Kimberly Galbraith v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                               Feb 02 2016, 8:53 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    R. Patrick Magrath                                       Gregory F. Zoeller
    Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP                      Attorney General of Indiana
    Madison, Indiana
    Richard C. Webster
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Kimberly Galbraith,                                      February 2, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    36A04-1507-CR-1045
    v.                                               Appeal from the Jackson Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Richard W.
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Poynter, Judge
    Trial Court Cause Nos.
    36C01-1304-FD-139
    36C01-1402-FD-82
    Baker, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 36A04-1507-CR-1045 | February 2, 2016     Page 1 of 4
    [1]   Kimberly Galbraith appeals the trial court’s order revoking probation and
    ordering her to execute the remainder of her sentences in two causes. Finding
    no error, we affirm.
    Facts
    [2]   On April 8, 2013, the State charged Galbraith with class D felony theft in Cause
    Number 36C01-1304-FD-139 (Cause 139). On March 5, 2014, the State added
    a count of class A misdemeanor criminal conversion. Galbraith pleaded guilty
    to criminal conversion and the State dismissed the theft charge. On July 17,
    2014, the trial court sentenced Galbraith—pursuant to the terms of her plea
    agreement—to twelve months incarceration, fully suspended to supervised
    probation.
    [3]   On February 11, 2014, the State charged Galbraith with class D felony theft,
    class D felony possession of methamphetamine, and class A misdemeanor
    possession of paraphernalia in Cause Number 36C01-1402-FD-82 (Cause 82).
    On July 17, 2014, Galbraith pleaded guilty to class A misdemeanor possession
    of paraphernalia in exchange for the dismissal of the other two charges. On
    August 6, 2014, the trial court sentenced Galbraith—pursuant to the terms of
    her plea agreement—to twelve months incarceration, fully suspended to
    supervised probation, to be served consecutively to the sentence in Cause 139.
    [4]   As a condition of probation, Galbraith was required to refrain from use of
    illegal drugs. On February 2, 2015, the State filed a petition to revoke
    probation in both causes, alleging that Galbraith had violated probation by
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 36A04-1507-CR-1045 | February 2, 2016   Page 2 of 4
    testing positive for methamphetamine. Galbraith admitted to the allegation at
    an April 6, 2015, factfinding hearing. At that hearing, the trial court ordered
    Galbraith to submit to weekly drug screens. At the June 26, 2015, sanctions
    hearing, Galbraith’s probation officer testified that six drug screens were
    administered to Galbraith between April 6 and June 4, 2015, and that Galbraith
    tested positive for methamphetamine on every single screen. At the conclusion
    of the hearing, the trial court revoked Galbraith’s probation in both cases and
    ordered her to serve the previously-suspended portion of each sentence. The
    trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, as originally
    ordered and as provided for in the plea agreement for Cause 82. Galbraith now
    appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    [5]   Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion rather than a right to
    which a defendant is entitled. Prewitt v. State, 
    878 N.E.2d 184
    , 188 (Ind. 2007).
    We review a trial court’s probation determinations and sanctions for an abuse
    of discretion. 
    Id.
     The revocation of probation is in the nature of a civil action
    rather than a criminal one; thus, the alleged violation need be proved only by a
    preponderance of the evidence. Cain v. State, 
    30 N.E.3d 728
    , 732 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2015), trans. denied. Violation of a single term or condition of probation is
    sufficient to revoke probation. 
    Id.
     When the procedures for revoking probation
    have been properly followed—and there is no allegation in this case that they
    were not—we will uphold the trial court’s imposition of the entire previously-
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 36A04-1507-CR-1045 | February 2, 2016   Page 3 of 4
    suspended sentence. Wann v. State, 
    997 N.E.2d 1103
    , 1106 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2013).
    [6]   In this case, Galbraith admitted to violating probation when she tested positive
    for methamphetamine in January 2015. That evidence, alone, is sufficient to
    support the revocation. Then, at the sanctions hearing, evidence was presented
    that she proceeded to test positive for methamphetamine on each of six drug
    screens. Presumably, had she tested clean between the factfinding and
    sanctions hearings, the trial court would have been more amenable to showing
    leniency. Yet she was unable to provide a single clean screen.
    [7]   Galbraith argues that there are mitigating circumstances to her case that the
    trial court ignored. But when imposing a sentence in a probation revocation
    proceeding, trial courts are not required to balance aggravating or mitigating
    circumstances. Treece v. State, 
    10 N.E.3d 52
    , 59-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.
    denied. Therefore, this argument is unavailing.
    [8]   Galbraith admitted to methamphetamine use and tested positive on six
    consecutive screens. It should be noted that supervised probation was a term to
    which she agreed as part of her two plea agreements. When offered leniency by
    the State, Galbraith took advantage and used illegal drugs. We find no error in
    the trial court’s decision to withhold its leniency the second time around.
    [9]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 36A04-1507-CR-1045 | February 2, 2016   Page 4 of 4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 36A04-1507-CR-1045

Filed Date: 2/2/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/5/2016