jesse T. Buchanan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 15 2016, 9:44 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jack Quirk Gregory F. Zoeller
Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
James B. Martin
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jesse T. Buchanan, July 15, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A04-1506-CR-712
v. Appeal from the Delaware Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Marianne L.
Appellee-Plaintiff Vorhees, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
18C01-9304-CF-26
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Jesse T. Buchanan (“Buchanan”) was convicted of Battery, as a Class C felony,
in 1994.1 We granted him permission to pursue a belated appeal of his
conviction under Post-Conviction Rule 2.
[2] We affirm.
Issues
[3] Buchanan raises a single issue for our review, whether there was sufficient
evidence from which the trial court could conclude that the State rebutted his
claim of self-defense.
[4] In its brief, the State raises a threshold issue, whether Buchanan’s challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence is barred as res judicata.
Facts and Procedural History
[5] In the spring of 1993, Garrett Rowe (“Rowe”) was dating Buchanan’s sister.
Rowe had struck Buchanan’s sister, and she told her mother that Rowe
intended to do the same to Buchanan. Buchanan became aware of the apparent
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(3) (1993). Because of the age of Buchanan’s conviction, we refer throughout to the
substantive provisions of the Indiana Code applicable at the time of trial.
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threat, and eventually Rowe became aware that Buchanan had decided to look
for him.
[6] On April 21, 1993, Rowe was at the home of Herman Jeeters, a known spot for
people to get together to drink and have a good time. Rowe and a friend were
smoking cigarettes on the front porch of the home when Buchanan’s car
stopped in front of the house. Seeing Buchanan pull up, and aware that
Buchanan was looking for him, Rowe thought, “I guess it’s time to fight” (Tr.
at 14), and started to walk toward Buchanan. Buchanan got out of the car, and
the two men were about twenty to twenty-five feet apart.
[7] Buchanan said, “man, why you hitting my sister?” (Tr. at 14-15.) Rowe started
to reply when Buchanan began to fire his gun. Rowe turned to run. Buchanan
fired between four or six shots. Two of the bullets struck Rowe’s right leg: one
struck the calf, the other struck the thigh. Buchanan then drove away.
[8] On April 22, 1993, the State charged Buchanan with one count of Aggravated
Battery, as a Class B felony.2 A bench trial was conducted on April 5, 1994. At
the conclusion of the trial, the court found Buchanan not guilty of Aggravated
Battery, but instead found him guilty of Battery. On May 5, 1994, the trial
court conducted a sentencing hearing, entered judgment against Buchanan, and
took the matter under advisement. On July 14, 1994, the trial court sentenced
Buchanan to two years imprisonment with credit for time served, and ordered
2
I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5 (1991).
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the remainder Buchanan’s sentence served through community corrections.
The court also ordered Buchanan to pay restitution to Rowe for his medical
expenses.
[9] On February 16, 1995, Buchanan’s community corrections placement was
revoked, and he was ordered to serve the remainder of his term in the Indiana
Department of Correction. He subsequently completed his sentence and was
discharged from the Department of Correction on September 5, 1995.
[10] In the ensuing two decades, Buchanan, proceeding pro se, sought on several
occasions to have his conviction vacated or reversed, including requests to file a
belated appeal and a petition for post-conviction relief. In 2009, Buchanan was
denied post-conviction relief.
[11] On May 21, 2015, Buchanan sought permission from the Delaware Circuit
Court No. 1 to file a belated notice of appeal under Post-Conviction Rule 2, and
to file a belated appeal from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief
and an associated motion to correct error. The court granted Buchanan
permission to seek a belated appeal on May 26, 2015, and Buchanan filed his
notice of appeal on June 16, 2015. On June 22, 2015, this Court notified the
trial court that the scope of any appeal would be limited only to a direct appeal
from the conviction in 1994. Counsel was subsequently appointed for
Buchanan. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
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Whether Buchanan’s Contentions are Barred as Res
Judicata
[12] In its appellee’s brief, the State contends as a threshold issue that Buchanan’s
designated issue on appeal is barred because he raised his sufficiency challenge
as a free-standing issue in post-conviction proceedings. Characterizing
Buchanan as in the “reverse” position of one who attempts in post-conviction
proceedings to re-litigate issues available for and/or presented upon direct
appeal (State’s Br. at 12), the State argues that claim preclusion bars
Buchanan’s presentation of the sufficiency question in the instant appeal.
[13] For a claim to be barred as res judicata under claim preclusion, four
requirements must be met:
(1) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction; (2) the former judgment must have been
rendered on the merits; (3) the matter now in issue was, or could
have been, determined in the prior action; and (4) the
controversy adjudicated in the former action must have been
between the parties to the present suit or their privies.
Wright v. State, 881 N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Afolabi v.
Atl. Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 849 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)).
[14] The State is correct that Buchanan is in some sense in an inverse position from
the typical post-conviction petitioner. This, however, does not in itself result in
claim preclusion. The State contends that the post-conviction court, in
considering Buchanan’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, necessarily
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evaluated the question of the sufficiency of the evidence and, on the merits,
determined that issue in an adverse manner. As a result, the State suggests, the
designated issue on appeal is barred.
[15] This approach puts the cart before the horse. In a post-conviction proceeding,
the petitioner cannot raise freestanding questions for the trial court’s review.
Rather, the scope of a post-conviction procedure is generally limited to the
grounds set forth under Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(a). Timberlake v. State, 753
N.E.2d 591, 597-98 (Ind. 2001) (observing “most free-standing claims of error
are not available in a post-conviction proceeding because of the doctrines of
waiver and res judicata). The post-conviction court here recognized this
limitation and declined to address directly the merits of the sufficiency claim:
The “fundamental error” doctrine does not apply in this case.
Buchanan could have challenged his conviction in a direct appeal
and did not do so. This petition is not based on newly-
discovered evidence. Therefore, the Court declines to review the
sufficiency of the evidence for Buchanan’s conviction under the
“fundamental error” doctrine.
(App’x at 266.)
[16] The post-conviction court elsewhere in its order addressed issues relating to
witness credibility, but it did so in considering a collateral attack upon the
conviction on the basis of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The post-conviction
court did not, however, directly address the merits of Buchanan’s sufficiency
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claim, which Buchanan never presented upon a direct appeal. 3 Rather, this is
the direct appeal. The merits of the sufficiency claim were not addressed by the
post-conviction court, thus precluding a conclusion that Buchanan’s claim on
appeal is res judicata.
[17] We thus conclude that Buchanan’s sufficiency claim is not barred as res judicata,
and proceed to consider the merits of his challenge.
Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Self-Defense
[18] Buchanan’s challenge to his conviction is that there was insufficient evidence
from which the trial court judge could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
the State disproved his self-defense claim. We review such challenges under the
same standard as any sufficiency of the evidence claim. Boyer v. State, 883
N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We will not disturb the judgment if
there is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the trier of fact’s
conclusion. Id. Thus, we will reverse “only if no reasonable person could say
the State disproved self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing Taylor
v. State, 710 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ind. 1999)). In conducting our review, we neither
reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id.3
Indeed, had the post-conviction court reached the merits of the claim, the court would have stepped outside
the purview of its authority under our Post-Conviction Rules.
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[19] At the time of Buchanan’s conviction, the Indiana Code defined self-defense as
follows:
A person is justified in using reasonable force against another
person to protect himself or a third person from what he
reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.
However, a person is justified in using deadly force only if he
reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious
bodily injury to himself or a third person or the commission of a
forcible felony.
I.C. § 35-41-3-2(a) (1979). When a defendant raises a self-defense claim, “the
State must disprove at least one of the following elements beyond a reasonable
doubt: 1) the defendant was in a place where she had a right to be; 2) the
defendant was without fault; and 3) the defendant had a reasonable fear or
apprehension of bodily harm.” Boyer, 883 N.E.2d at 162 (citing White v. State,
699 N.E.2d 630, 635 (Ind. 2009)). The State may accomplish this by
affirmatively showing the defendant did not act to defend himself or by relying
on evidence elicited in its case-in-chief. Id.[20] The evidence that favors the judgment is that Buchanan and Rowe were aware
that each wished to harm the other. While Rowe and a friend were sitting on
the porch of Herman Jeeters’s house, Buchanan’s car stopped and Buchanan
opened the door and got out of the vehicle. Rowe testified that as the two men
approached one another, Buchanan had an Army jacket over one of his hands.
That hand was already holding a gun. Buchanan admitted during his testimony
that he had obtained the gun only the day before the shooting.
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[21] Rowe testified that Buchanan said, “man, why you hitting my sister?,” and that
he was unable to respond with more than “hold it, Ty. It ain’t like—” before
Buchanan started firing the gun. (Tr. at 14-15.) Several witnesses testified that
Buchanan fired the gun from four to six times, and a police investigator
retrieved four spent bullet casings of matching caliber from the scene. Rowe
testified that one of the shots landed near his feet and that he ran away in
response, but Buchanan kept shooting, twice striking Rowe’s right leg—once in
the calf, and once in the thigh. Firing multiple shots undercuts a claim of self-
defense. Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 838 (Ind. 2006).
[22] Taken together, this is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder
could conclude that Buchanan acted as an aggressor and, whatever his
concerns, was not in reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily harm from
Rowe. To the extent Buchanan directs our attention to other testimony, we
decline his invitation to reweigh the evidence.
Conclusion
[23] Buchanan’s appeal is not barred as res judicata. There was sufficient evidence
from which the trial court could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
Buchanan did not act in self-defense and that the State carried its burden of
disproving Buchanan’s claim in that regard.
[24] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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