Nikolas Shannon v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                   FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                           Oct 25 2018, 9:14 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                            CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                             Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                        and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Daniel Hageman                                           Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Marion County Public Defender Agency                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    Jesse R. Drum
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Nikolas Shannon,                                         October 25, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-935
    v.                                               Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Clayton A.
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Graham, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49G07-1701-CM-3064
    Brown, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-935 | October 25, 2018             Page 1 of 11
    [1]   Nikolas Shannon appeals his conviction for resisting law enforcement as a class
    A misdemeanor. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On January 20, 2017, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officers Nathan Shell
    and Katie De Leon were dispatched to an apartment in Indianapolis in
    response to 911 calls. The woman who called 911 had called twice while crying
    and hung up both times. Officer Shell arrived at the apartment building,
    noticed two young children in an unattended vehicle which was parked directly
    across from the stairs to the apartment building entrance, and walked up to the
    apartment. Officer De Leon arrived at the scene, and Officer Shell directed her
    attention to the unattended vehicle. Officer De Leon heard the children crying
    and could see and smell cigarette smoke. Officer Shell knocked on the
    apartment door, Ahni Cottrell answered, and Officer Shell observed that
    Cottrell appeared “panicked” and “frightened, alerting [him] that maybe
    something was happening to her or had happened to her or near her that put
    her on alert.” Transcript Volume II at 107. Officer De Leon ran the license
    plate on the vehicle and the information provided by the control operator for
    the plate did not match the vehicle.
    [3]   Approximately three to four minutes after she arrived at the scene, Officer De
    Leon saw Shannon approaching her at a hurried place, and he was coming
    from the staircase just below Officer Shell. Shannon explained to Officer De
    Leon that he had left the children for only one minute and forty-five seconds
    and handed her his driver’s license. Officer De Leon observed that Shannon
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-935 | October 25, 2018   Page 2 of 11
    seemed panicked, that his speech was rapid, and that he was using a lot of hand
    motions. Officer Shell finished speaking with Cottrell and went to assist Officer
    De Leon. Officer De Leon input information for Shannon into her laptop and
    discovered a protective order in which Shannon was the protected person from
    Cottrell, and Officer De Leon input Cottrell’s information and discovered an
    order protecting her from Shannon. Officer DeLeon input information for
    Shannon into her laptop and discovered a protective order in which Shannon
    was the protected person from Cottrell, and Officer DeLeon input Cottrell’s
    information and discovered an order protecting her from Shannon. Shannon
    was placed in handcuffs.
    [4]   As part of standard operating procedure, Officer De Leon used her radio to
    contact her control operator to confirm the protective order between Shannon
    and Cottrell.1 The operator told Officer De Leon that there was a protective
    order between the two and that it had not been served. Once the officers
    received that information, they removed the handcuffs. Shannon then told
    Officer De Leon that he knew about the protective order and it had been in
    place for two years but that he just did not understand the rules of the order.
    (73) Officer De Leon pulled the protective order up on her laptop screen and
    read over the protective order with Shannon to let him know the rules or
    parameters which were set by the judge, and as she was doing so Shannon kept
    1
    Officer De Leon testified: “It’s just a standard operating procedure that we do for protection orders because
    they don’t tell us if they’ve been served or if they’re – sometimes they don’t tell us if they’re expired or if
    they’re active. So it’s just something we do to double-check.” Transcript Volume II at 68.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-935 | October 25, 2018                    Page 3 of 11
    telling her “that he didn’t understand the rules of the protection order because
    he knew it had been in place for two years.” Id. at 74.
    [5]   Officer De Leon sent a message using her laptop to her control operator asking
    the operator to double-check whether the protective order had been served
    because Shannon was stating that he already knew about it. Officer De Leon
    received a message from the control operator which indicated that the
    protective order became effective on March 8, 2016, and expired on March 8,
    2018, and stated “so yeah its [sic] good still.” State’s Exhibit 8. Officer De
    Leon interpreted the message to mean that the protective order had been served
    and thought that, if it had not been served, “it would not be good.” Transcript
    Volume II at 78. Officer De Leon informed Officer Shell that the protective
    order “was good per the message that [she] got back from [the] control
    operator.” Id.
    [6]   At that time, Shannon was on a telephone call with his mother. The officers
    told Shannon that they needed to place him in handcuffs and to place his hands
    behind his back, but he ignored them. They told Shannon that he could stay on
    the phone with his mother but that they needed to handcuff him. This went on
    for about three to five minutes. According to Officer Shell, the officers told
    Shannon that they were going to place him back in handcuffs “[i]n a very gentle
    manner because [he] understood that [the officers] had just taken him out,” that
    he calmly told Shannon that the officers needed to place him back into custody,
    and that he used “[a] deliberately slower tone, just so that way he could
    understand the words and that there was some sincerity in that [Officer Shell]
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-935 | October 25, 2018   Page 4 of 11
    was not yelling at Mr. Shannon.” Id. at 117. At some point, Shannon became
    louder with the officers, and Officer De Leon heard Shannon “screaming into
    the phone to his mother that the police were killing him” and that he “repeated
    that multiple times, although at that point neither of the officers had their hands
    on [him] at all.” Id. at 80. Officer Shell put one hand on Shannon’s right arm
    and the other hand around Shannon’s wrist, and another officer mirrored the
    same posture on Shannon’s left arm. The officers informed Shannon that they
    needed him to go down to the ground, Shannon eventually went to his knees,
    and the officers told him they needed to place him on the ground and in
    handcuffs.
    [7]   After being asked many times, Shannon eventually went to the ground. He was
    on his stomach, had his arms out in front of him, and was still holding onto his
    phone and talking to family members. Officer Shell was on Shannon’s right
    side, was “still providing weighted leverage,” and was “applying reasonable
    weight to his arm to keep . . . his right arm under control,” and the other officer
    was “mirroring that same posture on [Shannon’s] left side.” Id. at 120. Officer
    Shell “just used [his] hands to apply weighted leverage and then leaned on that
    while [he] talked to [Shannon], say hey, sir, we just need you to put your hands
    behind your back.” Id. at 121. Shannon “ripped his hand” away. Id. Officer
    Shell then informed Shannon “a little bit more deliberately” that he needed to
    take him into custody and that he needed him to place his hand behind his
    back. Id. at 123. Shannon was “[a]gitated” and would not voluntarily place his
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-935 | October 25, 2018   Page 5 of 11
    hands behind his back as requested and would not hold still, and weighted
    leverage was necessary to keep him under control. Id.
    [8]   Officer Shell gave Shannon a warning that, if he did not place his hands behind
    his back, necessary force would be applied to move his hands behind his back.
    Shannon did not comply. Officer Shell applied “one knee strike” to Shannon’s
    rib area, the officers then “assessed the situation, took a deliberate pause” to
    observe whether Shannon was in pain, and Shannon did not complain of pain
    from the strike, was still talking to his mother, did not comply with the officers’
    orders, and was even more agitated. Id. at 125. The officers gave him another
    warning, “[t]hen a second knee strike was administered, which did work,” no
    further strikes were administered, and Shannon was placed in handcuffs
    without further incident. Id. at 126.
    [9]   On January 23, 2017, the State charged Shannon with resisting law
    enforcement as a class A misdemeanor. Shannon filed a motion to suppress,
    and following a hearing the court denied the motion. A jury trial was held at
    which Officers Shell and De Leon testified. Officer Shell testified that he is
    trained to use necessary force, which “means starting with verbal, then
    escalating if necessary to hand, the weighted leverage, and then going up there
    to strikes if needed, and then to take OC spray or Taser, and then from there to
    less lethal . . . and then if necessary with lethal . . . .” Id. at 124. The jury found
    Shannon guilty as charged. The court sentenced Shannon to 365 days
    incarceration with 275 days suspended.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-935 | October 25, 2018   Page 6 of 11
    Discussion
    [10]   Shannon claims the police officers used excessive force and thus were not
    lawfully engaged in their duties. He argues the facts did not give rise to
    probable cause that he had committed invasion of privacy, he did not pose an
    immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and he was not actively
    resisting or attempting to flee the scene. He further argues the evidence does
    not show that he forcibly resisted law enforcement. The State maintains that
    the evidence establishes that the officers were lawfully engaged in the execution
    of their duties, did not use excessive force, acted objectively reasonably, and
    had probable cause to arrest Shannon. It also argues the evidence shows that
    Shannon forcibly resisted and ripped his arm away from Officer Shell.
    [11]   When reviewing claims of insufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the
    evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 
    656 N.E.2d 816
    ,
    817 (Ind. 1995), reh’g denied. We look to the evidence and the reasonable
    inferences therefrom that support the verdict. 
    Id.
     The conviction will be
    affirmed if there exists evidence of probative value from which a reasonable jury
    could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id.
    [12]   
    Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3
    -1 provides in part that a person who knowingly or
    intentionally forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement
    officer while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s
    duties commits resisting law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor. The
    State’s charging information alleged that Shannon did knowingly forcibly resist,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-935 | October 25, 2018   Page 7 of 11
    obstruct or interfere with Nathan Shell, a law enforcement officer, while he was
    lawfully engaged in his duties as a law enforcement officer.
    [13]   In Love v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court held:
    An officer is not lawfully engaged in the execution of his duties
    when he uses unconstitutionally excessive force. Claims that law
    enforcement officers have used excessive force in the course of an
    arrest of a free citizen are analyzed under the Fourth
    Amendment to the United States Constitution and its
    “reasonableness” standard. The “reasonableness” inquiry in an
    excessive force case is an objective one; the question is whether
    the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the
    facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their
    underlying intent or motivation.
    
    73 N.E.3d 693
    , 697 (Ind. 2017) (citations omitted).
    [14]   In addition, with respect to the term “forcibly” in 
    Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3
    -1, the
    Indiana Supreme Court in Spangler v. State held that the word “forcibly” meant
    “something more than mere action.” 
    607 N.E.2d 720
    , 724 (Ind. 1993). It held
    that “one ‘forcibly resists’ law enforcement when strong, powerful, violent
    means are used to evade a law enforcement official’s rightful exercise of his or
    her duties.” Id. at 723. “[A]ny action to resist must be done with force in order
    to violate this statute. It is error as a matter of law to conclude that ‘forcibly
    resists’ includes all actions that are not passive.” Id. at 724.
    [15]   “But even so, the statute does not demand complete passivity.” Walker v. State,
    
    998 N.E.2d 724
    , 726 (Ind. 2013) (citation omitted). In Graham v. State, the
    Court clarified that “[t]he force involved need not rise to the level of mayhem.”
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-935 | October 25, 2018   Page 8 of 11
    
    903 N.E.2d 963
    , 965 (Ind. 2009). “In fact, even a very ‘modest level of
    resistance’ might support the offense.” Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 727 (quoting
    Graham, 903 N.E.2d at 966 (“even ‘stiffening’ of one’s arms when an officer
    grabs hold to position them for cuffing would suffice”)). The Indiana Supreme
    Court held:
    So in summary, not every passive—or even active—response to a
    police officer constitutes the offense of resisting law enforcement,
    even when that response compels the officer to use force.
    Instead, a person “forcibly” resists, obstructs, or interferes with a
    police officer when he or she uses strong, powerful, violent
    means to impede an officer in the lawful execution of his or her
    duties. But this should not be understood as requiring an
    overwhelming or extreme level of force. The element may be
    satisfied with even a modest exertion of strength, power, or
    violence. Moreover, the statute does not require commission of a
    battery on the officer or actual physical contact—whether
    initiated by the officer or the defendant. It also contemplates
    punishment for the active threat of such strength, power, or
    violence when that threat impedes the officer’s ability to lawfully
    execute his or her duties.
    Id.
    [16]   We observe that a person commits the offense of invasion of privacy if the
    person knowingly or intentionally violates a protective order. See 
    Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15
    .1. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that probable cause to
    support an arrest exists when the officer has knowledge of facts and
    circumstances that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-935 | October 25, 2018   Page 9 of 11
    the suspect committed a criminal act. See Griffith v. State, 
    788 N.E.2d 835
    , 840
    (Ind. 2003).
    [17]   The record reveals that Officers Shell and De Leon responded to Cottrell’s
    apartment following two 911 calls, that upon arriving at the apartment Officer
    Shell observed that Cottrell appeared frightened, and that Shannon approached
    Officer De Leon from the staircase. While the operator initially reported that
    the protective order had not been served on Shannon, Shannon indicated that
    he knew about the order and, after Officer De Leon asked the operator to verify
    whether the order had been served, the operator informed Officer De Leon that
    the protective order was “good still,” which Officer De Leon interpreted to
    mean that the order had been served. State’s Exhibit 8. The record further
    reveals that, when the officers informed Shannon that they needed to place him
    in handcuffs, Shannon ignored them. Shannon became loud and screamed into
    the phone, the officers held Shannon by the arms and told him to move to the
    ground, and after being asked many times Shannon eventually did so. On the
    ground, Officer Shell applied weighted leverage to Shannon, and Shannon was
    agitated and ripped his hand away from Officer Shell. Officer Shell gave
    Shannon a warning, and Shannon did not comply with the officers’ verbal
    commands or respond to the applied weighted leverage. Officer Shell applied a
    knee strike and then deliberately paused to observe whether Shannon was in
    pain, Shannon did not complain of pain from the strike and was still talking to
    his mother, the officers gave Shannon another warning and applied a second
    knee strike, and Shannon was placed in handcuffs.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-935 | October 25, 2018   Page 10 of 11
    [18]   Based upon the record, we conclude that evidence of probative value was
    admitted from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that Shannon
    exercised at least a modest exertion of strength, power, or violence that
    impeded Officer Shell in the execution of his duties and that Officer Shell was
    lawfully engaged in the execution of his duties at that time. See Lopez v. State,
    
    926 N.E.2d 1090
    , 1093-1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding the evidence was
    sufficient to show the defendant acted with the requisite force in resisting the
    officers where the defendant refused to stand to be cuffed and “started to pull
    away” when the officers tried to physically pull him up from the couch and
    where the officers attempted to place his arms behind his back and were unable
    to do so), trans. denied; Johnson v. State, 
    833 N.E.2d 516
    , 518-519 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2005) (finding the defendant resisted officers by turning away and pushing away
    with his shoulders as they attempted to search him and refusing to enter the
    transport vehicle and stiffening up requiring that the officers exert force to place
    him inside the transport vehicle).
    [19]   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Shannon’s conviction for resisting law
    enforcement as a class A misdemeanor.
    [20]   Affirmed.
    Altice, J., and Tavitas, J., conur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-935 | October 25, 2018   Page 11 of 11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18A-CR-935

Filed Date: 10/25/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/25/2018