In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.H., B.H., and C.H. (Minor Children) J.H. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


Menu:
  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                     FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                            Nov 26 2019, 6:53 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                              CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                               Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Mark K. Leeman                                           Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Leeman Law Office                                        Attorney General of Indiana
    Logansport, Indiana
    Benjamin M.L. Jones
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Termination of the Parent-                        November 26, 2019
    Child Relationship of A.H.,                              Court of Appeals Case No.
    B.H., and C.H. (Minor                                    19A-JT-1259
    Children);                                               Appeal from the Cass Circuit
    J.H. (Father),                                           Court
    The Honorable Stephen Roger
    Appellant-Respondent,
    Kitts, Judge
    v.                                               Trial Court Cause Nos.
    09C01-1903-JT-1
    09C01-1903-JT-2
    The Indiana Department of
    09C01-1903-JT-3
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Pyle, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1259 | November 26, 2019             Page 1 of 11
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   J.H. (“Father”) appeals the termination of the parent-child relationship with his
    sons A.H.(“A.H.”), B.H. (“B.H.”), and C.H. (“C.H.”).1 He contends that there
    is insufficient evidence to support the terminations. Specifically, Father argues
    that the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) failed to prove by clear and
    convincing evidence that: (1) a continuation of the parent-child relationship
    poses a threat to the children’s well-being; and (2) termination of the parent-
    child relationship is in the children’s best interests. Concluding that there is
    sufficient evidence to support the termination of the parent-child relationships,
    we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Issue2
    Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the terminations.
    Facts
    [3]   Father is the parent of A.H., who was born in April 2011; B.H., who was born
    in September 2013; and C.H., who was born in August 2016. In February
    1
    The children’s mother’s (“Mother”) parental rights were also terminated. However, she is not a party to
    this appeal.
    2
    Father also argues that six of the trial court’s sixty-two detailed findings are clearly erroneous because they
    are not supported by the evidence. However, because the fifty-six unchallenged detailed findings “provide
    ample support for the trial court’s ultimate conclusion,” any error in the six challenged findings is “merely
    harmless surplusage.” See In re B.J., 
    879 N.E.2d 7
    , 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1259 | November 26, 2019                    Page 2 of 11
    2017, DCS Family Case Manager James Steele (“FCM Steele”) was assigned to
    assess allegations of neglect in Mother and Father’s home. When FCM Steele
    arrived at the home, law enforcement officers were in the process of arresting
    Mother and Father. The officers had found paraphernalia and more than three
    grams of methamphetamine in an area of the home that was accessible to the
    children. Father admitted that he had manufactured methamphetamine in the
    home for his own use. Father, who refused a drug screen, was arrested and
    subsequently charged with Level 5 felony burglary, Level 6 felony possession of
    methamphetamine, Level 6 felony maintaining a common nuisance, and Class
    B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. As law enforcement officers were
    leading Mother and Father out of the home, an officer asked the parents if they
    wanted to give three-year-old B.H. a hug. Both parents declined and asked the
    officer for a cigarette.
    [4]   While law enforcement officers were with the parents, FCM Steele looked
    around the house and noticed that it was infested with cockroaches. FCM
    Steele specifically noticed cockroaches in the kitchen drawers and cabinets. He
    also noticed both dead and living cockroaches in the refrigerator. The bedroom
    that the three brothers shared upstairs had food, trash, broken toys, and urine
    on the floor. Based on these findings, FCM Steele believed that the children
    had been isolated in their room for long periods of time.
    [5]   The three children were removed from the home that day and placed in foster
    care. DCS Family Case Manager Laura Knutson (“FCM Knutson”) was
    assigned to the children’s cases. In March 2017, the parents admitted that their
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1259 | November 26, 2019   Page 3 of 11
    three sons were children in need of services (“CHINS”). The following month,
    April 2017, the trial court ordered Father to: (1) keep all appointments with
    service providers; (2) provide safe and stable housing for his children; (3) obey
    the law; (4) abstain from the use of illegal substances; (5) attend visitation with
    his children; and (6) obtain a substance abuse assessment and follow all
    recommendations.
    [6]   Father, however, failed to comply with the court-ordered home-based,
    parenting, and addiction services. Further, he failed to attend eighteen of
    twenty scheduled visits with his children, including A.H.’s birthday visit.
    Parents also failed to notify FCM Knutson of changes in their address, and
    often the only way that the case manager could locate that parents was at their
    criminal court appearances.
    [7]   A bench warrant was issued in May 2017 when Father failed to appear in court
    for the February 2017 charges. In September 2017, Father pled guilty to the
    four February 2017 charges, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate
    sentence of six years, with an earliest release date of 2022.
    [8]   Eighteen months later, a March 2019 review hearing revealed that Father “had
    not enhanced his ability to fulfill [his] parental obligations [before his
    incarceration] [and] [had] not completed any parenting curriculum as offered by
    the Department of Correction facility.” (Exhibits Vol. at 49, 95, 141). DCS
    filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights two days later.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1259 | November 26, 2019   Page 4 of 11
    [9]    Testimony at the April 2019 termination hearing revealed that Father had not
    seen the children since April 2017. DCS Family Case Manager Jessica Risher
    (“FCM Risher”), who had been assigned to the case in December 2017,
    testified that the children had expressed several times that they were afraid of
    Father. FCM Risher further testified that even if Father were to be released
    before 2022, the children could not be immediately reunited with him.
    According to FCM Risher, “there would have to be a lot of therapy before
    [DCS] could even integrate [Father] into visits.” (Tr. at 93). FCM Risher also
    testified that the children had been in foster care for two years and that the
    current plan for them was adoption. According to FCM Risher, termination of
    Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
    [10]   Guardian Ad Litem Jeff Stanton (“GAL Stanton”) also testified that
    termination was in the children’s best interests. GAL Stanton further explained
    that the children were afraid of their father. According to GAL Stanton, the
    children were relaxed and comfortable in their foster home and removal from
    the foster parents would be traumatic for them. In addition, GAL Stanton
    testified that his recommendation would not change even if Father were to be
    released from incarceration the following day.
    [11]   Father testified that he was “currently taking a program of therapeutic
    rehabilitation” while incarcerated. (Tr. at 107). According to Father, he was
    scheduled to complete the nine-month program in four months and would then
    be eligible for a sentence modification. Father testified that he had also been
    taking an Inside Outside Dad class for two weeks. In addition, Father testified
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1259 | November 26, 2019   Page 5 of 11
    that he did not want the trial court to terminate his parental rights because “it
    would be in [the children’s] best interest[s] to be with their mom and their dad.”
    (Tr. at 110). Father further testified that he “would like to have [his] children
    back, yeah.” (Tr. at 111).
    [12]   Following the hearing, the trial court explained its decision to terminate
    Father’s parental rights as follows:
    What the record indicates to me is that we have a situation in
    which there were opportunities to participate [and] the father
    failed to and now as a result of whatever circumstances he may
    be in, effectively, you know, he would like a do-over, and that
    places the court in a position of having to weigh the father’s
    interest in a do-over against the interests of the children and
    subjecting [the] children to several more years of limbo while this
    works out or doesn’t. And by several more years of limbo, I am
    not referring to an out date of, that may or may not be true, but
    [what] I am referring to is also, the years of rehabilitation
    suggested as being necessary in best case scenario, [by] [DCS] in
    order to [e]ffect reunification. The suggestion is not in the best of
    all possible roles that this would happen upon release, it’s a
    suggestion that the children and the foster care family should be
    subjected to several more years in any set of circumstances and I
    can’t find that that is in the best interest of the children in this
    case either.
    (Tr. at 115). Father now appeals the termination.
    Decision
    [13]   The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is
    protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1259 | November 26, 2019   Page 6 of 11
    re J.W., Jr., 
    27 N.E.3d 1185
    , 1187-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.
    However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of
    the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. 
    Id. at 1188.
    Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where a child’s
    emotional and physical development is threatened. 
    Id. Although the
    right to
    raise one’s own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better
    home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is
    unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. 
    Id. [14] Before
    an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, DCS is
    required to allege and prove, among other things:
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
    that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
    placement outside the home of the parents will not be
    remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
    of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
    being of the child.
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
    adjudicated a child in need of services;
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
    the child.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1259 | November 26, 2019   Page 7 of 11
    IND. CODE § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by
    clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    989 N.E.2d 1225
    , 1230 (Ind. 2013).
    [15]   When reviewing a termination of parental rights, this Court will not reweigh
    the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re R.S., 
    56 N.E.3d 625
    ,
    628 (Ind. 2016). We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences
    to be drawn therefrom that support the judgment and give due regard to the
    trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand.
    
    K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229
    .
    [16]   Father first argues that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
    that a continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the
    children’s well-being. The continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
    threat to children’s well-being when: (1) their parents engage in destructive and
    dangerous behavior; (2) the behavior is ongoing without any serious sign of
    improvement; and (3) the behavior poses a threat to their children. In re A.I.,
    
    825 N.E.2d 798
    , 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
    [17]   In A.I., parents appealed the termination of their parental rights and argued
    that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the
    continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to A.I. This Court
    responded as follows:
    Although there was no specific testimony that either parent had
    physically abused A.I., there can be little doubt that the parties’
    serious substance abuse addictions detrimentally affected or
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1259 | November 26, 2019   Page 8 of 11
    greatly endangered her. The parties’ failure to maintain stable
    employment and housing, as well as the constant drug use and
    sporadic domestic violence, renders the environment for A.I.
    destructive at best and dangerous at worst. We need not wait
    until A.I. suffer[s] permanent psychological or physical injury
    before intervening. There is sufficient evidence to support the
    trial court’s finding.
    
    Id. at 811.
    [18]   Here, as in A.I., where Father manufactured methamphetamine in the family
    home and left the drug in an area of the home that was accessible to the
    children, there can be little doubt that Father’s drug manufacturing
    detrimentally affected or greatly endangered the children. In addition, a kitchen
    infested with both living and dead cockroaches and a shared bedroom with
    food, trash, and urine on the floor also detrimentally affected or greatly
    endangered the children.
    [19]   We further note that Father failed to engage in any services and visited the
    children only two times before he was incarcerated for three felony convictions
    during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings. At the time of the termination
    hearing, he had not seen his children, who were scared of him, for two years.
    There is also no evidence that he had attempted to contact DCS during his
    incarceration to inquire about his children. Further, Father was incarcerated
    for over a year before he engaged in any therapeutic programs, and there was
    no evidence regarding Father’s progress in the programs he was attending. In
    addition, Father’s sole stated reason for wanting his children back was because
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1259 | November 26, 2019   Page 9 of 11
    he simply believed that it was in their best interests to be with him. This
    evidence, which reveals that Father has engaged in destructive and dangerous
    behavior that posed a threat to his children without any serious sign of
    improvement, supports the trial court’s conclusion that the continuation of the
    parent-child relationship poses a threat to the children’s well-being.
    [20]   Father also argues that there is insufficient evidence that the termination was in
    the children’s best interests. In determining whether termination of parental
    rights is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the
    totality of the evidence. In re D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d 258
    , 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004),
    trans. denied. In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents
    to those of the child involved. 
    Id. Termination of
    the parent-child relationship
    is proper where the child’s emotional and physical development is threatened.
    In re R.S., 
    774 N.E.2d 927
    , 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. “‘A parent’s
    historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision
    coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that
    continuation of the parent-child relationship is contrary to the child’s best
    interest.’” In re B.D.J., 
    728 N.E.2d 195
    , 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting
    Matter of Adoption of D.V.H., 
    604 N.E.2d 634
    , 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans.
    denied, superseded by rule on other grounds). Further, the testimony of the service
    providers may support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interests.
    McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family and Children, 
    798 N.E.2d 185
    , 203 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2003).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1259 | November 26, 2019   Page 10 of 11
    [21]   Here, our review of the evidence reveals that Father has historically been
    unable to provide housing, stability, and supervision for his children and was
    unable to provide the same at the time of the termination hearing. In addition,
    FCM Risher and GAL Stanton both testified that termination was in the
    children’s best interests. The testimony of these service providers, as well as the
    other evidence previously discussed, supports the trial court’s conclusion that
    termination was in the children’s best interests.
    [22]   We reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear
    error’—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
    has been made.” Egly v. Blackford Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    592 N.E.2d 1232
    ,
    1235 (Ind. 1992). We find no such error here and therefore affirm the trial
    court.
    [23]   Affirmed.
    Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1259 | November 26, 2019   Page 11 of 11