Tyrone Tapp v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Feb 02 2016, 9:05 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stephen T. Owens Gregory F. Zoeller
Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Borahm Kim Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tyrone Tapp, February 2, 2016
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
82A01-1504-PC-154
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David D. Kiely,
Appellee-Respondent Judge
The Honorable Kelli E. Fink,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
82C01-1203-PC-7
Baker, Judge.
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[1] Tyrone Tapp appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in
which he claimed that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance
for failing to negotiate a plea agreement. Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts
[2] In April 2010, the State charged Tapp with class B felony robbery, three counts
of class D felony resisting law enforcement, and class A misdemeanor criminal
recklessness. The State later filed an information alleging that Tapp was an
habitual offender. Tapp secured the representation of Dennis Vowels, who had
represented Tapp on at least two prior occasions in which he was eventually
acquitted. The State offered no plea agreement and the case proceeded to trial.
[3] Trial was held in April 2011 and the jury found Tapp guilty of class B felony
robbery, two counts of class D felony resisting law enforcement, and class A
misdemeanor criminal recklessness. The jury also determined that Tapp was an
habitual offender. Following these verdicts, the trial court sentenced Tapp to a
total sentence of forty years. Tapp appealed his conviction, arguing that the
trial court should have dismissed the habitual offender allegation because he
had not been arraigned on it. We affirmed in a memorandum decision, finding
no reversible error as Tapp had been aware of the habitual offender allegation
prior to trial despite not being arraigned. Tapp v. State, No. 82A05-1106-CR-
275 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012).
[4] On June 30, 2014, Tapp filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief,
arguing that Vowels had provided ineffective assistance by failing “to
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communicate a favorable offer to plead to a B felony and dismiss the habitual
offender enhancement.” Appellant’s App. p. 33. The petition elaborated:
While awaiting trial in jail, Tapp wrote 3 letters to his attorney,
Dennis Vowels, indicating his desire to plead guilty. However,
during a hearing in Tapp’s trial, Mr. Vowels admitted that he had
represented to the State that Tapp had no desire to plead guilty.[ 1]
Also, in the hearing, it was revealed that the State was proposing
an open plea to the B felony robbery with dismissal of the
remaining counts and the habitual offender enhancement. Mr.
Vowels never communicated this offer to Tapp.
Id.
[5] On December 10, 2014, the post-conviction court held a hearing on Tapp’s
petition. Tapp, Vowels, and two Vanderburgh County prosecutors testified.
On April 1, 2015, the post-conviction court issued findings of fact and
conclusions of law, denying Tapp’s petition. The post-conviction court noted
that Tapp had not presented sufficient evidence that any plea agreement had
been offered by the State and, therefore, it could not find that Vowels was
ineffective for failing to communicate an offer. Tapp now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees defendants
in criminal cases the right to “effective assistance of competent counsel.” Lafler
1
Vowels testified in a hearing held on Tapp’s motion to dismiss the habitual offender charge.
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v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012). This right extends to the plea bargaining
process. Id. A petitioner alleging that his counsel has provided him with
ineffective assistance must first show that counsel’s “representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as ‘counsel’ guaranteed to the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment.” Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ind. 2007)
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). A petitioner must
also show that these errors were prejudicial, meaning that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id.[7] “[I]n the ordinary criminal case defense attorneys have a duty to inform their
clients of plea agreements proffered by the prosecution” and “a failure to do so
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.” Dew v. State, 843 N.E.2d 556, 568
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898, 902 (7th Cir.
1986)). Here, Tapp does not argue that Vowels failed to inform him of a plea
agreement proffered by the prosecution because no such agreement was ever
proffered. Instead, he argues that Vowels was ineffective for (1) failing to have
meaningful discussions with Tapp about seeking a plea agreement and (2)
misrepresenting Tapp’s desire to plead guilty to the State. Appellant’s Brief p.
1.
[8] We find that both of these arguments fail, as Tapp has not established that he
was prejudiced by the alleged errors. In post-conviction proceedings, the
petitioner has the burden to establish his grounds for relief by a preponderance
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of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). To show prejudice here, Tapp
would need to show that, but for Vowels’s unprofessional errors, the
prosecution would have proffered a plea agreement with more favorable terms
that Tapp would have accepted. No such showing has been made.
[9] Tapp believes that he could have avoided the habitual offender finding in this
case by entering into a plea agreement, arguing that “the State had a practice of
dismissing the Habitual Offender in exchange for open pleas on all other
counts.” Id. at 7. Vowels testified to this effect at the post-conviction hearing.
PCR. Tr. 15. However, as the State points out, simply because something may
have been the practice generally, does not mean that the practice would be
followed in any particular case. Tapp presented no evidence indicating that he
would have been offered a plea agreement in this case. In fact, the evidence
indicated the opposite. Doug Brown, Vanderburgh County’s Chief Deputy
Prosecutor at the time of Tapp’s case, testified that Tapp would not have been
offered a plea agreement in this case given his extensive criminal history. Id. at
33. Brown also disagreed with Vowels’s assertion that plea agreements
dispensing with the habitual offender allegation were common and noted that,
even if they were, one would not have been offered to Tapp in this case. Id. at
35.
[10] In his second argument, Tapp asserts that Vowels incorrectly informed the
prosecution that Tapp was not interested in negotiating a plea agreement,
thereby preventing any consideration of a plea agreement. However, a review
of the record shows that Tapp mischaracterizes Vowels’s actions. While
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testifying in a previous hearing, Vowels had the following exchange with
Charles Berger, a Vanderburgh County prosecutor with whom Vowels had
spoken regarding Tapp’s case:
Berger: . . . [D]o you recall a discussion where I said is this
defendant going to plead guilty?
Vowels: Yes I know, we did do that, we had that
conversation.
Berger: And you indicated to me that it was very unlikely
because he’d already beaten a couple of other cases,
and he was set on trying this case.
Vowels: I think I used the words there’s no way he’s going to
plead guilty.
State’s Ex. C p. 278.
[11] Tapp attempts to present this exchange as though the two were discussing the
possibility of a favorable plea agreement rather than simply a plea of guilty to
the charges. However, there is no indication from the language used that this
was the case. Vowels’s testimony at the post-conviction hearing clarifies that he
and Berger were discussing the possibility of Tapp pleading guilty to the
charges. He testified that
Mr. Berger had an overwhelmingly strong case and he likes to try
jury trials and I’ll just say this, I don’t have a direct memory of it,
but my conclusion is that Mr. Berger told me he was going to try
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this case or my client could just plead guilty with no
recommendation, that was it.
PCR Tr. p. 12-13. Therefore, the evidence only suggests that Vowels said that
Tapp was not interested in pleading guilty to the charges, and Tapp’s claim to
the contrary is a mischaracterization.
[12] In sum, Tapp’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails, as he did not
present sufficient evidence that he was prejudiced as a result of any alleged error
on the part of Vowels. All of the evidence as to whether Tapp would have been
offered a plea agreement in this case indicated that he would not have been.
Although we may have had a different case had Vowels informed the
prosecution that Tapp was not interested in a favorable plea agreement, the
evidence fails to suggest that this is what occurred here.
[13] The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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