Eric John Tulk v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be May 26 2016, 9:12 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Randy M. Fisher Gregory F. Zoeller
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Leonard, Hammond, Thoma & Terrill
Lyubov Gore
Fort Wayne, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Eric John Tulk, May 26, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A05-1512-CR-2228
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Wendy W. Davis,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D06-1506-F5-200
Baker, Judge.
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[1] Eric Tulk appeals the aggregate six-year sentence imposed by the trial court
after Tulk was convicted of Dealing in Methamphetamine,1 a Level 5 felony,
Possession of Methamphetamine,2 a Level 6 felony, and Possession of
Chemical Reagents or Precursors With Intent to Manufacture, 3 a Level 6
felony. Tulk argues that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to find
one of his proffered mitigators and that the sentence is inappropriate in light of
the nature of the offenses and his character. Finding no error and that the
sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.
Facts
[2] In early June 2015, Tulk and his wife were evicted from their home and began
staying with Tulk’s friend, William Snare. Tulk and his wife stayed in the
Snares’ garage while Snare, his wife, and their two minor children lived in the
home. At some point, detectives with the Fort Wayne Police Department
became suspicious about possible drug-related activity and began surveilling the
Snares’ home.
[3] Based on their observations, the detectives obtained a search warrant, which
they executed on June 23, 2015. The detectives found Tulk and his wife in the
garage with an active methamphetamine lab. The garage also contained
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1.
2
I.C. § 35-48-4-6.1.
3
I.C. § 35-48-4-14.5.
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precursors and products consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamine,
including bottles of “liquid fire,” coffee filters, chunks of lithium, pen tubes, and
straws that tested positive for methamphetamine. Tr. p. 96-98. When Tulk was
taken into custody, he smelled strongly of chemicals associated with the
manufacture of methamphetamine. The Snares’ two children, who were in the
home when the search warrant was executed, were taken into custody by the
Department of Child Services. The Snares’ garage had to be condemned as a
result of the dangerous chemicals present in the building.
[4] On June 29, 2015, the State charged Tulk with Level 5 felony dealing in
methamphetamine, Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6
felony possession of chemical reagents or precursors with intent to
manufacture, and class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Following
Tulk’s November 3 and 4, 2015, jury trial, the jury found him guilty of the first
three offenses and not guilty of the last. The trial court held a sentencing
hearing on November 23, 2015, and sentenced Tulk to concurrent terms of six
years for dealing in methamphetamine and two years each for possession of
methamphetamine and possession of chemical reagents or precursors. Tulk
now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Mitigating Factor
[5] First, Tulk argues that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to find
his history of substance abuse as a mitigating factor. We will review the trial
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court’s decision in this regard for an abuse of discretion. A trial court may
impose any sentence authorized by statute and must provide a sentencing
statement that gives a reasonably detailed recitation of the trial court’s reasons
for imposing a particular sentence. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490
(Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). The trial court is not
required to accept a defendant’s arguments as to what constitutes a mitigating
factor, nor is it required to explain why it did not find a factor to be mitigating.
Sherwood v. State, 749 N.E.2d 36, 38 (Ind. 2001); Page v. State, 878 N.E.2d 404,
408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[6] While a history of substance abuse may be mitigating, this Court has held that
“when a defendant is aware of a substance abuse problem but has not taken
appropriate steps to treat it, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by
rejecting the addiction as a mitigating circumstance.” Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d
977, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Here, Tulk states that he has had a substance
abuse problem since the age of fifteen. He admits that throughout his life he
has abused alcohol, marijuana, powder cocaine, crack cocaine, LSD, heroin,
mushrooms, methamphetamine, and opiate prescription pills. He is now forty-
four years old, but in the three decades during which he has experienced
substance abuse issues, he has participated in substance abuse treatment only
once through the Department of Correction. By his own admission, Tulk’s
substance abuse problem has caused him to commit crimes in the past. Given
that Tulk has done little to nothing to address his substance abuse problem, we
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find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to find this to be
a mitigator.
II. Appropriateness
[7] Tulk also argues, pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), that the aggregate
six-year sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offenses and his character. Rule 7(B) provides that this Court may
revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender. We must “conduct [this] review with substantial
deference and give ‘due consideration’ to the trial court’s decision—since the
‘principal role of [our] review is to attempt to leaven the outliers,’ and not to
achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence . . . .” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274,
1292 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2013))
(internal citations omitted).
[8] Here, Tulk was convicted of one Level 5 felony and two Level 6 felonies. For
the Level 5 felony, Tulk faced a sentence of one to six years, with an advisory
term of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6. Tulk received a maximum six-year
term. For the Level 6 felonies, Tulk faced sentences of six months to two and
one-half years, with an advisory term of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7. He
received a two-year term for each of these convictions. All terms were ordered
to be served concurrently, meaning Tulk received an aggregate sentence of six
years. Additionally, the trial court placed Tulk into a therapeutic incarceration
community that is specifically targeted at ameliorating his methamphetamine
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use, and also noted that it would consider modifying his sentence upon his
successful completion of that program.
[9] As for the nature of Tulk’s offenses, he was manufacturing methamphetamine
at a home in which he was staying as a guest. There were two minor children
present in the home while he was manufacturing the drug. Our Supreme Court
has recognized that the process of manufacturing methamphetamine is very
dangerous and poses a high risk of explosion and fire. Holder v. State, 847
N.E.2d 930, 939-40 (Ind. 2006). Tulk’s actions placed multiple innocent lives
in immediate danger. Moreover, the Snares’ home was raided by a SWAT
team, two children were taken into custody by the Department of Child
Services, and the garage had to be condemned because of the hazardous
chemicals, all as a result of Tulk’s actions. We do not find that the nature of
Tulk’s offenses aids his inappropriateness argument.
[10] With respect to Tulk’s character, we observe that he has a lengthy and
significant criminal history. Specifically, he has amassed six juvenile
adjudications, three misdemeanor convictions, and eight felony convictions,
across two states. Tulk has five prior convictions for burglary alone, which he
admits were committed to support his substance abuse behaviors. He has been
afforded lenient sentences in the past, including probation and parole on
multiple occasions, but has violated the terms of those lenient sentences at least
four times. All prior attempts to rehabilitate Tulk have failed, and his behavior
creates a threat to the community. His character evinces an unwillingness or
inability to respect the rule of law and his fellow citizens.
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[11] The trial court told Tulk that “I’m not sure what else the County can do for
you. We’ve done everything we can, and rehabilitation has failed.” Tr. p. 11.
Given this record, we cannot say that the trial court erred in drawing this
conclusion. We note that the trial court showed admirable leniency in placing
Tulk in a therapeutic incarceration community and in remaining open to
modifying Tulk’s sentence if he successfully completes that program. In sum,
we find that the aggregate six-year sentence imposed by the trial court is not
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and Tulk’s character.
[12] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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