Loretta A. Manier v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), May 26 2016, 8:35 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Derick W. Steele Gregory F. Zoeller
Kokomo, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Angela N. Sanchez
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Loretta A. Manier, May 26, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
34A02-1512-CR-2234
v. Appeal from the Howard Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable George A.
Appellee-Plaintiff Hopkins, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
34D04-1507-F6-85
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Loretta Manier (“Manier”) appeals her conviction for Failure to Register as a
Sex Offender, a Level 6 felony.1 We affirm.
Issues
[2] Manier presents two issues for review:
I. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support her
conviction; and
II. Whether her two-year sentence is inappropriate.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In 2006, Manier was convicted of two counts of Child Molesting as Class B
felonies. She was required to register as a sex offender. In 2014, Manier moved
to Howard County, Indiana and reported to the Howard County Sheriff’s
Office to register as a sex offender. Employee Christina Kline provided Manier
with a sex offender packet including a sex offender registration form. Manier
initialed the form, which included advice of heightened reporting requirements
for persons who were homeless or living in a temporary residence; specifically,
a seven-day reporting requirement.
1
Ind. Code § 11-8-8-12.
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[4] In June of 2015, Manier became homeless. She reported her status to her
probation officer, who advised her to go to the Howard County Sheriff’s Office
to update her sex offender registry information. On June 16, 2015, Manier
appeared at the Sheriff’s Office and reported that she could be staying at four
different places and lacked a permanent address. Employee Donna Bowland
(“Bowland”) obtained Manier’s signature on a Temporary
Residence/Homeless Offender Form which set forth the seven-day reporting
requirement. Manier agreed to return within seven days but she did not do so.
When Manier failed to return by June 23, 2015, Bowland advised her
supervisor of the omission. Manier reported to the Sheriff’s Office on June 29,
2015, July 6, 2015, and July 14, 2015.
[5] On July 20, 2015, Manier came to the Sheriff’s Office and was arrested. She
was charged with failure to report by June 23, 2015. Manier was convicted by a
jury and sentenced to two years imprisonment. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Sufficiency of the Evidence
[6] The State charged that Manier “did knowingly and intentionally fail to report
within the seven day time frame as required for registering as a homeless
offender[.]” (App. at 21.) Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-12 governs registration
when an offender resides in a temporary residence. In particular, subsection (c)
provides:
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A sex or violent offender who does not have a principal residence
or temporary residence shall report in person to the local law
enforcement authority in the county where the sex or violent
offender resides at least once every seven (7) days to report an
address for the location where the sex or violent offender will
stay during the time in which the sex or violent offender lacks a
principal address or temporary residence.
[7] Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well settled.
We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting
the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess
the credibility of witnesses or reweigh evidence. Id. We will affirm the
conviction unless “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726
N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)). “The evidence is sufficient if an inference may
reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.” Id. at 147 (quoting Pickens
v. State, 751 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)).
[8] The State offered testimony and exhibits to establish that Manier, a homeless
person, was aware of her seven-day reporting requirement and failed to comply.
Indeed, Manier does not claim that she lacked knowledge of the seven-day
requirement or that she actually maintained compliance. Rather, she claims
that she “substantially complied” with the reporting requirement. Appellant’s
Br. at 3, 5. Manier suggests that the legislature recognized the transportation
difficulties faced by the homeless and thus, in subsection (c), relaxed the
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requirement from “registering” to “reporting.”2 She then argues that she
substantially complied with the requirement of that subsection by keeping her
parole officer telephonically apprised of her whereabouts on a daily basis from
June 16 to June 29, 2015. We must disagree, as the plain language of
subsection (c) of Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-12 requires that the offender
“report in person to the local law enforcement authority.” (emphasis added.) The
State presented sufficient evidence to support Manier’s conviction.
Appropriateness of Sentence
[9] Upon conviction of a Level 6 felony, Manier faced a sentencing range of between
six months and two and one-half years, with one year as the advisory term. I.C.
§ 35-50-2-7(b). She was sentenced to two years imprisonment.
[10] Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), this “Court may revise a sentence
authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the
Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender.” In performing our review, we assess “the
culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to
others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v.
State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The principal role of such review is
to attempt to leaven the outliers. Id. at 1225. A defendant ‘“must persuade the
2
We observe that Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-4 clarifies that “register means report in person to a local law
enforcement authority and provide the information required[.]”
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appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard
of review.”’ Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Childress v.
State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006)).
[11] As for the nature of the offense, Manier, as a sex offender, failed to report as
required by statute. As to her character, Manier has four prior felony
convictions for Solicitation (Prostitution), Child Abuse, and Child Molesting,
and one prior misdemeanor conviction for Driving While Suspended. She was
on probation at the time she committed the present offenses.
[12] Having reviewed the matter, we conclude that the trial court did not impose an
inappropriate sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B), and the sentence does not
warrant appellate revision. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the sentence
imposed by the trial court.
Conclusion
[13] Sufficient evidence supports Manier’s conviction. The two-year sentence
imposed is not inappropriate.
[14] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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