Goldie Crews v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                      FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                  Nov 06 2019, 9:19 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                            Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                      and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Matthew J. McGovern                                     Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Anderson, Indiana                                       Attorney General of Indiana
    Caryn N. Szyper
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Goldie Crews,                                           November 6, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-273
    v.                                              Interlocutory Appeal from the
    Crawford Circuit Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Hon. Sabrina R. Bell, Judge
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Trial Court Cause No.
    13C01-1804-F6-23
    Bradford, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-273 | November 6, 2019                 Page 1 of 4
    Case Summary
    [1]   Goldie Crews appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss the
    charge of Level 6 felony battery against a public-safety official filed against her.
    Crews contends that dismissal is warranted because the State failed to rebut the
    evidence supporting her affirmative defense. Because a pre-trial motion to
    dismiss is not the proper vehicle for her claim, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On March 13, 2018, police officers were attempting to arrest Crews’s son Nick
    at her Crawford County residence when some sort of physical altercation
    occurred between Crews and one of the officers. On April 2, 2018, the State
    charged Crews with Level 6 felony battery against a public-safety official. On
    July 9, 2018, Crews moved to suppress evidence. On November 29, 2018, the
    trial court conducted a hearing on Crews’s motion to suppress, at which Crews
    indicated that the trial court could treat her motion as either a motion to
    suppress or a motion to dismiss. On January 2, 2019, the trial court denied
    Crews’s motion to suppress and/or dismiss. The trial court certified, and we
    accepted jurisdiction of, Crews’s interlocutory appeal.
    Discussion and Decision
    [3]   Crews contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss
    the charge of Level 6 felony battery against a public-safety official. Crews
    claims only that the charge should have been dismissed because the record
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-273 | November 6, 2019   Page 2 of 4
    contains no evidence to rebut her affirmative defense that she was resisting an
    illegal entry into her home by law enforcement.
    [4]   We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a charging information
    for an abuse of discretion, which only occurs if a trial court’s decision is clearly
    against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. An-Hung Yao v. State,
    
    975 N.E.2d 1273
    , 1276 (Ind. 2012). Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-
    4(a), a trial court may dismiss a charging information upon any of the following
    grounds:
    (1) The indictment or information, or any count thereof, is
    defective under section 6 of this chapter.
    (2) Misjoinder of offenses or parties defendant, or duplicity of
    allegation in counts.
    (3) The grand jury proceeding was defective.
    (4) The indictment or information does not state the offense with
    sufficient certainty.
    (5) The facts stated do not constitute an offense.
    (6) The defendant has immunity with respect to the offense
    charged.
    (7) The prosecution is barred by reason of a previous prosecution.
    (8) The prosecution is untimely brought.
    (9) The defendant has been denied the right to a speedy trial.
    (10) There exists some jurisdictional impediment to conviction of
    the defendant for the offense charged.
    (11) Any other ground that is a basis for dismissal as a matter of
    law.
    [5]   We have little trouble concluding that the trial court correctly denied Crews’s
    motion to dismiss. First, Crews did not file the mandatory written motion to
    dismiss citing the particular grounds, requesting orally that her motion to
    suppress also be treated as a motion to dismiss. See 
    Ind. Code § 35-34-1-8
     (“A
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-273 | November 6, 2019   Page 3 of 4
    motion to dismiss an indictment or information under section 4 of this chapter
    shall be in writing.”). At the very least, Crews’s oral motion to dismiss the
    charging information was procedurally improper.
    [6]   More fundamentally, even if Crews had filed a proper motion to dismiss, it
    would have been based on improper grounds. Crews’s argument that the State
    failed to rebut her affirmative defense is an argument directed at the sufficiency
    of the evidence admitted at a trial, and we have made it clear that “[a] hearing
    on a motion to dismiss is not a trial of the defendant on the offense charged.”
    State v. Y.M., 
    60 N.E.3d 1121
    , 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
    “Whether an individual has a statutory defense to the charges in an information
    goes beyond the issues that may be decided by a motion to dismiss and instead
    is a matter to be decided at trial.” Ceaser v. State, 
    964 N.E.2d 911
    , 918–19 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Because the question of whether the State has
    sufficiently rebutted Crews’s affirmative defense is for trial, any claim of that
    type is premature at this pre-trial stage of Crews’s case. Crews has failed to
    establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to
    dismiss.
    [7]   We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-273 | November 6, 2019   Page 4 of 4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19A-CR-273

Filed Date: 11/6/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/7/2019