Jimmy E. Crase v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Oct 04 2019, 6:28 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
James H. Voyles, Jr. F. Aaron Negangard
Tyler D. Helmond Chief Deputy Attorney General of
Voyles Vaiana Lukemeyer Baldwin & Indiana
Webb
Indianapolis, Indiana Sierra A. Murray
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jimmy E. Crase, October 4, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-2423
v. Appeal from the Shelby Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Charles D.
Appellee-Plaintiff. O’Connor, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
73C01-1607-FA-2
Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2423 | October 4, 2019 Page 1 of 5
Case Summary
[1] After being accused of and charged with molesting his step-granddaughters, on
February 10, 2018, Jimmy E. Crase pled guilty to two counts of Class B felony
child molestation. Pursuant to the terms of his guilty plea, Crase agreed that he
would be classified as a credit restricted felon. The trial court accepted Crase’s
guilty plea and sentenced him in accordance with its terms. On appeal, Crase
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his classification as a credit
restricted felon. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] M.D., who was born in 2002, and M.S., who was born in 1999, are Crase’s
step-granddaughters. Crase molested M.D. and M.S. “on numerous occasions”
between January of 2007 and December of 2010. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p.
19. On July 12, 2016, the State charged Crase with two counts of Class A
felony child molesting. On February 10, 2018, Crase pled guilty to two counts
of the lesser-included offense of Class B felony child molesting. The plea
agreement explicitly stated that Crase and the State “agree that [Crase] shall be
a credit restricted felon.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 54, 58.
[3] During Crase’s guilty plea hearing, the State provided a factual basis, stating
that if the matter proceeding to trial, M.D. and M.S. would testify that on a
number of occasions between January of 2007 and December of 2010, they
visited Crase and he molested them by placing his hand on or in their vaginas.
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Crase “admit[ted] and agree[d]” that he “acted as described” in the factual
basis. Tr. p. 13. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and, on July 31,
2018, sentenced Crase to an aggregate eighteen-year sentence with eight years
executed in the Department of Correction, two years served on home detention,
and eight years suspended to probation. The trial court also found, pursuant to
the terms of the plea agreement, that Crase would be classified as a credit
restricted felon.
Discussion and Decision
[4] Indiana courts “have long recognized that a defendant may forgo a trial and
plead guilty.” Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ind. 1996). “One
consequence of pleading guilty is restriction of the ability to challenge the
conviction on direct appeal.” Id. In comparing plea agreements to settlements
in civil cases, the Indiana Supreme Court indicated that “the plea as a legal act
brings to a close the dispute between the parties, much as settling civil parties
do by submitting an agreed judgment. To permit appeal by settling parties
would, of course, make settlements difficult to achieve in any litigation.” Id. at
396.
[5] Plea agreements “are in the nature of contracts entered into between the
defendant and the State.” Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2004). As the
Indiana Supreme Court has explained:
[A] plea agreement is contractual in nature, binding the
defendant, the state and the trial court. The prosecutor and the
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defendant are the contracting parties, and the trial court’s role
with respect to their agreement is described by statute: If the
court accepts a plea agreement, it shall be bound by its terms.
Pannarale v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ind. 1994) (internal citation and
quotation omitted).
[6] On appeal, Crase challenges his classification as a credit restricted felon.
Specifically, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the
classification because the factual basis does not specify that the qualifying acts
took place after the credit restricted felon classification came into existence on
July 1, 2008. For its part, the State argues that by specifically agreeing in the
plea agreement that he shall be classified as a credit restricted felon, Crase has
waived this challenge on appeal. We agree with the State.
[7] Again, the plea agreement entered into by Crase and the State explicitly stated
that Crase and the State “agree that [Crase] shall be a credit restricted felon.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 54, 58 (emphasis added). Given the contractual
nature of his plea agreement, Crase is bound by the terms of the agreement,
including the term indicating that he shall be classified as a credit restricted
felon. See Pannarale, 638 N.E.2d 1248; Holloway v. State, 980 N.E.2d 331, 335
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Crase, therefore, cannot challenge this classification on
appeal.
[8] Moreover, to the extent that Crase argues that the trial court imposed an illegal
sentence by classifying him as a credit restricted felon, we note that the Indiana
Supreme Court has held that “[a] defendant ‘may not enter into a plea
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agreement calling for an illegal sentence, benefit from that sentence, and then
later complain that it was an illegal sentence.’” Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 40
(Ind. 2004) (quoting Collins v. State, 509 N.E.2d 827, 833 (Ind. 1987)). In this
case, Crase received substantial benefit from his plea agreement, i.e., that two
Class A felony charges were reduced to Class B felony charges and the executed
portion of his sentence was capped at ten years. As such, even if classification
of Crase as a credit restricted felony did result in an illegal sentence, Crase
cannot challenge said sentence after entering into a plea agreement calling for
the sentence and benefiting from the terms of the agreement.
[9] Furthermore, waiver notwithstanding, the evidence is sufficient to support
Crase’s classification as a credit restricted felon. The factual basis alleges that
Crase’s criminal conduct occurred between January 2007 and December 2010.
Crase admitted both that the factual basis was accurate and that he should be
classified as a credit restricted felon. Given that timeline set forth in the factual
basis included approximately two and one-half years after the statute creating
the credit restricted felon classification went into effect on July 1, 2008, one can
reasonably infer from Crase’s admissions that he committed qualifying acts at
some point after July 1, 2008.
[10] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
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