Willie P. Jackson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
May 09 2016, 8:38 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this CLERK
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
precedent or cited before any court except for the and Tax Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Donald R. Shuler Gregory F. Zoeller
Barkes, Kolbus, Rife & Shuler, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Goshen, Indiana
Paula J. Beller
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Willie P. Jackson, May 9, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A03-1510-CR-1693
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit
Court.
The Honorable Terry C. Shewmaker,
State of Indiana, Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 20C01-1410-FB-76
Darden, Senior Judge
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Statement of the Case
[1] Willie P. Jackson appeals the forty-year sentence the trial court imposed for his
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convictions of two counts of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, five
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counts of criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon, and one
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count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, all Class B felonies. We affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Issues
[2] Jackson raises two sentencing claims, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in identifying
Jackson’s juvenile record as an aggravating factor.
II. Whether Jackson’s forty-year sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offenses and his character.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In December 2013, nineteen-year-old Willie P. Jackson conspired with three
other men to rob a sporting goods store in Elkhart. The conspirators prepared
plastic zip ties to secure their victims. They also dressed in white painter’s
outfits and put on masks. One of the robbers was armed with a handgun.
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Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (1984).
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Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3 (2006).
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Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-2 (1977); 35-42-5-1.
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[4] On December 14, 2013, Jackson drove his three co-conspirators to the store.
He stayed in the car while the other three men went inside. The three men
secured the employees and customers at gunpoint, using zip ties to restrain
most of them. Two of the store employees were as young as seventeen years
old. One of the robbers took a wallet from one of the customers. Next, the
men ordered another store employee to open the gun cases and put the guns
and ammunition into a shopping cart. They forced a store employee to wheel
the cart out of the store to their car. They loaded the guns and ammunition into
the car and drove away.
[5] Jackson and his co-conspirators stole forty-four handguns and four rifles from
the store, with a value of $22,139.52. Less than a quarter of those guns have
been recovered by the State.
[6] The State charged Jackson with two counts of Class B felony robbery, one for
the store and one for the customer; five counts of Class B felony criminal
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confinement; and one count of Class B felony conspiracy to rob the store.
Jackson pleaded guilty as charged, reserving only his right to appeal the
sentence imposed by the court.
[7] During the sentencing hearing, Jackson requested an aggregate sentence of
thirty years. The State asked for fifty years. The trial court imposed a total
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One other person was charged with participating in the robbery. The record does not state how those
charges were resolved.
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sentence of forty years, stating, “Mr. Jackson had a lesser involvement in this
case than other perpetrators, and that played a major role in the Court’s
decision not to impose the 50 year sentence requested by the State.” Tr. p. 71.
This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
I. Juvenile Record as an Aggravating Factor
[8] Jackson argues the trial court should not have identified his juvenile record as
an aggravating factor. The State asserts the trial court acted appropriately in
considering Jackson’s juvenile record because it is similar in nature to his
current offenses.
[9] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Winkleman v. State, 22 N.E.3d 844, 852 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. We
review the trial court’s decision only for an abuse of discretion. Singh v. State,
40 N.E.3d 981, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion
occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable and actual
deductions to be drawn therefrom. Lewis v. State, 31 N.E.3d 539, 541-42 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2015). One way in which a sentencing court may abuse its sentencing
discretion is by finding aggravating or mitigating circumstances that are not
supported by the record. Bisard v. State, 26 N.E.3d 1060, 1070 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015), trans. denied.
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[10] The significance of a criminal history for purposes of sentencing will vary based
on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current
offenses. Caraway v. State, 959 N.E.2d 847, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans.
denied. Jackson was twenty-one years old at the time of his sentencing hearing.
He had no prior adult criminal history, but his juvenile record is more than
minor. In 2008, Jackson was adjudicated a delinquent for an act that, if it had
been committed by an adult, would have been Class A misdemeanor battery.
In 2010, he was adjudicated a delinquent for an act that, if it had been
committed by an adult, would have been Class D felony theft. In 2012, Jackson
was adjudicated a delinquent for an act that, if it had been committed by an
adult, would have been aiding a burglary, a Class B felony. He committed his
current offenses a year and a half after being released from the Department of
Correction for his final juvenile adjudication. Jackson’s juvenile record
demonstrates that he has committed multiple serious offenses and has escalated
his misconduct over time, culminating in the current Class B felony offenses.
[11] Jackson cites Alvies v. State, 905 N.E.2d 57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), in support of
his claim, but that case is distinguishable. In Alvies, a panel of this Court
concluded Alvies’ juvenile record, which consisted of four misdemeanors and
one felony, was not a valid aggravating factor because it was dissimilar from the
brutal crimes he committed as an adult. Id. at 64. By contrast, in the current
case Jackson’s juvenile offenses are not so dissimilar from his current offenses.
Jackson’s last juvenile offense involved assisting in a burglary, and in the
current case he assisted in robberies and criminal confinements. The trial court
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did not abuse its discretion in identifying Jackson’s juvenile criminal history as
an aggravating factor.
II. Nature of the Offenses and Character of the Offender
[12] Jackson asserts his forty-year sentence is exceptionally long based on the facts
and circumstances surrounding his case and asks the Court to reduce it. The
State responds that his sentence is appropriate under the circumstances.
[13] Even where a trial court has not abused its discretion in sentencing, the Indiana
Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of a
sentence. Pierce v. State, 949 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind. 2011) (citing Ind. Const. art.
7, §§ 4, 6). Appellate courts implement this authority through Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that a sentence may be revised if, “after
due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence
is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.” A defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her
sentence has met this inappropriateness standard of review. James v. State, 868
N.E.2d 543, 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Appellate review of appropriateness
should focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—instead of the trees—the
number of counts, the length of the sentence on any individual count, or
whether the sentences are to be served consecutively or concurrently. Pierce,
949 N.E.2d at 352.
[14] At the time Jackson committed his offenses, a Class B felony was punishable by
a maximum sentence of twenty years and a minimum sentence of six years,
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with an advisory sentence of ten years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5 (2005). The trial
court sentenced Jackson to an enhanced sentence of fifteen years for each of the
robbery charges, to be served consecutively. The trial court further sentenced
Jackson to the advisory sentence of ten years on each of the confinement
charges and the conspiracy charge, to be served concurrently with each other
and consecutively to the robbery sentences, for an aggregate sentence of forty
years.
[15] Turning to the nature of the offense, Jackson, while serving as the getaway
driver of a car, participated in a brazen robbery. Numerous employees and
customers were endangered. Furthermore, several employees were tied up with
zip ties. Over forty guns and associated ammunition were stolen. The State
has recovered only a fraction of those guns, and the missing ones could possibly
be used in future crimes.
[16] On the other hand, we in no way discount Jackson’s role in carrying out these
offenses as an accomplice, although he did not go inside the store. As our
Supreme Court has stated, “‘while an accomplice may be found guilty of the
crime largely executed by his principal, it does not follow that the same penalty
is appropriate.’” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Castillo v.
State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 467 (Ind. 2012)). There is no evidence in the record or
any indication that Jackson intended or knew that his co-conspirators would
also rob a customer in addition to the store itself. There is also no evidence in
the record as to the extent to which Jackson participated in planning the crime.
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[17] Furthermore, although the effects of the crime were reprehensible, they were
not particularly heinous. Although some of the store’s employees reported the
impact on them from the robbery, including taking anxiety medication and
feeling unable to continue working at the store, those effects did not appear
disproportionate to the nature of the offenses as contemplated by statute.
[18] Turning to the character of the offender, Jackson was only nineteen when he
participated in the crimes. He was certainly old enough to know that the
robbery was wrong, especially in light of his three prior juvenile adjudications.
Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the record demonstrates a forty-year
sentence, which will consume most of his adult life, is appropriate. He pleaded
guilty as charged without any concessions from the State, and this was his first
felony case as an adult. Jackson obtained a G.E.D. during his last juvenile
incarceration.
[19] We acknowledge the sentencing court explicitly took into account Jackson’s
status as an accomplice in fashioning his sentence. Nevertheless, viewing
Jackson’s sentence in the aggregate, we conclude it is inappropriate. See, e.g.,
Laster v. State, 956 N.E.2d 187, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (reducing aggregate
sentence for multiple convictions for burglary and robbery); cf. Herron v. State,
808 N.E.2d 172, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (sentence deemed not inappropriate
even though defendant, acting as an accomplice, received a longer sentence
than the principal), trans. denied. Pursuant to our power to revise sentences, we
reverse and remand to the trial court to issue a revised sentencing order
directing that Jackson’s sentence for Count II, robbery of the store customer,
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shall be ten years. Jackson’s sentence is otherwise unchanged, for an aggregate
sentence of thirty-five years.
Conclusion
[20] For the reasons stated above, we affirm in part the judgment of the trial court,
reverse in part, and remand with instructions to amend Jackson’s sentence as
noted above.
[21] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
May, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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