Carlos Hernandez-Cabrera v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Nov 29 2018, 6:02 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David W. Stone IV Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Chandra K. Hein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Carlos Hernandez-Cabrera, November 29, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1302
v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Angela Warner
Appellee-Plaintiff. Sims, Judge.
Trial Court Cause No.
48C01-1609-F6-1838
Tavitas, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Carlos Hernandez-Cabrera appeals his convictions for possession of
methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony; possession of paraphernalia, a Class C
misdemeanor; and maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6 felony. We
affirm in part and reverse in part.
Issues
[2] Hernandez-Cabrera states three issues in his brief, which we restate as follows:
I. Whether the evidence is sufficient to convict Hernandez-
Cabrera of possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6
felony, and possession of paraphernalia, a Class C
misdemeanor.
II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to convict Hernandez-
Cabrera of maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6
felony.
III. Whether Hernandez-Cabrera’s convictions for possession
of methamphetamine and maintaining a common
nuisance violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.
Facts
[3] On September 7, 2016, Officer Zach Sieg and Officer Bert Chambers of the
Anderson Police Department went to a house in Anderson to serve an arrest
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warrant. 1 The State did not present evidence on why the police went to that
particular house to serve a warrant on Hernandez-Cabrera, who owned the
house, or who lived in the house. When the officers knocked on the door, an
unknown child between eight and ten years of age answered the door. The
officers entered the house and went to a small bedroom inside. There, the
officers found Hernandez-Cabrera sleeping in his boxers on the bed. The
officers also noticed two glass smoking pipes on the floor next to the bed and an
additional glass smoking pipe next to a “small baggie with crystal-like
substance” on a table in the closet. Tr. Vol. II p. 45. The closet door was a
curtain, which was already pulled back when the officers entered the room.
The closet’s proximity to the door made the contents of the closet easily visible
to the officers once they walked into the bedroom. Hernandez-Cabrera was
then taken into custody based on the officers’ observations of the drugs and
drug paraphernalia. After Hernandez-Cabrera was taken into custody, he
picked up his clothes, which were lying on the floor directly next to the two
glass smoking pipes, and got dressed. Other than Hernandez-Cabrera’s clothes
on the floor, it is not clear whether the bedroom was Hernandez Cabrera’s, or
even whether the room belonged to a male or female. 2
1
The fact that officers went to serve a warrant on Hernandez-Cabrera himself was not discussed in front of
the jury per court order. Instead, Officer Sieg merely testified that he went to serve a warrant, and the jury
was not told explicitly that the warrant was for Hernandez-Cabrera.
2
In reviewing the State’s exhibits, which include photographs of the bedroom, contents of the bedroom
included: food, trash, cell phones, cell phone chargers, loose change, scissors, vitamins, men’s razors,
women’s hygiene products, alcohol, cough drops, several sweatshirts and jackets, a television, and other
various unidentified items.
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[4] Officers cleared the house to ensure that no one other than Hernandez-Cabrera
and the child who answered the door was in the house. Officer Chambers
stated that later that evening, two adult females and two or three more children
arrived at the house. The officers did not know the identities of the children,
who the children’s parents were, or whether the children lived in the home.
Hernandez-Cabrera never admitted the items in the bedroom belonged to him.
The substance found in the closet tested positive for methamphetamine.
[5] The State charged Hernandez-Cabrera with Count I, possession of
methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony; and Count II, possession of paraphernalia,
a Class C misdemeanor. The State later added Count III, maintaining a
common nuisance, a Level 6 felony. A jury convicted Hernandez-Cabrera of
all three counts. Hernandez-Cabrera was sentenced to two and one-half years
for Count I; sixty days for Count II; and two and one-half years for Count III,
with his sentence to be served concurrently at the Department of Correction.
Hernandez-Cabrera received an aggregate sentence of two and one-half years.
Hernandez-Cabrera now appeals.
Analysis
[6] Hernandez-Cabrera challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for all three of his
convictions. When there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e
neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State, 51
N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016) (citing Bieghler v. State, 481 N.E.2d 78, 84 (Ind.
1985), cert. denied). Instead, “we ‘consider only that evidence most favorable to
the judgment together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.’” Id.
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(quoting Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d at 84). “We will affirm the judgment if it is
supported by ‘substantial evidence of probative value even if there is some
conflict in that evidence.’” Id. (quoting Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d at 84); see also
McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 558 (Ind. 2018) (holding that, even though
there was conflicting evidence, it was “beside the point” because that argument
“misapprehend[s] our limited role as a reviewing court”). Further, “[w]e will
affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696
(Ind. 2017) (citing Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)).
I. The Possession of Methamphetamine and Possession of
Paraphernalia Convictions
[7] Hernandez-Cabrera was convicted of two separate possession offenses. First,
Hernandez-Cabrera was convicted of possession of methamphetamine, a Level
6 felony, under Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-6.1(a). Indiana Code Section 35-
48-4-6.1(a) states:
[a] person who, without a valid prescription or order of a
practitioner acting in the course of the practitioner’s professional
practice, knowingly or intentionally possesses methamphetamine
(pure or adulterated) commits possession of methamphetamine, a
Level 6 felony . . . .
Second, Hernandez-Cabrera was convicted of possession of paraphernalia, a
Class C misdemeanor, under Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1). Indiana
Code Section 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1) states: “[a] person who knowingly or
intentionally possesses an instrument, a device, or another object that the
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person intends to use for . . . . introducing into the person’s body a controlled
substance . . . . commits a Class C misdemeanor.”
[8] Hernandez-Cabrera specifically argues that: (1) Hernandez-Cabrera did not
have “the exclusive control and possession of the property”; and (2) Hernandez-
Cabrera did not have “constructive possession of the meth[amphetamine] or
paraphernalia.” Appellant’s Br. p. 5. Hernandez-Cabrera does not appear to
challenge the other elements of his possession offenses.
[9] Hernandez-Cabrera did not have the methamphetamine or paraphernalia on his
person. Rather, the items were found in the small room that Hernandez-
Cabrera was sleeping in when police arrived. Accordingly, in the absence of
actual possession of drugs, “constructive” possession may support a conviction
for a drug offense. See Cannon v. State, 99 N.E.3d 274, 279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
In proving constructive possession, the State must show “that the defendant has
both (i) the intent to maintain dominion and control over the drugs and (ii) the
capability to maintain dominion and control over the drugs.” Id.
[10] Here, the capability element was met as to both the methamphetamine and
paraphernalia. The paraphernalia was within arm’s reach of Hernandez-
Cabrera. The methamphetamine, while not necessarily within arm’s reach, was
still on a table in the closet in very close proximity to Hernandez-Cabrera, and
easily visible to those—including the officers—who walked in the room where
Hernandez-Cabrera was sleeping.
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[11] The intent element was also established. “When a defendant’s possession of
the premises on which drugs are found is not exclusive, then the inference of
intent to maintain dominion and control over the drugs ‘must be supported by
additional circumstances pointing to the defendant’s knowledge of the nature of
the controlled substances and their presence.’” Id. (citing Lampkins v. State, 682
N.E.2d 1268, 1275 (Ind. 1997), on reh’g, 685 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. 1997)). “Among
recognized additional circumstances are: (1) incriminating statements made by
the defendant; (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures; (3) a drug manufacturing
setting; (4) proximity of the defendant to the contraband; (5) the contraband
being in plain view; and (6) the location of the contraband being in close
proximity to items owned by the defendant.” Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240,
248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Floyd v. State, 791 N.E.2d 206, 210-11 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003), trans. denied), trans denied.
[12] The methamphetamine and the smoking pipes were in close proximity to
Hernandez-Cabrera, and in close proximity to Hernandez-Cabrera’s belongings.
When officers arrived, Hernandez-Cabrera was undressed and asleep on a
mattress, which was directly next to the smoking pipes and mere feet away
from the methamphetamine. When Hernandez-Cabrera dressed himself after
he was awakened by officers, Hernandez-Cabrera’s clothes were immediately
next to the smoking pipes. Hernandez-Cabrera’s argument that evidence of
other additional circumstances was not presented is simply an invitation to
reweigh evidence, which we cannot do.
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[13] Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Hernandez-
Cabrera had constructive possession of the methamphetamine and the
paraphernalia. The evidence is sufficient to support Hernandez-Cabrera’s
conviction for possession of methamphetamine and possession of
paraphernalia.
II. The Maintaining a Common Nuisance Conviction
[14] Hernandez-Cabrera was charged with maintaining a common nuisance, a Level
6 felony, under Indiana Code Section 35-45-1-5(c). Indiana Code Section 35-
45-1-5(c) states: “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally maintains a
common nuisance commits maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6
felony.” The statute also defines common nuisance as follows:
(a) [a]s used in this section, “common nuisance” means a
building, structure, vehicle, or other place that is used for (1)
or more of the following purposes:
*****
(3) [t]o unlawfully:
(A) use;
(B) manufacture;
(C) keep;
(D) offer for sale;
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(E) sell;
(F) deliver; or
(G) finance the delivery of;
a controlled substance or an item of drug paraphernalia (as
described in IC 35-48-4-8.5).
Ind. Code § 35-45-1-5(a)(3).
[15] Indiana Code Section 35-45-1-5 was enacted in 2016 after the legislature
repealed the previous statute, Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-13, which governed
maintaining a common nuisance. There have been several amendments to the
statute, which resulted in questions about whether the legislature intended to
require proof that an act or occurrence take place more than once to support a
conviction for maintaining a common nuisance. In Leatherman v. State, a panel
of this court outlined the history of the amendments, saying:
Under the 2008 version of the statute, there was no requirement
for ongoing instances of prohibited activity; as the Seventh
Circuit noted in Wheeler v. Lawson, the 2008 version of the statute
abrogated Wells . . . . The “one or more times” language
remained in the statute for several years, until the statute was
again updated in Indiana Code Section 35-45-1-5 (2016) to
remove the language . . . . The 2016 amendment to the statute is
significant in that it evidences a conscious desire on the part of
our Legislature that the common nuisance statute not be applied
to isolated instances of prohibited activity . . . .
101 N.E.3d 879, 883-884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (emphasis supplied).
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[16] The 2016 version, which the Leatherman court discusses, was the version of the
statute in effect at the time Hernandez-Cabrera was charged. Therefore,
Hernandez-Cabrera’s concivction should be analyzed keeping in mind that the
legislature intended “that a common nuisance is one in which continuous or
recurrent prohibited activity takes place.” Leatherman, 101 N.E.3d at 884.
[17] Hernandez-Cabrera argues that “[t]he evidence in this case, at most, showed an
isolated occurrence of prohibited activity. There was no evidence of a recurrent
or continuing violation required to be guilty of maintaining a common
nuisance.” Appellant’s Br. p. 14. Therefore, according to Hernandez-Cabrera,
the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction. The State does not
address this argument. 3
[18] We agree with Hernandez-Cabrera that there was no evidence presented that
the activity was continuous or recurrent. The State does not refute this
argument. Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to convict Hernandez-
Cabrera of maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6 felony. We, therefore,
reverse and vacate Hernandez-Cabrera’s conviction on this count. Accordingly,
because we reverse and vacate this conviction, we do not address Hernandez-
Cabrera’s double jeopardy argument.
3
While the State’s brief identifies that one of the issues in dispute is “[w]hether the State presented sufficient
evidence to sustain Hernandez-Cabrera’s convictions,” the State only addresses whether the evidence
supported the possession charges. Appellee’s Br. p. 5. The State does not address arguments directly
regarding the maintaining a common nuisance conviction.
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Conclusion
[19] For the foregoing reasons, we find there was sufficient evidence to convict
Hernandez-Cabrera of possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony, and
possession of paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor. However, the evidence
was insufficient to convict Hernandez-Cabrera of maintaining a common
nuisance, a Level 6 felony. Therefore, we reverse and vacate Hernandez-
Cabrera’s conviction and vacate his sentence on that count only. Because we
find there is insufficient evidence on Hernandez-Cabrera’s maintaining a
common nuisance conviction, we decline to address the double jeopardy issue.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
[20] Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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