Michael R. Jent v. State of Indiana , 120 N.E.3d 290 ( 2019 )

FILED
Mar 13 2019, 9:41 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
APPELLANT, PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael R. Jent Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Pendleton, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Monika Prekopa Talbot
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael R. Jent, March 13, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-PC-785
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David M. Zent,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D06-1711-PC-107
Pyle, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Michael Jent (“Jent”), pro se, appeals the post-conviction court’s order denying
his petition for post-conviction relief. Concluding that Jent has failed to show
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that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for post-conviction
relief, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether the post-conviction court erred by summarily denying
Jent’s petition for post-conviction relief.
Facts
[3] In November of 2002, the State charged Jent with Class A misdemeanor
invasion of privacy, Class A misdemeanor interfering with the reporting of a
crime, Class B misdemeanor public intoxication, and Class B misdemeanor
disorderly conduct. The trial court held an initial hearing, during which it
advised Jent of his constitutional rights, which he waived. At the hearing, Jent
also pled guilty to all four misdemeanors and was sentenced to 365 days of
unsupervised probation.
[4] Fifteen years later, in November of 2017, Jent filed a petition for post-
conviction relief (“PCR”). Jent alleged that his guilty plea was not knowingly
made, that there was an insufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea, and
that he was denied the assistance of guilty plea counsel. Jent further alleged
that on the date of his hearing, he “went to court while he was still intoxicated.”
(App. 10). In its answer, the State argued that Jent’s issues were waived by his
guilty plea. The State also argued that his allegations did not create a genuine
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issue of material fact because they did not allege specific facts which, if proved,
would suffice to establish any grounds for post-conviction relief. The State
further asserted that Jent’s claims were “barred by laches in that he has
unreasonably delayed in seeking post-conviction relief.” (App. 19).
[5] On March 1, 2018, the post-conviction court summarily denied relief, stating:
“[t]he Court does not find merit to Mr. Jent’s claims. Additionally, Mr. Jent
[pled] guilty in the criminal case in question on November 27, 2002. The court
notes the unreasonable delay in filing the Petition.” (App. 7). Later, the court
reporter filed an affidavit, stating that she had been requested to prepare Jent’s
guilty plea hearing transcript. She explained that the transcript was not
available because Indiana destroys misdemeanor records after ten years. Jent
now appeals.
Decision
[6] Jent appeals from the post-conviction court’s order summarily denying post-
conviction relief. Our standard of review in post-conviction proceedings is well-
settled.
We observe that post-conviction proceedings do not grant a
petitioner a “super-appeal” but are limited to those issues available
under the Indiana Post-Conviction Rules. Post-conviction
proceedings are civil in nature, and petitioners bear the burden of
proving their grounds for relief by a preponderance of the
evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). A petitioner who
appeals the denial of PCR faces a rigorous standard of review, as
the reviewing court may consider only the evidence and the
reasonable inferences supporting the judgment of the post-
conviction court. The appellate court must accept the post-
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conviction court’s findings of fact and may reverse only if the
findings are clearly erroneous. If a PCR petitioner was denied
relief, he or she must show that the evidence as a whole leads
unerringly and unmistakably to an opposite conclusion than that
reached by the post-conviction court.
Shepherd v. State, 924 N.E.2d 1274, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations
omitted), trans. denied.
[7] Jent maintains that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for
post-conviction relief. He argues that “the State failed to present evidence to
support their claim of laches, or unreasonable delay and that the delay caused
prejudice[.]” (Jent’s Br. 14). We disagree.
[8] Our Indiana Supreme Court has explained our standard of review in a laches
case as follows:
The equitable doctrine of laches operates to bar consideration of
the merits of a claim or right of one who has neglected for an
unreasonable time, under circumstances permitting due diligence,
to do what in law should have been done. For laches to apply, the
State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
petitioner unreasonably delayed in seeking relief and that the State
is prejudiced by the delay. For post-conviction laches purposes,
prejudice exists when the unreasonable delay operates to
materially diminish a reasonable likelihood of successful re-
prosecution.
Because the State ha[s] the burden of proving laches as an
affirmative defense, [a post-conviction petitioner does] not appeal[
] from a negative judgment, and the applicable standard of review
requires that we affirm unless we find that the judgment was
clearly erroneous. This is a review for sufficiency of evidence.
Without reweighing the evidence or assessing the credibility of
witnesses but rather looking only to the evidence and reasonable
inferences favorable to the judgment, we will affirm if there is
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probative evidence to support the post-conviction court’s
judgment.
Armstrong v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 (Ind. 2001) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
[9] Our review of the record and the inferences favorable to the judgment reveals
that Jent unreasonably delayed in filing his petition for post-conviction relief.
Jent pled guilty in 2002 and petitioned for post-conviction relief in 2017.
Although lapse of time does not in and of itself constitute laches, a long delay in
filing for post-conviction relief may be sufficient to infer that the delay was
unreasonable. Kindred v. State, 514 N.E.2d 314, 317 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), reh’g
denied, trans. denied. Fifteen years passed from the time Jent originally pled
guilty to his misdemeanor offenses to the time when he petitioned for post-
conviction relief. Our appellate court and our Supreme Court have held that
such a length of time can constitute an unreasonable delay warranting the
application of laches. See, e.g., Ware v. State, 567 N.E.2d 803, 805 (Ind. 1991)
(ten-year filing delay); Oliver v. State, 843 N.E.2d 581, 587-88 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006) (ten-year filing delay), trans. denied; Kindred, 514 N.E.2d at 317 (sixteen-
year filing delay). The post-conviction court did not err by finding that Jent
unreasonably delayed in filing his petition.
[10] Concerning whether the State was prejudiced by Jent’s unreasonable delay, we
take note of the completion of clerk’s record, which states that no transcript of
the original hearing exists. See Ind. Appellate Rule 27 (providing that “[t]he
Record on Appeal shall consist of the Clerk’s Record and all proceedings before
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the trial court or Administrative Agency, whether or not transcribed or
transmitted to the Court on Appeal[]”). Additionally, the court reporter filed an
affidavit, which stated that the transcript in this case was not available because
misdemeanor records in Indiana are only kept for ten years and then destroyed.
Our case law makes clear that the destruction of documents can be prejudicial
to the State and support an affirmative defense of laches. See, e.g., Balderas v.
State, -- N.E.3d --, No. 17A-PC-3014, 2018 WL 67139, *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec.
21, 2018) (citing Stewart v. State, 548 N.E.2d 1171, 1176 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that the State was prejudiced by delay where it no longer has all the
evidence needed to prosecute defendant), reh’g denied, trans. denied).
[11] It should be noted that the State failed to present evidence to the post-
conviction court in its pleadings alleging the specific prejudice it suffered by
Jent’s unreasonable delay. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(f). Normally,
this would require reversal of the post-conviction court’s order under summary
disposition and a remand for further proceedings. However, this would be an
unnecessary and unwarranted waste of judicial resources when the result will be
the same – the case would be remanded, the post-conviction court would deny
Jent’s PCR petition after finding the State prejudiced by the destruction of
transcripts after Jent’s unreasonable delay, Jent would likely appeal, and we
would affirm. See App. R. 66(A). Thus, we conclude that the unreasonable
delay of fifteen years prejudiced the State. Accordingly, Jent has failed to show
that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to an opposite
conclusion than that reached by the post-conviction court.
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[12] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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