Carla S. Love v. Mauricio Bellido (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                           May 20 2016, 9:38 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                 CLERK
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                         Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    Kristi L. Fox                                            Jeffrey K. Branstetter
    Steven A. Gustafson                                      Blanton, Branstetter & Pierce, LLC
    Fox Law Offices, LLC                                     Jeffersonville, Indiana
    New Albany, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Carla S. Love,                                           May 20, 2016
    Appellant-Petitioner,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    22A01-1510-JP-1683
    v.                                               Appeal from the Floyd Circuit
    Court
    Mauricio Bellido,                                        The Honorable J. Terrence Cody,
    Appellee-Respondent.                                     Judge
    The Honorable Julie F. Flanigan,
    Magistrate
    Trial Court Cause No.
    22C01-1109-JP-116
    Bradford, Judge.
    Case Summary
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1510-JP-1683 | May 20, 2016       Page 1 of 13
    [1]   Appellant-Petitioner Carla Love (“Mother”) filed a petition to modify Appellee-
    Respondent Mauricio Bellido’s (“Father”) child support obligation. The trial
    court denied Mother’s petition. Mother argues that the trial court (1) erred by
    considering her investment accounts as income, (2) abused its discretion in
    denying her petition for modification, and (3) erred by not ordering Father to
    pay a portion of the child’s uninsured medical expenses. We affirm the trial
    court’s decision to include Mother’s investment accounts as income and
    remand with instructions that the trial court (1) make additional findings or
    complete a child support worksheet and (2) determine what amount of
    uninsured medical expenses Father is obligated to pay.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Mother and Father have one child together, born March 14, 2006. Mother
    initiated a paternity action on September 20, 2011. On January 10, 2013, the
    trial court approved an agreed order which provided that Father would pay
    Mother $108 per week in child support. At the time of the 2013 order, both
    Mother and Father lived in the southern Indiana area. In March of 2014,
    Father accepted a higher-paying job in Washington, D.C.
    [3]   On September 25, 2014, Mother filed a petition to modify Father’s child
    support obligation. On July 27, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on Mother’s
    petition. At the hearing, Mother was questioned about the nature of investment
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1510-JP-1683 | May 20, 2016   Page 2 of 13
    income in excess of $80,0001 which she listed on her 2014 tax return but did not
    include in the calculation of her weekly gross income on her child support
    obligation worksheet. Mother testified that her family set up an investment
    account for her retirement which was managed by a broker and the proceeds
    automatically reinvested. Mother did not know whether the investment
    account was an IRA, 401k, or some other type of account. Mother testified that
    she does not draw from her account for day-to-day expenses and withdrew
    $18,000 in 2014 to pay for the child’s medical expenses. The exact nature of the
    investment account was unclear from Mother’s testimony, including whether or
    not Mother could access account funds without permission.
    [4]   On July 28, 2015, the magistrate denied Mother’s petition, finding that Mother
    “fail[ed] to present the complete nature and scope of income or potential
    income available to her.” Appellant’s App. p. 10. Mother filed a petition
    objecting to the magistrate’s ruling and seeking a final appealable order on her
    petition for modification. The trial court judge held a hearing on Mother’s
    petition for a final order and affirmed the magistrate’s ruling.
    Discussion and Decision
    1
    On Mother’s 2014 tax return, she listed the following as income: $17,680 in wages, $2,299 in taxable
    interest, $14,985 in dividends, and $64,976 in capital gains. (Ex. 2) Mother’s adjusted gross income was
    $97,147. (id)
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1510-JP-1683 | May 20, 2016             Page 3 of 13
    [5]   On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court (1) erred by considering her
    investment accounts to be weekly gross income, (2) abused its discretion in
    denying her petition for modification, and (3) erred by not ordering Father to
    pay a portion of the child’s uninsured medical expenses.
    Standard of Review
    [6]           In reviewing the trial court’s decision regarding the modification
    of child support, we reverse only for an abuse of discretion. In re
    Marriage of Kraft, 
    868 N.E.2d 1181
    , 1185 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
    An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against
    the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
    court, including any reasonable inferences therefrom. In re
    Paternity of E.M.P., 
    722 N.E.2d 349
    , 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
    Whether the standard of review is phrased as “abuse of
    discretion” or “clear error,” the importance of first-person
    observation and preventing disruption to the family setting
    justifies deference to the trial court. MacLafferty v. MacLafferty,
    
    829 N.E.2d 938
    , 940-41 (Ind. 2005).
    Holtzleiter v. Holtzleiter, 
    944 N.E.2d 502
    , 505 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Here, the
    trial court issued a general judgment, which we will affirm if sustainable on any
    legal theory consistent with the evidence. 
    Id. “[W]e neither
    reweigh the
    evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses and consider only the evidence
    most favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.
    
    Id. Court of
    Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1510-JP-1683 | May 20, 2016   Page 4 of 13
    I. Mother’s Investment Income
    [7]   Mother argues that the trial court erred by imputing her retirement fund gains
    as income. Mother cites to Carmichael v. Siegel, in which we held that courts
    may not impute IRA earnings as income for the purpose of a parent’s child
    support obligation where there is no indication that previous withdrawals have
    been made to fund the parent’s living expenses. 
    754 N.E.2d 619
    , 629 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2001); see also Ind. Child Support Guideline 3A, cmty. 2(e) (“The annual
    return of an IRA, 401(K) or other retirement plan that is automatically
    reinvested does not constitute income” unless “withdrawals…have been made
    to fund the parent’s lifestyle choices or living expenses.”). In reaching this
    result, we reasoned that “actual weekly gross income,” as contemplated by the
    Indiana Child Support Guidelines (“the Guidelines”), only includes earnings
    that are presently available to the parent “for his or her immediate use.” 
    Id. at 628.
    [8]   In its order denying Mother’s petition, the trial court found that Mother
    “fail[ed] to present the complete nature and scope of income or potential
    income available to her.” Appellant’s App. p. 10. When questioned by the trial
    court at the modification hearing, Mother gave the following testimony
    regarding her investment account:
    Court: Is this money in an account somewhere that you hope to
    use someday in retirement and it’s sold by a broker?
    Mother: What my father set up for me.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1510-JP-1683 | May 20, 2016   Page 5 of 13
    Court: Okay. It’s separate it’s not in – I know what you’re saying.
    It’s not in a savings account but it’s in a brokerage account?
    Mother: Yes.
    Court: And you – if you absolutely had to have it, um, you could
    get to it, is that correct?
    Mother: Yes, that’s correct.
    Court: Okay. What [Father’s counsel] is asking you is, is it held
    in a 401k or an IRA or some other vehicle that would not allow
    you to get to it before a certain age?
    Mother: Well, no, I don’t believe so your honor.
    …
    Court: [I]n order to determine what it is, we need to know what
    kind of account it is. So to your knowledge it is not in an IRA or
    a 401k or any of those tax vehicles?
    Mother: I don’t know your honor.
    Tr. pp. 25-26.
    [9]   As evidenced by Mother’s admission, it is unclear what type of investment
    account Mother has. Mother made a substantial withdrawal in 2014 but it is
    unclear if that was permitted due to a medically-related hardship, or if Mother
    is free to withdraw from her account and is either unaware of this fact or simply
    chooses not to make withdrawals. In any case, the trial court made a factual
    determination that Mother “fail[ed] to present the complete nature and scope of
    income or potential income available to her.” Appellant’s App. p. 10. The trial
    court was thorough in its attempt to determine the nature of Mother’s
    investment account and we are in no better a position to make such a
    determination. Accordingly, Mother’s argument that we reverse the trial
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1510-JP-1683 | May 20, 2016   Page 6 of 13
    court’s factual finding amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which
    we cannot do. 
    Carmichael, 754 N.E.2d at 634
    .
    [10]   Mother argues that Father waived the imputed-income argument by failing to
    submit a child support worksheet. We must disagree. We are aware of no
    authority supporting Mother’s argument that the only manner in which to
    challenge another party’s income calculation is by filing a child support
    worksheet. The issue surrounding Mother’s investment income was repeatedly
    addressed during the modification hearing. We see no reason why
    subsequently declining to file a child support worksheet would waive an
    already-raised argument.
    II. Modification of Child Support
    [11]   Child support orders may only be modified
    (1) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and
    continuing as to make the terms unreasonable; or
    (2) upon a showing that:
    (A) a party has been ordered to pay an amount in child
    support that differs by more than twenty percent (20%)
    from the amount that would be ordered by applying the
    child support guidelines; and
    (B) the order requested to be modified or revoked was
    issued at least twelve (12) months before the petition
    requesting modification was filed.
    Ind. Code § 31-16-8-1. Mother argues that even including her investment
    income in the child support calculation, the increase in Father’s income still
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1510-JP-1683 | May 20, 2016   Page 7 of 13
    justifies a modification in his child support obligation because it would yield a
    change of greater than twenty percent.
    [12]   Once the trial court decided not to exclude Mother’s investment income from
    the worksheet calculation, it suggested that it would craft a new worksheet
    using her total income. Mother submitted her 2014 tax return as evidence
    which showed that her adjusted gross income was $97,147. According to
    Mother’s calculation, using $97,147 for her income along with Father’s new
    income yields a weekly child support obligation of $157 for Father, which is
    approximately a 45% increase from his current obligation of $108. In making
    this calculation, Mother makes three significant assumptions: (1) Father is not
    entitled to a parenting time credit, i.e. the child would stay with him less than
    fifty-two days a year, (2) Father had no weekly work-related childcare expenses,
    and (3) Father’s bonus should be included in his weekly income. Child Supp.
    G. 6; Child Supp. Worksheet. However, each of these facts was disputed at the
    modification hearing.
    [13]   Regarding work-related childcare expenses, Father testified that he incurred
    expenses in the amount of $270 a week for daycare. With regard to Father’s
    income, Mother calculated that Father’s weekly gross income is $1864. In
    reaching this figure, Mother included a bonus Father received from his
    employer that amounted to $158 a week. However, Father testified that this
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1510-JP-1683 | May 20, 2016   Page 8 of 13
    was a one-time bonus, as opposed to a recurring annual bonus, and so should
    not be considered in calculating his gross weekly income. 2
    [14]   As for parenting time, there was evidence that Father would exercise time
    pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.
    Court: [Mother’s counsel] is correct almost in her numbers
    because I come up with 7 times 7 is 49 days in the summer and 7
    [days] of winter is 56 and then 9 days at spring break which
    would be 65 days is what I come up with under the
    guidelines….It’s just commentary but that’s all I really have
    unless there’s been a real pattern.
    Counsel for Mother: I mean, I want to leave it open – I agree
    with you using that as a basis but I do want to leave it open to
    rebuttal on what is actually been exercised.
    Tr. p. 35. When Mother was later asked how much parenting time she
    anticipated Father to exercise in the future, Mother was inconsistent, initially
    saying, “I believe we would go by the Indiana State Guidelines,” tr. p. 39, but
    later predicting that Father would not “have more than 51 overnights,” in a
    year. Tr. p. 54. As the trial court noted, the Indiana Parenting Time
    Guidelines recommend that Father, as the non-custodial parent, is entitled to
    take the child for a total of approximately sixty-five days throughout the year,
    which would entitle Father to a parenting time credit that would reduce his
    support obligation. Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines Section III, cmty. (C).
    2
    Aside from his bonus, Father did not dispute Mother’s calculation of his weekly gross income.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1510-JP-1683 | May 20, 2016                 Page 9 of 13
    [15]   The trial court did not complete a worksheet or make findings on the
    aforementioned contested factual issues. Additionally, Father did not file a
    worksheet which would provide us with guidance on what numbers the trial
    court could have used for these variables. We note that this court “[does] not
    condone [a] trial court’s decision to proceed without verified child support
    worksheets,” and “‘we strongly discourage such a practice and urge trial courts
    in the exercise of their discretion to require verified child support worksheets in
    every case. Failure to do so frustrates not only appellate review but also the
    goals of the child support guidelines.’” Hedrick v. Gilbert, 
    17 N.E.3d 321
    , 327
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Butterfield v. Constantine, 
    864 N.E.2d 414
    , 417
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).
    [16]   Where the failure to complete a worksheet prevents this court from determining
    whether the trial court complied with the Guidelines, we will remand for
    clarification.
    While Child Supp. G. 3(B)(1) does state that the parties “shall”
    file a worksheet, it does not state the consequence of failing to file
    one. The dissent assumes such a failure prevents a trial court
    from entering a support award. A more logical assumption is that
    it prevents the non-complying party from challenging the income
    figures arrived at by the trial court.
    However, because the trial court did not award the amount
    calculated by Young, and made neither findings concerning the
    income it attributed to each party nor completed its own child
    support worksheet, we are unable to determine whether the court
    in fact complied with the child support guidelines. Thus, we must
    remand to the trial court for clarification of its award. If the trial
    court complied with the guidelines, it should enter findings or
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1510-JP-1683 | May 20, 2016   Page 10 of 13
    complete a child support worksheet, detailing how it arrived at
    the $110.00 amount. The findings or worksheet should contain
    the figures assigned for income, child care, health insurance
    premiums and credit for Dye’s support obligations to his other
    children as well as the percentage of support assigned to each
    parent. If the court deviated from the guidelines, it should enter
    findings or provide a worksheet demonstrating its calculations, as
    well as a written finding setting forth the factual basis for the
    deviation. Child Supp. G. 3(F)(2).
    Dye v. Young, 
    655 N.E.2d 549
    , 550-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). Here, as in Dye, the
    trial court neither completed its own child support worksheet nor made findings
    concerning Father’s income, parenting time credit, child care costs, or the
    percentage of support assigned to each parent. As such, we are unable to
    determine whether the trial court complied with the Guidelines.
    [17]   We note that while there may be evidence in the record which supports the
    denial of modification, we will not pick and choose to credit only that evidence
    when Father did not complete a worksheet and there is little or no indication of
    what evidence the trial court found credible or relied upon in reaching its
    decision. To do so would discourage the use of child support worksheets,
    incentivize trial courts to issue conclusory judgments, and ultimately vitiate this
    court’s ability to independently and accurately review those judgments. While
    trial courts are not always required to explain their reasoning, doing so is
    particularly important where, as here, there is a statutory formula which we can
    easily review. Therefore, we remand with instructions that the trial court make
    additional findings or complete a child support worksheet and, if applicable,
    explain why any deviations from the Guidelines are justified. See Beardsley v.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1510-JP-1683 | May 20, 2016   Page 11 of 13
    Heazlitt, 
    654 N.E.2d 1178
    , 1182 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“[A] trial court is required
    to articulate its reasons when its child support order deviates from the result
    which would have been reached under the guidelines.”).
    III. Medical Expenses
    [18]   Mother argues that she is entitled to reimbursement by Father for the child’s
    uninsured medical expenses in 2014 and that the trial court erred in failing to
    order such reimbursement. The trial court made no mention of medical
    expense obligation in its order. The Guidelines provide as follows with regard
    to uninsured medical expenses:
    Ordinary uninsured health care expenses are paid by the parent
    who is assigned to pay the controlled expenses (the parent for
    whom the parenting time credit is not calculated) up to six
    percent (6%) of the basic child support obligation (Line 4 of the
    Child Support Obligation Worksheet). Extraordinary health care
    expenses are those uninsured expenses which are in excess of six
    percent (6%) of the basic obligation, and would include
    uninsured expenses for chronic or long term conditions of a
    child. Calculation of the apportionment of the health care
    expense obligation is a matter separate from the determination of
    the weekly child support obligation. These calculations shall be
    inserted in the space provided on the Worksheet.
    Child Supp. G. 7.
    [19]   Initially, we note that Father made no arguments at the modification hearing as
    to why he would not be responsible for some portion of the child’s uninsured
    medical expenses, nor did he contest the validity or amount of any of the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1510-JP-1683 | May 20, 2016   Page 12 of 13
    expenses submitted by Mother. On appeal, Father argues only that Mother’s
    calculation of his medical expense obligation is based on information outside
    the record on appeal. We disagree. At the modification hearing, Mother
    submitted records and receipts detailing the child’s 2014 uninsured medical
    expenses which amounted to $1,445.11. It appears that these expenses are far
    in excess of six percent of Father’s current yearly obligation and would entitle
    Mother to reimbursement of some portion thereof.3 Accordingly, we remand
    with instructions that the trial court determine what amount of uninsured
    medical expenses Father is obligated to reimburse Mother.
    [20]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and remanded with
    instructions.
    Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    3
    While we cannot make exact determinations with the evidence available to us on appeal, we estimate that
    Father’s current yearly basic obligation is approximately $6,000, six percent of which is $360.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1510-JP-1683 | May 20, 2016          Page 13 of 13