In the Matter of: U.E., T.C. and K.C., Children in Need of Services, and R.C. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
May 04 2016, 7:38 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jill M. Acklin Gregory F. Zoeller
McGrath, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Carmel, Indiana
Robert J. Henke
David E. Corey
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of: May 4, 2016
U.E., T.C. and K.C., Children in Court of Appeals Case No.
Need of Services, 49A04-1510-JC-1566
and Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
R.C. (Mother),
The Honorable Marilyn Moores,
Appellant-Respondent, Judge
v. The Honorable Danielle P.
Gaughan, Magistrate
The Indiana Department of Trial Court Cause Nos.
49D09-1504-JC-1454
Child Services, 49D09-1504-JC-1455
Appellee-Petitioner 49D09-1508-JC-2374
Baker, Judge.
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[1] R.C. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order finding her children to be
Children in Need of Services (CHINS). Mother argues that the evidence is
insufficient to support the CHINS adjudication. Finding the evidence
sufficient, we affirm.
Facts
[2] Mother has three children: T.C., born in December 2009; K.C., born in
October 2012; and U.E., born in August 2015.1 On April 30, 2015, the
Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging that T.C. and K.C.
were CHINS because T.C. had visible injuries to her neck, lower back, and
both arms. T.C. stated that Mother had inflicted the injuries. At a hearing held
the same day, the juvenile court removed the two children from Mother’s care
and custody; they have remained out of her care since that time.
[3] The CHINS case remained open and unresolved when U.E. was born on
August 3, 2015. DCS filed a petition alleging U.E. to be a CHINS on August 6,
2015. The petition was based on allegations that Mother had tested positive for
marijuana during the pregnancy, had not been successfully participating in
services in the ongoing CHINS case, and had failed to address mental health
issues. The juvenile court removed U.E. from Mother’s care and custody; she
has remained out of Mother’s care since that time.
1
The children’s fathers are not parties to this appeal.
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[4] The juvenile court held a factfinding hearing on August 24, 2015. At that
hearing, DCS offered the following evidence in support of its CHINS
allegations:
 T.C. reported that the injuries to her arms, neck, and back occurred when
Mother had “whooped” her. Tr. p. 32.
 T.C. was evaluated by a child abuse specialist at Riley Hospital, who
recommended that T.C. be seen and evaluated by her primary care
provider. Mother never scheduled that appointment.
 After U.E. was born and removed from Mother’s care and custody,
Mother stated she did not want to see the child. At the time of the
CHINS factfinding hearing, Mother had not visited with U.E. on a single
occasion.
 At first, Mother was willing to participate with services. She began to
work with a home-based therapist, who testified that during their three
meetings, Mother was “very guarded” and “somewhat paranoid.” Tr. p.
80, 83. The therapist recommended that Mother complete a full
psychological evaluation. Mother did not complete the evaluation and
stopped meeting with the home-based therapist.
 Mother reported that she has been diagnosed with depression in the past.
 Between July 29 and August 23, Mother chose not to visit with T.C. or
K.C. even though she was permitted to have supervised parenting time
with them.
 Mother told the Family Case Manager that she would not participate
with any services unless her children were returned to her care and
custody.
 On August 6, 2015, at an initial hearing in court, Mother became upset
with D.E., U.E.’s father. She physically pushed him and threw a pen at
him.
 Approximately one week before the factfinding hearing, Mother again
became angry with D.E. while in the juvenile court building. While D.E.
was holding infant U.E. in his arms, Mother punched and/or pushed
him and raised an umbrella at him. Mother threatened, “bitch, I’ma [sic]
beat your ass[.]” Tr. p. 98-99.
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 On another occasion, Mother went to D.E.’s home, where U.E. was
living. D.E. met her outside the building and tried to escort her away,
explaining that he did not want her there because he did not want to risk
losing custody of U.E. Mother pulled away from him, entered his
apartment, and locked the door. D.E. called law enforcement, who
ordered Mother to leave.
Based on the above evidence, the juvenile court found all three children to be
CHINS at the close of the hearing, and entered a written order to the same
effect on August 27, 2015. At the September 15, 2015, dispositional hearing,
the juvenile court ordered Mother to participate in home-based case
management and therapy, parenting and substance abuse assessments, a mental
health evaluation, and random drug screens. Mother now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[5] Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to support
the juvenile court’s CHINS finding. Our Supreme Court has explained the
nature of a CHINS proceeding and appellate review of a CHINS finding as
follows:
A CHINS proceeding is a civil action; thus, “the State must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a
CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” In re N.R., 919 N.E.2d
102, 105 (Ind. 2010). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge
the credibility of the witnesses. Egly v. Blackford County Dep’t of
Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992). We consider
only the evidence that supports the trial court’s decision and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We reverse only
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upon a showing that the decision of the trial court was clearly
erroneous. Id.
There are three elements DCS must prove for a juvenile court to
adjudicate a child a CHINS. DCS must first prove the child is
under the age of eighteen; DCS must prove one of eleven
different statutory circumstances exist that would make the child
a CHINS; and finally, in all cases, DCS must prove the child
needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he or she is not
receiving and that he or she is unlikely to be provided or accepted
without the coercive intervention of the court. In re N.E., 919
N.E.2d at 105.
In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253–54 (Ind. 2012) (footnote omitted).
[6] Here, DCS alleged that the children were CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code
section 31–34–1–1, which provides as follows:
A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes
eighteen (18) years of age:
(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously
impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the
inability, refusal, or neglect of the child’s parent, guardian,
or custodian to supply the child with necessary food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision;
and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
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(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
coercive intervention of the court.
Our Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to require “three basic
elements: that the parent’s actions or inactions have seriously endangered the
child, that the child’s needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those
needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283,
1287 (Ind. 2014).
II. Sufficiency
[7] Mother’s argument focuses solely on her mental health. She contends that the
evidence regarding her mental health is speculative and stems from the
testimony of individuals who do not specialize in treating mental health issues.
We disagree. Mother herself reported that she has been diagnosed with
depression in the past. Tr. p. 96. Her home-based therapist, who had sufficient
training to identify whether an individual might benefit from a psychological
evaluation, testified that Mother’s “paranoid” and “guarded” behavior
indicated that a psychological evaluation would be beneficial. Tr. p. 80, 83.
This evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that the children’s
physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or endangered because, in
part: “Mother herself has acknowledged that she has depression and service
providers have concerns regarding her mental health.” Appellant’s App. p. 160.
[8] Even had we found the evidence regarding Mother’s mental health to be
lacking, however, we would still have affirmed the CHINS finding. The record
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reveals the following evidence regarding Mother’s behavior: she caused visible
injuries to T.C.’s neck, back, and arms; she did not want to see U.E. and had
not yet visited with her newborn at the time of the CHINS factfinding hearing;
she had not visited with her other two children in the month leading up to the
hearing; she engaged in multiple acts of domestic violence with D.E., and on
one of those occasions, she physically attacked D.E. while he was holding U.E. in
his arms. This evidence readily supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that the
children’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously
endangered as a result of Mother’s actions. Furthermore, this evidence
supports a conclusion that the children needed care that they were not receiving
when in Mother’s custody.
[9] Mother also stated that she refused to participate in services unless her children
were returned to her care and custody. This evidence supports the juvenile
court’s conclusion that the coercive intervention of the court is necessary to
ensure that the children receive the care that they need. In sum, we find that
the evidence readily supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that these children
are CHINS.
[10] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
May, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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