Charles R. Whittington v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                   FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    Feb 21 2017, 8:05 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                 CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                      Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Chris M. Teagle                                          Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Muncie, Indiana                                          Attorney General of Indiana
    George P. Sherman
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Charles R. Whittington,                                  February 21, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    05A02-1512-CR-2359
    v.                                               Appeal from the Blackford Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Dean A. Young,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    05C01-1502-MR-41
    Altice, Judge.
    Case Summary
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017    Page 1 of 18
    [1]   Following a jury trial, Charles R. Whittington was convicted of two counts of
    murder and sentenced to an aggregate term of 170 years in the Department of
    Correction. Whittington raises the following issues on appeal:
    1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting
    Whittington’s statements to police?
    2. Was the jury’s verdict of guilty—rather than guilty but
    mentally ill (GBMI)—contrary to law?
    3. Is Whittington’s 170-year sentence inappropriate?
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts & Procedural History
    [3]   In January of 2015, Whittington was a regular visitor at Shane Williamson’s
    Hartford City apartment. Whittington had recently split up with his girlfriend,
    Heather Lennartz, and Lennartz had blocked him on Facebook and her cell
    phone. Lennartz had also been childhood friends with Shane, and they had
    reconnected on Facebook around the end of 2014 or the beginning of 2015.
    When Whittington visited Shane’s home, he would often use Shane’s Facebook
    profile and cell phone to contact Lennartz while pretending to be Shane. At
    some point, Lennartz sent provocative photographs of herself to Shane.
    Whittington was angry about the photos and repeatedly demanded that Shane
    give them to him, even though Shane had already done so and then deleted the
    photos.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017   Page 2 of 18
    [4]   In early February 2015, Whittington was served with a restraining order barring
    him from contacting Lennartz and her children. When Whittington spoke with
    Lennartz’s mother on February 2, 2015, he told her that Shane had photos of
    Lennartz and that he was going to get the cell phone and delete the photos even
    if he had to “beat the fuck out of him[.]” Transcript at 321.
    [5]   On the morning of February 5, 2015, Whittington drove to Shane’s apartment.
    Shortly after 9 a.m., he entered the bedroom of Katelin Williamson, Shane’s
    fourteen-year-old daughter, and shot her in the face at close range, killing her.
    Whittington then shot Shane twice in the head after a struggle in Shane’s truck,
    which took place in the parking lot of the apartment complex and in front of
    eyewitnesses. Shane also died as a result of his injuries.
    [6]   On February 9, 2015, the State charged Whittington with two counts of
    murder. The State also filed two sentencing enhancements based on
    Whittington’s use of a firearm in the murders. A five-day jury trial commenced
    on November 3, 2015, at which Whittington asserted an insanity defense. On
    November 9, 2015, the jury returned guilty verdicts on the murder charges and
    found that Whittington had used a firearm in the commission of the offenses as
    required to support the sentencing enhancements. On December 1, 2015, the
    trial court sentenced Whittington to sixty-five years for each of the murder
    convictions, enhanced each count by twenty years based on the use of a
    firearm, and ordered the sentences to run consecutively, resulting in an
    aggregate term of 170 years imprisonment. Whittington now appeals.
    Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017   Page 3 of 18
    Discussion & Decision
    Admission of Statements
    [7]   Whittington first argues that the trial court erred in admitting his statements to
    police because those statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights.
    The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility
    of evidence, and we will reverse the trial court’s ruling only when
    the trial court abuses that discretion. Fuqua v. State, 
    984 N.E.2d 709
    , 713-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The trial court
    abuses its discretion only if its decision regarding the admission
    of evidence is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
    circumstances before it, or if the court has misinterpreted the law.
    
    Id. Regardless of
    whether the challenge is made through a
    pretrial motion to suppress or by an objection at trial, our review
    of rulings on the admissibility of evidence is essentially the same:
    we do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting
    evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, but
    we may also consider any undisputed evidence that is favorable
    to the defendant. 
    Id. Additionally, we
    may consider
    foundational evidence introduced at trial in conjunction with any
    evidence from a suppression hearing that is not in direct conflict
    with the trial evidence. Kelley v. State, 
    825 N.E.2d 420
    , 427 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2005).
    Hicks v. State, 
    5 N.E.3d 424
    , 427 (Ind. 2014), trans. denied.
    [8]   On appeal, Whittington claims that police employed the sort of “question-first”
    interrogation technique condemned by the United States Supreme Court in
    Missouri v. Seibert, 
    542 U.S. 600
    (2004). Officers using this technique withhold
    Miranda warnings until after a suspect has confessed, and thereafter, give
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017   Page 4 of 18
    Miranda warnings and secure a waiver before obtaining a second, similar
    confession. 
    Id. at 611-14.
    As the Seibert court explained:
    Upon hearing warnings only in the aftermath of interrogation
    and just after making a confession, a suspect would hardly think
    he had a genuine right to remain silent, let alone persist in so
    believing once the police began to lead him over the same ground
    again. A more likely reaction on a suspect’s part would be
    perplexity about the reason for discussing rights at that point,
    bewilderment being an unpromising frame of mind for
    knowledgeable decision. What is worse, telling a suspect that
    “anything you say can and will be used against you,” without
    expressly excepting the statement just given, could lead to an
    entirely reasonable inference that what he has just said will be
    used, with subsequent silence being of no avail. Thus, when
    Miranda warnings are inserted in the midst of coordinated and
    continuing interrogation, they are likely to mislead and
    “depriv[e] a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to
    understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of
    abandoning them.” By the same token, it would ordinarily be
    unrealistic to treat two spates of integrated and proximately
    conducted questioning as independent interrogations subject to
    independent evaluation simply because Miranda warnings
    formally punctuate them in the middle.
    
    Id. at 613-14
    (alteration in original, footnote omitted). Thus, the Court held
    that the defendant’s statements made both before and after Miranda warnings
    were inadmissible. 
    Id. at 617.
    [9]   Indiana courts have consistently applied Seibert to hold a defendant’s post-
    Miranda statements inadmissible in situations where a defendant has been
    interrogated prior to receiving Miranda warnings and confessed or made
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017   Page 5 of 18
    incriminating statements, and then repeated those statements after receiving
    Miranda warnings. See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 
    997 N.E.2d 1045
    , 1053-54 (Ind.
    2013); Morris v. State, 
    871 N.E.2d 1011
    , 1018-19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans.
    denied. But our review of the record in this case reveals that Whittington was
    not subjected to pre-Miranda interrogation.
    [10]   Whittington was arrested on the day of the murders and transported to the Jay
    County Jail. Whittington was handcuffed and placed in an interview room,
    and Officer Todd Wickey of the Portland Police Department sat with him while
    waiting for Hartford City police to arrive. It is undisputed that Whittington had
    not been Mirandized at that time. Contrary to Whittington’s arguments,
    however, the evidence favorable to the trial court’s ruling establishes Officer
    Wickey did not interrogate him. Indeed, Officer Wickey testified that he did
    not ask Whittington any questions and merely listened while Whittington
    talked about his motorcycle and his recipe for ribs, which Whittington said he
    had been making that day. See White v. State, 
    772 N.E.2d 408
    , 412 (Ind. 2002)
    (explaining that “[u]nder Miranda, ‘interrogation’ includes express questioning
    and words or actions on the part of the police that the police know are
    reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect” and that
    “[v]olunteered statements do not amount to interrogation”). Although
    Whittington claims that Officer Wickey questioned him concerning his
    activities that day, it is not our province to judge the credibility of witnesses in
    this manner on appeal. Because Whittington was not interviewed until after
    Officer Matthew Felver of the Hartford City Police Department arrived and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017   Page 6 of 18
    advised him of his Miranda rights, Whittington’s reliance on Seibert and its
    progeny is misplaced.
    Rejection of GBMI Verdict
    [11]   Next, Whittington challenges the jury’s failure to return a GBMI verdict. 1 Ind.
    Code § 35-36-2-3 provides that, in all cases where a defense of insanity is raised,
    the jury shall determine whether the defendant is guilty, not guilty, not
    responsible by reason of insanity, or “guilty but mentally ill at the time of the
    crime.” For purposes of a GBMI verdict, “mentally ill” means “having a
    psychiatric disorder which substantially disturbs a person’s thinking, feeling, or
    behavior and impairs the person’s ability to function.”2 I.C. § 35-36-1-1. When
    a defendant challenges a jury’s failure to return a GBMI verdict as contrary to
    law, we grant substantial deference to the verdict in light of the jury’s “right to
    determine the law and the facts” in all criminal cases. Satterfield v. State, 
    33 N.E.3d 344
    , 348 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Ind. Const. art 1, § 19). Because a
    defendant raising such a challenge appeals from a negative judgment, he faces a
    heavy burden. 
    Id. Indeed, the
    conviction will be set aside only if the evidence
    is without conflict and leads to only the conclusion that the defendant was
    GBMI. 
    Id. In considering
    such issues, this court “will not reweigh evidence,
    reassess witness credibility, or disturb reasonable inferences made by the trier of
    1
    Whittington does not challenge the jury’s rejection of his insanity defense.
    2
    Although not relevant in this case, the term “mentally ill” also expressly includes “having an intellectual
    disability.” I.C. § 35-36-1-1.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017           Page 7 of 18
    fact.” 
    Id. (quoting Myers
    v. State, 
    27 N.E.3d 1069
    , 1074 (Ind. 2015)). We will
    consider only the evidence favorable to the verdict and the reasonable and
    logical inferences flowing therefrom. 
    Id. [12] Whittington
    argues that the jury’s decision to find him guilty rather than GBMI
    was “contrary to the evidence and erroneous[,]” but he fails to cite or apply the
    statutory definition of mentally ill. Appellant’s Brief at 18. Accordingly, his
    argument in this regard is waived. See Davis v. State, 
    835 N.E.2d 1102
    , 1113
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that “[a] party waives an issue where the party
    fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and
    portions of the record”), trans. denied.
    [13]   Waiver notwithstanding, we cannot say that the evidence presented concerning
    Whittington’s mental condition at the time of the crime was without conflict
    and led only to the conclusion that he was mentally ill as defined in I.C. § 35-
    36-1-1 at the time of the murders. Although there was evidence presented that
    Whittington had previously been diagnosed with a number of mental illnesses,
    including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, and post-
    traumatic stress disorder, there was also significant evidence that Whittington
    had a history of malingering and being dishonest with service providers. For
    example, Whittington had previously told mental health care providers that he
    had hallucinated clowns and that an alter ago named “Elmer” could make him
    do things, but he later admitted that he was being untruthful. Yet when he was
    interviewed by investigators on the day of the murders, he again claimed to
    have an alter ego named Elmer, and he stated that “when Elmer comes out, he
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017   Page 8 of 18
    doesn’t remember what Elmer does.” Transcript at 275. Whittington also lied
    to service providers about being in active combat in Vietnam. Dr. Craig
    Buckles testified that although Whittington had been diagnosed with
    schizophrenia early on, many of Whittington’s service providers had serious
    doubts about this diagnosis. Dr. Buckles testified further that he did not
    observe any signs of a thought disorder in Whittington.
    [14]   Moreover, evidence of Whittington’s behavior around the time of the murders
    supports a conclusion that Whittington was not mentally ill at the time of the
    crimes within the meaning of I.C. § 35-36-1-1, in that his thinking, feeling, and
    behavior was not substantially disturbed and his ability to function was not
    impaired. Brian McDonald, who was Shane’s close friend and who had spent
    time with Whittington at Shane’s apartment, testified that approximately one
    week before the murders, Whittington had said that “all he had to do was quit
    taking his medication and he had . . . a free pass to kill.” Transcript at 149.
    Three days before the murders, Whittington told Lennartz’s mother that he was
    going to delete the photos of Lennartz from Shane’s phone even if he had to
    “beat the fuck out of him[.]” 
    Id. at 321
    The day before the murders,
    Whittington went to the VA office in Marion and requested his medical
    records. The VA records from that date showed that Whittington met with a
    therapist and discussed his relationship with Lennartz and the restraining order
    with a therapist and that Whittington was “lucid and oriented” and “did not
    express bizarre, paranoid or delusional thoughts.” Exhibit Volume IV at 30.
    Immediately after the murders, Whittington altered his appearance by shaving
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017   Page 9 of 18
    his beard and he disposed of the baseball cap he was wearing while he
    committed the crimes. After he was arrested, Whittington denied ever having
    been to Shane’s apartment and lied to police about owning a 9mm handgun.
    [15]   Although it is undisputed that Whittington had been diagnosed with some
    psychiatric disorders in the past, the evidence in this case amply supported a
    conclusion that any psychiatric disorder Whittington might have had at the
    time he murdered Katelin and Shane did not substantially disturb his thinking,
    feeling, or behavior and impair his ability to function. Indeed, the evidence
    presented easily supports a conclusion that Whittington acted out of anger and
    jealousy, and then sought to use his mental health history to escape
    responsibility for his actions. Because Whittington has fallen far short of
    establishing that the evidence presented concerning his mental state at the time
    of the murders was without conflict and led only to the conclusion that he was
    GBMI, we affirm the jury’s guilty verdict. See 
    Satterfield, 33 N.E.3d at 350-51
    (affirming a jury’s rejection of a GBMI verdict where the evidence supported a
    conclusion that the defendant was acting deceitfully).
    Sentencing
    [16]   We first note that Whittington’s sentencing argument conflates two separate
    sentencing standards: whether the trial court abused its discretion in identifying
    mitigating and aggravating factors and whether Whittington’s sentence is
    inappropriate pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7. “As our Supreme Court
    has made clear, inappropriate sentence and abuse of discretion claims are to be
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017   Page 10 of 18
    analyzed separately.” King v. State, 
    894 N.E.2d 265
    , 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
    Accordingly, “an inappropriate sentence analysis does not involve an argument
    that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant.” 
    Id. [17] With
    respect to Whittington’s argument concerning the trial court’s
    consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, we note that sentencing
    decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State,
    
    868 N.E.2d 482
    , 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 
    875 N.E.2d 218
    . So long as
    the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an
    abuse of discretion. 
    Id. “An abuse
    of discretion occurs if the decision is ‘clearly
    against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the
    reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’” 
    Id. at 490
    (quoting K.S. v. State, 
    849 N.E.2d 538
    , 544 (Ind. 2006)).
    [18]   A trial court may abuse its sentencing discretion in a number of ways,
    including: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a
    sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are
    unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits
    reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing
    statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law. 
    Id. at 490
    -
    91. If the trial court abuses its discretion in one of these or another way,
    remand for resentencing is the appropriate remedy “if we cannot say with
    confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it
    properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” 
    Id. at 491.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017   Page 11 of 18
    [19]   First, Whittington acknowledges that the trial court identified his history of
    mental illness as a mitigating factor, but he appears to argue that the trial court
    afforded it insufficient mitigating weight. We note, however, that trial courts
    are no longer obligated to weigh such factors against each other when imposing
    a sentence. 
    Id. Thus, a
    trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion
    in failing to properly weigh such factors. 
    Id. Accordingly, Whittington’s
    argument in this regard is without merit.
    [20]   Whittington also argues that the trial court relied on an improper aggravating
    factor, namely, that the imposition of a lesser sentence would depreciate the
    seriousness of the offense. According to Whittington, “[t]his aggravator is only
    appropriate if the trial court is considering imposing a sentence less than the
    advisory.” Appellant’s Brief at 22. This is an inaccurate statement of the law.
    Our Supreme Court has held that “it is not error to enhance a sentence based
    upon the aggravating circumstance that a sentence less than the enhanced term
    would depreciate the seriousness of the crime committed.” Mathews v. State,
    
    849 N.E.2d 578
    , 590 (Ind. 2006). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in relying upon this aggravating factor in imposing the maximum
    sentence. Moreover, even if the trial court had abused its discretion in this
    regard, reversal would not be necessary, both because we can say with
    confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it not
    relied on this aggravating factor and because we conclude below that the
    sentence imposed is not inappropriate. See Mendoza v. State, 
    869 N.E.2d 546
    ,
    556 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that “even if the trial court is found to have abused
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017   Page 12 of 18
    its discretion in the process it used to sentence the defendant, the error is harmless if
    the sentence imposed was not inappropriate”), trans. denied.
    [21]   Turning now to Whittington’s challenge to the appropriateness of his sentence,
    we note that although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion
    in imposing a sentence, Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution
    authorize independent appellate review and revision of a sentence imposed by
    the trial court. Alvies v. State, 
    905 N.E.2d 57
    , 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing
    
    Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491
    ). This appellate authority is implemented
    through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that a court “may revise a
    sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s
    decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
    of the offense and the character of the offender.” 
    Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491
    .
    Nevertheless, “we must and should exercise deference to a trial court’s
    sentencing decision, both because Rule 7(B) requires us to give ‘due
    consideration’ to that decision and because we understand and recognize the
    unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions.” Stewart v.
    State, 
    866 N.E.2d 858
    , 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The appellant bears the
    burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 
    848 N.E.2d 1073
    , 1080 (Ind. 2006).
    [22]   The determination of whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on
    our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the
    damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given
    case.” Bethea v. State, 
    983 N.E.2d 1134
    , 1145 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Cardwell v.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017   Page 13 of 18
    State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1224 (Ind. 2008)). Moreover, “[t]he principal role of
    such review is to attempt to leaven the outliers.” Chambers v. State, 
    989 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1259 (Ind. 2013). It is not our goal in this endeavor to achieve the
    perceived “correct” sentence in each case. Knapp v. State, 
    9 N.E.3d 1274
    , 1292
    (Ind. 2014). Accordingly, “the question under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not
    whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether
    the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” King v. State, 
    894 N.E.2d 265
    , 268 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis in original).
    [23]   In order to assess the appropriateness of a sentence, we look to the statutory
    range established for the classification of the relevant offense. Whittington
    received the maximum 65-year sentence on each murder count, and the trial
    court imposed the maximum twenty-year firearm enhancement on each count.
    See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 (providing that a person who commits murder shall
    be imprisoned for a term ranging from forty-five to sixty-five years); I.C. § 35-
    50-2-11 (allowing an additional term of between five and twenty years when the
    defendant is found beyond a reasonable doubt to have used a firearm in the
    commission of certain offenses, including murder). The trial court ordered the
    sentences to be served consecutively, resulting in an aggregate term of 170
    years. In other words, Whittington received the maximum sentence allowed by
    law. Our Supreme Court has explained that while “the maximum possible
    sentences are generally most appropriate for the worst offenders,” this is not “a
    guideline to determine whether a worse offender could be imagined” as “it will
    always be possible to identify or hypothesize a significantly more despicable
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017   Page 14 of 18
    scenario.”3 Buchanan v. State, 
    767 N.E.2d 967
    , 973 (Ind. 2002) (citations and
    quotation marks omitted). Thus, in reviewing a maximum sentence, “[w]e
    concentrate less on comparing the facts of this case to others . . . and more on
    focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense . . . and what it
    reveals about the defendant’s character.” Wells v. State, 
    904 N.E.2d 265
    , 274
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
    [24]   Whittington’s offenses were heinous in nature. Whittington ended two lives
    because he was angry and jealous over a woman who wanted nothing to do
    with him, and who had even obtained a restraining order preventing
    Whittington from contacting her or her children. Whittington shot Katelin, a
    fourteen-year-old girl who was completely uninvolved in Whittington’s quarrel
    with Shane, in the face at close range. Katelin died an excruciating and
    terrifying death as a result of choking on her own blood. Although the precise
    sequence of events is not entirely clear from the record, it appears that
    Whittington then forced Shane to get into his truck. Once there, Whittington
    shot and killed Shane, and he did so in a parking lot of an apartment complex
    during the day. There were eyewitnesses to the murder, including a girl in the
    seventh grade. After the shooting, this young witness observed Whittington
    3
    Whittington provides the reporter citation for Hamilton v. State, 
    955 N.E.2d 723
    (Ind. 2011), but refers to the
    case as McCormick v. State. Whittington cites this case for the proposition that “maximum sentences should
    be reversed for the ‘worst of the worst[,]’” and goes on to suggest that the trial judge should not have imposed
    the maximum sentence because it clearly believed that Whittington was among the worst of the worst.
    Appellant’s Brief at 23 (emphasis supplied). Whittington has apparently misread Hamilton, in which our
    Supreme Court held that trial courts “should reserve maximum sentences for classes of offenses that constitute
    the worst of the 
    worst.” 955 N.E.2d at 727
    (emphasis supplied).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017           Page 15 of 18
    open the driver’s side door and saw Shane’s body fall to the ground.
    Whittington then looked up at her and said “he fell” before bending down to
    grab something. Transcript at 23. Fearing that Whittington was reaching for a
    gun, the girl fled in terror. After the murders, Whittington took steps to alter
    his appearance and conceal his identity as the perpetrator. Whittington’s
    sentence is certainly not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses.
    [25]   Whittington’s argument concerning the appropriateness of his sentence in light
    of his character focuses almost exclusively on his history of mental illness.
    There are several factors that bear on the weight, if any, to be given mental
    illness in sentencing. Taylor v. State, 
    943 N.E.2d 414
    , 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011),
    trans. denied. “These factors include: (1) the extent of the defendant’s inability
    to control his or her behavior due to the disorder or impairment; (2) overall
    limitations on functioning; (3) the duration of the mental illness; and (4) the
    extent of any nexus between the disorder or impairment and the commission of
    the crime.” 
    Id. [26] The
    trial court in this case acknowledged the duration of Whittington’s mental
    illness, but expressed doubt as to its severity and impact on Whittington’s
    functioning and ability to control his behavior. See Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at
    168 (sentencing order in which the trial court found as a mitigating
    circumstance that Whittington “had long-term mental health issues, although
    not nearly approaching the defendant’s claim to insanity, episodic blackouts,
    and the existence of the defendant’s fictional character ‘Elmer’”). We reach a
    similar conclusion for the purposes of our App. R. 7(B) review. Although
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    Whittington had long-standing psychiatric diagnoses, there was significant
    evidence presented that Whittington had a history of malingering and
    exaggerating symptoms. A number of mental health care providers expressed
    doubts concerning Whittington’s schizophrenia diagnosis, and Dr. Buckles
    testified that he saw no signs of a thought disorder in Whittington.
    Additionally, evidence presented concerning Whittington’s behavior before and
    after the offenses supports an inference that Whittington was thinking rationally
    and in control of his behavior. Furthermore, Whittington has not established a
    nexus between his mental illness and his crimes. Instead, the evidence supports
    and inference that Whittington was acting out of anger and jealousy, and that
    he expected to use his history of mental illness to escape responsibility for his
    premeditated crimes. Indeed, about a week before the murders, Whittington
    told McDonald that if he stopped taking his medication, he would have “a free
    pass to kill.” Transcript at 149. The evidence presented at trial paints a picture
    of a deceitful, manipulative, and violent criminal rather than a seriously
    mentally ill individual.
    [27]   We note, as did the trial court, that Whittington’s criminal history was limited
    and remote in time. The seriousness of the crimes in this case, however,
    counterbalances the weight we attribute to this factor. We believe that the
    brutality and senselessness of the current offenses reveals Whittington’s true
    character. In sum, Whittington truly is among the worst of the worst. As such,
    he is deserving of the maximum sentence.
    Judgment affirmed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017   Page 17 of 18
    Riley, J., and Crone, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017   Page 18 of 18