Troy Liggin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Jun 24 2016, 6:19 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Derick W. Steele Gregory F. Zoeller
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General
Kokomo, Indiana
Richard C. Webster
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Troy Liggin, June 24, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
34A04-1511-CR-2041
v. Appeal from the Howard Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable William C.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Menges, Jr., Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
34D01-0804-FB-283
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Troy Liggin was ordered, as a condition of his probation, to attend and
complete the Howard County Reentry Court Program. As a condition of that
program, the trial court ordered Liggin not to have any contact with Holly
Turner and not to have her at his house. When Turner was later discovered in
Liggin’s house when he was not there, he was terminated from the program.
[2] Liggin contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his termination from
the reentry-court program. Because the evidence shows that Liggin took
reasonable steps to comply with the court’s order—including staying at his
sister’s house, asking his landlord to remove Turner from the lease and to
change the locks, and posting a note on the door that Turner was not allowed to
be there—we reverse his termination from the reentry-court program (and the
revocation of his probation that was based on his termination from the
program) and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this decision.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In 2010, Liggin was charged with ten counts of dealing and possessing various
drugs. He agreed to plead guilty to one of these counts: Class C felony dealing
in a Schedule IV controlled substance. The trial court sentenced him to eight
years, with four years executed and four years suspended to supervised
probation.
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[4] Liggin later violated his probation, and in October 2014 the trial court
sentenced him to 180 days of his previously suspended sentence to be served on
in-home detention. Liggin then again violated the conditions of his in-home
detention, and in February 2015 the court sentenced him to 194 days of his
previously suspended sentence to be served in jail, extended his probation
period, and ordered him, as a specific condition of probation, to attend and
complete the reentry-court program.
[5] The trial-court judge orally ordered Liggin, as a condition of his participation in
the reentry-court program, not to have any contact with Turner and not to have
her at his house. Tr. p. 2-3. At that time, Turner and Liggin were both on the
lease to his house. Liggin submitted an application with Brian Day, his Reentry
Court Case Manager, to change his address from his house to his sister’s house.
Id.; see also Ex. A (Liggin listed his reasons for moving as “Judge” and “put
myself in better invoriment [sic]”). In late June, Liggin was moving back and
forth between his house and his sister’s house. Tr. p. 13.
[6] On July 6, 2015, Liggin called the police about a conflict between him and
Turner, and on or around that date, Liggin renegotiated the lease with his
landlord to have Turner removed from the lease, so that she would have no
right to be at his house. Liggin told Doug Hoover, the Reentry Court Field
Officer, that he left a note on the front door of his house that Turner was not
allowed to be there. Although Liggin asked his landlord to change his locks, his
landlord said no. On July 13, 2015, Day told Liggin to change the locks even
though his landlord would not do so. But the very next day, before Liggin
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could change the locks, Hoover discovered Turner with her three children doing
laundry at Liggin’s house. Liggin was not in the house at that time and there
were no signs of forced entry.
[7] Day filed a notice to terminate Liggin’s participation in the reentry-court
program for allowing “Turner to stay at his home contrary to the direct Order
of the Court.” Appellant’s App. p. 189. After a hearing, the trial court found
that Liggin violated the trial court’s order that he was to have no contact with
Turner. Accordingly, the trial court terminated Liggin’s participation in the
reentry-court program and gave the State seventy-two hours to file a formal
petition to revoke Liggin’s probation. The State then timely filed a petition to
revoke Liggin’s probation based on his termination from the program. The trial
court found that Liggin violated his probation and sentenced him to serve the
balance of his previously suspended sentence, 1152 days.
[8] Liggin now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[9] Liggin contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he violated the
condition of his participation in the reentry-court program that he was not to
have any contact with Turner and not to have her at his house.1 A reentry court
1
The trial court took judicial notice that it orally ordered Liggin, as a condition of his participation in the
reentry-court program, not to have any contact with Turner and not to have her at his house. To the extent
that Liggin argues on appeal that the trial court erred by taking judicial notice, we note that Liggin concedes
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is “a problem solving court that is focused on the needs of individuals who
reenter the community after a period of incarceration and that may provide a
range of necessary reintegration services . . . .” Ind. Code § 33-23-16-9. A
reentry court may terminate an individual’s participation in the program if the
individual has violated at least one of the conditions of the individual’s
participation agreement or case-management plan. Ind. Code § 33-23-16-
14.5(a). The State must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id. at (c). In addressing sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges in cases like
these, we consider all the evidence most favorable to the judgment of the trial
court without reweighing that evidence or judging the credibility of the
witnesses. Monroe v. State, 899 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Cox
v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999)).
[10] Although Hoover found Turner in Liggin’s house on July 14, 2015, when
Liggin was not there, there is no evidence that Liggin knew Turner was there or
allowed her to be there. Rather, the evidence shows that Liggin took
reasonable steps to comply with the court’s order and to keep Turner away
from him and his house: he applied to change his address, stayed at his sister’s
house, called the police when he was having a conflict with Turner, asked the
landlord to remove Turner from the lease, asked the landlord to change the
locks, and posted a note on the door that Turner was not allowed to be there.
on appeal that he “knew he was not to be around Holly Turner.” Appellant’s Br. p. 3. We therefore treat the
trial court’s oral order as a condition of Liggin’s participation in the reentry-court program.
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Moreover, the alleged violation happened only one day after Day told Liggin to
change the locks notwithstanding the landlord’s objection. Because we find
that the evidence is insufficient to prove that Liggin violated a condition of his
participation in the reentry-court program, we reverse his termination from the
program (and the revocation of his probation that was based on his termination
from the program) and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
decision.
[11] Reversed and remanded.
Barnes, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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