those assertions. Rather, the evidence indicated that, if Child relocated, he
    would attend a good school that could accommodate his needs, and he would
    have consistent contact with cousins around his age, with whom he was close.
    The evidence also showed that Child’s behavior had improved recently, despite
    his recent move within Henry County and his alternating weekend stays with
    Mother and her fiancé’s family in Putnam County. Thus, Father did not
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1002 | October 1, 2019   Page 13 of 15
    present sufficient evidence that his reasons for opposing the relocation
    supported denial of relocation and modification of custody. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-
    1(b)(5)(B).
    [23]   And the record evidence supported the trial court’s determination that
    relocation was otherwise in Child’s best interest. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(b)(6); I.C. §
    31-17-2-8. The evidence indicated that Child, who was age seven, was loved
    and cared for by both parents, but that Mother was the primary caregiver.
    Child has a close relationship with his relatives on Father’s side, but he is also
    close with his maternal cousins. Although Child had some behavioral issues,
    the evidence showed that Mother had obtained treatment for Child at a place
    close to the proposed new residence and that Child’s behavioral issues were
    improving. Although Child has some special needs at school, the evidence
    indicated that Child would be relocated in a better school district that could also
    accommodate his needs. And the evidence indicated that Child was adjusting
    to recent changes in his routine without additional behavioral problems.
    [24]   Father failed to carry his burden of proving that relocation was not in Child’s
    best interest. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment,
    as we must, the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that relocation
    was in Child’s best interest. 
    H.H., 3 N.E.3d at 37
    .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1002 | October 1, 2019   Page 14 of 15
    Conclusion
    [25]   Considering the evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgment and the
    reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, we hold there was evidence in the
    record to support the trial court’s decision to grant Mother’s request to relocate
    and deny Father’s motion to modify custody. Father essentially requests that
    we reweigh the evidence in his favor, which we cannot do. The judgment of
    the trial court was not clearly erroneous.
    [26]   Affirmed.
    Najam, J., and May, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1002 | October 1, 2019   Page 15 of 15