Melody Helmbrecht v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Dec 05 2018, 10:16 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Yvette M. LaPlante Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Keating & LaPlante, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Evansville, Indiana Justin F. Roebel
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Melody Helmbrecht, December 5, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1965
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert J. Pigman,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
82D03-1708-F5-4645
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] In 2017, Melody Helmbrecht was tasked with the care of the severely-disabled
B.M. B.M.’s father (“Father”) eventually became concerned about B.M.’s care
and installed surveillance cameras, which recorded Helmbrecht abusing B.M.
Helmbrecht was eventually convicted of Level 6 felony battery of a disabled
person, and the trial court sentenced her to two years of incarceration with one
year suspended to therapeutic work release. Helmbrecht contends that the trial
court abused its discretion in sentencing her. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Helmbrecht is a licensed practical nurse who, in the summer of 2017, was
assigned to care for nine-year-old B.M. at her Evansville home while Father
was at work. B.M. suffers from cerebral palsy and a seizure disorder, is
developmentally delayed, is non-verbal with no way of communicating,
requires constant supervision, and is entirely dependent upon others to fulfill
her needs. At some point, Father became concerned about B.M.’s care and
installed cameras in the house in plain view, informing Helmbrecht’s employer
that he was doing so. When Father reviewed the video recorded by the
cameras, he observed B.M. on the couch “swaying back and forth” while
Helmbrecht ignored her from the other side of the couch. Tr. p. 24. Additional
video showed Helmbrecht dragging B.M. by a wrist, pinning B.M. behind
herself on the couch while B.M. was kicking and apparently trying to escape,
ignoring B.M., and dropping B.M. onto the couch.
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[3] On August 3, 2017, the State charged Helmbrecht with Level 5 felony battery
resulting in bodily injury to a disabled person and Level 6 felony neglect of a
dependent. On May 4, 2018, the trial court found Helmbrecht guilty of battery
of a disabled person as a Level 6 felony. On June 12, 2018, the trial court
sentenced Helmbrecht to two years of incarceration with one year suspended to
therapeutic work release.
Discussion and Decision
[4] Under our current sentencing scheme, “the trial court must enter a statement
including reasonably detailed reasons or circumstances for imposing a
particular sentence.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007),
modified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2008). We review the
sentence for an abuse of discretion, which occurs if “the decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id. A trial court
abuses its discretion if it (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all[,]” (2)
enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence–
including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any–but the record
does not support the reasons,” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits
reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for
consideration,” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”
Id. at 490–91.
[5] Helmbrecht contends that the trial court impermissibly used elements of her
crime as aggravating circumstances. It is true that the Indiana Supreme Court
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has concluded “that in some circumstances it is improper” to rely on a
“material element of an offense” when identifying a sentencing aggravator.
Gomillia v. State, 13 N.E.3d 846, 852 (Ind. 2014). That said, while “a material
element of a crime may not be used as an aggravating factor to support an
enhanced sentence[,] the trial court may properly consider the particularized
circumstances of the factual elements as aggravating factors” and “this
aggravator is thought to be associated with particularly heinous facts or
situations.” McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589–90 (Ind. 2007).
[6] Turning to the case before us, Helmbrecht was convicted of Level 6 felony
battery of a disabled person, which required proof that she knowingly or
intentionally touched B.M. in a rude, insolent, or angry manner where “[t]he
offense [was] committed against a person of any age who has a mental or
physical disability and [was] committed by a person having the care of the
person with the mental or physical disability[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(e)(4). In
sentencing Helmbrecht, the trial court stated the following:
[Y]ou have no prior criminal record but the nature and
circumstances of the events that you are in a position of care,
custody and control over the victim, that the victim, obviously, is
a young child and not only is it a young child, is a disabled child,
these are the folks who deserve our best and you fell way short of
that in this case.
Tr. Vol. II p. 52. In addition, the sentencing order indicates the following:
Court finds mitigating circumstances to be [Helmbrecht’s] lack of
criminal record. Court finds aggravating circumstances to be the
nature and circumstances of the crime, [Helmbrecht’s] position of
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care and control of the victim, the fact that the victim was a child
and that the victim was disabled. Court finds aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances calling for
an enhanced sentence.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 50.
[7] We conclude that the trial court’s findings reflect a consideration of the
particularized circumstances of Helmbrecht’s offense and not a mere
restatement of the elements. First, the trial court properly found it aggravating
that B.M. was a young child, being nine at the time. While the offense was
aggravated to a Level 6 felony based on Helmbrecht’s status as a caregiver to a
disabled victim, the offense for which Helmbrecht was convicted does not
account for B.M.’s youth.1 Second, while B.M.’s mental or physical disability is
an element of the offense, B.M. is not merely disabled but profoundly disabled,
being entirely dependent on others and suffering from cerebral palsy, a seizure
disorder, a developmental delay, and a complete inability to communicate.
Third, even though assumption of care is an element of the offense, the trial
court went beyond that element by recognizing that Helmbrecht was entrusted
with providing a high degree of care, finding that Helmbrecht was in “a
position of care, custody and control over the victim[.]” Tr. 52. Helmbrecht
was charged with the care of a severely disabled child who is entirely dependent
1
Indeed, B.M.’s youth would have independently justified elevating the offense to a Level 6 felony charge
because the battery was “committed against a person less than fourteen (14) years of age and [was]
committed by a person at least eighteen (18) years of age.” See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(e).
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on others, which goes beyond the mere assumption of care. Helmbrecht has
failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her.
[8] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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