Ronald M. Marshall v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Nov 26 2018, 8:25 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Thomas A. Whitsitt Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Alexander S. Kruse Attorney General of Indiana
Whitsitt Nooning & Kruse, P.C.
Lebanon, Indiana Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ronald M. Marshall, November 26, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-843
v. Appeal from the Boone Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Matthew C.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Kincaid, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
06D01-1703-F5-232
Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-843 | November 26, 2018 Page 1 of 15
Statement of the Case
[1] Ronald M. Marshall appeals his convictions for three counts of child
exploitation, as Level 5 felonies, and two counts of voyeurism, as Level 6
felonies, following a jury trial. Marshall presents the following consolidated
and restated issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted evidence of his prior bad acts.
2. Whether he was denied the effective assistance of trial
counsel.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On February 19, 2017, Marshall’s eleven-year-old granddaughter F.M. and her
friend were visiting at Marshall’s house in Lebanon. At some point in the
evening, F.M. texted her mother, Heather Marshall, to report that Marshall
“was being sexually inappropriate in front of her and her friend,” and F.M.
wanted Heather “to come get her right away.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 242. When
Heather arrived at Marshall’s house, she checked the footage from a
surveillance camera Marshall had set up to monitor the backyard, which is
where F.M. had stated that the inappropriate behavior had occurred. After
watching the footage, which showed Marshall exposing himself and
masturbating in front of F.M. and her friend, Heather called the police.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-843 | November 26, 2018 Page 2 of 15
[4] Officers with the Lebanon Police Department arrived at Marshall’s house to
investigate. Lieutenant Rich Mount called Detective Tony Bayles and
conveyed the results of his initial investigation, which led Detective Bayles to
apply for and obtain a search warrant “to search for computer[s], cell phones,
cameras or other such devices capable of storing photographs, video or other
digital media.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 16. During the search of Marshall’s
house, Detective Bayles found a micro SD card. When he looked at the digital
files on that SD card a few days later, he found five videos. Two of the videos
depicted Marshall’s then twelve-year-old granddaughter A.R. naked and
entering and exiting the shower in Marshall’s bathroom. One video depicted
A.R. naked in a guest bedroom in Marshall’s house. One video depicted an
adult female using the toilet in Marshall’s bathroom. And the final video
depicted Marshall entering his bathroom and holding a remote-control device
for a hidden camera in the bathroom.
[5] After seeing the videos, Detective Bayles obtained a second search warrant for
Marshall’s home “to search for covert devices” such as “cameras that were
maybe disguised as other items or hidden cameras.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 166. When
he executed that warrant, Detective Bayles found: two digital clocks with
pinhole cameras and SD card slots in them; a clock radio with a pinhole camera
and SD card slot in it; and two remotes for the cameras. A subsequent search
of Marshall’s cell phone revealed that he had run a search on the internet for
“nude teens.” Tr. Vol. 5 at 221.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-843 | November 26, 2018 Page 3 of 15
[6] The State charged Marshall with three counts of child exploitation, as Level 5
felonies; three counts of possession of child pornography, Level 6 felonies; and
two counts of voyeurism, as Level 6 felonies. Each of the charges related to one
of the three videos of A.R. in a state of undress.1 Prior to trial, the State filed a
notice of intent to file evidence of two of Marshall’s prior bad acts under Trial
Rule 404(b), namely, that Marshall had surreptitiously made a video depicting a
woman using the toilet in his bathroom and that Marshall had masturbated in
front of two young girls. Marshall filed a motion in limine to prohibit the State
from introducing the following evidence: testimony regarding VHS tapes
depicting child pornography allegedly in Marshall’s possession; the video of the
woman using his bathroom; and the internet search for “nude teens” found on
his cell phone. Following a hearing, the State agreed not to present evidence
regarding Marshall’s masturbating in front of the two young girls unless
Marshall introduced evidence of contrary intent relevant to the charges filed.
And the trial court ruled that the State could introduce into evidence the video
of the woman using the toilet in his bathroom, but the court prohibited the State
from introducing evidence of the VHS tapes or the internet search for “nude
teens.”
[7] During the jury trial, the State introduced into evidence over Marshall’s
objection the video of the woman using the toilet in his bathroom. And during
cross-examination of Detective Bayles, Marshall asked him whether, in
1
Under a separate cause number, the State charged Marshall with child solicitation and two counts of
performing sexual conduct in the presence of a minor for masturbating in front of F.M. and her friend.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-843 | November 26, 2018 Page 4 of 15
addition to taking “covert pictures of people,” the covert cameras could also be
used for security purposes. Tr. Vol. 2 at 184. On the State’s ensuing motion,
the trial court ruled that, by eliciting testimony supporting a notion of contrary
intent by Marshall, Marshall had opened the door to the evidence that he had
masturbated in front of F.M. and her friend, which had led to the first search
warrant, and that he had searched for “nude teens” on his cell phone.
[8] The jury found Marshall guilty as charged. But the trial court entered judgment
of conviction only on three counts of child exploitation, as Level 5 felonies, and
two counts of voyeurism, as Level 6 felonies, all related to the videos of A.R.
The court imposed an aggregate sentence of eight years, with five years
executed and three years suspended. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Admission of Evidence
[9] Marshall first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted certain evidence. As the Indiana Supreme Court has stated:
Generally, a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence is
accorded “a great deal of deference” on appeal. Tynes v. State,
650 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ind. 1995). “Because the trial court is best
able to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, we
review its rulings on admissibility for abuse of discretion” and
only reverse “if a ruling is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party’s
substantial rights.’” Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind.
2014) (quoting Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind.2013)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-843 | November 26, 2018 Page 5 of 15
Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015).
[10] Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides in relevant part that evidence of a prior
crime or other act is “not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.” But such evidence may be admissible to prove motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident. Id. The standard for assessing the admissibility of Rule 404(b)
evidence is: (1) the court must determine that the evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant’s
propensity to commit the charged act; and (2) the court must balance the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule
403. Bishop v. State, 40 N.E.3d 935, 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.
[11] Indiana Evidence Rule 403 states that a trial court “may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . .
unfair prejudice . . . .” The Indiana Supreme Court has explained the trial
court’s broad discretion to apply Rule 403:
“Trial judges are called trial judges for a reason. The reason is
that they conduct trials. Admitting or excluding evidence is what
they do.” United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 288 (4th Cir. 2017)
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting). That’s why trial judges have
discretion in making evidentiary decisions. This discretion
means that, in many cases, trial judges have options. They can
admit or exclude evidence, and we won’t meddle with that
decision on appeal. See Smoote v. State, 708 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind.
1999). There are good reasons for this. “Our instincts are less
practiced than those of the trial bench and our sense for the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-843 | November 26, 2018 Page 6 of 15
rhythms of a trial less sure.” Hall, 858 F.3d at 289. And trial
courts are far better at weighing evidence and assessing witness
credibility. Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014).
In sum, our vantage point—in a “far corner of the upper deck”—
does not provide as clear a view. State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180,
1185 (Ind. 2014).
***
The unfair prejudice from [the challenged evidence] . . . was not
so high that it overrode the trial court’s wide discretion. See
Dunlap[ v. State], 761 N.E.2d [837, 842 (Ind. 2002)]. We thus
decline to second-guess the trial court’s determination that the
[evidence’s] relevance . . . was not substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court could have
admitted or excluded the [evidence]. The trial court chose
admission. . . .
Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 177, 179 (Ind. 2017).
Video of Woman Using Toilet
[12] Marshall first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted into evidence over his objection the video of an unidentified woman
in a state of undress using the toilet in his bathroom. Marshall maintains that
the video was not relevant to the charged offenses and that, even if it were
relevant, the prejudice substantially outweighed any relevance. At the hearing
on the motion in limine, the State argued that the video was admissible under
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-843 | November 26, 2018 Page 7 of 15
Rule 404(B) to prove absence of mistake, lack of accident, plan, and
knowledge.2
[13] We agree with the State that the challenged video was admissible to prove
absence of mistake. Initially, we note that “[u]se of ‘absence of mistake or
accident’ evidence does not require the defendant to assert a specific contrary
intent because the evidence often goes to other relevant matters, as well, such as
motive or relationship between the defendant and the victim.” 12 Robert
Lowell Miller, Jr., Indiana Practice: Indiana Evidence § 404.229 (4th ed. Supp.
Aug. 2018).
[14] Here, the video in question showed a woman in a state of undress using the
toilet in Marshall’s bathroom, and the video was found on the same SD card as
the video that depicted A.R. naked in the same bathroom. Both videos used the
same hidden camera operated by remote control. Because both videos were
obtained using a hidden camera and depict people in a state of undress, the
video of the woman using the toilet tends to prove an absence of mistake. That
is, it tends to prove that Marshall was not accidentally recording people in a
state of undress in his bathroom, but that he was purposely seeking to obtain
such videos. See, e.g., Nicholson v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1096, 1100 (Ind. 2012)
(holding prior instance of stalking against same victims admissible to show
absence of mistake, specifically, that defendant was not dialing a random phone
2
Because the State proffered this evidence before Marshall opened the door to permit evidence relevant to
his intent, the intent exception to the prohibition against evidence of prior bad acts does not apply here.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-843 | November 26, 2018 Page 8 of 15
number). And, given that the challenged video featured an adult woman in a
state of undress rather than a child, we cannot say that the unfair prejudice to
Marshall was so high that it overrode the trial court’s wide discretion. See
Snow, 77 N.E.3d at 179. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it admitted the video into evidence.
Video of Marshall Masturbating in Front of Two Young Girls
and Internet Search for “Nude Teens”
[15] Marshall next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it found
that he had opened the door to permit evidence relevant to the issue of his
intent. The intent exception to Evidence Rule 404(b) is available only when a
defendant goes beyond merely denying the charged culpability and alleges a
particular contrary intent, whether in opening statement, by cross-examination
of the State’s witnesses, or by presentation in defendant’s own case-in-chief.
Lafayette v. State, 917 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 2009); Wickizer v. State, 626 N.E.2d
795, 799 (Ind. 1993). The State can respond by offering evidence of prior
crimes, wrongs, or acts to the extent genuinely relevant to prove the defendant’s
intent at the time of the charged offense. Id. The trial court must then conduct
an Evidence Rule 403 analysis to determine if the “probative value [of the
evidence of prior bad acts] is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Id.[16] Here, during cross-examination of Detective Bayles, defense counsel asked
whether the hidden cameras Marshall had around the house had been a part of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-843 | November 26, 2018 Page 9 of 15
“fun time” with his kids when they were little, where they would try to find the
hidden cameras in the house. Tr. Vol. II at 184. Defense counsel also asked
Detective Bayles whether the hidden cameras could be used “for security.” Id.Detective Bayles answered in the affirmative to both questions. Because those
questions elicited testimony from Detective Bayles that suggested the
surreptitiously placed cameras were actually placed with innocent intent, we
agree with the State that Marshall asserted a particular contrary intent and
opened the door to Rule 404(b) evidence relevant to his intent.
[17] Thus, we turn to whether the trial court abused its discretion when it weighed
the value of that evidence under Rule 403. Again, we will not second-guess the
trial court’s determination that the evidence’s relevance was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Snow, 77 N.E.3d at 179. On that
question, we cannot say the trial court erred when it concluded that the
relevance of the challenged evidence was not substantially outweighed by the
prejudice to Marshall. Contrary to Marshall’s suggestion that he had made
videos of A.R. in a state of undress without any intent to arouse his sexual
desires, see Ind. Code § 35-42-4-4(b) (2016), the evidence that he had
masturbated in front of F.M. and her friend and that he had searched the
internet for “nude teens” is highly probative of his intent and ultimately his
guilt. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the
challenged evidence at trial.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-843 | November 26, 2018 Page 10 of 15
Issue Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
[18] Marshall also contends that he received ineffective assistance from his trial
counsel.
When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we
apply the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). See Helton v.
State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ind. 2009). To satisfy the first
prong, “the defendant must show deficient performance:
representation that fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant
did not have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”
McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002) (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052). To satisfy the
second prong, “the defendant must show prejudice: a reasonable
probability (i.e. a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052).
Id. at 274.
There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment. Counsel is afforded
considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and these
decisions are entitled to deferential review. Isolated mistakes,
poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do
not necessarily render representation ineffective.
Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746-47 (Ind. 2002) (citations omitted). The two
prongs of the Strickland test are separate and independent inquiries. Williams v.
State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 154 (Ind. 1999). “Thus, ‘[i]f it is easier to dispose of an
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-843 | November 26, 2018 Page 11 of 15
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that
course should be followed.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct.
2052).
[19] Marshall alleges that his trial counsel’s representation was deficient in several
respects, namely, when he: did not file a motion in limine with respect to the
evidence that he masturbated in front of F.M. and her friend; elicited testimony
from Detective Bayles about other uses for the cameras, thus opening the door
to the other evidence of prior bad acts; did not “preemptively ask for a limiting
instruction” with respect to the video of the woman using the toilet when the
court asked him about it at a pretrial hearing; did not ask for limiting
instructions with respect to certain evidence introduced at trial; and did not
make a hearsay objection when Heather testified about F.M.’s text to her the
night of his arrest. We address each contention in turn.
Motion in Limine
[20] Marshall contends that his trial counsel should have included in his motion in
limine the evidence that he had masturbated in front of F.M. and her friend.
But Marshall cannot show that he was prejudiced by this decision because,
during the pretrial hearing addressing the State’s notice to introduce Rule
404(b) evidence, the trial court ruled that that evidence would not be allowed
unless Marshall opened the door to the issue of intent. Further, his trial counsel
objected to that evidence at trial. Accordingly, Marshall was not denied the
effective assistance of trial counsel in this respect.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-843 | November 26, 2018 Page 12 of 15
Cross-examination of Detective Bayles
[21] Marshall contends that his trial counsel should not have elicited testimony from
Detective Bayles that opened the door to Rule 404(b) evidence relevant to
Marshall’s intent. And Marshall maintains that the prejudice to him was
obvious, in that it led to the admission of the evidence of his masturbating in
front of F.M. and her friend and his internet search for “nude teens.” But the
State describes trial counsel’s cross-examination of Detective Bayles as “a
strategic calculation that ultimately failed.” Appellee’s Br. at 25. In particular,
the State asserts that the suggestion of innocuous uses for the cameras was
necessary “to provide or suggest an alternative explanation for why covert
cameras were secretly filming people in Marshall’s home.” Id.[22] The choice of defense theory is a matter of trial strategy. Benefield v. State, 945
N.E.2d 791, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Counsel is given “‘significant deference
in choosing a strategy which, at the time and under the circumstances, he or she
deems best.’” Id. (quoting Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ind. 1997)).
“‘A reviewing court will not second-guess the propriety of trial counsel’s
tactics.’” Id. (quoting Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441, 446 (Ind. 2002)).
“‘[T]rial strategy is not subject to attack through an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, unless the strategy is so deficient or unreasonable as to fall
outside of the objective standard of reasonableness.’” Id. (quoting Autrey v.
State, 700 N.E.2d 1140, 1141 (Ind. 1998)). “‘This is so even when such choices
may be subject to criticism or the choice ultimately prove[s] detrimental to the
defendant.’” Id. (quoting Autrey, 700 N.E.2d at 1141).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-843 | November 26, 2018 Page 13 of 15
[23] We agree with the State that trial counsel’s cross-examination of Detective
Bayles eliciting testimony that the hidden cameras could be used for innocuous
purposes was a reasonable trial strategy, even though that strategy ultimately
proved detrimental to Marshall. See id. Marshall could offer no other
explanation for why he had the videos of A.R. in a state of undress.
Accordingly, we cannot say Marshall was denied the effective assistance of trial
counsel in this respect.
Limiting Instructions
[24] Marshall contends that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient when,
during a pretrial hearing, he did not “preemptively” ask for a limiting
instruction on the video of the woman using the toilet and when, during trial,
he did not ask for limiting instructions on the evidence regarding his
masturbating in front of F.M. and her friend and regarding his internet search
for “nude teens.” But, as this court has observed, “admonishments are double-
edged swords. On the one hand, they can help focus the jury on the proper
considerations for admitted evidence. However, on the other hand, they can
draw unnecessary attention to unfavorable aspects of the evidence.” Merritt v.
State, 99 N.E.3d 706, 710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. Accordingly, we
cannot say that trial counsel’s choice to not seek limiting instructions was an
unreasonable strategy. And, in any event, the trial court gave a limiting
instruction for the evidence that Marshall masturbated in front of the girls and
the internet search. Marshall cannot show that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel on this basis.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-843 | November 26, 2018 Page 14 of 15
Alleged Hearsay
[25] Finally, Marshall contends that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient
when he did not object to Heather’s testimony regarding F.M.’s text message to
her stating that Marshall “was being sexually inappropriate in front of her and
her friend” and that F.M. wanted Heather “to come get her right away.” Tr.
Vol. 2 at 242. Marshall maintains that that testimony was inadmissible
hearsay. However, as the State correctly points out, that testimony was
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule as a “present sense impression.”
Ind. Evidence Rule 803(1). Thus, Marshall cannot show that his trial counsel’s
assistance was ineffective on this basis.
[26] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-843 | November 26, 2018 Page 15 of 15