Ana Milomira Stanisic v. Steven Massa (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
May 20 2016, 8:42 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Ana M. Stanisic Lisa V. Schrader
Carmel, Indiana Lafayette, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ana Milomira Stanisic, May 20, 2016
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
79A02-1507-DR-970
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe
Circuit Court
Steven Massa, The Honorable Thomas H. Busch,
Appellee-Petitioner. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
79C01-0402-DR-16
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 1 of 16
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Respondent, Ana M. Stanisic (Stanisic), appeals the trial court’s
Order denying her motion for relief from judgment as to the appointment of a
commissioner to execute a quitclaim deed on her behalf following the
dissolution of her marriage to Appellee-Petitioner, Steven D. Massa (Massa).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUES
[3] Stanisic raises four issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the
following single issue: Whether the trial court erred by appointing a
commissioner to execute a quitclaim deed to Massa on Stanisic’s behalf in light
of Massa’s ongoing contemptuous behavior.
[4] Massa raises one issue on cross-appeal, which we restate as: Whether Stanisic’s
claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[5] On June 12, 2000, Stanisic and Massa were married. The couple had been
cohabiting since 1991 and had a child together, a daughter, born on March 3,
1993. Stanisic is the sole shareholder of Milo’s Property Inc., which owns
numerous rental properties in and around West Lafayette, Tippecanoe County,
Indiana. Massa is a sales representative for a media company in West
Lafayette.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 2 of 16
[6] A few months before the couple’s third wedding anniversary, on March 24,
2003, Massa filed a petition to dissolve the marriage. On February 16, 2006,
the trial court issued an order on matters of child custody, parenting time, and
contempt. It appears that the trial court found Massa to be in contempt for
removing certain items of property from Stanisic’s storage facility in violation of
the standard restraining order. 1 According to Stanisic, the items purportedly
removed included numerous family photo albums from her childhood.
[7] Following mediation, on December 28, 2006, the parties executed a
handwritten Settlement Agreement, which provided that “[Stanisic] will convey
to [Massa] the real estate at 801 Princess Dr[.,] West Lafayette[,] Ind[iana,] in
full and complete settlement of [Massa’s] claim for real estate owned by
[Stanisic]. [Massa] will return family pictures of [Stanisic].” (Appellant’s App.
p. 1). The Settlement Agreement also stipulated that Massa “will provide to his
attorney all photos of the daughter of the part[ies] in order that his attorney
should be able to copy the same and deliver this to the attorney for [Stanisic].”
(Appellant’s App. p. 1). The Settlement Agreement was entered in court on
January 4, 2007.
1
Neither this order nor the transcript of these proceedings are included in the appellate record, nor are the
contents of this order described in the chronological case summary. During the final hearing, Massa
admitted that the trial court “found [him] in contempt [for] having removed something from the [storage
facility].” (June 30, 2009 Tr. p. 30). However, he claimed that he “did not break into the [storage facility]
and take [Stanisic’s] photographs” as alleged by Stanisic. (June 30, 2009 Tr. p. 30).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 3 of 16
[8] In February of 2007, Stanisic transferred physical possession of the Princess
Drive property to Massa, but she did not execute a quitclaim deed to transfer
ownership. Since that time, Massa has maintained the home and used it as a
rental property. On January 30, 2008, Massa filed a petition to enforce the
Settlement Agreement’s requirement that Stanisic convey ownership of the
Princess Drive Property. On June 29, 2009, Stanisic filed a petition to hold
Massa in contempt for failing to return photographs pursuant to the Settlement
Agreement.
[9] On June 30, 2009, the trial court held a final hearing. During the hearing,
Massa testified that he had provided all of the pictures in his possession to his
attorney pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, whereas Stanisic testified that
she had not received a single photograph. On October 5, 2009, the trial court
entered a Decree of Dissolution, dissolving the parties’ marriage. In the Decree
of Dissolution, the trial court found that Stanisic had failed to sign a quitclaim
deed, and Massa had failed to provide photographs to Stanisic; therefore, both
parties were found to be in contempt of court. The trial court ordered the
parties to purge themselves of the contempt by complying with the Settlement
Agreement within twenty-one days of the dissolution date. In addition, the trial
court entered a judgment in Stanisic’s favor, ordering Massa to pay $6,301.91 in
unpaid medical bills within ninety days. If Massa failed to remit payment
within ninety days, the Decree of Dissolution provided that he would be
required to pay interest in the amount of 18% per year.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 4 of 16
[10] More than five years after the parties’ marriage was dissolved, on February 4,
2015, Massa filed a petition to emancipate and terminate his child support
obligation for the parties’ then twenty-one-year-old daughter. On February 6,
2015, Stanisic filed a Verified Motion for Proceedings Supplemental. Stanisic
argued that although Massa had paid $6,301.91 to Stanisic pursuant to the
Decree of Dissolution, Massa had failed to satisfy the 18% post-judgment
interest due. Accordingly, Stanisic asserted that Massa “should be ordered to
appear before the [c]ourt to answer as to his non-exempt property subject to
execution or proceedings supplemental to execution and to apply any such
property toward satisfaction of the judgment.” (Appellant’s App. p. 104). On
February 12, 2015, Massa filed a Motion for Appointment of Commissioner.
Massa claimed that Stanisic had refused to sign a quitclaim deed to convey the
Princess Drive property pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and Decree of
Dissolution. Thus, he requested that the trial court appoint a commissioner to
sign a quitclaim deed on Stanisic’s behalf.
[11] On March 9, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on the issues of emancipation
and child support, the appointment of a commissioner, and proceedings
supplemental. During the hearing, Stanisic testified that she refused to sign a
quitclaim deed because Massa
has not complied with [the trial] [c]ourt[’s] [o]rder of returning
some photo albums and pictures that are irreplaceable and
priceless for me. They were a part of the [S]ettlement
[A]greement, he agreed at the time with [the mediator] that he
was in possession of my child[]hood albums and these pictures of
my daughter pre-age [nine] and to date he has [not] returned
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 5 of 16
those items pursuant to the [Decree of Dissolution and]
[p]ursuant to the Settlement Agreement.
(March 9, 2015 Tr. p. 6). In support of her claim, Stanisic presented the court
with an affidavit from her former attorney, who attested to the fact that “neither
[Massa] or his attorney delivered . . . the photographs as set out in [the
Settlement Agreement].” (Appellant’s App. p. 110).
[12] In response, Massa testified that he had provided the photographs in his
possession to his attorney. He submitted an affidavit from his attorney’s
assistant, who averred that she had personally packaged the photographs for
delivery to Stanisic’s attorney. Massa also testified that at a prior hearing, he
brought a box containing the “duplicates of the photographs that I gave to her”
for Stanisic to copy, but Stanisic did not even examine them. (March 9, 2015
Tr. p. 8). Stanisic, however, claimed that the photographs which Massa had
provided were not the photographs contemplated by the Settlement
Agreement—i.e., those from Stanisic’s childhood and those of the parties’
daughter—but rather were photographs of Massa’s mother and his children
from a prior marriage. 2
[13] At the close of the evidence, the trial court issued an order, granting Massa’s
petition to emancipate the parties’ child and to terminate his child support
2
Throughout the record, Stanisic repeatedly contends that during the final hearing on June 30, 2009, the
trial court reviewed the photographs that Massa provided and held Massa in contempt based on the fact that
he had not produced the correct pictures. We note that nowhere in the transcript of the final hearing does it
indicate that any pictures were presented to or reviewed by the trial court.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 6 of 16
obligation, as well as Massa’s Motion for Appointment of Commissioner to
execute a quitclaim deed on Stanisic’s behalf. The trial court also granted
Stanisic’s Motion for Proceedings Supplemental and ordered Massa to pay
interest on the judgment within thirty days. With respect to the photographs,
the trial court stated:
I believe the two are separate issues that need to be resolved
separately and I don’t know—there are several Affidavits that
have been presented to the [c]ourt which are really not
dispositive of the issue. It sounds like each side is relying on the
testimony of an attorney who is—who could help clarify what
the issue is, what was presented, how—the—whether in fact the
requested photographs were in albums, were transferred or not
and if not where they might be and that is certainly something
worth investigating but I don’t find that the issues have been
presented in a form that I can decide it.
(March 9, 2015 Tr. p. 12).
[14] On March 16, 2015, Massa filed a Motion for Clarification. Because the
Princess Drive property was titled in the name of Milo Properties, Inc., rather
than Stanisic individually, Massa requested that the trial court clarify that the
commissioner could sign on behalf of Milo Properties, Inc. to transfer the
Princess Drive property to Massa. On March 30, 2015, Stanisic filed a motion
for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(7), in which she
claimed that Massa was “not entitled to any relief in equity because he is in
contempt of [c]ourt.” (Appellant’s App. p. 126). Specifically, Stanisic argued,
in pertinent part, that Massa “has NEVER returned the family pictures of
[Stanisic] in accordance with . . . the Settlement Agreement” and “has NEVER
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 7 of 16
provided to his attorney all photos of the daughter of the part[ies].”
(Appellant’s App. p. 126). That same day, Stanisic filed a petition for rule to
show cause, seeking to have Massa held in contempt, in part, for his failure to
turn over the photographs.
[15] On June 25, 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing on the outstanding
motions. Stanisic again argued that it is not “equitable” to force her to comply
with the Settlement Agreement by executing a quitclaim deed without also
demanding that Massa return her photographs in accordance with the
Settlement Agreement. (March 9, 2015 Tr. p. 31). Massa, however, reiterated
that he had provided the photographs in his possession and further explained
that he “never had” any albums of Stanisic’s family or childhood pictures.
(June 25, 2015 Tr. p. 35).
[16] On June 30, 2015, the trial court issued its Order, determining that Stanisic
“undertook the obligation to transfer the property to [Massa] and that [Massa’s]
Motion to Clarify should be GRANTED.” (Appellant’s App. p. 227). The trial
court also found that, with respect to Stanisic’s motion to obtain her
photographs, the “matter has been litigated previously and nothing more can be
done about the photos and said issue shall not set off the obligation to transfer
[the Princess Drive] property.” (Appellant’s App. p. 227). The court “advise[d]
[the] parties to set a date for [Stanisic] to examine [the] box of photos [provided
by Massa] in [Massa’s] attorney’s office.” (Appellant’s App. p. 227).
[17] Stanisic now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 8 of 16
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[18] Stanisic appeals from the trial court’s Order of June 30, 2015, which addressed
Massa’s motion to clarify that the commissioner appointed to execute the
quitclaim deed could sign on behalf of Milo Properties, Inc., as well as
Stanisic’s motion for relief from judgment regarding her family photographs.
The Order granted Massa’s motion and effectively denied Stanisic’s motion,
stating that the matter of Stanisic’s photographs had “been litigated previously
and nothing more can be done.” (Appellant’s App. p. 227).
[19] As the “Indiana Trial Rules do not provide for a ‘motion for clarification[,]’ our
court has previously found that a motion for clarification is tantamount to a
motion to correct error. See Hedrick v. Gilbert, 17 N.E.3d 321, 325-26 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014) (stating that “it would elevate form over substance to treat a
‘motion to clarify’ as something other than a motion to correct error” because
“Indiana Trial Rule 59(F) plainly states that ‘[a]ny modification . . . following the
filing of a Motion to Correct Error shall be an appealable final judgment or
order’” (alterations in original)). On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on both a
motion to correct error and a motion for relief from judgment are generally
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. See In re Adoption of K.G.B., 18
N.E.3d 292, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); Dillard v. Dillard, 889 N.E.2d 28, 33 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008). Our court does not reweigh evidence, and we will find an
abuse of discretion if “the trial court’s judgment is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before it or where the trial court errs on a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 9 of 16
matter of law.” In re Adoption of K.G.B., 18 N.E.3d at 296 (quoting Perkinson v.
Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013)); Case v. Case, 794 N.E.2d 514, 517
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003). If “the issue on appeal is purely a question of law[,]” our
review is de novo. In re Adoption of K.G.B., 18 N.E.3d at 296.
II. Res Judicata
[20] In its Order, the trial court concluded that the matter of Stanisic’s photographs
“has been litigated previously and nothing more can be done.” (Appellant’s
App. p. 227). As a result, Massa now contends in his cross-appeal that
Stanisic’s claim is barred by res judicata. Specifically, Massa states that “[a]t
the beginning of the June [25], 2015 hearing, [Massa] objected to the testimony
about the pictures because the issue had already been litigated on March 9,
2015.” (Appellee’s Br. p. 9). According to Massa, “[t]he court heard evidence
on March 9 and found insufficient evidence to rule. [Therefore,] [Stanisic]
should not have another opportunity to present evidence on the same issue of
the pictures.” (Appellee’s Br. p. 8).
[21] The doctrine of res judicata “serves to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes
which are essentially the same.” Kalwitz v. Kalwitz, 934 N.E.2d 741, 750 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2010). Res judicata consists of both claim preclusion and issue
preclusion. Id. Claim preclusion is applicable “where a final judgment on the
merits has been rendered which acts as a complete bar to a subsequent action
on the same issue or claim between those parties and their privies.” In re
Adoption of Baby W., 796 N.E.2d 364, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. In
turn, issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, “bars the subsequent
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 10 of 16
relitigation of the same fact or same issue between the same parties or their
privies where that fact or issue was necessarily adjudicated in a former suit and
the same fact or issue is presented in a subsequent action.” French v. French, 821
N.E.2d 891, 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). When, as in the present case, a party
argues that claim preclusion applies, the following factors must be present:
(1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) the former judgment was rendered on the merits;
(3) the matter now at issue was, or could have been, determined
in the prior action; and (4) the controversy adjudicated in the
former action was between parties to the present suit or their
privies.
Kalwitz, 934 N.E.2d at 750. Under claim preclusion, “all matters that were or
might have been litigated are deemed conclusively decided by the judgment in
the prior action.” Id.
[22] We find that Stanisic was not barred by res judicata from litigating her claim at
the June 25, 2015 hearing because the trial court did not issue a judgment on
the merits in its March 9, 2015 order with respect to the photographs. Rather,
the trial court specifically stated that the matter of the quitclaim deed and the
photographs “are separate issues that need to be resolved separately” and the
issue of the photographs “is certainly something worth investigating but I don’t
find that the issues have been presented in a form that I can decide it.” (March
9, 2015 Tr. p. 12). Thus, the trial court’s March 9, 2015 order decided only
Massa’s claim for the quitclaim deed notwithstanding his obligation to produce
the photographs. Moreover, Stanisic filed a motion for relief from judgment
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 11 of 16
challenging the trial court’s March 9, 2015 order on the basis that equitable
principles precluded the issuance of a quitclaim deed in light of Massa’s failure
to comply with the Settlement Agreement. Thus, she was not relitigating the
matter at the hearing on June 25, 2015, but rather was availing herself of the
trial court’s procedural remedies prior to filing an appeal on the matter. See Ind.
Trial Rule 60(B).
III. Unclean Hands
[23] Stanisic challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion for relief from
judgment, claiming that it was not equitable for Massa to receive a quitclaim
deed to the Princess Drive Property due to his ongoing contemptuous
behavior—i.e., his failure to return Stanisic’s family photographs pursuant to
the Settlement Agreement. In other words, Stanisic argues that Massa is “not
entitled to the equitable relief of the [c]ommissioner signing the [q]uitclaim
[d]eed because he had and continues to have unclean hands.” (Appellant’s Br.
p. 13). Although Stanisic did not specifically raise the issue of unclean hands
before the trial court, she did repeatedly assert that Massa is not entitled to a
quitclaim deed based on his own failure to adhere to the Settlement Agreement.
[24] The unclean-hands doctrine is an equitable tenet that demands
one who seeks equitable relief to be free of wrongdoing in the
matter before the court. The purpose of the unclean-hands
doctrine is to prevent a party from reaping benefits from his or
her misconduct. For the doctrine of unclean hands to apply, the
alleged wrongdoing must be intentional and must have an
immediate and necessary relation to the matter being litigated.
The doctrine of unclean hands is not favored by the courts and
must be applied with reluctance and scrutiny.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 12 of 16
Kahn v. Baker, 36 N.E.3d 1103, 1116-17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citations
omitted), trans. denied.
[25] Stanisic asserts that Massa intentionally refused to comply with the Settlement
Agreement. More particularly, she argues that
[i]t was completely reasonable to assume that [Massa] would
only agree to return the ‘family pictures of [Stanisic]’ and ‘all of
the photos of the daughter of the part[ies]’ because he actually
had them in his possession at the time of his agreement to and
execution of the . . . Settlement Agreement, unless his intent was,
in fact, to deceive [Stanisic] into having her execute the
[q]uitclaim [d]eed, ultimately deceiving the [c]ourt as well.
(Appellant’s Br. p. 14). Stanisic further asserts that Massa “admitted to his
intentional deception and unclean hands in the proceedings. [Massa] gave sworn
testimony as to having intentionally deceived [Stanisic] in agreeing to and
executing the December 28, 2006 Settlement Agreement.” (Appellant’s Br. p.
14). We find that this is a gross mischaracterization of the evidence. Massa
testified that he agreed to the term in the Settlement Agreement because his
“attorney told me that it was a negligible aspect and that I would return
whatever [pictures] I had so that is what I did.” (June 30, 2009 Tr. p. 82).
[26] Based on the evidence before us, we cannot say that Massa engaged in
intentional misconduct. Stanisic testified that during a prior dissolution
proceeding, the trial court held Massa in contempt because he had broken into
her storage unit and removed the photo albums. However, neither the
transcripts of this proceeding, the trial court’s contempt order, nor a coherent
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 13 of 16
summary of that evidence has been presented to our court. Furthermore,
Massa testified that, although he was held in contempt for “having removed
something from the [storage facility,]” he never removed Stanisic’s photo
albums. (June 30, 2009 Tr. p. 30). Keeping in mind our policy of applying the
unclean-hands doctrine “with reluctance and scrutiny[,]” we decline to reweigh
the conflicting testimonies in Stanisic’s favor. Kahn, 36 N.E.3d at 1117.
[27] Our review of the available evidence indicates that, in the Decree of
Dissolution, the trial court held Massa in contempt for failing to produce
photographs pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. Thereafter, Massa stated
that he gathered all of the photographs that he had in his possession and
presented them in a box for Stanisic to review. However, Stanisic testified that,
pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, she expected to receive from Massa
approximately fifteen “family albums dated from birth until [Massa] violated
that storage facility in May of 2003.” (June 25, 2015 Tr. pp. 23-24). She now
insists that
[t]he only pictures which [Massa] ever tendered to [Stanisic] were
pictures of HIS mother and HIS children from a previous
marriage from the year 2003, the year after . . . Massa separated
legally from [Stanisic] in 2002. They were not those which he
had agreed to return in the . . . Settlement Agreement.
(Appellant’s Br. p. 14) (citation omitted).
[28] We note that the plain language of the Settlement Agreement provides simply
that Massa was obligated to “return family pictures of [Stanisic]” and “all
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 14 of 16
photos of the daughter of the part[ies].” (Appellant’s App. 1). See Bailey v.
Mann, 895 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. 2008) (“Unless the terms of the agreement
are ambiguous, they will be given their plain and ordinary meaning.”). The
Settlement Agreement does not provide any further details as to the nature of
the pictures purportedly in Massa’s possession—i.e., it does not specify that
there were fifteen albums; nor does it indicate that the photographs comprised
Stanisic’s childhood “family” photographs as opposed to Stanisic’s general
“family” photographs that might include Massa, their child together, her former
stepchildren, her former mother-in-law, etc. (Appellant’s App. p. 1).
Moreover, Massa explained:
I have half of the photographs that we had. I separated all of the
photographs that I had that were duplicates. I gave her half of
them and I don’t have anything from her father, from her family,
from these [fifteen] albums. I never said that I did.
****
I’ve explained when I’ve been asked do you have some
photographs I said yes I have some photographs. And she is
misconstruing that to you to mean that I admitted to having the
photographs that she is asking about now [ten] years later. So if
she is going to find a box of photographs of my kids and her kid
and her and her family and I’ve already given those to her half of
them.
****
But this is everything that I have left and you are not going to
find [fifteen]—she’s not going to find [fifteen] supposed—I don’t
even—frankly if I had to be completely honest with you which I
will be I have never seen [fifteen] photo albums of her family that
she is even speaking about. They’ve never existed as far as I
know.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 15 of 16
(June 25, 2015 Tr. pp. 35-36).
[29] Accordingly, the evidence supports a finding that Massa provided all of the
photographs in his possession to Stanisic pursuant to the Settlement
Agreement, and Massa repeatedly stated that he does not have any other family
photographs of Stanisic. As such, we find that Stanisic has failed to establish
that Massa engaged in intentional misconduct, so the doctrine of unclean hands
is not applicable. 3
CONCLUSION
[30] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court acted within its
discretion by denying Stanisic’s motion for relief from judgment and appointing
a commissioner to execute a quitclaim deed on Stanisic’s behalf.
[31] Affirmed.
[32] Kirsch, J. and Pyle, J. concur
3
Because we find no intentional misconduct on Massa’s part, we need not address whether the alleged
wrongdoing had “an immediate and necessary relation to the matter being litigated.” Kahn, 36 N.E.3d at
1117.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1507-DR-970 | May 20, 2016 Page 16 of 16