Lamont Escoe v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Jul 13 2016, 9:09 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. Burns Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Katherine Modesitt Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Lamont Escoe, July 13, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1510-CR-1628
v. Appeal from the Marion County
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Stanley Kroh,
Appellee-Plaintiff Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49F15-1404-FD-017604
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Lamont Escoe (“Escoe”) appeals his convictions of Battery1 and Resisting Law
Enforcement2 as Class A misdemeanors. On appeal, Escoe claims that the State
failed to present sufficient evidence to prove:
(1) Whether police officers entered Escoe’s dwelling unlawfully;
(2) Whether police officers used unlawful force in their restraint of Escoe;
(3) Whether Escoe resisted law enforcement with force.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On April 4, 2014, Anna Pfau (“Pfau”), a Department of Child Services
(“DCS”) caseworker, visited Escoe and his family to look into a report of
potential neglect of the three Escoe children. (Tr. at 36-37) When she knocked
on the door, Elizabeth Escoe (“Elizabeth”), Escoe’s wife, narrowly opened the
door. (Tr. at 37) While Pfau identified herself, she was able to see and smell
the apartment, noting the trash that covered the floor and a strong, unpleasant
odor. (Tr. at 38) Elizabeth asked Pfau to wait outside for five minutes, and in
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(B). We refer at all times to the versions of the statutes in effect at the time of
Escoe’s offenses.
2
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1).
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that time, Pfau called the police to assist with a child welfare check due to the
state of the apartment. (Tr. at 39)
[3] Elizabeth returned shortly thereafter and told Pfau that Elizabeth would prefer
doing the check another day, claiming she needed to take the children to a
doctor’s appointment. (Tr. at 40) Pfau informed Elizabeth that Pfau needed to
do a child welfare check because of conditions in the apartment, and that the
police were coming to assist her. (Tr. at 39) Escoe came to the door and told
Pfau to “do what [she] had to do.” (Tr. at 39) Pfau went down the stairs of the
apartment to wait for the police to arrive. (Tr. at 41)
[4] Approximately five minutes later, Pfau observed the Escoes carrying their
children to their car. (Tr. at 41) Pfau ran after them to try and talk them out of
leaving. (Tr. at 43) At that time, Officer Jose Navarro (“Officer Navarro”) had
arrived on scene and began to engage the Escoes. (Tr. at 42) Officer Navarro
observed the Escoes were very agitated, and advised them to speak with Pfau
about the DCS report. (Tr. at 92) After several minutes of talking, during
which the Escoes asserted their Constitutional rights were being violated, the
Escoes escorted Pfau, Officer Navarro, and Officer Jacob Tranchant (“Officer
Tranchant”), who had recently arrived on scene, to their apartment. (Tr. at 94)
[5] Both Officers Navarro and Tranchant entered the home briefly before making
the decision to stand outside while Pfau conducted her business with the
Escoes. (Tr. at 98) Escoe pulled out chairs and offered them to the officers,
which the officers declined. (Tr. at 186) The officers left the door cracked to
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ensure the safety of Pfau. (Tr. at 139) During the course of the DCS
investigation, Escoe turned to the officers and stated, “You’re not gonna take
my kids, you’re gonna have to fight.” (Tr. at 139)
[6] After a while, Pfau stepped out to consult with her supervisor. When she
returned, Pfau informed the officers that she and her supervisor had decided to
remove the children. (Tr. at 140) Officers Navarro and Tranchant decided to
call for a supervisor due to Escoe’s threats. (Tr. at 140) Once Pfau had
informed the Escoes of her decision, she, Elizabeth, and Officer Navarro went
back to gather clothes for the children. (Tr. at 103) During this time, Sergeant
Chad Osborne (“Sergeant Osborne”) arrived on scene, and Officer Tranchant
informed him of the situation. (Tr. at 156) Sergeant Osborne entered the
apartment and observed that Escoe was greatly agitated. (Tr. at 157)
[7] Sergeant Osborne began to talk to Escoe, who then jumped off the couch and
began pacing with clenched fists. (Tr. at 157) Sergeant Osborne decided to
handcuff Escoe for the safety of all in the apartment. (Tr. at 158) Both
Sergeant Osborne and Officer Tranchant attempted to grab an arm of Escoe in
order to handcuff him, at which point Escoe spun around and struck Officer
Tranchant in the shoulder, causing Officer Tranchant pain. (Tr. at 142-143)
[8] Following the battery, Officer Tranchant then locked Escoe in a bear hug to
keep him from striking again. (Tr. at 143) Escoe stepped on the couch and
pushed off from it, bringing Officer Tranchant and him to the ground. (Tr. at
143) Officer Navarro, Sergeant Osborne, and Officer Chris Morgan (“Officer
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Morgan”), who had recently arrived on scene, began to deliver knee and hand
strikes to Escoe in order to stop him from struggling against Officer Tranchant.
Their attempts, however, did not end the struggle. In response, Officers
Navarro and Morgan delivered a “drive stun” to Escoe’s lower back with their
tasers, after which Escoe complied with the orders to stop resisting and allowed
himself to be handcuffed. (Tr. at 146) On April 8, 2014, he was charged with
one count of Battery as a Class D felony3, one count of Resisting Law
Enforcement as a Class D felony4, and one count of Resisting Law Enforcement
as a Class A misdemeanor.
[9] At trial, Escoe presented the affirmative defense to the Battery charge under the
“castle doctrine,” which gives a defendant a statutory right to use reasonable
force to protect his person and property against unlawful force and to end
unlawful entry of public servants. The court instructed the jury on the defense.
[10] At the conclusion of the jury trial on August 5, 2015, Escoe was found guilty of
Battery, as a Class D felony, and one count of Resisting Law Enforcement, as a
Class A misdemeanor. He was acquitted of the Class D felony Resisting Law
Enforcement charge. On September 16, 2015, the trial court reduced the Class
D felony to a Class A misdemeanor because Escoe was a first-time offender,
3
I.C. § 35-42-2-1(a)(2)(A). This offense is now a Level 5 felony under I.C. § 35-42-2-1(f)(5)(A).
4
I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(b)(1)(B). This offense is now a Level 5 felony.
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and entered a sentence of 365 days on each count, with 361 days suspended, to
be served concurrently. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
[11] When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we consider only the
probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment, and we
will not reweigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Sargent v. State, 875
N.E.2d 762, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We will affirm a conviction if all
probative evidence and reasonable inferences allowed a reasonable trier of fact
to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Murrell v. State, 960
N.E.2d 854, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). When reviewing a claim of insufficiency
to rebut an affirmative defense, we use the same standard. Id.
Battery and the Castle Doctrine Defense
[12] The Indiana Code provides:
(i) A person is justified in using reasonable force against a
public servant if the person reasonably believes the force is
necessary to:
(1) Protect the person or a third person from what the
person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of
unlawful force;
(2) Prevent or terminate the public servant’s unlawful entry
or attack on the person’s dwelling, curtilage, or
occupied motor vehicle; or
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(3) Prevent or terminate the public servant’s unlawful
trespass on or criminal interference with property
lawfully in the person’s possession, lawfully in
possession of the member of the person’s immediate
family, or belonging to a person whose property the
person has authority to protect.
I.C. § 35-41-3-2(i). We determined that this statute provides “an
affirmative defense to the crime of battery on a law enforcement officer
when that officer has unlawfully entered the person’s dwelling.” Cupello
v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1122, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
[13] Escoe does not dispute that he committed the battery against Officer Tranchant.
Rather, he claims that the police officers entered his home unlawfully and used
unlawful force when they attempted to handcuff him. Thus, under this statute,
Escoe asserts that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut this
defense. As we have previously noted, our review focuses on the evidence most
favorable to the judgment.
[14] The evidence before us reveals that Escoe invited the officers into his home.
Both Officers Navarro and Tranchant testified that they did not intimidate or
threaten Escoe in order to get him to let them into the home. (Tr. at 94, 137)
Officer Navarro also testified that the Escoes were free to leave when he first
approached them, and they chose not to do so. (Tr. at 115) Pfau provided
similar testimony. (Tr. at 44-45) Furthermore, Escoe set out chairs for the
officers when they first entered the apartment. (Tr. at 186-187) From this
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evidence, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Escoe consented to the
entry of the officers to his home.
[15] Next, we look to whether Officer Tranchant and Sergeant Osborne used lawful
force in their initial attempt to handcuff Escoe. Indiana law charges police
departments with, among other things, the duty to “preserve peace.” I.C. § 36-
8-3-10(a)(1). Police officers are thereby expected not only to enforce criminal
laws, but also to aid those in distress, abate hazards, prevent potential hazards
from materializing, and perform myriad other tasks to maintain the safety of the
communities. Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 431 (Ind. 1993). In the present
case, Escoe was pacing with clenched fists and making threats to fight the
police officers. (Tr. at 102) Sergeant Osborne testified that in similar situations,
where a person was acting as Escoe was, he had always handcuffed the person
even when they were not under arrest. (Tr. at 158) Looking at the evidence
most favorable to the judgment, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that
the police acted with lawful force.
[16] Thus, there was sufficient evidence to overcome Escoe’s affirmative defense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Any argument to the contrary is simply an
invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, a task we will not do.
Resisting Law Enforcement
[17] Under Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1, a person commits this offense when he
“knowingly or intentionally: (1) forcibly resists, obstructs or interferes with a
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law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while the officer is
lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties.” I.C. § 35-44.1-3-
1(a)(1). A person forcefully resists law enforcement when “strong, powerful,
violent means are used to evade a law enforcement official’s rightful exercise of
his or her duties.” Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Ind. 1993). We have
affirmed convictions for resisting law enforcement where a defendant pulled
away when an officer attempted to handcuff him, Lopez v. State, 926 N.E.2d.
1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied; where a defendant was flailing or
squirming her body while an officer was trying to handcuff her, J.S. v. State, 843
N.E.2d 1013 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied; and where a defendant
“stiffened up” when police attempted to place him in a police vehicle, Johnson v.
State, 833 N.E.2d 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “The element may be satisfied with
even a modest exertion of strength, power, or violence.” Walker v. State, 998
N.E.2d 724, 727 (Ind. 2013).
[18] Escoe argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove the
“force” element beyond a reasonable doubt. Officers Navarro and Tranchant
and Sergeant Osborne all testified that once Officer Tranchant had attempted to
restrain Escoe, Escoe fell on top of Officer Tranchant. (Tr. at 107, 143, 158)
Furthermore, both Officer Tranchant and Sergeant Osborne stated that Escoe
caused this fall by pushing off of the nearby couch. (Tr. at 143, 158) Once he
was on top of Officer Tranchant, Escoe continued to struggle to get free of
Officer Tranchant’s hold by attempting to strike him. (Tr. at 144) Officer
Navarro and Sergeant Osborne stated that Escoe did not comply with the order
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to stop resisting until Officers Navarro and Morgan delivered drive stuns to
Escoe’s lower back. (Tr. at 107, 109, 161) Given this evidence, a reasonable
finder of fact could conclude that Escoe resisted with force.
[19] Escoe attempts to counter by presenting evidence that he did not act with force,
specifically citing that he “became a noodle” and exclaimed, “I am not trying to
fight you” in an “emergency voice.” (Tr. at 197, 198, 218) Once again,
however, Escoe invites us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
Conclusion
[20] Sufficient evidence supports the convictions.
[21] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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