Shaquille Q. Delaney v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Jun 08 2016, 8:29 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Gary L Griner Gregory F. Zoeller
Mishawaka, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Shaquille Q. Delaney, June 8, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
71A03-1601-CR-79
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Hon. Jenny Pitts Manier, Judge
The Hon. Elizabeth A. Hardtke,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No. 71D08-1507-
CM-2577
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] On July 18, 2015, Appellant-Defendant Shaquille Delaney and Sharpree
Jackson were in a relationship and were watching television at Jackson’s house
along with Jackson’s seven-month-old son, Jackson’s friend Shartesha Suggs,
and Suggs’s two-year-old daughter. Jackson asked Delaney if he knew where
her mobile telephone charger was, which he took as accusatory. The incident
escalated, and eventually Delaney poked Jackson in the face, scratched her in
several places, ripped her shirt, and shoved her. Appellee-Plaintiff the State of
Indiana (“the State”) charged Delaney with Class A misdemeanor battery, and
the trial court found him guilty as charged. Delaney contends that the charging
information was insufficient to put him on notice of the charge against him and
that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction.
Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On July 18, 2015, Jackson lived in her home in Mishawaka and was in a
relationship with Delaney. That day, Delaney, Suggs, and Jackson’s and
Suggs’s children were in Jackson’s living room watching television when
Jackson went upstairs to look for her mobile telephone charger. Jackson could
not find the charger, and asked Delaney about it because it was “not the first
time things done came up missing.” Tr. pp. 9-10. Delaney told Jackson that
she needed to go find it and called her an “idiotic b****.” Tr. p. 10.
[3] Jackson told Delaney to leave, but Delaney went upstairs instead, apparently
locating Jackson’s charger. Delaney returned with Jackson’s charger and
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demanded an apology. Delaney began poking Jackson in the face, provoking
her and still demanding an apology. Although Jackson did not fight back,
Delaney followed her around the house, “restraining [her] and pulling [her]
down and pushing [her.]” Tr. p. 10. At one point, Delaney tried to grab
Jackson and ripped her shirt. After a while, Jackson was “all out of breath
crying and yelling[.]” Tr. pp. 10-11. When Suggs called police and they
arrived, Delaney threatened Jackson, saying, “I know where you stay” and
telling her not to say anything. Tr. p. 11. Jackson suffered scratches to her
arm, face, and neck and her shirt was bloodied.
[4] On July 20, 2015, the State charged Delany with Class A misdemeanor battery,
specifically, that “[o]n or about July 18, 2015, in St. Joseph County, State of
Indiana, Shaquille Quentin Delaney did knowingly touch Shapree L. Jackson
in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, resulting in bodily injury.” Appellant’s
App. p. 5. On August 8, 2015, a bench trial was conducted, after which the
trial court found Delaney guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Delaney
to 180 days of incarceration, with 90 suspended, and ordered that Delaney
spend 365 days on probation.
Discussion and Decision
I. Specificity of the Charging Information
[5] Indiana Code section 35-34-1-2(a) provides as follows:
(a) The indictment or information shall be in writing and allege
the commission of an offense by:
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(1) stating the title of the action and the name of the court in
which the indictment or information is filed;
(2) stating the name of the offense in the words of the statute
or any other words conveying the same meaning;
(3) citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated,
except that any failure to include such a citation or any error
in such a citation does not constitute grounds for reversal of a
conviction where the defendant was not otherwise misled as
to the nature of the charges against the defendant;
(4) setting forth the nature and elements of the offense
charged in plain and concise language without unnecessary
repetition;
(5) stating the date of the offense with sufficient particularity
to show that the offense was committed within the period of
limitations applicable to that offense;
(6) stating the time of the offense as definitely as can be done
if time is of the essence of the offense;
(7) stating the place of the offense with sufficient particularity
to show that the offense was committed within the
jurisdiction of the court where the charge is to be filed;
(8) stating the place of the offense as definitely as can be done
if the place is of the essence of the offense; and
(9) stating the name of every defendant, if known, and if not
known, by designating the defendant by any name or
description by which he can be identified with reasonable
certainty.
[6] “The purpose of the charging information is to provide a defendant with notice
of the crime of which he is charged so that he is able to prepare a defense.”
Gilliland v. State, 979 N.E.2d 1049, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The State is
under no obligation to include detailed factual allegations; rather, a charging
information satisfies due process if it “enables an accused, the court, and the
jury to determine the crime for which conviction is sought.” Id. at 1061.
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“Errors in the information are fatal only if they mislead the defendant or fail to
give him notice of the charge filed against him.” Id.
[7] As an initial matter, Delaney acknowledges that he did not object to the
charging information below and has waived the claim for appellate review. See
Wilhoite v. State, 7 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Delaney, however,
seeks to avoid the effects of his waiver by contending that the charging
information was so defective as to constitute fundamental error. Fundamental
error is “error so egregious that reversal of a criminal conviction is required
even if no objection to the error is registered at trial.” Hopkins v. State, 782
N.E.2d 988, 991 (Ind. 2003). The standard for fundamental error is whether
the error was so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant that a fair trial was
impossible. Krumm v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1170, 1181-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
Fundamental error requires prejudice to the defendant. Hopkins, 782 N.E.2d at
991.
[8] Delaney contends that the charging information was defective for failing to
specify the precise nature of the touching he committed or the injury that he
caused. Such detailed pleading, however, is not required. “[T]o be sufficient, a
charging information generally needs only contain a statement of the ‘essential
facts constituting the offense charged,’ as well as the statutory citation, the time
and place of the commission of the offense, the identity of the victim (if any),
and the weapon used (if any).” Pavlovich v. State, 6 N.E.3d 969, 975 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014) (quoting Laney v. State, 868 N.E.2d 561, 566-567 (Ind. Ct. App.
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2007), trans. denied.). “The State is not required to include detailed factual
allegations in a charging information.” Laney, 868 N.E.2d at 567.
[9] We conclude that the charging information in this case was not so deficient as
to constitute error, much less fundamental error. The charging information
included all of the statutory elements of Class A misdemeanor battery, the time
and place of the alleged commission, the identities of the defendant and victim,
the relevant statutory citations, and a list of potential witnesses. Delaney cites
to no authority that more specificity is required, and our research has uncovered
none. Delaney has failed to establish fundamental error in this regard. See, e.g.,
Moody v. State, 448 N.E.2d 660, 662 (Ind. 1983) (concluding that charging
information was adequately specific even though it did not “disclose either the
bodily injury suffered by [the victim] or the specific conduct on appellant’s part
that led to the injury”).
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[10] Delaney contends that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain
his convictions for battery, specifically that the State did not establish that he
“knowingly” touched Jackson in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. “A person
engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware
of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither weigh the evidence nor
resolve questions of credibility. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind.
1995). We look only to the evidence of probative value and the reasonable
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inferences to be drawn therefrom which support the verdict. Id. If from that
viewpoint there is evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of
fact could conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
we will affirm the conviction. Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 724 (Ind.
1993).
[11] Delaney argues that the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the
evidence presented at trial was that Jackson was the aggressor and that any
touching Delaney may have done was incidental or not intended to cause
injury. While expressing no opinion on whether the trial court could have found
that Jackson was the aggressor, it did not, and the only question before us is
whether that finding is supported by the record. We conclude that it is.
[12] Jackson testified that Delaney became angry when asked about Jackson’s
telephone charger and, when asked to leave, started poking Jackson in the face
while following her. Jackson testified that she did not fight back while Delaney
poked, scratched, pulled, and pushed her and ripped her shirt. Suggs, the
State’s other witness, corroborated Jackson’s version of events, testifying that
Delaney was pushing and shoving Jackson and “got in her face[.]” Tr. p. 39.
Suggs also testified that although she did not actually see Delaney “poking”
Jackson in the face, she did see him “pointing.” Tr. p. 41. Suggs did not see
Jackson put her hands on Delaney. Delaney testified that Jackson became
angry when he denied taking her telephone charger and scratched him on the
arm with a wrist band. Delaney testified that this was the extent of the physical
conflict between him and Jackson on July 18, 2015. The trial court, however,
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was not required to credit this testimony and did not. Delaney’s argument
amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we
may not do. See Jordan, 656 N.E.2d at 817.
[13] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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